A History of Selangor (1766-1939)

J. M. Gullick

Published by
Falcon Press Sdn Bhd
as MBRAS Monograph No. 28

on behalf of
The author in association with
The Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
Kuala Lumpur
1998

Published by Falcon Press Sdn Bhd
(157710-H)
43C, Jalan SS22/23, Damansara Jaya,
47400 Petaling Jaya, Selangor Darul Ehsan
Malaysia

ISBN: 967 9948 10 2

Contents

		Page
Maps and Tables		iv
Abbreviations		v
Preface		1
Chapter		
1.	A Dynasty is Established	4
2.	Selangor under Sultan Ibrahim (1782-1826)	16
3.	Tin Mines and Power Struggles (1826-1864)	33
4.	Civil War and British Intervention	49
5.	Selangor after the War	67
6.	A Modern Structure	84
7.	The Development of Agriculture	99
8.	State Capital	115
9.	A Troubled Dynasty	130
10.	Into the Twentieth Century	147
11.	An Epilogue - Selangor 1914-1939	174
Appendices		
1.	Rulers and Residents of Selangor	185
2.	The Government of Selangor in the 19th Century	186
3.	Malay Vernacular and Islamic Education	192
Glossary		196
Sources and Bibliography		200
Index		217

Maps and Tables

MAPS

		Page
1.	The Straits of Malacca in the 18th Century	5
2.	The Mine at Ulu Selangor	20
3.	Selangor in the first half of the 19th Century	23
4.	Bandar Langat and Klang	38
5.	Selangor in the 1870's	53
6.	The earliest map of Kuala Lumpur	69
7.	19th Century Ulu Langat	75
8.	Selangor in 1887	85
9.	The Selangor River valley in the late 1880's	105
10.	Kuala Lumpur in 1895	119
11.	Port Swettenham	152
12.	Rail and Road Links - early 20th Century	160

TABLES

1.	The Yam Tuan Muda of Johor 1721-1831	6
2.	The Selangor Dynasty in mid 19th Century	50

Abbreviations

AR	Annual Report on the work of a Malay state government by the British Resident, unless distinguished by the name of a specific department whose head has written his report on its work
BKI	*Bijdragen tot de Taal-, en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indie*
Cmd	Command Paper, ie official document printed and laid before the House of Commons (or Lords) as a Parliamentary Paper. The papers of each session are numbered in series: Cmd sometimes abbreviated to 'C'
CS	Chief Secretary (FMS): Colonial Secretary (SS)
EIC	[British] East India Company; sometimes HEIC (H = Honourable]. The corresponding Dutch Company referred to as VOC
EMR	Extract from Mukim [Land] Register, issued to each registered land holder as evidence of his title to a plot (not exceeding 100 acres in size), ie written title to a smallholding
FMS	Federated Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang) (1896-1946)
IMR	Institute for Medical Research at Kuala Lumpur
IOL	India Office Library, now part of the Oriental and India Office Collections (OIOC) of the British Library
JHSUM	*Journal of the Historical Society of the University of Malaya*
JMBRAS	*Journal of the Malayan\Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society,* successor (in 1922) to *JSBRAS*
JSBRAS	*Journal of the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1878-1921)

JSEAH	*Journal of South East Asian History* (1960-1969)
JSEAS	*Journal of South East Asian Studies* (successor to *JSEAH* from 1970)
MBRAS	Malayan\Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
MIJ	*Malayan Historical Journal*
MIH	*Malaysia in History* (successor to *MHJ*)
PMS	*Papers on Malay Subjects*. series of occasional papers ed. R. J. Wilkinson (1907-1921); selected papers, ed. P. L. Burns, as a single volume 1971
OAG	Officer Administering the Government, ie acting Governor
PRO	Public Records Office
Sel.Sec.	Selangor Secretariat files, now held at Arkib Negara Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, numbered in series for each year
SGG	*Selangor Government Gazette* (1888-1908)
SITC	Sultan Idris [Teacher] Training College
SJ	*Selangor Journal* (1892-1897)
SS	Straits Settlements (Singapore, Penang and Malacca): Crown Colony 1867-1945
SSD	Despatches from Governor Straits Settlements to Secretary of State (in CO 273 or other PRO series or published as Cmd)
UMNO	United Malays National Organisation

Preface

This book is entitled 'A' - not 'The' 'History of Selangor, as there are several different lines of approach to the subject according to the views of the historian as to what aspects and topics are most important. Over the past century and a half there has a substantial output, both in Malay and in English, much of it of high quality. This writing relates either to Selangor history as such, or to connected topics such as the Bugis ascendency or British relations (before assuming control) with Selangor as an independent state. In these studies the emphasis has generally been on dynastic affairs, the power struggle arising from them, on commercial relations between Straits Settlements merchants, Chinese and European, with an area which produced substantial quantities of tin with capital borrowed from the Straits Settlements, and on the events leading up to outright British intervention in 1874. In various places in this study the author, especially at the commencement of chapters, has reviewed and acknowledged his debt to earlier research and writing on the relevant topic.

In two respects the present study seeks to widen the field of view. First, there is an account of the unobtrusive efforts of immigrants to make a home in Selangor, and to develope a livelihood in agriculture and, to some extent, in trade and mining. In this fashion new rural communities took root in areas of Selangor which had previously been only sparsely settled if at all. It is a story of achievement by humble people, which was a major contribution to making Selangor what it has become.

Secondly, this history extends its period of coverage to take in Selangor down to 1939. That date has been chosen as the end of the pre-war era. Thereafter the war and the Japanese occupation (1942-1945) made an interruption between 'history' before living memory, and 'modern times'.

In carrying the story through the period when colonial rule seemed firmly based (from 1945 it was packing its bags to go), the historian has the advantage of being able to draw on a considerable quantity of archives, the working records of bureaucratic government. On the other hand the use of such source material creates the risk that they will impose an alien view of what happened and what mattered, which has been dubbed 'colonial records history.'

The pioneer European historians, Winstedt and Wilkinson (in his *History of the Peninsular Malay States*), preferred to confine themselves to the period of a traditional and - more or less - autonomous society, which ended in 1874. Yet if one seeks to describe what Selangor has become, it is necessary to take account of fac-

tors such as land policy or the development of communications, which did so much to shape the new Selangor emerging towards the end of the 19th century. Education, in the form of village schools, offered to the Malays a powerful agency of change - for their children if not for themselves. At first they were hesitant about it, but in the end decided to expose their children to it, with widespread and important consequences. It was the colonial regime which made land available, on permanent title and with access to markets for produce, and promoted the opening of schools. Yet it was the peasant who decided whether to take up land, and if so whether it suited him to grow padi or rubber on it. The impact of alien control is undeniable, but there was always an indigenous dynamic which determined what happened from it.

In the period covered by the later chapters of this book, the future of a Malay state, be it Selangor or any other, was becoming involved with, in some respects subordinated to, wider issues and aspirations. This is not the place to enter into the ideology of nationalism and of nation building, which have been analysed by Roff (1967) and by Milner (1995). In retrospect their origins can be found in the period of colonial rule, but they had hardly found significant expression by 1939. Then followed shocks which shattered the apparently immutable mould. As late as 1927 Hugh Clifford, who had known Malaya since 1883, declared that 'no mandate has ever been extended to us by Rajas, Chiefs or People to vary the system of government' nor to introduce 'any form of democratic or popular government.' Fate determined otherwise - but after 1939.

A different but convergent process of change had made its first impact in 1896, with the formation of the Federated Malay States, including Selangor. In this innovation Swettenham, the prime mover, simply sought a uniformity of policy, on questions such as land tenure and use, throughout the states which were at the time under British control. That object might have been achieved by setting up a standing conference of Residents, to meet under the chairmanship of the Governor of the Straits Settlements as High Commissioner. That, however, would not have satisfied the ambitions of Swettenham, and so the post of Resident-General (inevitably held by Swettenham at the outset) was created. Thus was sown the seed of the federal bureaucracy which drained the governments of Selangor and of other FMS states of their independence and vitality. The long-term effects of creating the FMS in 1896 did not become apparent until twenty years had elapsed. By then it was too late to devise any practicable form of 'decentralization', but the efforts to do so preoccupied the regime between the wars.

How then, after 1896, does the historian continue the story of Selangor after it had lost most of its individuality and some of its autonomy as a community? The leading modern studies of the Malay states in the first half of this century (Emerson (1937), Mills (1942), Sidhu (1980) and Yeo Kim Wah (1982)) tacitly concede that a single Malay state is not an ideal unit for analysis, and they deal with the FMS states or all the Malay states as a collective entity. If Malaya was to become a nation state (in 1957), it had to be founded upon some form of association of the traditional Malay monarchies.

In continuing the history of Selangor down to 1939 the author has compromised by setting particular episodes peculiar to the state in the context of experience which it shared with other states.

The appendices have been written to cover subjects which cannot easily be fitted into a single chapter.

One of the pleasures of the writing on the history of Selangor is the personal interest and encouragement which is graciously given to such projects by H.H. Tengku Idris Shah, the Raja Muda of Selangor and a Patron of the Society. Some years ago His Highness gave his support to the republication (as Glimpses of Selangor, MBRAS Monograph No 25) of articles which had previously appeared in the Society's Journal. This was followed by discussion of how best to continue a programme of publishing material on the history of Selangor, including the possibility of a new state history. In the publication of this Monograph the author again expresses his thanks for this much valued encouragement.

The author has also to express his gratitude to the Society and its officers, notably Professor Dato' Khoo Kay Kim, Mr H S Barlow and the late Tan Sri Dato' Dr Mubin Sheppard, for the acceptance of this history for publication in the Society's series of monographs, and to Mr John Nicholson and Falcon Press for publishing it with such expertise and despatch.

Chapter One

A Dynasty is Established

In November 1766 Raja Lumu, the Bugis chief who ruled the coastline of modern Selangor from his stronghold at Kuala Selangor, visited Sultan Mahmud of Perak at his capital. A few days later Sultan Mahmud ceremoniously installed Raja Lumu as Sultan Salehuddin of Selangor and presented to him the instruments of a royal orchestra *(nobat)* and a state seal. With these regalia Sultan Salehuddin returned to Kuala Selangor, in company with Perak envoys, and there further ceremonies were held to mark his elevation to the status of a royal ruler.

The leading modern history of eighteenth century Perak rightly describes this episode as 'a momentous event' since it satisfied the 'traditional prerequisites to any claim of sovereignty in the Malay world'.[1] A Malay kingdom *(negeri)* or state could only exist if at its apex there was a sovereign ruler of royal status. 'It was not the land which was important, but the ruler, without whose presence there was no *negeri* and no purpose or focus within the *negeri*.[2] The new Sultan of Selangor did not have authority over the entire territory of the modern State - much of which was at that time uninhabited - but he was essential to create a *kerajaan*, a royal government, a foundation upon which to develope the State of Selangor, which is the theme of this study.

None the less the ceremony of 1766 was only one episode in a long-drawn power struggle along the Straits of Malacca, which began in 1699, with the assassination of the last descendant and heritor, in political terms, of the great Malacca Sultanate of the fifteenth century, and which ended in 1795, with the British seizure of Malacca and the collapse of Dutch power in the Straits region. In that long and complicated story, the rise of the Selangor Bugis is only one element. A brief summary of the eighteenth century struggle for power, extending from the Kra Isthmus to Pontianak in south-east Borneo is required, to put the birth of Selangor in its context.

Raja Lumu was a Bugis and, one hundred and thirty years later, his great-grandson, Sultan Abdul Samad of Selangor, still insisted that he too was a Bugis rather than a Malay ruler.[3] The original home of the Bugis was a group of small kingdoms in the south-west Celebes, whose most renowned centres were Luwu, Bone, Soppeng and Goa. The Bugis were among the finest navigators of South-East Asia, traders who sailed forth upon the monsoon winds carrying cargoes to and from distant parts of South-East Asia. They were also formidable warriors who fought in chain-



mail (*baju rantai*), and were not averse to piracy and trading in slaves. Dutch intervention in their Celebes homeland towards the end of the seventeenth century led to a Bugis diaspora, and a migration to the Straits of Malacca in search of places in which to settle.

Although they traded at royal capitals and main ports, the Bugis preferred to make a base at the periphery of power, where they could preserve the loose political system which was traditional among them. Thus it was that the stretch of Malayan coastline between the mouth of the Perak River and the mouth of the Linggi River, the boundary of Dutch Malacca, attracted Bugis settlers.[4] Here were coastal villages with an almost empty interior behind them; such inland population as there was, mainly in what is now Negri Sembilan, was Sumatran, and in particular of Minangkabau (Sumatran highland) origin. Along the Selangor coast there were a few Malay settlements whose chiefs were tributaries of Johor (the successor state to Malacca) though the links had become very tenuous by the start of the eighteenth century.

The main Bugis settlements at that time were Kuala Selangor, ie the mouth of the Selangor River, where high ground afforded an advantageous site for stockades, the town of Klang which stood some miles upstream from the mouth of the Klang River, and the mouth of the Linggi River (Kuala Linggi). The Dutch at Malacca, mindful of hard fighting against the Bugis in the Celebes, observed their arrival with misgiving. There were only a few hundred Bugis settlers in Selangor in 1714, as estimated by the Dutch, but by 1723 much larger numbers had made it their 'adopted homelands'.[5] The cause of this rapid influx was the rise of Bugis leaders to a position of influence at the capital of Johor. After the regicide of 1699, the family

of the chief ministers (*Bendahara*) of Johor seized power, but it was unable to command the loyalty of the seafarers (*orang laut*) who had been the fighting arm at sea of the old dynasty. The weakness of the new Johor dynasty created an opportunity for an onslaught on Johor by the ruler of Siak, on the opposite coast of Sumatra. In their hour of need the rulers of Johor found the support of the Bugis invaluable in fighting off the threat from Siak. The outcome was a compact, by which the Bugis were to defend the Johor ruler, but in return were to govern his kingdom through the appointment of a Bugis leader to the new office of Yang di-Pertuan ('Yam Tuan') Muda, more or less 'Under King'. In the Bugis (as distinct from the Peninsular Malay) tradition this office was purely executive and carried no prospect of succession to the ruler under whom the Yam Tuan (or Raja) Muda served.[6]

In this new arrangement the leading Bugis were a group of five brothers, sometimes known as the 'Upus' since Upu was their father's name. They were related to the ruler of Bone in the Celebes. One of the brothers, Daeng Marewa, after wanderings which took him as far afield as Arabia, had settled at Linggi c.1711, where he joined forces with Daeng Manompok, another Bugis - not a close relative - from Soppeng in the Celebes.[7] Daeng Marewa and Daeng Manompok became respectively Yam Tuan Muda and Raja Tua, which was another traditional Bugis office with the function of 'regulating the relations between the ruler and other lords.' The

Table 1
The Yam Tuan Muda of Johor 1721-1831



Note. This is a selective genealogy, to show the direct relationship, in the male line, of the Bugis leaders of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Most of them had numerous other children, and the table does not show the important marriage ties which cemented political alliances.

alliance between Marewa and Manompak was competitive and uneasy, but by introducing a structure of authority which the scattered Bugis communities of the Straits region could recognise as their own, they laid the foundations of their leadership of those communities. Among the five Upu brothers Daeng Parani was preeminent.[8]

After much fighting and some setbacks the Bugis ended the threat of Siak invasion, but the Siak rulers remained very hostile. With the removal of this external pressure the Malay nobles around the throne of Sultan Sulaiman of Johor (r.1721-60) sought to oust the Bugis interlopers; as a result there was an endless sequence of intrigues, battles and diplomacy, in which the Dutch and the Siak dynasty were sometimes involved. The contest moved as far north on the west coast of Malaya as Kedah, where Daeng Parani was killed in 1724, to Trengganu on the east coast, whose Malay rulers were generally hostile to the Bugis, and to Pontianak in south-east Borneo. However, throughout their changing fortunes the Bugis retained their hold on most of the Selangor coastline, which 'remained a crucial part of the Bugis diaspora government.'[9] In 1757, however, the Bugis were forced by the Dutch to withdraw from their southern outpost at Linggi. Thereafter Kuala Selangor replaced Linggi as the main centre of Bugis power in that area. In accordance with their traditional practice of decentralised authority, the Bugis leaders at Riau left Selangor in the charge of semi-independent chiefs, calling on them for men and ships in support of operations further afield.

Raja Lumu was the son of the second Yam Tuan Muda, Daeng Cellak, who died in 1745 and was succeeded by Daeng Kemboja, who held office until his death in 1777.[10] At the death of his father, Daeng Cellak, Raja Lumu was too young to assume control of Selangor, which was put in charge of a Regent (Suliwatang), Daeng La Kanna, who was deemed equal in rank to Daeng Kemboja.[11] By temperament and tradition Bugis leaders were ambitious and assertive men. Raja Lumu grew up in the shadow of more successful and prestigious kinsmen, and it is clear that he fretted and felt frustrated, since the highest office of Yam Tuan Muda had passed from his father to a cousin.

As Raja Lumu took over control of his patrimony, the Selangor coast, his rivalry with Yam Tuan Muda Kemboja increased. There was an open quarrel when, in 1766, Raja Lumu exerted pressure on Sultan Mahmud of Perak to instal Raja Lumu, hitherto known only as 'Tengku Raja Selangor' (more or less 'Prince Regent'), as Sultan; now he had *daulat*, 'the divinity that doth hedge a king.'[12] Thus an accident of dynastic rivalry was the occasion for the creation of a kingdom (*kerajaan*) of Selangor, though, if it had not happened in 1766, it would probably have come to pass in some other circumstances. As the Bugis position in the state of Johor weakened later on, Selangor became the principal Bugis stronghold in the Straits. Yet Sultan Salehuddin was not content with his new royal dignity but, we are told, pressed his claims to succeed Daeng Kemboja in 1777, only to be passed over in favour of Lumu's younger brother, Raja Haji, who was already recognised as the outstanding Bugis leader of his time.[13] Raja Haji's reign lasted only seven years (1777-1784) but while it continued he 'bestrode the narrow world like a colossus'.[14]

Left to brood in his part of the narrow world of the Straits, Sultan Salehuddin fell out with the Dutch, who damned him as a 'greedy and untrustworthy ruler.' He also became estranged from Sultan Alauddin of Perak, by making an uninvited appearance in Perak in 1777 with twenty Bugis ships, and causing 'a major scandal by secretly marrying the widow of the late Orang Kaya Besar;' this insult to the local ruler was the greater because Salehuddin had previously married (in 1773) a daughter of the Raja Muda of Perak, whom he had grossly neglected.[15]

Whatever their personal rivalries, the Bugis leaders knew that they themselves must hang together to avoid hanging separately. Sultan Salehuddin had mended his fences with Daeng Kemboja by marrying his elder son, Raja (later Sultan) Ibrahim, to one of Kemboja's daughters in 1769. Soon afterwards, when the Bugis leaders were planning a major attack on Kedah in 1770, Salehuddin purchased six hundred pistols from English traders in Selangor and recruited forty European mercenaries. These foreign troops were lodged on a hill at Kuala Selangor and paid 5 reals a month pending their deployment.[16]

Salehuddin's son, and heir apparent, Raja Ibrahim, was brought up to follow his father's turbulent example. Such was his reputation for piracy that in 1774, when Ibrahim and a couple of other Selangor tearaways planned to visit Perak, the Sultan of Perak invited the Dutch, who had a trading post near the mouth of the Perak River, to station a ship there to deny ingress to these unwelcome visitors.[17] As in so much other military and political activity of this period, the underlying causes were commercial. The Sultan of Perak had a contract with the Dutch under which he was bound to sell all tin exported from Perak to the Dutch at a fixed price. That price was below the ruling market level because the Dutch reckoned to recover, by this margin on their tin dealings, their naval expenditure in maintaining a patrol in the Straits to enforce their highly regulated trade system. The Selangor Bugis were anathema both to the Dutch and to the Perak regime because they would not respect such arrangements. Selangor, which until 1786 was unfettered by any similar arrangement for selling tin to the Dutch, sold its output at market prices to English traders from India who put in at Selangor ports, especially Kuala Selangor, for that purpose. 'Many members of the Selangor court', including Raja Ibrahim, promoted the smuggling of Perak tin for resale with their own. Some of the Perak tin was illicitly exported from Larut, on the coast of Perak, and some through Bernam, on the border between the two States, which had become 'a natural refuge for pirates and fugitives', including the Kedah princes who had fled their own country after the failure of the Bugis incursion into Kedah (1770-1773).[18]

Although the ties of inter-marriage and diplomacy between Perak and Selangor were becoming rather frayed, Raja Ibrahim claimed the status of a friend when, in 1777, he came to Perak with chests of opium for sale; yet he did little to conceal his intention to use the proceeds, or to barter the opium, to acquire Perak tin for illicit export. A year later a vessel, belonging to Raja Ibrahim and carrying cash for the same purpose, sank at the mouth of the Perak River. It did not suit the Sultan of Perak to have an open quarrel with such belligerent neighbours as the Selangor Bugis, but eventually Sultan Alauddin informed Sultan Salehuddin that he would

not permit Selangor 'to bring misfortune to Perak' by inducing breaches of Perak's contract with the Dutch.[19]

Sultan Salehuddin died in 1782, unlamented in Malacca and Perak, and Ibrahim became Sultan. It proved to be a long and eventful reign (1782-1826), to be described mainly in the next chapter. However Sultan Ibrahim began his reign in the same style as his father, and so the the story of his first decade is best narrated here. Soon after his succession Ibrahim became involved in a dispute between his uncle, Yam Tuan Muda Raja Haji, and the Dutch, which led eventually to a Bugis attack on Malacca itself in 1784, in which Raja Haji met his death in battle and the Bugis forces were repelled. Dutch power had been in decline for many years but, in a final strenuous effort, a Dutch squadron under Van Braam first relieved Malacca, and then drove the Bugis out of Riau; Sultan Ibrahim withdrew overland from Selangor to Pahang. However in 1785 Ibrahim returned by the same route to expel the Dutch garrison from the forts which they had occupied on the hill at Kuala Selangor. By now there was a Dutch Resident at Riau; Dutch vessels blockaded Kuala Selangor for a year (1785-1786) and in the end Sultan Ibrahim found it expedient to concede a Dutch monopoly of the purchase of Selangor tin exports.

It was a sad situation in which everyone was a loser. The Dutch East India Company, overloaded by the cost of its efforts to control the trade of the Straits, was lurching towards its eventual insolvency (in 1799). In 1791 the Dutch Governor of Malacca wrote to Sultan Ibrahim, deploring his neglect of his country, saying that many Selangor people were leaving the state and tin production was declining.

A new era had indeed begun with the foundation of Penang as a British settlement in 1786, followed by the British occupation of Malacca in 1795 (būt only as a response to a major (Napoleonic) war in Europe). Selangor and Riau were now free of Dutch harassment. The Malay Sultan of Johor decided to return from exile, and to settle not at Riau but further south at Lingga. With the decline of Riau many Bugis migrated to Selangor.[20]

The death of Raja Haji and the ensuing reverses of 1784-1790 had marked the end of the heroic age of Bugis domination, when these Vikings of the Eastern seas sailed forth to win victory or suffer defeat as Allah might decree. There were no paladins after Raja Haji; the later Yam Tuan Mudas lived at Riau and had little active contact with Selangor. Before coming to the new era it is worth taking a brief retrospective view of the eighteenth century Bugis tradition.[21]

From Bone in the Celebes they brought 'folk beliefs concerning the sacred nature of the ruler, bridging the world of man and the world of the gods... reinforced in the Adat Bone' by maxims such as 'a ruler who does not consult with his ministers will be destroyed.'[22] In Bone this requirement was formalised by a court or assembly of elders (*Hadat*) to adjudicate on questions of custom and to advise the ruler. Each local community claimed descent from a single ancestor and founded its unity on a sacred and symbolic object (*gaukang*). Through its representative in the *Hadat* it had the means of advising the ruler, whose function was to conciliate rather than to govern. In Selangor, where the Bugis were free of the constraints of fitting into the structure of a Peninsular Malay monarchy, to which they were sub-

ject in Riau-Johor, the Bugis introduced a council of elders and created lesser executive offices, such as the *suliwatang* (regent) who had governed during the minority of Raja Lumu.[23] Yet they maintained a clear distinction between Selangor-born and immigrant Bugis leaders (from Riau), which contributed to the feuds of the 1860's (Chapters 3 and 4).

The elaborate structure of their homeland could not be transplanted in its entirety to alien soil in the Malay Peninsula; it is more apparent in the ideology of power-sharing through a loose and confederal system by which expatriate Bugis settled their affairs and concerted common action. In Bugis, much more than Malay society, descent was reckoned on a bilateral basis, through the maternal as well as the paternal line, so that matrimonial alliances and affinal ties were often the instrument of creating a political coalition. The absolutism of Malay monarchy, however much qualified by delegation of executive powers, was uncongenial to them. When they had reached agreements, they were disposed to embody them in formal pacts, sometimes but not always in writing, such as the much-quoted bargain of 1722, by which Bugis interlopers pledged their support to the newly enthroned Sultan Sulaiman of Johor in exchange for an entitlement to govern in his name through the office of Yam Tuan Muda. To lend ceremonial weight to the compact the first Yam Tuan Muda performed the *kanjar* and *arok* ritual, described as a frenetic dance with drawn sword, rather as, on a somewhat similar occasion, King David 'danced before the Lord...with shouting and with the sound of trumpets.'[24] The introduction of written treaties into the diplomacy of South-East Asia is attributed to the Portuguese, but among the Bugis communities of the Celebes they were treated as part of the sacred regalia'.[25]

Formality was a necessary counterbalance in a political culture which often gave expression to uninhibited emotion and sometimes violence. The death of a great man, such as a Yam Tuan Muda, could 'cause turmoil in Riau'; convention required public lamentation. Thus, on hearing of the death of his cousin, Daeng Kemboja (at the age of 80 !), Raja Haji and other kinsmen 'wept bitterly'.[26] Major dynastic events such as a marriage between princely families might entail ceremonies spread over three months.[27]

Raja Haji enjoyed the pleasures of life with great gusto.[28] Even on a warlike mission to Pontianak, in a flotilla 'equipped with huge cannon,' he sailed 'taking *joget* and *tandak* dancers, his children by secondary wives, and his singers and musicians, according to the custom when a great king makes a journey'.[29] As his final struggle with the Dutch moved towards its climax in 1783, 'Raja Haji enjoyed himself every night dancing the *joget* and the *tandak*, eating and drinking and feasting with all the princes and dignitaries.' Despite these jollifications he 'constantly recited devotional texts from the Koran and unceasingly read the holy work, *Indications of Virtues*, which were never out of his hands'.[30]

In their numerous battles, often fought at sea, the Bugis skilfully adapted their tactics to the occasion, though the object was usually to get to hand-to-hand fighting in which they excelled. As an example - 'He then embarked with his fleet, accompanied by large gongs, drums, flutes and signal gongs. At Pengujan they started

firing, and the noise of the cannon exchanges was deafening, with clouds of smoke billowing into the air. During the fighting the Bugis transferred to *sampan* (boats), with their rifles and muskets. Then they intercepted the Minangkabau *perahu* (ships) amidships and closed in. The Minangkabau were unable to resist because they no longer had time to load the cannon, and many were killed'.[31]

In addition to their chain mail armour (*baju rantai*) they wore helmets of rattan or bamboo, and showed ingenuity in developing new uses for their armaments, such as mounting light swivel guns (*lela*) on poles, so that they could raise them to a height and thus extend their range.[32] Yet loss of life in their hard-fought encounters was relatively light, since as soon as one side sensed that the battle would be lost, they did not fight to the death but withdrew to fight another day. On one occasion the opposing commanders were kinsmen by marriage and 'they would eat together and then return to their stockades and resume the battle'.[33] Even the Dutch sometimes entered into the spirit of these encounters. When Raja Haji had been killed outside the besieged town of Malacca, the Governor ordered the town's Malay and Bugis leaders 'to lay out Raja Haji's body according to the customs traditional to a great king' offering to pay the expenses and to provide the customary alms. Thus it was that Raja Haji found his rest for the time being in a grave 'behind the Company's garden' in the town.[34]

Some of the stratagems became legends. A century after Sultan Ibrahim recaptured the forts at Kuala Selangor from the Dutch (in 1785) the story was told that the attackers 'tied handkerchiefs and other head-gear on stakes' among the trees to look like the heads of an attacking force from that quarter. When the small garrison had been concentrated to repel an assault from that direction, the attackers came in from the other side and easily overran the lightly defended segment of the perimeter.[35]

The glorification of warfare in the Bugis chronicle tends to distract attention from the less dramatic process of earning a living. Yet the Bugis were traders as well as warriors, and there are signs of their practical canniness in that respect. As an example, they built dual-purpose vessels which could carry cargo or be adapted to serve as military transports or even as fighting ships, as the first stage of launching a major offensive.[36] By that means they avoided the heavy expense of maintaining a specialist navy which crippled their Dutch opponents.

The Bugis suffered some reverses at the hands of the Dutch, at Linggi in 1757 and again at Malacca and elsewhere in 1784-1785.[37] Even in those times of adversity they saw that a commercial revival was a necessary first step towards regaining lost ground. They made a treaty in 1757 'in order to satisfy the people who were dependent on trade for their livelihood'.[38]

There is an interesting contrast here between Bugis and Malay methods of conducting major trade transactions. Malay Rulers left this business to a 'king's merchant' (*saudagar Raja*) who was often an Indian muslim not a Malay.[39] The Bugis, however, did not follow this practice, even in Selangor where from 1766 there was a royal court in which such a specialist agent could have found a place.[40] They preferred to combine trading with other business, using a trading vessel both as

personal transport on a political mission and as a cargo carrier. As an example when Opu Daeng Kelola came on a family visit, he was 'entertained with feasting and jollity, as is customary among relatives' but at the end of a month, 'when all his merchandise had been sold' he sailed home again.[41]

By the middle of the eighteenth century tin had displaced spices as the key trade commodity.[42] Selangor was an important producer of tin (with Perak and Banka at the southern end of the Straits) and this commercial factor made it more important to the Bugis confederacy. Tin mining was still a Malay industry in which the miners were Malays (including Sumatrans) rather than Bugis. More is known of the methods used in Perak, where there was a Dutch post to buy the tin to which the Dutch had monopoly rights.[43] However there is no reason to think that the techniques used in Selangor were different.

To exploit the larger accessible deposits in river valleys, where the ore was often a buried stratum overlaid by many feet of alluvial soil, a pit was dug down to the ore stratum; it had to be revetted at the sides to prevent them collapsing on to the workers in the pit. The buckets of ore were lifted to the surface by manipulating a pole placed across an upright forked post, with a counterbalance at the opposite end. The ore came up mixed with soil and the two were separated by panning or sluicing with running water, so that the tin ore which was heavier than soil dropped to the bottom or side. A century later the remains of such pits were known as 'lombong Siam' but there is no reason to think that Siamese miners ever worked in Perak or Selangor.[44]

The smuggling of Perak tin into Selangor, mentioned above, adds to the difficulty of estimating the volume of Selangor production at this stage. Kuala Selangor, which was the main port of export, seems to have become a haven for pirates, deserters from European armed forces etc. The revival of British commercial activity in Southeast Asia, which had begun in mid 18th century, brought English 'country ships' to ports such as Kuala Selangor. The Dutch had been forced in 1784 to concede to ships of other nations the right of 'free navigation' (and trade), though they continued until 1795 to have monopoly rights by contract to purchase tin exported from Perak (and after 1786 from Selangor).[45]

English 'country' (private) traders had to search for cargoes which the Dutch had not pre-empted. After making the crossing from Madras or Calcutta, they usually put in first at Banda Aceh, or one of the other Acehnese ports at the northern tip of Sumatra, since this was the main centre of the export of pepper. They might then sail on to Kuala Kedah, which - until replaced by Penang after 1786 - was an entrepot for trade with southern Burma and Siam as well as Sumatra and Perak. Their next port of call, mainly for tin, was Kuala Selangor, whence they moved southwards again to Riau, often calling at Dutch Malacca if it was expedient to look in there as well.[46] In this fashion the 'Princess Royal' left Madras at the end of 1785, went first to Kuala Kedah, where there was a Dutch ship 'lading rice for Mallacca ....the Captain is a very funny fellow.' The ship's pinnace was sent up river to Alor Star, the capital of Kedah, with seven chests of opium to sell and hopes of obtaining gold and 'teeth' (elephant tusks). Here the young John Pope, the third mate, ran into

trouble, instigated by the Indian 'King's Merchant' seeking payment of a debt outstanding from an earlier visit, but eventually got away. Southern Kedah and northern Perak - 'the terriblest place in the world for rain' - produced nothing, but at Aceh the Malay harbourmaster contracted to supply pepper in exchange for opium and Indian textiles. They sailed from Aceh and 'on the 29th [July 1786] we anchored at Selangor, a port on the Peninsula of Malay [sic] with an intention of securing some more Block Tin but we found it blockaded by a Dutch fleet...so that we proceeded to Malacca immediately'.[47]

In the next chapter we find Sultan Ibrahim offering Francis Light in 1785 'pepper, wax and canes' [rattan] as 'export produce'. There is no mention of the import of rice and other foodstuffs into Selangor at this period, and it may be that sufficient was grown locally to feed a small population.[48]

This was the humdrum aspect of life on the coastal fringe of Selangor under the Bugis Sultans. Selangor was an established port of call in a trade network, which was about to change. Most of the alarums and excursions of the struggle for power in the Straits occurred elsewhere, though the Selangor Bugis were one of the players in the game, for whom their state was a useful base and a growing source of revenue.

Notes

1. B.W.Andaya, *Perak, the Abode of Grace - A Study of an Eighteenth Century Malay State*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1979, p.262, which reproduces much of the same author's previous study, 'The Installation of the First Sultan of Selangor'. *JMBRAS* 47(1), 1974, pp.41-57. The author of this volume gratefully acknowledges his debt to Dr.Andaya (in particular her use of Dutch archive sources) in his understanding of the subject of this chapter.
2. L.W.Andaya, *The Kingdom of Johor 1641-1728,* Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1975, p.285. The above acknowledgement is repeated to Dr L.Y Andaya also. A.C.Milner, *Kerajaan - Malay Political Culture on the Eve of Colonial Rule*, University of Arizona Press, Tucson, 1982, and J.M.Gullick, *Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya,* Athlone Press, London, 1958 (revised edition 1988) develope the same theme in the context of nineteenth century Malay States.
3. 'He is proud of his Bugis descent, and never speaks of himself as a Selangor Malay', Anon., 'H. H. Sultan Abdul Samad K.C.M.G. at Home', *SJ* 1, 1892-1893, p.5. The author of that article was probably J.H.M.Robson, who had been District Officer at Kuala Langat, where the Sultan lived.
4. 'Selangor was a basically unpopulated territory, and so the Bugis were able to develope it in their own way with Bugis from Riau.' L.W.Andaya, 'The Bugis-Macassar Diaspora', *JMBRAS* 68(1), 1995, pp.129 and 134.
5. L.Y.Andaya, *Johor*., pp.235, and (population increase) pp.333 and 300.
6. L.Y.Andaya, *Diaspora*, p.131.
7. L.Y.Andaya, *Johor*, p.229f. Linggi was the original Bugis base in the Straits, but when in 1722 they had helped the Malay Sultan of Johor to expel the Siak invaders from Riau, which had been the capital of Johor since 1673, the Yam Tuan Muda decided that his position would be more secure if he moved to Riau to be close to the Sultan.
8. L.Y.Andaya, *Diaspora*, p.132.
9. Ibid, p.134.
10. Daeng Cellak was one of the five Upu brothers, but Daeng Kemboja, as the son of Daeng Parani, the most prestigious of the five, was considered to have the better claim than the sons of Daeng Cellak.

11. Raja Ali Haji ibni Ahmad, *Tuhfat-al-Nafis*, translated and annotated by V.Matheson (Hooker) and B.W.Andaya, (as *The Precious Gift*) Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1982, p.343. The Malay author was a grandson of the celebrated Raja Haji, frequently mentioned in this chapter, His 'Bugis chronicle', though it is a major and scholarly historical study. reflects the viewpoint of the Riau Bugis dynasty in general and of the Upu family in particular. See also B.W.Andaya and V.Matheson, 'Islamic Thought and Malay Tradition: the Writings of Raja Ali Haji of Riau (ca.1809 - ca,1870)' in A.Reid and D.Marr (eds.), *Perceptions of the Past in Southeast Asia*, ASAA/Heinemann, Singapore, 1979.
12. W.Shakespeare, *Hamlet*.
13. Raja Ali Haji, op. cit., p.363.
14. W.Shakespeare, *Julius Caesar*.
15. B.W.Andaya, *Perak*, p.332.
    D.Lewis, *Jan Compagnie in the Straits of Malacca 1641-1795*, Ohio University Press, Athens Ohio, 1995, Chapters 3-7, gives the Dutch side of their prolonged struggle with the Bugis, and other opponents. Chapter 5 incorporates a revised version of the author's 'The Growth of the Country Trade to the Straits of Malacca 1760-1777,' *JMBRAS* 43(2), 1970.
16. B.W.Andaya, *Perak*, p.294 and 314.
17. Ibid., p.333.
18. Ibid., p.335.
19. Ibid., p.334.
20. For a concise but authoritative account of a complicated sequence of events see D. G. E. Hall, *A History of South-East Asia*, London, 4th ed. 1981, pp. 376-377. After the death of Raja Haji the office of Yam Tuan Muda devolved on Raja Ali, a son of Daeng Kemboja, who held it until his death in 1805. Then Raja Jafar, a son of Raja Haji then living at Klang, was recalled to become Yam Tuan Muda (1805-1830).
21. Raja Ali Haji, op. cit., pp.136-137, pauses in his long narrative to list ten wars between 1721 and 1767 in which the Bugis were major contestants. There were of course several more after 1767.
22. L. Y. Andaya, 'The Nature of Kingship in Bone', A. J. S. Reid and L. Castles, (eds.), *Pre-Colonial State Systems in Southeast Asia*, MBRAS Monograph No 6, 1979, pp. 117 and 119, and his *Diaspora* are the main source of this passage of the text.
23. L. Y. Andaya, *Johor*, p.295, and Raja Ali Haji, op. cit., pp.65, and 156.
24. L.Y.Andaya, *Johor*, p.56, *Diaspora*, p.133 (politics of marriage ties). The *Old Testament*, Samuel, Bk. 2, Chap.6, Verse 14.
25. 'Oaths of allegiance or treaties were regarded with great veneration [and] as deeds of the ancestors....treated as sacred regalia.' L. Y. Andaya, *Diaspora*, p.131.
26. Raja Ali Haji, op. cit., p.158.
27. Ibid., p.139.
28. 'For several days there were entertainments such as *gamelan* playing, *joget* dancing, *wayang*, and huge feasts with rows of dignitaries, elders and princes all joking and having fun': ibid., p.158. Yet Raja Haji was much more than a playboy. Under his brief rule 'Riau became more populous and its prosperity increased' with vessels coming from China, Siam, Java and Arab ports until 'they were crammed like sardines from the estuary to Kampung China...On Thursday nights they all gathered to celebrate the birth of the Prophet and afterwards alms were distributed, some receiving ducatoons, some dollars, and some rupees....Several armed *penjajab* lay at the ready at the harbour, complete with ammunition and captains'. Ibid. p.161.
29. Ibid., p.152.
30. Ibid., p.174. Sultan Salehuddin, elder brother of Raja Haji, was no less carefree in those final days of Bugis ascendency. He 'holidayed for some time' at nearby Rembau. Loc.cit.
31. A sea-battle off Siak in 1726, Ibid., p.56.
32. Ibid., p.101 ('Bintan helmets'), and p.150 (swivel guns on poles), a device invented by La Kanna, Regent (*Suliwatang*) of Selangor, while fighting in Kedah in 1771. We are not told how the man (or men) who elevated the gun coped with the recoil.

33. Ibid., p.68.
34. Ibid., p.176.
35. Report of a visit to Kuala Selangor by Sir Frederick Dickson, acting Governor, enclosed with SSD 10 December 1890 (CO 273/169).
36. The editors of Raja Ali Haji (see Note 11 above) have appended a very useful glossary and description (op. cit., pp.417-421) of the different types of vessel mentioned in this work. One type, a large two-master, 60 metres in length and 9 metres in breadth, with a crew of 20, known as a *kecil*, was more than once converted from cargo carrier to fighting ship (*penjajab*) with an increased crew of up to 30 men; in this adapted form it was 'extremely fast and often used by pirates'.
37. There were also political setbacks. As an example, when Malay and Dutch pressure on the Bugis at Riau increased in 1754 Daeng Kemboja, then Yam Tuan Muda, withdrew, leaving his deputy, Raja Haji, to sustain the Bugis presence as long as he could. In the end the decisive point came at Linggi, which was lost in 1756. Raja Ali Haji, op.cit., pp.103-104.
38. Ibid., p.109.
39. B. W. Andaya, 'The Indian "Saudagar Raja" in Traditional Malay Courts'. *JMBRAS* 51(1), 1978. describes this arrangement at the courts of Johor, Kedah, Perak, Siak and Acheh, at various times in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Among a variety of reasons for this practice Dr. Andaya notes (p.16) that 'Malay rulers...still saw something distasteful in any close association with commerce'. The Bugis, by tradition traders, regarded business as the business of their lives.
40. Sultan Salehuddin does not seem to have developed the full apparatus of a royal court at Selangor. The Bugis were of course in the court circle at Riau at most times during the eighteenth century, but by then the Sultan had abandoned the use of a Saudagar Raja, which, as regards Johor was the practice only in the seventeenth century under a different dynasty and before the arrival of the Bugis.
41. Raja Ali Haji, op. cit., pp.70-71.
42. Until the early nineteenth century, when the development of food canning greatly increased European demand for tin (to make tin-plate), Cornish tin production was the main source of tin for European needs. Most of the tin produced in Malaya (and on the adjacent island of Banka) at this time was exported to China. Wong Lin Ken, *The Malayan Tin Industry to 1914*, University of Arizona Press, Tucson, 1965, pp.3-4.
43. B.W.Andaya, *Perak*, passim. The passage on Malay mining follows Andaya's Appendix A 'Tin-Mining in Eighteenth Century Perak'.
44. There were of course Siamese political missions to Perak c.1820, and Siamese traders came to Malayan ports. However there is no record whatever that the Siamese ever mined in Malaya. The origin of *Lombong Siam* is discussed in Chapter 3.
45. Under the treaty which ended a European war in 1784 Holland reluctantly conceded a right of 'free navigation to the Eastern Seas' to the other contracting parties.
46. Lee Kam Hing, *The Sultanate of Aceh: Relations with the British 1760-1824*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1995, p.28.
47. A.Bulley, *Free Mariner - John Adolphus Pope in the East Indies 1786-1821*, British Association for Cemeteries in South Asia, London, 1992, p.68. This was the Dutch blockade of Kuala Selangor which obliged Sultan Ibrahim to enter into the treaty of 1786 giving the Dutch a monopoly of the purchase of his tin exports.
    In May 1787 Pope's vessel again passed Selangor (p.89) but without calling at Kuala Selangor. In November 1786 it put in to a point on the coast near Klang to cut firewood (p.78), but it had loaded a cargo of textiles and opium at Malacca, and was bound for north Sumatra. To these essentially opportunist seafarers Kuala Selangor, now fettered by Dutch monopoly of its tin, was no longer important. In a forthcoming paper Dr. D Lewis demonstrates that country ships often put in to Malacca for cargo, since there was no reluctance on either side to do business where it was mutually convenient to do so. Personal communication.
48. Raja Ali Haji mentions (op. cit.p.58) that in 1722 'at the estuary of the Linggi River some Selangor Bugis were in the process of setting their fish traps'.

Chapter Two

Selangor under Sultan Ibrahim

Sultan Ibrahim had succeeded to the throne in 1782, in the last days of the Bugis hegemony in the Straits of Malacca. As related in the previous chapter he had been closely associated with his uncle. the rumbustious Yam Tuan Muda Raja Haji, in the debacle of 1784-86, in which Raja Haji met his death and Sultan Ibrahim was driven into temporary exile from Selangor and ultimate submission to Dutch demands for a monopoly of the purchase of Selangor tin exports.

Yet the foundation of the British settlement of Penang in 1786, a few weeks before Sultan Ibrahim came to terms with the Dutch Governor of Malacca, marked the beginning of a new era in which Britain replaced Holland as the leading colonial power in the Straits region. A number of local rulers, including Sultan Ibrahim, were quick to see an opportunity of securing British support to free them from the Dutch regime of regulated trade. For twenty years past the rulers of Selangor, among other States, had traded with English 'country ships', selling tin and other produce and buying opium, a key commodity in local commerce, and textiles etc. in exchange. The masters of these ships had included Francis Light and his partner, James Scott, now established at Penang, Thomas Forrest and other seafaring traders, who were congenial figures, well-informed and accommodating, and above all willing to buy and sell on better terms (for the Malays) than the Dutch, who fixed their prices to recover the expense of their regulated system.

As soon as Sultan Ibrahim had driven the Dutch out of the forts at Kuala Selangor (a year before the British occupied Penang) he wrote to the East India Company at Calcutta. proposing an alliance and the appointment of a British representative to reside at Kuala Selangor 'that we may consult and fix upon some means of trading.' The Sultan asked explicitly that Francis Light, or James Scott, who had a house at Kuala Selangor, or Thomas Forrest, whom he also knew personally, should be appointed. The correspondence passed through the hands of Light who recommended the Sultan's proposal 'for in his, and his Father's time, the English Merchants were always well received, protected and favored beyond any other nation.'

Towards the end of 1785 Sultan Ibrahim sent a polite reminder, saying that 'of our former letter we have not hitherto received any acknowledgement whatever....if [the Governor General] has any favorable regard for this country of Silangur, he

will, as soon as possible, supply us with the Company's colours [flag]....with respect to the export produce of tis country, such as tin, pepper, wax and canes, all of these we offer to our friend with perfect good will'.[1]

There is no record of any reply being sent to Sultan Ibrahim and certainly his proposals did not find favour. The Directors in London and the Governor General in Calcutta were too much preoccupied with more pressing problems, such as the terms proposed by the Sultan of Kedah for British occupation of Penang, to respond to a scheme for a relationship with Selangor which they were not minded to accept. However the EIC Directors in London were not unsympathetic and later wrote to Calcutta:- 'We would particularly point your attention to the most prudent and efficient means of giving support to the King of Salangore, as that would, from the friendly intercourse that has long subsisted between us, give credit to us in the eyes of the Malay chiefs, and secure that confidence and esteem'.[2]

'Friendly intercourse' did not however inhibit Francis Light from warning Sultan Ibrahim against interference in the affairs of Aceh, which Light feared might damage the stability of Aceh which was an important trade partner of Penang. Aceh was also an ally of Selangor. Since 1727 a family of Bugis descent had been in precarious occupation of the throne of Aceh. Although the two dynasties were unrelated, Anderson noted a century later that 'the former Kings of Acheen were on very friendly terms with the Salengore Chiefs, and the King [Sultan Ibrahim] now possesses many large guns which he procured at Acheen.' This artillery included 'a large brass piece of ordnance, a long 32 pounder', which was mounted at the fort on the hill above Kuala Selangor and was believed to accommodate 'a White Snake, which comes out every Sunday.' At a workaday level Aceh and Selangor had such active commercial ties that when the Dutch occupied Kuala Selangor in 1784-85, it had 'a sizeable community of Acehnese, largely traders.'

Hard-pressed by the Dutch blockade of 1786 Sultan Ibrahim had obtained several hundred men from Aceh to strengthen his garrison. When, in the following year, the Sultan of Aceh was facing trouble, Francis Light issued his warning to Sultan Ibrahim to keep away. The latter replied in injured innocence, asking 'with what propriety can we say to [the Acehnese] "do so" or "do so" seeing that they have the right to act as they please in the affairs of their own country....were we to do any open injury to the Acehnese....they would owe us a grudge.' It was a disingenuous disclaimer since the Sultan was about to repay a favour received, not to inflict an injury on his brother ruler. When the call for help from Aceh came, the Sultan despatched his younger brother, and principal aide, Raja Muda Nala, with 16 ships and 80 men, to strengthen the hand of the Sultan of Aceh in suppressing a local rising (in the port of Pedir from which much pepper was shipped to Penang). This episode came to little, though Raja Nala's death at Aceh, in August 1788, incidentally cleared the path to power for a younger generation of Selangor princes.[3]

Although the 'man on the spot' in Penang might advocate developing closer ties with local rulers, the unhappy story of Anglo-Kedah relations showed how easily these could go sour. Far away in London the mounting European crisis of the early 1790's disposed Britain to avoid precipitating an open conflict with the Dutch in

South-East Asia, though there was anxiety lest the Dutch of Malacca should interrupt the flow of trade 'from the Eastwards' (and China) passing Malacca on its way through the narrow Straits to Penang, India and beyond.

However, for all their bluster with Malay rulers, the Dutch were no longer able to impose their restrictions. Penang developed its trade with the states north of Malacca, including Selangor. There is, for example, among the Malay letters of the Francis Light collection, one from the wife of the Raja Muda of Selangor on a deal in tin, rice and textiles on a commercial scale. As ever the Bugis did not miss opportunities of trading. Another sign of the trade partnership between Penang and Selangor was the presence, for some years, at Kuala Selangor, of Syed Hussain, who had moved from Aceh in the 1770's to Riau, and then, as Riau went into decline, to Kuala Selangor, where he and his relatives built up 'a flourishing trading business'. Finally Syed Hussain moved on to Penang, where he became 'a very prominent merchant' and an associate of John Palmer, a 'most influential figure in official circles in Calcutta'. By virtue of a dubious claim to membership of the ruling dynasty of Aceh, Syed Hussain was later 'a serious contender to the throne' of Aceh.[4] The case of Syed Hussain illustrates the commercial (and political) nexus in the Straits, centred on Penang, in which Kuala Selangor had its place.

The British occupation of Malacca in 1795 put an end - for some twenty years - to the threat of Dutch interference. Both Selangor and Riau were released from the constraints of their treaties of the late 1780's with Dutch Malacca. In these circumstances the Bugis leaders made a final attempt, though without success, to restore the widespread trade system which had brought prosperity to Riau during the brief but glorious reign (1777-1784) of Raja Haji as Yam Tuan Muda, until it was destroyed by the drastic Dutch military and naval actions of 1784-1788. In the fading Bugis ascendency Riau was still the main centre and Selangor was only at the periphery. However Sultan Ibrahim, as a Bugis leader rather than as Sultan of Selangor, had an opportunity to play a prominent role, first in seeking to restore harmony between Sultan Mahmud of Johor and the Dutch at Malacca (until 1795) and later, when the Sultan had returned from exile to Riau-Lingga, between the Sultan and Raja Ali, who had succeeded Raja Haji as Yam Tuan Muda.[5] Although Raja Ali did eventually return to Riau, there was much hostility towards the Bugis there and many moved to Selangor.

The most outstanding figure among these new settlers was Raja Jafar, son of Raja Haji, to whom (jointly with Raja Jafar's brothers) Sultan Ibrahim assigned the Klang River district as an appanage for his support. From Klang the sons of Raja Haji exported tin to Malacca and established friendly relations with the merchants there from whom they obtained the supplies which they needed.[6] Meanwhile Sultan Ibrahim led his forces into Perak, no longer protected by a Dutch fort at the estuary, and occupied territory along the lower reaches of the Perak River.

Events took a new turn with the death, in 1805, of Yam Tuan Muda Raja Ali. Raja Jafar accepted an invitation from Sultan Mahmud of Riau-Lingga to succeed to the vacant office of Yam Yuan Muda. When he left Klang, to move back from trade to diplomacy in Bugis fashion, his baggage included 'a box of money, which

needed about eight people to carry it'.[7] Raja Jafar was to hold office for quarter of a century (1805-1831), but his role was political and he was unable to restore the commercial fortunes of Riau to the level they had reached in the time of his father, Raja Haji.

Since Raja Jafar was evidently a good man of business, the explanation is to be found in the changing pattern of trade. The Portuguese and the Dutch, by their use of force, had been unable to divert to Malacca from Riau, and other local ports, the trade of the region. A regime of free trade at a colonial port was a much more powerful inducement. Although the situation of Penang limited its trade catchment area to the northern end of the Straits, the Sultan of Kedah justified his demand for an annual payment of $30,000 as compensation for lost trade revenues (of Kuala Kedah) now that the trade passed through Penang.[8] Singapore, founded in 1819, drew in trade from a much wider field. This trade in 'Straits produce' and imported manufactures from the West still moved between the central entrepot and the outer ports in local craft, until they were displaced late in the nineteenth century by coastal steamships. The 'hundreds of Bugis and Javanese *perahu*' and the Chinese junks and Siamese *tob* (vessels of 200 tons burthen) seen at Riau in Raja Haji's time were now anchored in the Singapore roads.[9]

Selangor had been a rear base for Bugis naval operations and a source of tin exports rather than a trade centre, and it was not so adversely affected by the new system as was Riau. Like other territories which had agricultural or mineral resources, it was now to prosper by producing 'staples' for which there was demand in world or regional trade. As we have seen, Sultan Ibrahim sought to entice a reluctant Governor General of India with the offer of 'the produce of this country, such as tin, pepper, wax and canes....with perfect good will.'

Although detailed information is not available, the trend of Selangor recovery from the nadir of its fortunes c.1790 is clear enough. We have noted Raja Jafar's phenomenal success in mining in the Klang valley. There is different evidence, but to the same effect, for development in the upper reaches of the Selangor River (modern Ulu Selangor). Swettenham visited this area in 1875 and he found:-

> 'A lake formed by the damming of a considerable stream which runs into the Salangor river just below the village [Kuala Kubu]. The dam is about 200 yds long and it forms a very considerable lake between 1 and 2 miles long running nearly to the foot of the hills, and varying from 100 to 200 yds wide. 13 streams fall into it, all tin streams it is said. The dam head is ¼ to 1 ½ miles from the village and was made about 80 years ago to work one huge mine below it. From the mine run two long and deep sluices, now empty, but which appear to have [been] used to run the earth and rubbish dug out of the mine down into the Salangor river. They run from each end of the embankment down into the Salangor river. The mine this dam was made to work is gigantic compared to the mines today and was worked entirely by Malays. The whole of the earth taken out was, as I said before, thrown into the sluices and carried into the Salangor river instead of being heaped up



MINE AT ULU SELANGOR
From Swettenham's Journal for March 1875, when he visited and described the mine.

'Gunong Ulu Selangor' denotes the watershed on the northern side of the valley. The main village was at this time called 'Ulu Selangor' and its exposure to inundation, if the dam burst (as it did in 1883), is clear enough.

close by the mine as is the present practice. The mine is 40 ft. deep and the stratum of tin then reached is very rich, so much so that out of a surface of 60 sq ft they got 36 *bharas* of tin. Panglima Garam shewed me where he had mined in the old mine; these are the figures he gave me. The sluices are each a mile or more in length, and a very large surface of ground has been worked out'.[10]

It is not surprising that local informants were apparently unable to give any account of the development of this 'huge mine' since the local Malay leader (Panglima Garang) and the Chinese headman were comparatively recent arrivals, who had come into the area long after the mine had been abandoned and its history forgotten.

The most important internal clue is that, in 1875, the mine was dated from 'about 80 years ago', and in the circumstances of a break in local folk memories this may be flexibly intepreted as c.1800. Works on this 'gigantic' scale (the dam was said to have cost $8,000 to build) were not a mere village enterprise of fossicking for tin in the short interval between harvesting the padi crop and the next planting season.[11] Two alternative explanations, or some combination of them, suggest themselves. Since an enterprise of this size, in particular excavating to a depth of 40 feet, would have taken years rather than months to see through to fruition, it could only have been undertaken with permission obtained from Sultan Ibrahim or some other Bugis grandee, who would protect the miners from disruption. It is possible that a Bugis leader used debt-bondsmen or mobilised peasants to give traditional labour service (*kerah*) to open and work the mine.[12] The difficulty over that hypothesis is that there is no record or tradition that the Bugis, who generally - as seafarers - settled on the coast, ever established villages in Ulu Selangor even later in the nineteenth century. The alternative guess -- it can be no more -- is that Bugis entrepreneurs entered into some form of partnership with Sumatran immigrants, who had begun to establish villages in the interior and who did mine for tin, though not generally on this massive scale. This was the pattern later on when Bugis chiefs brought in Chinese miners (see Chapter 3). The miners needed protection and also a supply of foodstuffs to sustain them over the months required to bring a mine into production. A generation or so later Sultan Mohamed (r 1826-1857) and, before his accession to the throne in 1857, Sultan Abdul Samad, were said to have been actively involved in opening mines in Ulu Selangor. These traditions, for what they are worth, lend some credibility to the suggestion that the huge mine which Swettenham saw in 1875, was an enterprise of a Bugis leader (or leaders) in association with Sumatran miners.

The origin of the Sumatran settlements along the upper reaches of the rivers is not recorded. It was outside the purview of Bugis chronicles and Dutch archives. However there is evidence that by the second decade of the 19th century there were small, scattered but significant Sumatran settlements along the main rivers of Selangor. There were already some Minangkabau communities in the interior of what is now Negri Sembilan when, at the beginning of the eighteeenth century, the Bugis took

control of the coastline as far south as the mouth of the Linggi river. Like the early Bugis settlers, the headmen of these villages had formal, but nonetheless significant ties with the Malay Sultans of Johor and their high officers of state, especially the Bendahara.[13] On the coast of modern Selangor the most important Malay centre, from the time of the Malacca Sultanate of the fifteenth century, was Klang. Although contemporary Bugis traditions make no reference to him, there was a tributary chief of Johor with the title of To' Engku Klang. A modern holder of that ancient title told Winstedt in the 1930's that his predecessors had asserted their independence of Raja Lumu until he established his credentials by becoming Sultan Salehuddin.[14] The Sumatrans who made their unrecorded migration into the interior of Selangor may have included Minangkabau, but seem to have been mainly of the groups known in Malaya generally as 'Rawa', or in specific contexts as 'Mendiling' or 'Batu Bara'[15]; John Anderson, whose description of their settlements will appear in its place below, refers to them merely as 'Inhabitants'.[16]

There is no less vagueness about their numbers. At the time of Anderson's visit in 1818 there had been a mass exodus under the threat of Siamese invasion, and so his estimate of the population of Selangor as between one thousand and fifteen hundred is very low,[17] but Newbold, writing in 1839 when the situation had returned to normal, gives a figure of 12,000.[18] The following review, based mainly on Anderson's book of 1824, moves from north to south through the Selangor valleys.

Bernam was the most northerly of the main centres on the Selangor coast with a population estimated by Anderson at one thousand. The Raja Muda lived here, presumably with the task of safeguarding a frontier in dispute between Selangor and Perak. Mud flats at the estuary made the town of Bernam inaccessible to any but small craft, though it was a trade centre 'celebrated for Rattans, of which large quantities are exported, and occasionally some Tin which is brought down the small Channels from the Perak Country'.[19]

The population of the town of Kuala Selangor was four hundred only; at one time vessels of 250 tons burthen could enter the river. However in resisting the Dutch attack in 1784 'the natives threw a great quantity of large Stones across the entrance of the River' and in 1824 that obstacle still denied ingress to any but 'small vessels'. Anderson lists no less than 28 small settlements along the Selangor river as far inland as the point at which the traveller took the track over the hills to Pahang, One of the villages in his list is 'Kataran, where much tin is procured' [20] -- one is tempted to suppose that this may be the site of the very large mine seen by Swettenham. Tin for export was brought in to Kuala Selangor and amounted to 2,000 *pikuls* per annum. In the Chinese market Selangor tin, in ingots of one *kati* weight, 'very pure and white', sold at a small discount on the price paid for tin from the better known mines of Banka and Phuket (Junk Ceylon).[21]

Apart from the Selangor river valley, the main centres of tin production were the Klang valley and Lukut. There were 23 villages in the Klang valley, but only eight, well up the river from Klang town, produced tin.[22] The Sultan sometimes resided in Klang town, which was 'defended by several batteries' and, before the dispersal under threat of Siamese invasion, Klang had a population of 'about 1,500.' South

Selangor in the first half of the 19th Century
The boundary with Perak was fixed in 1826 at the Bernam River, but previously Selangor had occupied territory as far as Bidor. The boundary with colonial Malacca was at Kuala Linggi, but in 1878 Selangor ceded the coastal strip, from just north of Lukut, to Sungei Ujong (Negeri Sembilan) in exchange for land further from the coast.

of Klang was Kuala Langat, later to become the royal capital of Sultan Abdul Samad; in 1818 it had about 500 inhabitants and produced tin and rattans. Lukut (north of the modern Port Dickson) had 'lately become a great place for Tin' with 200 Chinese in its estimated population of one thousand.[23]

In addition to the main coastal towns already mentioned there were a number of villages on the coast:-

Village	*Estimated Population*	*Products*
Api Api (nr Kuala Selangor)	100	Padi
Buloh	40-50	'celebrated place for fruit'
Jeram	500	
Kapar	80	Padi
Tamponi	200	
Pasir	20	
Gubbang	50	
Tanjong Ru	300	
Sepang	200	Wood oil, *damar*, Padi
Nipah	50	
Linggi Kechil (on the frontier)	150	

Sultan Ibrahim also claimed the main settlement at the estuary of the Linggi river, where the mixed population included a considerable number of Bugis.[24]

The first six villages in the list above had a Malay penghulu [headman], which suggests that they had been settled earlier than the places below them in the list, and so had closer ties with the royal capital. Beyond Kuala Langat identifiable places such as Tanjong Ru are now in the Coast District of modern Negri Sembilan, and Selangor authority was more tenuous.

This population was too small to support an elaborate political hierarchy. Moreover the Bugis tradition of a loose and decentralised system of authority was quite alien to the Malay *kerajaan*, with its high officers of state (Bendahara, Temenggong etc.) and grades of four chiefs of the first rank, eight of the second, sixteen of the third such as were found in Perak. Next in authority to the Sultan of Selangor was the Raja Muda, a post filled by a younger brother or son of the Sultan, sometimes heir presumptive to the throne. If any other royal kinsman among collateral relatives of the ruler was his executive aide, his position was recognised by the title of Tengku Panglima Besar (or Raja).

A number of *orang besar* ('great men' or chiefs) were assigned the charge of outlying districts. Newbold lists them (in the 1830's) as the *Pengawa Permatang* and *Pengawa-Tua*, whose area of responsiblity was the estuaries and coastal districts, the *Penghulu Arru* in charge of the interior except Klang, and the *Orang Kaya Kechil* of the Klang valley. It may well be that these offices were created in the time of

Sultan Ibrahim, but half a century after his death, they had declined into empty titles and only the *Penghulu Aru* among them was still a dignitary of consequence (Chapter 4).[25] These non-royal chiefs were overshadowed and displaced by members of the royal dynasty. Anderson mentions that Sultan Ibrahim had fathered some sixty children, of whom half had grown up to adult life.[26] Royal sons and grandsons, even if born of non-royal mothers, competed for a very limited number of remunerative offices.

The extant records give little or no information on the Islamic activities of the time. However there was a trickle of pilgrims to Mecca from Selangor and they looked to the Sultan for help, and he in turn corresponded with the authorities at Penang, as the port of embarkation, for help in arranging passages and what a modern age calls 'travel documents'. Some travelled on Arab sailing ships; others made a swifter transit on an English ship to an Indian port and there transhipped to a vessel bound for an Arabian port. One of the Sultan's letters, written in 1791, deserves quotation, since such applications 'occur very frequently' and the letter incidentally illustrates the practical problems which arose. The letter relates to three *ulama*, whom the Sultan had directed:-

> 'to present themselves to our friend, in order that if it can be conveniently done, our friend may afford his assistance in providing them with a passage on board of a ship; it being their intention to proceed on the pilgrimage [to Mecca]; and, if possible, in expediting the departure of these three Priests, so that they may save the monsoon. Should there be an English vessel bound to *Juddah* or to *Mokha*, we request our friend to accommodate them with a passage on her; or if not bound to those places, on a vessel going even as far as *Cochin* [India]. We likewise request that he will cause good care to be taken of them; and moreover he will furnish them with a document under his hand, to serve them as a token in case of meeting with any Englishmen, who may assist them in consequence of our friend's signature, and prevent them from experiencing a long detention at every port, for which their supplies would be inadequate'.[27]

The long-drawn Napoleonic War (1793-1815) had, after initial upheavals, imposed on South-East Asia an unwonted standstill in the rivalry between Britain, France and Holland. When the war ended, Sultan Ibrahim had reigned for 33 years and he was an elderly man. He hoped to follow the example of his subjects and end his days in an unwonted state of pious quietude by making the pilgrimage as they had done.

A royal pilgrimage, however, raised additional problems. An absence of several months, perhaps a year or more, from the government of Selangor was unavoidable but it must be kept as short as possible. As a ruler the Sultan must be accompanied by a numerous entourage of kinsfolk and attendants, making a large party. If there were to be a transhipment at Cochin or some other Indian port, a long delay might ensue before a vessel could be found to carry so many passengers on to Arabia. So, for those reasons or perhaps others, the Sultan opted to travel on an Arab sailing

ship bound direct for Arabia. In reply to his enquiries the Penang government informed the Sultan that the fare from Penang to Arabia would be $30 for each man and $50 for each woman, plus $500 for the use of half the round-house. If the party was to be picked up at Klang, that would add $1,000 to $1,500 to the expense, but the Governor offered to send a Penang vessel (at the Sultan's expense!) to bring the party across.[28]

Either the cost or the deteriorating political situation induced the Sultan to abandon his plan. He had learnt some time before, with much dismay, that Malacca was to be returned to Dutch occupation, and on 21 September 1818 the transfer was made. Governor Bannerman of Penang shared the Sultan's concern, and in anticipation of Dutch attempts to reassert their monopoly of the purchase of tin from Selangor (and Perak) he had proposed that (1) the East India Company should have 'most favoured nation' treatment at Selangor (and Perak and some other) ports, thus effectively overriding any Dutch attempt to reestablish their monopoly and (2) the EIC should contract to buy a substantial portion of the local output of tin. Perak leaders, at odds with each other and under threat of Siamese domination would not go beyond (1), but in Selangor the British envoy (W. S. Cracroft) was 'received with eagerness nad his business transacted with despatch'; Sultan Ibrahim wrote to Bannerman of his 'joy and satisfaction'.[29]

The Dutch countered by sending a mission to Selangor to assert that the treaty of 17 July 1786, by which Selangor had conceded to them a monopoly of the purchase of Selangor tin was still in force and that they found it 'difficult to comprehend' how the Sultan had made commitments (to the EIC) in breach of it.[30] The Sultan wrote to Penang that he was 'like one divided between iron on the right hand and iron on the left hand -- cut in two'.[31] Bannerman could not extract from Calcutta (still less from London) backing for a showdown with the Dutch, and his death in August 1819 removed from the scene the only British official who was really determined on such measures. Without British support the Sultan gave in to Dutch pressure and signed a treaty which renewed that of 1786. In the end it did not greatly affect the situation. Britain and Holland were at odds over the foundation of Singapore, and the Governor-General in Batavia did not find it expedient to ratify the new treaty with Selangor.[32] Under the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1824, Holland gave up Malacca for good and withdrew from the Straits region.

The inconclusive diplomacy of 1818-1819 does nonetheless provide information on the situation in Selangor at that time. After Cracroft's mission to Selangor Governor Bannerman sent another official of the Penang government, John Anderson, to negotiate with the Sultan for the purchase of tin; Anderson thus obtained at firsthand much of the information already reproduced in the passage above on the population and settlement of Selangor. Cracroft and Anderson, as a two-man committee, reported that exports of tin from Selangor 'had formed part of Penang's trade for some time,' and that they thought that it should be possible for the Penang Government to contract for the annual purchase of 700 *baharas* [2,100 *pikuls*], which was about two thirds of the total Selangor output, at a price of about $45 per *bahara*. The tin could then be resold to Penang merchants at a considerable profit.[33]

In effect the government was to relieve local merchants of the political risks created by Dutch and Siamese actions in the Straits region, and safeguard a valuable trade link which had developed since the Dutch gave up Malacca in 1795. It is confirmation of the economic recovery in Selangor after the collapse of 1786.

The original 'tin scheme' promoted by Bannerman provided for the appointment in Selangor (and in each other major source of supply) of a resident 'native agent', who would buy tin and ship it to Penang by Chinese junk. Anderson was given the task of setting up these buying agencies. He found it difficult to achieve in Perak, but he was able to make a contract with Sultan Ibrahim for the purchase of 500 *baharas* annually at a price of $43 per *bahara*. We have already seen that Bugis rulers were much more accustomed than their Malay contemporaries to engaging directly in commercial transactions. The Sultan obtained a down payment against the delivery of the initial 100 *baharas*, and reported to Penang from time to time the accumulation of 250 *baharas* awaiting shipment.[34]

Anderson concluded, however, that purchase -- from all sources of supply -- through 'native agents' was not the best method. He therefore proposed that a single buying post should be established on Pangkor island, off the coast of Perak, to which tin from all States would be shipped.

In the event it proved unnecessary to pursue counter-measures of this kind because, long before their withdrawal from Malacca in 1825, the Dutch had failed in their attempt to re-establish their hold on the tin trade of the Straits. As a result Selangor, among other producers, was free to sell its tin in markets of its own choice. In response to the powerful attraction of Singapore as a 'free port', large numbers of the trading population of Malacca migrated to the new metropolis. Governor Thyssen of Malacca, who had intimidated Sultan Ibrahim in 1818, was now as helpless as King Canute before the incoming tide. He prohibited the migration to Singapore 'on pain of fines, imprisonment and confiscation of property and posted patrol boats at the river's mouth' but in vain. By 1822 his port was almost deserted and 'lifeless dulness reigns at Malacca.' Total receipts at Malacca from export and import duties and harbour dues fell from $50,592 in 1815 to $23,282 in 1821 and a mere $7,217 in 1823.[35]

The other major and long-drawn crisis in the Malay Peninsula in the last decade (1816-1826) of the reign of Sultan Ibrahim arose from Siam's attempts to reassert its authority, dormant during the struggle between Siam and Burma, over Kedah, Perak, Kelantan, and Trengganu, as tributaries which had sent the 'Golden Flower' (*Bunga Mas*) to Siam. Selangor had emerged as a state only half a century before, but it had occupied parts of Perak in 1806, and in 1770-1773 had fought a war in Kedah, actions which Siam regarded as an affront to its dignity as suzerain. The Siamese, represented by the Raja of Ligor, the Siamese proconsul who directed the push southwards, were minded to seek revenge against these presumptuous Bugis.[36]

Selangor was at the extreme limit of Siamese intervention, but that was a risk best avoided. When Kedah forces, under Siamese instructions occupied Perak in 1817-1818, Selangor withdrew from the places along the estuary of the Perak River and coastline which it had held since 1806, probably as outposts through which to

divert to Selangor tin produced in Perak.[37] In 1822 the Siamese occupied Kedah itself, and Sultan Ibrahim seized the opportunity of that diversion to send his own troops back into Perak to expel the Kedah and Siamese force and so reoccupy the territory which he had lost.[38] This defiance enraged the bellicose Raja of Ligor, who began to mobilise a fleet of *perahu* in north Kedah ports (Trang, Kuala Kedah, Setul and Perlis); altogether his expeditionary force was reported to number 200 *perahu* and 4,000 men.

Sultan Ibrahim had once told the British authorities at Penang, concerned at his incursion into Perak, that 'this country I have taken by force of Powder and Ball, which Custom the Governor of Pinang is acquainted with'.[39] He now assembled men and ships in northern Selangor to resist the expected Siamese onslaught. Malay forces, however resolute in attack, found mere waiting a trial on their patience and the Selangor men 'engaged in a little desultory piracy to keep their spirits up'.[40] The prospect of Siamese forces penetrating as far south as Selangor added to the concern in Penang, where Robert Fullerton had become Governor in 1824. Fullerton intended to bring Siamese expansion to a halt. He warned the Raja of Ligor that he would not permit the Siamese fleet to pass through the narrow straits between Penang and the mainland to attack Perak and Selangor, and he sent out naval patrols into these waters to indicate that his threat was to be taken seriously. It sufficed to keep the flotilla of the Raja of Ligor 'on the beach' of their north Kedah bases.[41]

After stabilisng the local situation Fullerton negotiated with the Raja of Ligor, undertaking to 'effect the removal of Rajah Hussein of Salangore' from Perak in return for the Siamese leader's promise that 'no Siamese force by land or water shall proceed to Salangore'.[42] Anderson was then sent to negotiate a treaty with Sultan Ibrahim, who gave him a very friendly welcome and readily agreed to a new treaty to confirm the basic principle of Cracroft's treaty of 1818, providing for 'most favoured nation' treatment of British trade through Selangor ports.

With characteristic obstinacy the old Sultan Ibrahim argued at length about the settlement of small monetary claims between Selangor and Perak, and it remained for his more accommodating successor to accept a net claim of $345 against Selangor. Rather less satisfactory, in the long term, was the treaty provision to fix the boundary between Perak and Selangor not at a watershed, as was customary, but on the line of the Bernam River, thus bisecting the Malay settlement at Bernam. There was a common form article by which the Sultan undertook 'not to permit any pirates to resort to any part of his territory' and to hand over any pirates 'who may escape to Salangore.' There was indeed a growing problem of piracy which would lead to British threats of action against Selangor in the next few years. In the long term that article would provide the pretext for British intervention in Selangor in 1874.[43]

Sultan Ibrahim had begun his adult life as a Bugis fighting captain but he had matured into an entrepreneur and diplomat who had built up Selangor from a shaky start into modest prosperity and complete independence. Yet apart from the coastal fringe of small ports and villages, and a few settlements along the rivers, inland Selangor was still in 1826 an empty country. As a strong ruler over a small population, Ibrahim had enforced the peace among a turbulent community by per-

sonal authority and by keeping his young men occupied with wars and talk of wars, or by sending them abroad, like Raja Hussein in Perak. Such a personal regime could not outlive the ruler.

Notes

1. D.K.Bassett, 'Anglo-Malay Relations 1786-1795,' *JMBRAS* 38(2),1965, for this passage. Op. cit., p.191, for the quotations from letters in the EIC archives. The Sultan's reminder, dated 4 *Safar* 1200 A.H.(7 December 1785) is one of the specimen Malay letters to Francis Light of the 'Praxis' (practical exercises) appended to W.Marsden, *A Dictionary and Grammar of the Malay Language*, 2 vols., Cox and Baylis, London 1812, reprinted Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1984, vol.2, p.147.
2. EIC letter quoted by H.P.Clodd, *Malaya's First British Pioneer - The Life of Francis Light*, Luzac, London, 1948. p.39.
3. Lee Kam Hing, *The Sultanate of Aceh: Relations with the British 1760-1824*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1995, pp.76 and 80. J.Anderson, *Political and Commercial Considerations Relative to the Malayan Peninsula and the British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca*, Government Press, Penang, 1824, reprinted in *JMBRAS* 35(4), 1962) pp.195-96. The letter from Sultan Ibrahim to Light is in Marsden, op.cit., p.150. Raja Ali Haji ibni Ahmad, *Tuhfat al-Nafis*, translated and annotated by V. Matheson (Hooker) and B. W. Andaya (as *The Precious Gift*), Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1982, p.379 n4.4.
4. Bassett, op. cit., for a detailed review of this phase of British policy. Letter from the wife of the Selangor Raja Muda (at that time Raja Nala, younger brother of Sultan Ibrahim) in E.U.Kratz, 'The Light Letters 1786-1794', A.T.Gallop, *The Legacy of the Malay Letter,* British Library (for Arkib Negara), London, 1994, p.133. Lee Kam Hing, op.cit., p.219, on the career of Syed Hussain.
5. Raja Ali Haji, op.cit., p.194f.
6. Ibid., pp.196-203.
7. Ibid., pp.214-215.
8. Clodd, op. cit., p.37. In the end the amount of the annual payment was fixed at $6,000, later increased to $10,000 in consideration of the cession in 1800 of Province Wellesley; op. cit., pp.82-83.
9. Raja Ali Haji, op. cit., pp.160-161. See also Khoo Kay Kim, *Malay Society - Transformation and Democratization,* 'The Demise of the Traditional Entrepot', Pelanduk Publications, Petaling Jaya, 1991, pp.52-82. When Joseph Balestier was appointed the first American Consul at Riau in 1833, he decided to reside at Singapore since there was not one European merchant at Riau and 'despite its fine harbour not a single trading vessel was to be seen.' Sharon Ahmad, 'Joseph B Balestier: The First American Consul in Singapore,' *JMBRAS* 39(2), 1966, p.110.
10. F.A.Swettenham, *Sir Frank Swettenham's Malayan Journals 1874-1876*, edited by P.L.Burns and C.D.Cowan, Oxford University Press, 1975, p.226, entry dated 30 March 1875. His description is supplemented by a useful sketch map. In 1883 (*AR Selangor 1883* para 15,) Swettenham reported that the dam. which had 'been in existence for about 100 years' and had not shown signs of weakness, had burst with loss of life. Taken literally this would date the building of the dam in the 1780's, but it seems more likely that Swettenham was imprecise, seeking to emphasise that no one had reason to expect such a venerable structure to give way. The 1780's were a period in which the Selangor Bugis were much preoccupied with wars and in the early 1790's the export of tin had almost come to a standstill. The technique described is *lampan* mining though on a much larger scale than was usual in Malay mining.
11. J.M.Gullick, *Malay Society in the late Nineteenth Century - the Beginnings of Change*, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1987, p.151 and p.170 n.2. Wong Lin Ken, *The Malayan Tin Industry to 1914*, University of Arizona Press, Tucson, 1965, p.43. Swettenham's report of 8 April 1875 enclosed with SSD 27 April 1875 (printed in C1320).
12. P.Sullivan, *Social Relations of Dependence in a Malay State: Nineteenth Century Perak*, MBRAS Mono-

graph No 10, 1982, argues that these traditional rights to service had been exploited, especially in tin mining, as a 'capitalist mode of production'. However E.Sadka, *The Protected Malay States 1874-1895*, University of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1968, p.85, concludes that such labour was not used 'on any significant scale to develop mining...'. Reviewing Sullivan's study in *Kajian Malaysia* 11(1), 1984, J.S.Kahn and P.H.Kratoska drew attention to a number of flaws in Sullivan's case.

13. R.O.Winstedt, 'History of Negri Sembilan,' *JMBRAS* 12(3), 1934, pp.42-58. The Bugis had dealings with the local headmen of Rembau; Raja Ali Haji, op. cit., pp.107-108 (1757) and p.171f (1784). They may even have occupied, for a time, Sungei Ujong, whose Malay chief still bears the Bugis title of Dato' Klana; Winstedt, loc. cit., p.58.
14. R.O.Winstedt, 'A History of Selangor', *JMBRAS* 12(3), 1934, p.113.
15. R.J.Wilkinson, *A Malay-English Dictionary (Romanised)*, 2 parts, Salavopoulos and Kinderlis, Mytilene, 1932, pt. 2, p.319, notes that 'Orang Rawa' is 'a name given loosely (in Peninsular Malay) to non-Minangkabau immigrants from central Sumatra' although the true 'Rawa' were aborigines of Siak who did not emigrate. The Mandailing district (on the Sumatran west coast) and Batu Bara (on the east) were south of Aceh and its dependencies and north of the Minangkabau highland district.
16. J.Anderson, op.cit. The Introduction to the 1962 reprint by J.S.Bastin explains the origin and purpose of Anderson's book.
17. Anderson, op cit., p.53.
18. T.J.Newbold, *Political and Statistical Account of the British Settlements of the Straits of Malacca* etc. 2 vols., Murray, London, 1839, reprinted Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1971, vol.2, p.29. See Chapter 3 below for fuller extracts from Newbold's book, and the basis of his knowledge of Selangor.
19. Anderson, op. cit., p.190. In Anderson's time the Raja Muda was the Sultan's son and successor, the future Sultan Mohamed.
20. Ibid., pp.191-192.
21. Ibid., pp.196 and 123.
22. Ibid., p.199. Among the villages identified as mining centres are such familiar names (in modern times) as Petaling, Serdang and Batu. Most intriguing of all, since it produced the most tin, is Anderson's 'Sungei Lumpoor'. Could this be 'Kuala Lumpur', a place name whose origin is uncertain?
23. Ibid., pp.200 and 202. See Chapter 3 below on the origin and growth of Lukut.
24. Loc. cit., and also p.204.
25. Newbold, op. cit. p.29. Khoo Kay Kim, *The Western Malay States 1850-1873 - The Effects of Commercial Development on Malay Politics*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1972, p.19 for a preliminary survey (at 1850) of the traditional Selangor system, and see also the same author's 'Raja Lumu/Sultan Salehuddin - the Founding of the Selangor Dynasty', *JMBRAS* 58(2), 1985, pp.10-11.
    The word '*Penggawa*' is of Sanskrit origin and its traditional sense denoted a military or naval commander. Wilkinson, *Dictionary*, Pt 2, p.243 and L.Y.Andaya, 'the Bugis-Makassar Diaspora,' *JMBRAS* 68(1), 1995, p.138 n62. It seems that Sultan Ibrahim conferred the title on some of his lieutenants; he may have given them territorial responsibilities, such as Newbold suggests. They took part in the discussions to choose a successor to Sultan Mohamed in 1857, but in 1874, when Braddell described the constitution, only the Dato Aru was 'important'.
26. Anderson, op. cit., p.193.
27. Marsden, op. cit. p.150.
    Kratz/Gallop (cited in Note 4 above), reproduces in facsimile (Letter No 161 at p.139) another letter from Sultan Ibrahim, seeking help for pilgrims in 1786, and comments (p.141) that such letters 'show the role of EIC shipping for the pilgrimage, as it was the protection of the Company flags, her ships, and a Company travel document which ensured a safer passage for many pilgrims from Pinang to India, where they changed ship in order to continue their quest to the Arab Peninsula.'

28. Winstedt, *Selangor*, p.11, using material from a letter of 9 September 1818 from Governor Bannerman to Sultan Ibrahim. See also C. D. Cowan, 'Governor Bannerman and the Penang Tin Scheme 1818-1819.' *JMBRAS* 23(1), 1950, p.73.
29. Cowan, *Tin Scheme*, p.58, for the Sultan's cordial reception of Cracroft and the treaty (letter dated 22 August 1818). For the text of the treaty J.de V.Allen, A.J. Stockwell and L.R.Wright (eds.), *A Collection of Treaties and Other Documents affecting the States of Malaysia 1761-1963*, 2 vols., Oceana Publications, London and New York, 1981, vol.1, p.436.
30. Cowan, *Tin Scheme*, and see also his 'Early Penang and the Rise of Singapore, 1805-32,' *JMBRAS* 23 (2), 1950 for a detailed account of the negotiations with rulers of various tin-producing states, with a selection of original documents.
31. Letter dated 15 May 1819 from Sultan Ibrahim to Governor Bannerman, reproduced in translation in Cowan, *Early Penang*, pp.93-94. See also Cowan, *Tin Scheme*, p.75.
32. Cowan, *Tin Scheme*, p.76.
33. Ibid., pp.60-63. Points on the coast of Perak occupied by Selangor (1805-1816) had included Pangkor Island the designated main port of export.
34. Cowan, *Tin Scheme*, pp.73 and 75.
35. C.M.Turnbull, 'Melaka under British Colonial Rule', K.S.Sandhu and P.Wheatley (eds.), *Melaka - the Transformation of a Malay Capital c.1400-1980*, 2 vols., Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1983, vol.1, p.247. Turnbull cites J.Crawfurd, *Journal of an Embassy...to the Courts of Siam and Indo-China*, Henry Colburn, London, 1828, reprinted Oxford University Press, 1987, p.41, on the 'lifeless dulness' of Malacca in 1822.
36. The following general histories of the period provide comprehensive coverage of the topics of the brief passage in the text:- L.A.Mills, 'British Malaya 1824-1867', *JMBRAS* 3(2), 1925, reprinted with additions by C.M.Turnbull and D. A. Bassett, *JMBRAS* 33(3), 1960; K.G.Tregonning, *The British in Malaya*, University of Arizona Press, Tucson, 1965; D.G.E. Hall, *A History of South-East Asia*, MacMillan, London, 4th ed. 1984, Part III ('The Period of European Territorial Expansion'); and D.G.E.Hall, *Henry Burney - A Political Biography*, Oxford University Press, London, 1974.

    Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, *Thai-Malay Relations: Traditional Intra-regional Relations from the Seventeenth to the Early Twentieth Centuries*, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1988, draws on Thai archive sources in Bangkok to provide a valuable account of Siamese perceptions of their historic role as suzerain of the north Malayan States.
37. In 1806 Selangor forces had penetrated up the Perak River as far as Rantau Panjang (ie the junction of the Kinta and Perak Rivers) but had later been forced to withdraw to Kuala Bidor, still some distance upstream from Tanjung Putus, where the Dutch had had their eighteenth century post. See B.W.Andaya, *Perak - The Abode of Grace - A Study of an Eighteenth Century Malay State*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1979, map 5 at p.xv.

    Raja Hussain of Selangor, and his kinsman, Raja (later Sultan) Mohamed, had charge of the Selangor posts in Perak between the Dindings and the estuary of the Perak River and levied duties on tin exported down the river. Anderson, op. cit., p.189. See also Raja Ali Haji, op.cit., p.379 fo 278, n 3, for a useful summary of the Selangor occupation of parts of Perak.
38. *The Burney Papers*, 5 vols., 1910-1914, Bangkok, vol. 2, p.221.
39. Anderson, op. cit., p.189.
40. Cowan, *Early Penang* , p.13.
41. Tregonning, op. cit., p.97.
42. Allen, Stockwell and Wright, op. cit., vol.2, pp.309-310, for the treaty of 31 July 1825 made between Henry Burney (for the EIC) and the Raja of Ligor, articles 1 and 5. The subsequent, and more elaborate, treaty of 20 June 1826, negotiated by Burney in Bangkok provided, in article 14, that ' the English will not allow the State of Salangore to attack or disturb Perak and the Siamese shall not go and attack or disturb Salangore.' Ibid. p.318. The immediate *casus belli* for the Siamese in 1824 was the seizure by Selangor of 40 Siamese boats carrying 205 *baharas* of Perak tin. Winstedt, *Selangor*, p.13.

43. Ibid. vol 1., p.489, gives the text of the treaty of 20 August 1825 between the EIC and Selangor, articles 2 (boundary at Bernam) and 4 and 5 (piracy). Winstedt, *Selangor*, pp.15-16, for the disputed claims.

Most Malay settlements were on the banks of rivers (Gullick, *Malay Society*, p.98). The watersheds were a barrier between river valleys and a convenient zone in which to place a boundary between States, since no one lived there. Although Perak continued, even in the early years of colonial rule, to lay claim to part of Bernam, it was politically part of Selangor, ruled by a local branch of the Selangor dynasty (Chapters 3 and 5).

Chapter Three

Tin Mines and Power Struggles 1826-1864

The death of Sultan Ibrahim coincided with the end of external threats to the State of Selangor. The Straits Settlements Government was constrained to a policy of non-intervention in the Malay States and committed to promoting unrestricted trade with its neighbours. The Governor might occasionally admonish the Sultan over piracy or unpaid debts, but these were light taps on the wrist, without the threat of a blockade or even an invasion of his territory such as the Dutch and the Siamese had made.

1826 was not so much the beginning of a new era as the start of a period in which some existing trends gathered momentum. The philoprogenitive Sultan Ibrahim was survived by at least ten adult sons, and they of course had numerous children - Sultan Mohamed was said to have fathered nineteen. With a ruling dynasty expanding at this headlong rate, the competition for a limited number of positions of power, and wealth, became acute. Sultan Ibrahim, like Sultan Salehuddin before him, had conferred the title of Raja Muda partly to promote the claims of his chosen heir. Sultan Mohamed (r.1826-1857) had been Raja Muda for quarter of a century at least before his accession, and so had played a prominent part in his father's regime. However when the old ruler died, brothers and cousins challenged the claims of Mohamed to the throne. He was not the eldest son nor born of the late ruler's senior consort (*isteri tua*), thus providing grounds for challenge not uncommon in dynasties in which polygamy was normal practice.[1] However the assembly of notables, ie lesser royals and *orang besar* preferred Raja Mohamed to the other claimants, and he was duly elected and installed.[2]

The accepted tradition is that Sultan Mohamed was a weak (*lemah*) ruler who allowed the state to disintegrate into a collection of districts, whose chiefs were at odds with each other and beyond his control.[3] The contemporary European view in the 1830's was that 'the country had lapsed into comparative decay [under] this indolent and sensual prince.'[4] Governor Murchison noted in 1836 that 'the Raja of Selangor has a rather bad reputation.'[5] There may be some prejudice in this disparagement. Sultan Mohamed had as a young man been a fighting captain but he did not inherit the aura of unchallenged leadership which had carried his father through setbacks in his turbulent reign. In the Straits ports it was alleged that the Selangor

coast was a nest of pirates, though the Sultan denied it, and the naval measures against piracy never directly affected Selangor or its people.[6] Malacca merchants lent the Sultan substantial sums to open tin mines, which failed, leaving the Sultan unable to pay his debts. He may have had poor business judgment but, so far from being indolent, modern scholarship sees him as 'a vigorous businessman, determined to develope the state's tin resurces.'[7] It is unlikely that his father, the forceful Sultan Ibrahim, would have preferred him to his half-brothers if he had been totally ineffectual.

Another factor in a changing situation was the Bugis tradition (Chapter 1) that the ruler was merely the head of a confederal regime, in which each local grandee or community expected to be left to manage its own affairs. In the first half of the long reign (1782-1826) of Sultan Ibrahim military necessity, whether defensive or offensive, had made strong leadership the price to be paid for Bugis survival on the Selangor coast, and the same factor came back into play against Dutch and Siamese pressure (1816-1824). Sultan Mohamed inherited a more or less peaceful state which, by 1826, comprised a much larger territory, requiring dispersion of authority. There was an interesting oral tradition that Sultan Mohamed was a man of exceptional physique who 'had killed a tiger with his hands and could push over a buffalo with great ease. No one had ever imagined that any man could be so tall.'[8] Taking these clues together, one has a picture of a ruler who believed and acted on the conviction that making money was the best route to political authority, but was unequal to the task.[9] It must be conceded however that his reign saw a gradual decline of Selangor into a condition of near anarchy, which was precursor to the disastrous civil war of 1867-1873.

Although the threat of direct military intervention had receded, a different external influence was at work, which a leading study has characterized as 'dynamic economic energies which began to penetrate ever more deeply into the peninsula [as a result of] the stabilizing of the international situation and the foundation of the Straits Settlements.'[10] In Selangor, and other states of western Malaya, this penetration took the form of an expansion of tin-mining, with the introduction of Chinese labour and foreign, mainly Chinese capital.[11]

The advent of Chinese tin miners was associated with, and indeed made necessary by, a change in mining technique. As illustrated by the large mine in Ulu Selangor (Chapter 2) Malay sluicing (*lampan*) for tin could be developed into major enterprises in terms of the surface area worked. However they did not afford the means of reaching the richer deposits which lay at a depth of twenty feet or more below the surface of alluvial soil in the valley bottom. Malay shaft mines (*lombong Siam*) carried the risk of subsiding side walls. The Chinese tackled the problem by opening much larger pits (*lombong*), initially over a moderate area but capable of being enlarged sideways to follow the ore deposits in their unpredictable course. Excavations on this scale required a large concentration of manpower for continuous working. Continuity was essential since a pit dug in low ground soon flooded by seepage or rainfall; abandoned mines quickly deteriorated into 'mining pools'. On a working mine the first task of the day was to bale out the water which had accumulated

overnight. Later the Chinese used an ingenious waterwheel pump (*kinchir*), which they had developed for irrigation in their native China.

Continuous mine working, which could not fit into the Malay agricultural cycle, was only possible for the Chinese if they felt secure in a strange, and often turbulent, country. Hence the first Chinese miners in Malaya worked (from 1793) in the safe enclave of Malacca territory, to recover gold and tin.[12] Although mining around Malacca continued until the mid-nineteenth century, the Chinese miners moved cautiously into adjoining Sungei Ujong, It also spread to Lukut, where the mines were not in the remote and dangerous interior; there were Chinese miners at work at Lukut from 1815.[13] The remarkable success of the Lukut mines over the ensuing half century was not only an encouragement, but also the source of capital, for later ventures elsewhere in the State. Its story, though familiar, is instructive. When Anderson wrote his survey (Chapter 2), based on his visit to Selangor in 1818, Lukut's population was about a thousand people, of whom one fifth were Chinese. It appears that the miners, Malay and then Chinese, arrived first, and their success led to the imposition of local Malay rule. The first Malay ruler of Lukut was Raja or Tengku Busu, 'a chief and near relation of the Sultan [Mohamed] universally respected by the Malays.' It appears nonetheless that he took Lukut, in Bugis fashion, of his own initiative and not by royal grant; he did not pay over to the Sultan any part of his revenues. He was an effective administrator, and if he had become Sultan 'might have rescued this once powerful state from its present degraded conndition.' [14] He brought in more Chinese to expand the output of the mines.

As was customary, Busu taxed the miners, requiring them to deliver to him one tenth of their output. This impost, and possibly Busu's assumption of the 'entire direction', of the mines, antagonised both the local Chinese and also some Malacca merchants, who were probably their financial backers.[15] As a result Busu 'fell victim to a singular conspiracy of the Chinese miners.' Some 300--400 Chinese came to his house one dark rainy night in September 1834 and their rage was increased on finding it 'surrounded with ore in various forms.' To their demand that Busu should come out and parley with them over their grievances, he sent a defiant reply that as a Muslim he was not afraid to die. The Chinese set fire to the houses of Busu and other Malay 'employers' and 'massacred them indiscriminately.' A century later Busu's grave was 'still an object of veneration in the neighbourhood.' The angry Malay survivors ambushed the Chinese as they tried to escape over the border to Malacca territory. Thereafter the Lukut mines were abandoned for a time. This was not the first Sino-Malay clash; in 1828 nearly 1,000 Chinese on the Sungei Ujong mines (at Rasah on the outskirts of the modern Seremban) were killed or fled, with the result that there was 'depopulation of the mines.' [16]

Within a year or two the lure of profitable mining brought in some Chinese resolute enough to reopen the Lukut mines. In the death of Raja Busu Sultan Mohamed saw the opportunity to assert his authority over this important district on his frontier. He visited Lukut, probably in 1836, to proclaim it to be Selangor territory and to restore Malay rule.[17] More important than the Sultan's dominant physical presence was his decision to appoint Raja Jumaat to be chief of Lukut; it

was the beginning of Jumaat's rise to become *de facto* ruler of Selangor a quarter of a century later. It was a sensible choice since Jumaat's father, Raja Jaafar, a son of Yam Tuan Muda Raja Ali of Riau-Johor (r.1784-1805), had settled at Lukut some time before, with his sons Rajas Jumaat and Abdullah. It was an instance of the inflow of Bugis entrepreneurs from Riau into the richer fields of Selangor. As Sultan Mohamed's wives included Raja Asiah, a daughter of Yam Tuan Ali, Jumaat was his nephew by marriage. Again one notes how kinship and affinity worked within a still close-knit group of Bugis leaders. Nonetheless Jumaat, as a Riau Bugis, was an interloper in the eyes of the throng of descendants of the Selangor Sultans. Jumaat had the advantage over his local born country cousins of wider connections, in particular with the Malacca businessmen who trusted him enough to lend him money. He also found a mentor in Lieutenant Colonel Ronald Macpherson, one of the Indian Army officers who made a new career in civil administration in the Straits Settlements. Macpherson was Resident Councillor [chief administrator] at Malacca between 1857 and 1860, when Jumaat's influence on the government of Selangor was reaching its peak.[18]

This was a period in which the more thoughtful Malay men of power were beginning to consider whether adopting some elements of British colonial practice would resolve the growing problems of Malay traditional government (*kerajaan*) in dealing with the economic development of their states.[19] Jumaat was one of the earliest Malay administrators to experiment on these lines. Under his rule Lukut had a small uniformed police force, a customs house, and a well-laid out township with a main street of shophouses, built of brick and roofed with tiles, 'scrupulously clean and well drained', and 'large and massively built godowns.' All these amenities brought in Chinese traders, mainly Hailam, as well as miners, and produced 'a general air of contentment.'[20] Raja Jumaat maintained his authority in Malay fashion with a well-built fort on a hill above the town, protected by cannon. By good fortune new and rich tin ore deposits were found at Lukut in the 1840's, as world demand for tin was increasing, with the result that Jumaat's revenues in the 1850's were running at the level of $10,000 pm.

The remarkable success of the Lukut mines encouraged Sultan Mohamed and others to enter into similar ventures. For this purpose Sultan Mohamed borrowed from Malacca merchants, to whom after ten years of failure, he owed $169,000. In 1839, and again in 1846, the Sultan returning from a visit to relatives at Riau, broke his journey at Malacca, where his creditors seized the opportunity of threatening him with arrest for debt. On both occasions Raja Jumaat was with the Sultan and was able, as guarantor of the royal debts, to extricate the Sultan from his embarassment. On the first of these occasions, in 1839, Raja Jumaat made his political position more secure by marrying a daughter of the Sultan, Raja Senai (or Nai). For his services in 1846 he was rewarded with a royal grant in writing of the Lukut district, which by this stage extended to the estuary of the Linggi River, including Sungai Raya as a dependency. The grant was in perpetuity:-

'...the same is to descend to the children and grandchildren of Raja Jemahat;

it became the gift of us the Yang de Pertuan, that our Heirs and Successors are not to claim it hereafter because it is in truth and in fact we have affixed our chop to this paper.'[21]

Such a permanent disposition of territory by a ruler was probably contrary to Malay custom, and this grant was destined to cause a major dispute forty years later.

The Sultan's unsuccessful mining ventures were in the Klang valley, where there was certainly plenty of tin. Nothing is known of the reasons why the Sultan's mines were unprofitable. His reaction was to assign the Klang valley to the charge of his eldest son, Raja Sulaiman, but he too did not have the skill or ability to achieve successful development.[22]

The Malay ruling class was running into the hard reality that mining on this scale was a business enterprise requiring management skills which most of them lacked, even if - and it was unusual - they were able to live close at hand and give the mines their sustained personal supervision. As might be expected, Raja Jumaat had grasped this point before his contemporaries. It was useless to secure a grant of Lukut in perpetuity unless his heirs could manage it successfully. His son, Raja Bot, recalled that at about the age of ten his father sent him to Malacca, where he first lived with Macpherson and attended the English school, and 'was then given into the charge of Baba Chi Yam Chuan', where he dealt with Malay correspondence and with 'prices and other details of business [and was] required to keep accounts of dealings between my people and the Chinese merchant.'[23]

Raja Sulaiman may have lacked expertise in promoting tin mining but he seems to have encouraged the export of 'Straits produce' from the Klang valley. The evidence for this is that he built a house some miles upstream from Klang town, at Bukit Bangkong near Damansara village. This place was 10-15 miles distant from the mines of the interior and may have been chosen as a centre for trading with the aborigine community (the Besisi) who lived in that central part of the valley and were collectors from whom Malay traders purchased rattan, gutta percha, *damar* and other jungle produce.[24]

The 'gigantic' mine opened c.1800 near Kuala Kubu in Ulu Selangor (Chapter 2) was an inducement to Malay notables to prospect there again for other tin deposits. Raja Bot asserted that the pioneers were his father and his uncle, Raja Abdullah, but, if it was so, they were associated with another Malay chief, Raja (later Sultan) Abdul Samad, to whom (c.1844) Sultan Mohamed had assigned the charge of Kuala Selangor.[25]

Raja Abdul Samad, like Raja Jumaat, had the initial advantage of being a nephew of the Sultan, he consolidated this tie by his marriage to a daughter of Sultan Mohamed, Raja Atfah, and was given Kuala Selangor to govern. His hereditary fief, however, was the Langat valley, which had been ruled by Abdul Samad's father, Raja Abdullah who was a younger brother of Sultan Mohamed, and probably one of his supporters in the disputed succession of 1826.[26] The complexities of Abdul Samad's character, exhibited during his long reign (1857-1898) must wait for a later chapter. At this stage in his career, when he was a man of about forty years of



Bandar Langat and Klang

Bandar Langat, some thirty miles upstream from the Langat River estuary, became the royal capital on the accession of Sultan Abdul Samad in 1857. The long, winding and strongly tidal stretch between the town and the sea prevented sudden raids by pirates or other attackers, but it was an inconvenient route for goods or travellers. A tributary (the Kluang) joined the Langat, from the south, at Bandar Langat, and the Jugra inlet (Kuala Jugra), with the Jugra stream running into it, provided a natural waterway almost as far as Jugra Hill. The American miners made a trial 'cut', said to have been no more than 200 yards long, to link the Kluang and Jugra streams. Owing to differences in tide levels between the Langat River, at Bandar Langat, and the sea at Jugra, there was a violent flow of water through the channel, which eroded its banks, widened the cut and so made a waterway which boats and small lighters could pass through. In the early 1880's a road was made to carry goods and people between Jugra and Bandar Langat. For Sources see Chapter 3 Note 30.

Klang Town was sited well inland from the estuary for similar reasons. Here the ultimate solution (c.1900) was the construction of a cargo port (Port Swettenham) on the coast with a railway link to Klang and Kuala Lumpur.

age, his uncle, Sultan Mohamed, had recognised him as a useful executive aide and a good man of business.[27]

The Langat valley witnessed one of the most unusual episodes in the history of tin mining of this period, It began in the late 1840's with the arrival of an 'American gentleman' to inspect the thriving tin mines in Malacca territory; he went on to look at mining prospects 'in the Malayan states to the north and south,' and produced a 'very favourable' report likely to be 'duly appreciated by his enterprising countrymen, whose habit it is to plunge *in medias res*.'[28] However some years elapsed before 'about a dozen Americans with a following of some 60 *Orang Hitam* ('Blacks')' opened a mine at Sungei Tangkas near Rekoh (Ulu Langat) from which they 'got a considerable quantity of ore.' Even twenty years later their abandoned mine was 'a huge pond' with the remains of a 'good road' from the mine to Rekoh. However they did not employ the services of the 'Great Medicine-Man', a magician and diviner of 'great fame throughout the country....reputed to have the power of turning rock into ore, and vice versa.' Hell hath no fury like an expert scorned. The enraged magician did not show his prowess by converting their ore deposits into rock, but led a night attack on the house in which they lived, killing three of the Americans and half a dozen labourers; the house was burnt down. The miners moved temporarily to Bagan Terendah, but soon decided against continuing to mine in such a hostile environment and so 'made their way downstream to Kuala Langat', and thus disappeared (c.1855) from the annals of Selangor.[29]

The same American miners, seeking to improve their communications, made a canal to provide a short cut from the Langat River, a few miles above its estuary, and the Jugra inlet from the sea, only a mile away. It was still in use a quarter of a century after their departure.[30] (Map 4)

The last major mining development of the period was a second attempt, this time under the capable direction of Raja Jumaat and Raja Abdullah, to introduce Chinese miners to the existing mining area, already worked by Malays, around what was to be Kuala Lumpur. Raja Sulaiman, chief of the Klang district, died c.1853. Jumaat then prevailed on the Sultan to pass over the claims of Sulaiman's son, Raja Mahdi, and put the Klang valley under the charge of Jumaat's brother, Raja Abdullah, who had earlier married Raja Khalijah, the Sultan's neice. In 1857 the two brothers borrowed $30,000 from Baba Chi Yam Chuan and Baba Liam Say Hoe of Malacca, to finance a major new project in the upper reaches of the Klang valley. The first party of 87 Chinese miners travelled up the river and disembarked from their boats at the junction of the Gombak River with the Klang River (the Kuala (river junction) of Kuala Lumpur), where the main stream ceased to be navigable to heavy boats. They moved a few miles on to what was to become 'Ampang' (a suburb of modern Kuala Lumpur) and began to dig. However the risk of malaria on newly cleared land was always severe, and within a short time all but seventeen of the original party were dead. Undeterred by this setback, Jumaat despatched an additional 150 Chinese from Lukut, with the result that by 1859 tin exports had begun. The disembarkation point became the trade and supply post for the mines and also the upstream end of the river route to the area. Thus was Kuala Lumpur born. The

Chinese of the Kuala Lumpur district were at odds with those at Kanching, in Ulu Selangor, and their rivalry was one of the factors which began the devastating civil war a few years later.[31]

Whatever his failures as a mining tycoon, Sultan Mohamed was remembered for his active encouragement of agriculture. Raja Bot, writing in 1902, recollected that 'in olden times my grandfather, Sultan Muhammad of Selangor, was himself very fond of planting padi and rigorously imposed on all his subjects doing so too. There were tools and men moreover to work. Those who were slow or who did not toil at padi planting were punished...nothing but padi fields could be seen in those days' along the lower reaches of the Selangor River. In 1857 Selangor padi fetched $2.50 and milled rice $5 for 100 *gantang*, and 'ducks, fowls and goats were cheap.' In the Langat valley Raja (later Sultan) Abdul Samad also gave active help to padi growing throughout his reign -- it was something of an obsession -- but here, in the 1850's, the crop was 'dry padi' grown on clearings (*ladang*) under a system of shifting cultivation. Selangor was at this period able to produce enough rice to feed its small Malay population, but not the Chinese miners. Already the prospect of earning more in mining and related work was tempting Malays away from padi growing; this may explain the strict injunctions attributed to Sultan Mohamed.

Towards the end of the 1850's a rinderpest epidemic decimated the buffalo herds essential in preparing the padi fields (*sawah*). It may have been this disaster which induced the villagers along the Selangor River to plant 'the coconut plantations, which exist [in 1871] on both sides along this river so luxuriantly.' The only other area for which there is data on agriculture is the lower reaches of the Linggi River, where Newbold (c.1835) saw pineapples, bananas and *keladi* (colocasia - a root crop) grown by new settlers who had moved in after the disturbances had driven the original villagers into flight. All along the coast there were fishing villages, salting their surplus catch for sale.

Sultan Mohamed did not live in the fort at Kuala Selangor in military style but had a country seat at Telok Piei, where it was remembered forty years after his death he had a '*tempayan*' (or jar) with a large mouth, which was used for ablution previous to certain religious rites.'[32]

Agriculture, however, could not flourish without stability. Irrigated rice fields or fruit trees are a long-term investment, and in a world in which 'no one could be certain that he would not have to fly on the morrow,' the peasant limited himself to annual crops, such as Newbold saw, and to shifting cultivation, exploiting the fertility of the jungle and then moving on. Fishermen feared to go to sea if they risked being captured and sold into slavery by passing pirates.[33]

Until the 1840's piracy in the Straits was more than a local problem of the coastal villages. The new colonial entrepots of the Straits Settlements depended, as much as Riau and other pre-colonial trade ports, on a satisfactory degree of safety for the local craft plying to and fro with cargoes of Straits produce and imported goods. Much of Selangor's trade was with the nearest main port, Malacca, though Malacca 'quickly became a feeding port for Singapore.'[34] Sultan Mohamed completely denied that either he, or Sultan Ibrahim before him, had allowed pirates to

have bases on his coast.[35] This disclaimer did not, however, convince the naval captains and civil administrators who were energetically pursuing pirates in the Straits. It is unlikely that Sultan Mohamed was personally involved in piracy but he seems to have failed to restrain such activities by his turbulent subjects. The only reference in colonial archives of this period to the future Sultan Abdul Samad describes him as 'a notoriously bad character.' Much later, when the sobriety of age and a crown had come upon him, he insouciantly told a visiting Governor that he now left piracy to younger men.[36] However 'the "Wolf" and the "Diana" brought terror to the pirates who were unaccustomed to steamers and by the 1840's piracy, a major threat to trade in the mid 1830's, had disappeared from the Straits, except for minor depradations.[37]

In April 1832 there was alarm in Perak at rumours of a renewed invasion by Selangor forces. At the other end of Selangor the flight of the inhabitants of the village of Tamponi, just across the border, into Malacca territory in August 1833 was another sign of disorder. The Straits Settlements authorities, preoccupied with the 'Naning War' and piracy at sea, were content to let Selangor alone unless there was a serious incident. The 1840's saw a different problem, ie the growing involvement of Straits merchants in financing mining in Selangor, and the Sultan's default in payment of his debts. However his creditors could only threaten him with civil action for debt and the government did not usually exert any pressure.[38]

British non-intervention did not relieve the Sultan of his internal problems, arising from the rivalry of ambitious men to share the fruits of office, much increased by the steady expansion of tin-mining. When he vacated the office of Raja Muda to become Sultan in 1826, Sultan Mohamed had not appointed a new Raja Muda.[39] He must at his accession have been in early middle age.[40] As he grew older the choice of a successor became more pressing. Two of his adult sons, Raja Sulaiman of Klang and Raja Othman, who seems to have had charge of the southern coastline in the 1830's, together with a younger brother, Raja Yusuf, intrigued for the coveted position of Raja Muda. However the Sultan held them off and, by 1853, had outlived them all.

In the last years of Sultan Mohamed, Raja Jumaat was the power behind the throne. He doubtless recognised that, as an outsider from Riau, he would never be accepted as a potential successor. However he advanced steadily towards assuming the role of deputy ruler. At the time of the written grant of Lukut in 1846, the Sultan also conferred on Jumaat the title of Raja Tua which, by Bugis custom, marked a royal coadjutor of almost equal status.[41] As already mentioned he secured the district of Klang for his brother, Raja Abdullah, and was apparently a business associate (at the Kanching mines) of Raja Abdul Samad, upon whom the title of Tengku Panglima Besar had been conferred. It was a trio strong enough to hold in check the aspirations of the dispossessed son of Raja Sulaiman, Raja Mahdi.

When the death of Raja Sulaiman removed the leading rival contender, Sultan Mohamed gave the title of Raja Muda to Raja Mahmud, his son by his royal consort, Tuan Puan Basik, although Mahmud was (in 1853) still a young boy. Raja Jumaat was to perform the duties of Raja Muda during Mahmud's minority. The

Sultan intended that if he died while Mahmud was too young to govern, there should be an informal council of regency of the ruling trio.[42] However, at the death of Sultan Mohamed in 1857, Raja Jumaat judged it better to promote the outright accession to the throne of Raja Abdul Samad, as the only member of the trio who could possibly (as a grandson of Sultan Ibrahim in the male line) win acceptance.

Sultan Abdul Samad was duly elected in 1857 but the resistance rumbled on for some time. The new ruler was then aged 52 and, as no one then foresaw that he would reach the age of 92, it was quite likely that the throne would conveniently fall vacant when Raja Muda Mahmud was still a young man and of a suitable age to be the successor. It appears that, in an effort to mollify the opposition, the new Sultan was not formally installed and some prospect was held out that he might abdicate in favour of Mahmud later on.[43] The dissidents had no suitable candidate to put forward for immediate selection as ruler, nor even to be regent during the minority of Mahmud if he were elected Sultan. Among the surviving sons of Sultan Mohamed the only man of consequence was Raja Laut (so named because he had been born at sea). However Laut, like the late Raja Sulaiman, was a son born to a secondary wife; he had achieved nothing during his father's life; although he did become Raja Muda in 1898 he was, as was Raja Mahmud in adult life, a distinguished nonentity. Raja Mahdi, son of Raja Sulaiman, bided his time.

For greater personal safety the new Sultan chose to reside in his ancestral fief of Langat. Even so, when his vengeful kinsmen came to make formal obeisance 'he was always expecting that one or other of them would seize the opportunity of stabbing him.'[44] He could no longer supervise his mines in Ulu Selangor and so he developed mines at Bukit Karang in Ulu Langat.[45] Kuala Selangor was put in the charge of his eldest son, Musa, who assumed the title of Raja Muda, but he proved ineffectual and was eventually ousted during the civil war.[46] Despite its economic importance Kuala Selangor was never again the royal capital. The fort on the hill was to suffer a final battering in 1871, but a generation before, in 1835, 'its guns, some of large calibre [were] in bad repair.'[47] It became something of a museum -- 'the old Malay cemetery surrounding the Sultans' graves...some of the headstones are very picturesque.'[48] In 1879 Isabella Bird was shown 'a large flat stone on a rude support' at the entrance to the fort. She declined to believe a horrific story that its magical powers had been increased by smearing it with the blood of a human sacrifice.[49]

Selangor had five recognised ports, each the point of entry and exit from a river valley. Raja Hitam, a great-grandson of Sultan Ibrahim and a maternal nephew of Sultan Abdul Samad, was chief of Sabak Bernam on the boundary with Perak. Now that Selangor had been warned off further incursions into Perak, the Bernam district, which produced little tin, was the least important of the districts. Kuala Selangor, Klang, Bandar Langat and Lukut were held by Raja Jumaat's coalition under arrangements already described. There were a few other sizeable Malay settlements, such as Jeram and Sungai Raya, under chiefs of secondary status.

More and more the real power passed into the hands of Raja Jumaat, who (in 1861) 'has recently been vested by the Sultan with supreme authority over the

whole of Salangore.'[50] He had worked out proposals for reducing the disputes over revenue, which embittered the quarrels of the ruling class. His scheme may also have been prompted by the complaints of the Chinese miners, and their backers in Malacca, over the traditional arrangement by which each Malay chief bought the tin produced in his district at a fixed price (then $30 per *bahara*).[51] If he owed money he delivered tin in payment of his debts. Raja Jumaat, advised by Macpherson, proposed to allow direct deliveries from the miners to the Straits merchants, subject to a uniform export duty of 20% (later reduced to 10%) which was to be pooled and applied in payment of regular allowances to some Malay chiefs; there is no information of the individuals who were to participate and of the basis of fixing their allowances. Another source of disorder was the system of 'gambling farms', to which the Chinese miners resorted. At Lukut Jumaat had insisted that there should be only one such gambling house under strict supervision, and he proposed that similar arrangements should be made elsewhere.[52]

These reforms required the abandonment of cherished traditional privileges and practices, and the institution of new methods of revenue collection and accounting. Fifteen years later British administrators ran into severe difficulties in introducing arrangements of that kind. Raja Jumaat had only begun to cope with the obstacles when his death, in 1864, removed the only man with ability and determination to make the new system work.

The death of Jumaat also upset the precarious balance within the ruling class between the 'haves' and the 'have nots'. Selangor was now a powder keg waiting for some maladroit move or personal quarrel to throw a lighted match into it. An additional risk, which will be described in the next chapter, was the growing antagonism between rival groups of Chinese miners, whose numbers had grown with the expansion of the tin mining industry, and the traditional hostility between the Sumatran miners and peasants of the upstream vilages, and the Bugis tax gatherers of the coastal ports. In former times strong Bugis leadership had held the state together, but the last man capable of governing the state in decisive fashion had died in 1864. The regime was now not so much decentralized as fragmented.

Notes

1. Haji Buyong Adil, *Sejarah Selangor*, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur, 1971, p.45 (*isteri tua*). The only royal consort of Sultan Ibrahim was a daughter of Raja Haji, but the one son of that marriage died in infancy. R.J.Wilkinson, *The History of the Peninsular Malays*, Kelly & Walsh, Singapore, 1920, reprinted as *Papers on Malay Subjects*, edited by P.L.Burns, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1971, p.119.

   Sultan Ibrahim had adult sons born to at least three wives (as distinct from a royal consort and a mere concubine). One (Raja Ismail) had been born to a wife who was 'a princess from Kedah' and another (Raja Said) was the son of a wife who was a daughter of Yam Tuan Muda Kemboja. The future Sultan Mohamed had a 'foster mother [who] was a woman of good birth' in the Celebes. Raja Ali Haji, *Tuhfat-al-Nafis*, translated and annotated by V.Matheson and B.W.Andaya, *The Precious Gift*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1982, pp.28, 40 and 45.

   On royal polygamy as a source of succession disputes, J.M.Gullick, *Rulers and Residents - Influence and Power in the Malay States 1870-1920*, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1992,

p.277f. Although holding the office of Raja Muda gave some presumptive claim to succeed to the throne, it was primarily an executive office. Gullick, ibid.

2. According to Bugis, not Malay, custom Sultans of Selangor are crowned at their installation. Khoo Kay Kim, 'Raja Lumu/Sultan Salehuddin - the Founding of the Selangor Dynasty,' *JMBRAS* 58(2), 1985, p.11.
M.Sheppard, *Taman Saujana - Dance, Drama, Music and Magic in Malaya Long and Not-so-Long Ago*, International Book Service, Petaling Jaya, 1983, p.18, explains why no Malay ruler was crowned at his installation between 1200 and 1850 A.D.
3. Buyong, loc.cit.
4. T.J.Newbold, *Political and Statistical Account of the British Settlements of the Straits of Malacca* etc., Murray, London, 1839, 2 vols., reprinted Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1971, vol. 2, p.32. Newbold, who commanded a military post on the Malacca frontier with Selangor in the mid-1830's had firsthand knowledge of conditions in parts of the State. See Note 32 below.
5. Letter of 12 August 1836 (IOL BC 69433, p.318) quoted by N.Tarling, *Piracy and Politics in the Malay World* etc., Kraus Reprint, Liechtenstein, 1978, p.93.
6. Buyong, loc.cit, and R.O.Winstedt, 'A History of Selangor', *JMBRAS* 12(3)1934, p.16.
7. Raja Ali Haji, op.cit., p.379, editorial note 3, 'A bold businessman determined to develope the tin resources of his kingdom.' Khoo Kay Kim, *The Western Malay States 1850-1873 - the Effects of Commercial Development on Malay Politics*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1972, p.71.
8. L.D.Gammans, 'The State of Lukut', *JMBRAS* 2(2), 1924, p.292, giving the Lukut tradition of the impression made by the Sultan's visit in 1836. See Note 17 below. Gammans was District Officer, Coast (Port Dickson) District, in the 1920's.
9. A.C.Milner, *Kerajaan - Malay Political Culture on the Eve of Colonial Rule*, University of Arizona Press, Tucson, 1982, Chapter 2, 'Commerce and Politics' for a general analysis - 'wealth was one condition for gaining supporters'. p.28.
10. Khoo Kay Kim, *Western Malay States*, p.2. This chapter owes much to Professor Khoo's analysis and detailed description of the impact of Straits Settlements commerce on Selangor among other Malay States.
11. Wong Lin Ken, *The Malayan Tin Industry to 1914*, University of Arizona Press, Tucson, 1965, pp.3-17, describes the increase in western industrial demand for tin, which gained momentum in the 1840's when the reform of UK import duties on tin (imposed to protect the Cornish tin industry) opened the British market to supplies from South-East Asia. The growing use of tin cans (iron, later steel, containers coated with tin to prevent corrosion) to hold food, which had developed in the later years of the Napoleonic War (1793-1815), greatly increased this industrial demand for tin.
12. K.S.Sandhu, 'Chinese Colonization in Melaka', K.S.Sandhu and P.Wheatley, eds., *Melaka - The Transformation of a Malay Capital c.1400-1980*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1983, 2 vols., vol 2, p.108. The first Chinese mine was at Titian Akar, eleven miles from Malacca town.
13. Wong Lin Ken, op. cit., p.18. See also Chapter 2 note 23 above (Anderson's account of Lukut in 1818).
14. Newbold, op. cit., vol.2, p.33, writes that 'the Chinese....formerly worked the mines on their own account....Latterly, I believe, Tiunku Boosu took upon himself the entire direction.' Buyong, loc.cit., dates Busu's control of Lukut to before 1826, adding that he opened mines at Lukut.
Busu is a variant form of bongsu, ie 'youngest'. R. J. Wilkinson, *Malay-English Dictionary (Romanised)*, Salavopoulos and Kinderlis, Mytilene, 1932, 2 parts, Pt 1, p.171. It masks a personal name. It is tempting to suppose that 'near relation' means younger brother; the youngest (tenth) son of Sultan Ibrahim, father of Sultan Mohamed, was Raja Salih. Raja Ali Haji, op.cit., p.41.
15. 'Perhaps at the prompting of Malacca merchants'. Winstedt, *Selangor*, p.16. Gammans, op. cit., p.291.
16. Wong Lin Ken, op.cit., p.18.
17. Gammans, loc.cit. Tarling, op.cit., p.88, cites a report of August 1836 that a British ship, calling at Kuala Selangor left a letter 'for the Sultan who was away in Lukut.'

18. C.M.Turnbull, *The Straits Settlements 1826-1867 - Indian Presidency to Crown Colony*, Athlone Press, London, 1972, p.79, for details of Macpherson's career. He died in office (Colonial Secretary SS) in 1869. See also C.B.Buckley, *An Anecdotal History of Old Times in Singapore* 2 vols., Fraser & Neave, Singapore, 1902, vol.2, p.782. Since Macpherson had served in the Straits Settlements from 1857, he may well have met Jumaat before 1867, when he was posted to Malacca.
19. Others were Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin of Kedah (r.1855-1879) and his brother, Tunku Kudin, Viceroy of Selangor (1868-1878) - see Chapter 4 below, and Sultan Abu Bakar (r.1862-1895) of Johor, and the chief ministers of Kedah and Johor during those reigns. A. C. Milner, *The Invention of Politics in Colonial Malaya*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, Chapter 8 '*Kerajaan* Self Reform', analyses the ideology of these reform and modernization programmes.
20. Macpherson, on a visit to Lukut in 1860, quoted in Gammans, op. cit., p.292.
21. Quoted in Khoo Kay Kim, *Western Malay States*, p.72. If his creditors had actually tried to sue the Sultan for debt in Malacca, the court would have declined jurisdiction over the ruler of a Malay state. That was the basis of the decision in *Nairne v. Rajah of Quedah* 1861, reported by J.W Norton Kyshe, *Cases heard and determined in H M Supreme Court of the Straits Settlements 1808-1884*, 4 vols., 1885, vol. 1, pp.147-151. In 1839 and 1846 however that ruling had yet to be given.
22. Buyong, op.cit., pp.47-49. Buyong writes of Sulaiman '*tidak berikhtiar*,' which denotes both lack of resources and of ability for the task.
23. Raja Bot's letter was first published, in English translation, in the *Malay Mail* of 14 November 1902, and has been reprinted in *Peninjau Sejarah* 1(2) 1966.

    There is perhaps an interesting parallel in Wan Mat Saman, chief minister of Kedah for many years until his death in 1898 and best known as the builder of 'Mat Saman's Canal', a major irrigation work in Kedah, He 'speaks Hindustani fluently' (report by Swettenham on a visit to Kedah enclosed with SSD 23 November 1889; CO 273/162). As he had never, so far as is known, lived in India, he probably learnt the language during an apprenticeship to an Indian merchant in Penang.
24. The unpublished diary of Bloomfield Douglas, entry for 12 July 1878, noting that he had seen the remains of Raja Sulaiman's house; quoted in J.M.Gullick, 'The Growth of Kuala Lumpur and the Malay Community in Selangor before 1880', *JMBRAS* 63(1), 1990, p.16 and p.29 note 10.
25. Bot, op.cit., and Buyong, op. cit., p.49.
26. W.W.Skeat and C.O.Blagden, *Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula*, 2 vols., MacMillan, London, 1906, vol.1, p.360, mention a tradition that Abdul Samad's mother was partly of aborigine descent. Skeat had been District Officer, Kuala Langat, in the mid-1890's.

    J.W.W.Birch, *The Journals of J. W.W.Birch First British Resident to Perak 1874-1875*, ed. P.L.Burns, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1976, p.150 (entry dated 8 December 1874), after meeting Syed Mashhor, celebrated as a leader in the Selangor civil war (Chapter 4), notes that Mashhor was 'born at Langat, his mother was sister to the Sultan's mother'.
27. 'A very shrewd money-loving man', according to J.G.Davidson, British Resident, Selangor 1875--76. Report dated 28 October 1875 printed in C 1320. It was not true however that the Sultan had killed 99 men with his own hand. W.W.Skeat, *Malay Magic* etc. MacMillan, London, 1900, p.40 note 2, although Swettenham repeated the rumour to that effect. F.A.Swettenham, *British Malaya* etc. George Allen & Unwin, London, rev.1948, p.128, and his *Journal*, p.146.
28. *Commercial Tariffs and Regulations and Trade of the Several States of Europe and America, together with Commercial Treaties between England and Foreign Countries*, Part XXII, India, Ceylon and Other Oriental Countries, HC Papers, Vol 61, 1847-48, Cmd 974, p.734, cited by Wong Lin Ken, op.cit., p.32, for the American prospector.

    It is not unlikely (but there is no evidence) that Joseph Balestier, American Consul in Singapore 1833-1852, prompted this survey, since he was active in promoting American trade, and in his later years, investment in the region. Sharom Ahmat, 'American Trade with Singapore 1819-1865', *JMBRAS* 38(2), 1965, and his 'Joseph B.Balestier: The First American Consul In Singapore,' *JMBRAS* 39(2), 1966. Balestier is quoted by name, on the trade of Malacca. in the paragraph of

Cmd. 974 which precedes the reference to the 'American gentleman'.

In medias res - rushing into the middle of things (from the Latin poet, Horace).

29. Swettenham visited and described the remains of the mine in March 1875. F.A.Swettenham, *Sir Frank Swettenham's Malayan Journals 1874-1876*, edited P.L.Burns and C.D.Cowan, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1975, p.212, entry of 21 March 1875. He reported (in similar terms) what he had seen in his 'Report of Her Britannic Majesty's Acting Assistant Resident at Salangore', dated 8 April 1875, enclosed with SSD 27 April 1875 (printed in Cmd 1320 of 1875)

The source of the story of the *pawang*, Toh Perkasa, and his revenge is from 'Traditions of Ulu Langat', *SJ* 5, 1896-97, p.307. The initials 'W.S.' at the end of this article identify the author as W.W.Skeat, who had been District Officer, Ulu Langat, in the mid-1890's. Skeat dates the mine as c.1855. There is no direct evidence to link this venture with the prospector's report of a few years before.

30. 'The story goes that formerly there was no connection between the Langat River and the river or inlet of the sea at Jugra; that some enterprising Americans, who were working tin in the neighbourhood of Reko, were wont to drag their boats across the intervening neck of land, until one day it struck them that it would save time if they cut it through and made a waterway for their boats. This was done, and at present there exists a broad and deep stream through which runs a strong tideway.' 'Notes of the Resident's Visits to Districts in Selangor, 1894', *SJ* 2, pp.429-430, and Chapter 7 Note 17.

However Swettenham, in his *Journal* (p.117) and 1875 report (cited in Note 29 above), and in F.A.Swettenham, *The Real Malay*, John Lane Bodley Head, London, 1900, p.64, describes its origin, saying that 'a man could step across' the first cut, and that it was widened by the flow of water.

There are later references to it (between January and March 1877) in the unpublished diary of Bloomfield Douglas, who had been Assistant Resident at Bandar Langat (early in 1876). As Resident Douglas spent $500 on improving the channel a year later. Later still, the District Officer, Kuala Langat, refers to using the channel, in his journal (entry for 11 February 1884 and elsewhere). When Emily Innes moved from Bandar Langat to the new house on Jugra Hill at the end of 1877, her goods and chattels were transported in 'a big cargo boat', apparently through the channel. E.Innes, *The Chersonese with the Gilding Off*, Richard Bentley & Sons, London, 1885, 2 vols., vol.1, p.233.

Douglas calls it 'the Culwong' but there are later references to 'the Kluang river' which seems the more likely version.

31. Buyong, op.cit., pp.51-52, claims that Raja Abdullah took personal charge of the original expedition of 1857, and so must be regarded as the founder of Kuala Lumpur. However, so far as is known, there is no contemporary evidence to support this assertion. It is clear nonetheless that it was Raja Abdullah, in association with Raja Jumaat, who initiated the venture which led to the foundation of Kuala Lumpur (see Chapter 4).

32. Bot, op.cit., on the Sultan's encouragement of padi planting. Wilkinson, *Peninsular Malays*., p.120, on the rinderpest epidemic. Birch, *Journal*, p.52 (7 April 1874), took his launch some way up the river above the town of Kuala Selangor and noted the coconut plantations. Swettenham, *Journal*, p.230 (31 March 1875) to the same effect. A monthly report from Kuala Selangor printed in *SGG* 1893, p.506, commented that 'Kuala Selangor used in old times to be a great padi-planting place' but (*AR Kuala Selangor 1892*) there were (in the 1890's) 3,000 acres under coconuts and no padi planting.

Birch, op.cit, p.43, at Lukut found 'salt fish in great abundance, which is collected and salted, all along the beach from here to Jugra river, principally by Malacca Chinese and Malays'. At an earlier period Newbold, op.cit., vol.2, p.37, noted that the islands off the coast of Selangor 'have of late become the occasional resort of Bugis and Salangore fishermen'.

SJ 1, p.34, 1892, on the royal residence at Telok Piei.

33. *AR Jelebu 1892*, para 133, quoted in J.M.Gullick, *Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya*, Athlone Press, London, 1958, rev. 1988, p.29.

34. C.M.Turnbull, 'Melaka under British Colonial Rule', Sandhu and Wheatley (eds.), op.cit., vol.1, p.252, and see also Turnbull, *Straits Settlements*, p.161.
35. Buyong, op.cit., p.45, Winstedt, *Selangor*, p.16. See Tarling, op.cit., (under index entries for 'Selangor') for British dealings with and suspicions of Selangor over piracy.
36. 'Notoriously bad character' in IOL BC 2605/163367, pp.45-61, dated 26 September 1854. In November 1874 Swettenham met Tunku Panglima Raja who 'was the Sultan's right hand...in the Sultan's wicked days.' Swettenham, *Journal*, p.145 (8 November 1874).

However, in February 1875 (ibid. p.202), the Sultan remarked to Swettenham that 'Englishmen have always been kind to me... *even before I was Sultan* [ie before 1857 emphasis supplied] but I never understood the Government nor they me until this Governor [Clarke] came. I was never friends with the Govt. before as I am now.' In the memorandum cited below Braddell remarks (para 83) that 'there had now been an opportunity of seeing the Sultan,' with the implication that he and other long-serving British officials had not met him before. As Abdul Samad was not the obvious successor to Sultan Mohamed, the officials who had been 'always been kind to me', presumably took no particular note of this Bugis Raja among several from Selangor, except of course when he was suspected of piracy.

Piracy left to the boys his sons. Memorandum by T. Braddell on Sir Andrew Clarke's visit to Selangor in February 1874, enclosure 3 with SSD 24 February 1874 (C 1111), para 84.

37. Turnbull, *Straits Settlements*, p.246, on steamers. Tarling, op.cit., p.228, on the disappearance of piracy in the 1840's. It was an act of piracy, though a minor one, which led to British intervention in 1874.
38. R.O.Winstedt and R.J.Wilkinson, 'A History of Perak', *JMBRAS* 12(1), 1934, p.74, on the threat to Perak. Newbold, op.cit., vol.2, pp.32 and 37 on villagers' flight.

Khoo Kay kim, *Western Malay States*, p.65, on an unusual government intervention in 1842 on behalf of the Penang merchant, Nairne, who by coincidence was to sue the Sultan of Kedah in the later case cited in Note 21.

39. Whether he appointed a supporter in the recent contest for the succession, such as his brother, Raja Abdullah, or one of his rivals, the choice was likely to stir up more trouble. Newbold, op.cit., vol.2, p.33, thought he should have chosen Raja Busu of Lukut (Note 14 above).
40. Raja Mohamed, as he then was, had taken part as an adult in the invasion of Perak soon after 1800. Raja Ali Haji, op.cit., p.202.
41. Buyong, op.cit., p.49, and Raja Ali Haji, op.cit., p.329 note 5. Jumaat was 'all powerful in Selangor at the time.' Wilkinson, *Peninsular Malays*, p.120.

Newbold, op.cit., vol.2, p.32, identifies the three rivals for the office of Raja Muda, and implies (p.36) that Raja Othman was in charge of the extreme southern coast around Sungai Raya.

42. Buyong, op.cit., p.49, and Winstedt, *Selangor*, p.19.
43. Abdul Samad informed Governor Blundell of his accession before the end of 1857, since the latter replied in January 1858. However the widowed Tengku Puan Basik, demanded that her son, Raja Muda Mahmud, should be nominated to succeed Abdul Samad. Winstedt, *Selangor*, p.19 (where 'her death' is surely a mistake for 'his death'). It appears that these disputes were temporarily laid to rest by 1859, but in 1864, as soon as Raja Jumaat was dead, demands were made to Abdul Samad that he should abdicate but he refused. Buyong, op.cit., p.58.

A less credible version is that by his Will Sultan Mohamed directed that his son, Mahmud, should immediately become Sultan at his death, but in 1857 the Selangor notables would only confer on him the title of Raja Muda, since he was then about 13. During his minority his mother was to govern the country with Raja Abdul Samad as Tunku Panglima Raja. However four or five years later (ie in the dispute of 1864 following Jumaat's death) Abdul Samad, despite opposition by the notables, assumed the title of Sultan. Claim by Raja Laut, Mahmud's elder half-brother, in SSF CS 407/1877, quoted in Swettenham, *Journal*, p.145, note 2). It is clear that until the contest of 1864 Abdul Samad's position as Sultan was open to challenge. He was never formally installed with the customary ceremonies.

44. Innes, op.cit, vol.1, p.44. F.A.Swettenham, 'Some Account of the Independent Native States,'

JSBRAS 6, 1880, p.96, confirms this with 'It was even at one time proposed to murder the Sultan,' and (Swettenham, *Journal*, p.146) 'from morning till night his heart was never free from trouble and anxiety, but now ....he felt perfectly safe and happy.'

45. Wong Lin Ken, op.cit., p.23. The Bukit Karang concession was given to Chin Ah Chan, with a loan of $20,000 from the Sultan. C.D.Cowan, *Nineteenth Century Malaya : the Origins of British Political Control*, Oxford University Press, London, 1961, p.138, note 85.
46. Khoo Kay Kim, *Western Malay States*. pp.26 and 156.
47. Newbold, op.cit., vol.2, p.28. The fort had of course been built by the Dutch during their brief occupation in 1785-86. Ibid.
48. Monthly report from Kuala Selangor printed in SGG 1893, p.262,
49. I.Bird, *The Golden Chersonese and the Way Thither*, Murray, London, 1883, p.243. The human sacrifice was said 'to have occurred in the aftermath of the 'Rinaldo' incident of July 1871.' Wilkinson, *Peninsular Malays* p.124. Sultan Sulaiman (b.1866) had spent his early boyhood at Kuala Selangor; his recollection was that 'this table was used for laying the heads of those unfortunates who belonged to the rival camp', but he may have been confusing it with the table in the Market Square, Kuala Lumpur, on which heads of his enemies for laid before Yap Ah Loy, during the civil war, by claimants for reward. 'Royal Recollections - An Extract from a Talk given by H.R.H. Sultan Sulaiman of Selangor to the Rotary Club of Kuala Lumpur in 1936,' *MIH* 12(2), p.17, 1969.
50. Report from Governor SS to Calcutta dated 16 May 1861, quoted by Khoo Kay Kim, *Western Malay States*, p.141.
51. For similar monopolies in Pahang see the Journal of Hugh Clifford enclosed with SSD 28 April 1887 in CO 273/144, pp.469-470, and in Kelantan (royal monopoly of textile imports) SSD 14 October 1867 (CO 273/12 p.220f) and CO 273/15. It was system generally applied to the export of minerals and to various imported goods, in particular opium for sale to Chinese.
52. Khoo Kay Kim, *Western Malay States*, p.76. Gammans, op.cit., p.292 on the good order in the Lukut gambling farm. Swettenham, *Journal*, p.151, mentions that the five sons of Raja Abdullah were (in 1874) in receipt of 'a very fair amount of salary (8 *baharas* of tin a month i.e about $560 amongst five men) but that [the Sultan] expected them to work.'

Chapter Four

Civil War and British Intervention

The civil war (1867-1873), which did so much damage to Selangor, with the destruction of its principal tin mines and the depopulation of its largest agricultural district, was a gradual convergence or interconnection of separate disputes. As the contestants sought allies, and some of them changed sides to pursue their own interests, two unstable coalitions emerged in the final years of this long struggle. Even then geographical factors continued to divide the fighting into local encounters, with only indirect effects, one on another. It was also a war of intermittent military moves, since, apart from a small number of mercenaries, who were fit only for garrison duties, there were no standing forces. Levies of Malay peasants or Chinese miners were mobilised from their civilian pursuits, from time to time, but had soon to return to those occupations, partly because neither side had the resources to supply them for long periods. There were some famous warriors but a notable dearth of strategists. As a result the story of the war, as a military conflict, is confused and difficult to follow.[1] It is however rather easier to trace the gradual spread of the struggle through opportunist alliances, and that is taken as the main theme of this chapter, since it reflects the continuing balance of political and economic factors in the history of the State.

The death of Raja Jumaat in 1864 had caused alarm among the Malacca merchants who had large sums at risk in their past advances made to finance his mining ventures, in association with his brother, Raja Abdullah. The latter, pressed to repay these debts, was unable to withdraw from his commitments to the mines around Kuala Lumpur. His creditors then urged the Governor to remonstrate with the Sultan, who replied that 'we have settled the case of these merchants with our brother Raja Abdullah.'[2] It has been suggested that the settlement took the form of granting to a syndicate, headed by W. H. Read and Tan Kim Cheng, of the right to collect the revenues of Klang for two years (1866-1868), and to deduct a 20% commission (later reduced to 10%) in accounting to Raja Abdullah.[3] This mode of revenue collection was of course along the lines advocated by Raja Jumaat a few years before.[4]

The tax collectors became embroiled in a dispute with Raja Mahdi, one of the early instances of a conflict between Malay tradition and colonial practice, intro-

duced by the reformers in the ensuing decade. Although Raja Mahdi had been passed over, at the time of his father's death, in the succession to the control of the Klang district, Raja Abdullah had sought to mollify him by assigning to him 'a small district in the neighbourhood,' and by giving him a monthly allowance from the revenues of Klang. In addition Mahdi, in his trading transactions, had hitherto been exempt from customs duties, on the basis that 'a prince is exempt from toll.'[5]

Even so Mahdi probably lacked the force to resist, until another dispute brought allies to his support. Relations between the Bugis chiefs of the coastal ports and the Sumatran communities of the interior had always been strained. To sustain his authority at the important centre of Kuala Lumpur, Abdullah maintained a garrison

Table 2
Relationships within the Selangor Dynasty in mid 19th Century



A translation of a genealogy said to have been prepared by Raja Mahdi, the defeated leader in the Selangor civil war (1867-1873), to show the principal contenders for power in the last years of Sultan Mohamed, and how they were related.

The genealogy was drawn up at the end of 1874, when Mahdi was in exile in Singapore (he died there in 1882). Presumably he was intending to put forward a statement of his claims to the Straits Settlements Government. 'Raja Aji' may be a nickname given to some brother of Sultan Mohamed, who appears elsewhere under his proper name. There is no other mention of a 'Raja Aji', though it is known that Raja Abdullah of Klang did marry a niece of Sultan Mohamed.

Source: *SJ* 1, p.60, 1892.

there in a stockade under To' Bandar Yasih. In a local quarrel one of Yasih's men killed Rasul, a man of the local Batu Bahara group; the headman of the group, Mohamed Akib, applied to Raja Abdullah for redress but did not obtain it. Malay convention required that in fighting a raja 'it is wise to follow a leader of equal rank.'[6] So Akib proposed to Mahdi that he should lead them in a revolt against Abdullah. Mahdi, who was to prove himself a formidable fighting captain, had no difficulty in driving Raja Abdullah, a businessman rather than a warrior, out of Klang in March 1867. Abdullah then tried to blockade the Klang strait, but the consequent disruption of tin exports to Malacca alienated both Malacca traders and Selangor chiefs. After a brief effort to regain what he had lost, Abdullah withdrew to Malacca, where he died; his son, Raja Ismail, was left to carry on the struggle.[7]

Mahdi held Klang for the ensuing three years, but he refused to pay to the Sultan the $500 per month from Klang revenues, which Raja Abdullah had paid. There seems to have been an earlier attempt at a rapprochement between the two through the traditional means of a marriage; the Sultan's favourite daughter, Raja Arfah, was affianced to Raja Mahdi. The Sultan now showed his displeasure by breaking off the engagement.[8]

From the widening feuds within the Bugis-Malay community it is timely to pass to the quarrels among the Chinese, now present in Selangor in substantial numbers.[9] Originally the Chinese had come in to open mines under the protection of the local Malay chiefs, and -- as the initiative had rested with the latter -- the capital to finance the mines had been borrowed by the Malays, but around 1860 Raja Jumaat had promoted a different system, under which the miners had direct support from the Malacca merchants. This change must have strengthened the ties between the leadership of the Chinese community in the SS ports and the mining communities in Selangor and other States, since they were aligned into distinct, and often aggressive, groups based on membership of what Europeans vaguely described as *kongsi* or 'secret societies'.[10] Far away in Penang there had been serious riots in 1867 between these warring factions, with serious consequences in the main Perak mining district of Larut.

In Selangor there was a bitter feud between the Chinese communities of Kanching (Ulu Selangor) and Kuala Lumpur. Although the main centres were separated by a watershed, there were disputes at the borders over claims to land and the use of water. In addition these emigrant communities, lacking an established system of authority, were reft by personal rivalry for leadership. There was also an urge to avenge former wrongs which miners, moving from one mining centre to another - from Lukut or Sungei Ujong to Kanching or Kuala Lumpur - brought with them. Yap Ah Loy's opponents at Kuala Lumpur included Chong Chong, for whom he had once worked as a coolie at Lukut. When Ah Loy secured the position of Capitan China, and the property of his deceased predecessor, his rivals moved across to Kanching. Here the situation was unstable because the founder of Kanching, Ah Sze, was a Fei Chew Hakka, like Ah Loy, but the majority of the Kanching Chinese were Kah Yeng Chew Hakkas. Although Chong Chong too was a Fei Chew, the enemies of Ah Sze and Ah Loy were willing to follow his lead in toppling those two

detested figures. The quarrel became much more bitter as a result of the murder of Ah Sze, ambushed between Kanching and Kuala Lumpur early in 1869, and Ah Loy's reprisals, known as 'the Kanching massacre', in June 1870.[11]

Before that onslaught however, Yap Ah Loy had obtained the formal recognition of Raja Mahdi, then chief of Klang. when Mahdi visited Kuala Lumpur to instal Ah Loy as Capitan China.[12] This was an alliance of expediency; when control of Klang passed from Mahdi to Kudin, as related below, Yap Ah Loy soon allied himself with the latter. He had little choice since the Malay chief of Klang controlled the route over which Kuala Lumpur obtained its supplies and exported its tin.[13]

Thus, by 1870, quarrels and alliances were drawing Bugis chiefs, Sumatran communities and Chinese miners into opposing, but unstable alliances. The death of Raja Jumaat had deprived the Sultan of the means of stabilising the situation through him. He may possibly have felt that he might find a replacement in Tunku Dhiauddin ('Kudin') of Kedah who was invited to come to Selangor as the husband of the Sultan's daughter, Raja Arfah.[14] Matrimonial alliances between the Selangor and Kedah dynasties, and other links, had begun a century or more before.[15] Whether by accident or design Sultan Abdul Samad thus introduced 'a new and potent figure....[to]....the stage of Selangor politics, a stage Elizabethan in its alarums and sudden deaths.'[16] Kudin, like Jumaat before him, was a very westernized Malay aristocrat by the standards of his time, the antithesis of Raja Mahdi and utterly uncongenial to such a man; in addition he was to marry the royal bride previously promised to Mahdi.[17] Kudin was also experienced since, for fifteen years before his arrival in Selangor, he had acted as Raja Muda of Kedah, an office which vested in him executive powers as deputy, more or less, to his elder brother, Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin of Kedah.[18]

Both the Sultan and Kudin were arch-dissemblers who found it expedient to conceal the nature of their mutual relationship, though it was clearly shaped by interest rather than personal regard.[19] The Sultan's position, following the exit from Klang of Raja Abdullah in 1867, was precarious. Raja Mahdi in defiant possession of Klang, and its revenues, might bid for the throne as a grandson of Sultan Mohamed.[20] This fear made the Sultan's adult sons favourably disposed to Tunku Kudin, on his first arrival, though they were later antagonised by his pretensions as 'Viceroy'. At all events the Sultan proceeded to delegate powers of government to Kudin, though it may have been Kudin, and not the Sultan, who took the initiative. The delegation was made by a letter, dated 26 June 1868, which granted to Kudin power to govern the Langat district and also 'to govern and develope the country [of Selangor] with its districts.'[21] After Kudin had gained control of Klang, a grant of that district was made in substitution for Kuala Langat. However it was the interpretation of the wider and less precise authority over the State as a whole which was to prove contentious.

There is evidence that Kudin, in furtherance of his own aims, was soon drawn into a coalition of interests and individuals bent on expelling Mahdi from Klang. In brief, Raja Ismail, son of the dispossessed and now deceased Raja Abdullah, together with the leader of the Sumatrans of the Klang valley whose role carried the



Source: S.S.R., G7, Appendix to C.J. Irving's Memo of Affairs of Salangore and Perak, 1872

title of Dato' Dagang, and the Malacca Chinese who had lent money to Raja Abdullah, invited Kudin to take the lead against Mahdi, although he was supposed to act as a sort of arbitrator and conciliator above the warring factions. If such an invitation was made, it was concealed while Kudin returned to Kedah, ostensibly on family affairs, and recruited five hundred Kedah men, a praetorian guard, so he asserted, needed to support his authority in Selangor. In his absence Raja Ismail struck the first blow, by seizing the forts on either side of the Klang estuary, in August 1869, which commanded the approach to the town from the sea. Ismail had only a hundred men but shortly afterwards Kudin returned from Kedah with his much larger force and a flotilla of 72 *perahus* and junks; Raja Mahdi obligingly provided a *casus belli* by repudiating Kudin's letter of authority from the Sultan, which Mahdi said was a forgery. The six months' siege of Klang had begun.[22]

In some respects the siege was conventional Malay warfare, with sallies forth from stockades, ambushes and fusillades of musket fire. It is unusually well documented by the memoirs of two Malay participants.[23] It was unusual in the use of cannon, including floating batteries on the river and a decisive plunging barrage from high ground on to Mahdi's positions, which forced him in March 1870 to withdraw.[24] Even at this early stage in the struggle Kudin employed at least one European, de Fontaine, as commander of mercenary troops, upon whose uncertain performance he was increasingly reliant in the later years of the war. In 1870 however he still had a sizeable Kedah Malay contingent; later they returned to Kedah and could not be replaced.

As stated above, as soon as Kudin was in control of Klang, he and Yap Ah Loy reached an understanding which, through periods of adversity, lasted to the end of the war, in which Kudin never lost control of Klang town itself. His relations with the Selangor ruling class were less helpful to his cause. Apart from the Sultan's sons and the sons of Raja Abdullah, few of them supported him. Raja Bot of Lukut, by a combination of bad fortune and bad management, saw his district decline as a tin producing area. He and Raja Hitam of Bernam, at the northern extremity of the State, held aloof from the struggle but were unsympathetic towards this interloper with his new-fangled ideas. The Sultan's three adult sons were in different ways ineffectual but now more concerned over Kudin's pretensions than Mahdi's activities. More serious was the estrangement of Syed Mashhor, who had originally joined Kudin's forces in mid-1870, but who went over to Mahdi's side when his brother was killed at Kuala Langat (no fault of Kudin). Syed Mashhor lacked the charisma of Raja Mahdi and of Raja Mahmud, who joined Mahdi for the sheer joy of fighting. Mashhor, in his cold, repellent fashion, proved himself the most effective field commander on either side; he not only fought hard but was able to concert sustained operations.[25] He won more battles for Mahdi than either Mahdi himself or Mahmud, despite their dash and personal courage.[26]

It is difficult to paint a portrait of Mahdi; history is unkind to losers. He was defeated more than once, but was never captured in the field. He had the gift of raising the morale of his followers by his mere reappearance from temporary exile. He seems to have been a Malay fighting captain in the traditional mould. As chief of

Klang he showed no talent for progressive administration.[27] Kudin, on the other hand, lacked the ability and temperament of a war leader, but was a sound diplomat who secured British and Pahang support at critical times, and showed dogged determination in face of disaster. Straits Settlements merchants and administrators praised his achievements in developing the Klang district during the comparative lull of 1870-1872.[28] Some Europeans found him rather indolent and inclined to leave too much to his aides, particularly the slightly disreputable Arab, Syed Zin, who acted as his chief of staff.

In the interior Yap Ah Loy had a firm hold on his own Chinese and was able to maintain good relations with his Malay allies.

After Kudin had taken Klang, Mahdi went off to Pahang to join the opponents of the ruler, Bendahara Ahmad. It was a brief episode, but in the end lost him the war in Selangor, since Ahmad was thereafter inclined to assist Kudin, with decisive results in 1872-1873. Mashhor joined the Kanching Chinese in a first assault on Kuala Lumpur in 1870, which Yap Ah Loy, and his Sumatran allies, were able to repel, though their own advance into Ulu Selangor produced no lasting gains.

By chance an episode in mid-1871, known as 'the Rinaldo affair', led to open British support of Kudin. Mahdi had now reappeared at Kuala Selangor, where he took control of the forts out of the hands of Raja Muda Musa. Then a piratical attack on a trading vessel sailing from Penang to Perak led to British reprisals, ending with the bombardment of Kuala Selangor by HMS 'Rinaldo'. Mahdi and his supporters were driven out and Kudin seized the opportunity of installing a garrison at Kuala Selangor.[29]

The acting Governor, Anson, decided to obtain some more durable restraint of piracy on the Selangor coast, invoking the Sultan's obligation under the 1825 treaty 'not to permit any pirates to resort to any part of his territory'.[30] However the two senior British officials sent to Selangor early in July 1871 did more than remonstrate over piracy. They brought a letter demanding that the Sultan should 'place some person in the office of Governor or Chief over the country about the Salangore River, whom this Government can trust to carry out the treaty...'[31] With this pretext they picked up Kudin and brought him to their meeting with the Sultan at Kuala Langat, and sought confirmation that the royal grant of 1868 was genuine and that Kudin was 'the Sultan's "*Wakil Mutallak*" or agent having full powers.' It was also suggested that the title of 'Viceroy' was appropriate to describe Kudin's position.[32] The Sultan readily confirmed that the 1868 letter was genuine but demurred at declaring that Kudin was his sole plenipotentiary. In the end he resealed the 1868 letter rather than produce a replacement. In substance the British representations had secured the recognition of Kudin which was desired.

One consequence was a final break between Kudin and the Sultan's sons, who regarded Kuala Selangor as their fief not his.[33] Another was the impression in the Straits settlements that it was safe to lend more money to Kudin, already a debtor for substantial sums, since he had overt British government support.[34] It did not however please the Sultan who could see that Kudin's 'war debts' were a liability of his government. In April 1872 Irving, one of the two emissaries sent in 1871,

revisited Klang and had further discussions with Tunku Kudin.[35]

In mid-1872 the tide turned against Kudin who, by the end of that year, retained control only of Klang town and its immediate neighbourhood (see summary of events below). The worst defeat of all was the loss of Kuala Lumpur, whose garrison of mercenaries was destroyed as they tried to break out down the Klang valley. Mashhor at last had his revenge for past setbacks and he completely destroyed Kuala Lumpur; Yap Ah Loy escaped through the jungle to Klang. Later Kuala Selangor also fell to Mahdi's forces. This sudden collapse owed something to the defection of the Sumatran leaders, in the upper Klang and Langat valleys, who apparently came to believe that Kudin had lost British support and that Mahdi would win the war.[36]

If so, they had made a miscalculation. In the midst of his disasters Kudin had secured vital support from Bendahara Ahmad of Pahang, whose forces were already over the central range and in Ulu Selangor at the time (Augst 1872) when Kuala Lumpur fell. If the garrison, under Cavaliero and van Hagen, had moved to make a junction with them, they would have escaped ambush and annihilation.[37] By March 1873 the Pahang forces had driven Mashhor out of the ruins of Kuala Lumpur and they pressed on down the valley of the Selangor River. Additional Pahang forces brought round by sea joined them to retake Kuala Selangor.

Kudin was, however, unable to persuade the ruling chief of Sungei Ujong, to which Mahdi had fled in mid-1873, to hand him over, though he left there in July. Mashhor made a fighting retreat northwards to Ulu Bernam. With his principal enemies still in the field, Kudin faced the possibility that they would launch yet another onslaught on Selangor. It did not in the event materialise but Kudin's position was far from secure, since he had little support in Selangor upon which to rebuild his political authority. He could not retain a foreign army from Pahang indefinitely, and the ruin of the Kuala Lumpur mines deprived him of the means of paying for levies from Pahang or mercenaries from elsewhere. The Straits Settlements was no longer a source of political or financial support on the scale he required.[38] There is no knowing how long he would have survived if the situation had not suddenly changed.[39]

The first sign of that change was the arrival in Singapore on 4th November 1873 of a new Governor, Sir Andrew Clarke, who was soon to demonstrate that he had backing from London (denied to his discredited predecessor Sir Harry Ord) which Clarke interpreted as authority to establish in the tin-producing areas of western Malaya a system of advice to Malay Rulers to be given by British Residents stationed in their territories.[40] In pursuance of that policy Clarke moved swiftly, giving Perak his attention, in January 1874, before coming to Selangor, in February, with a strong naval escort. The occasion for this forceful move was another act of piracy, in Selangor waters, which had occurred in November 1873.

It is significant that Clarke's party did not include any of the three senior British officials (Anson, Birch and Irving) who had given Kudin British support in 1871. Instead he brought, as his senior and most influential adviser, Thomas Braddell, the SS Attorney-General, who was also legal adviser to the Maharaja of Johor, no friend of Kudin. The party also included J. F. A. McNair who, like Braddell, was an 'old

hand' with considerable knowledge of Malay affairs, though both knew more of Perak than Selangor.[41] Clarke was in no way committed to maintain the support given previously to Kudin as 'Viceroy' but he needed to discover more about the balance of Malay opinion in Selangor before deciding what to do.

When they met the Sultan, Clarke and his advisers had expected to meet a Malay Ruler 'described as a feeble, worn out opium smoker.' They were agreeably surprised to encounter 'an elderly looking gentleman of fifty-five or sixty years of age. ...having his senses perfectly about him.'[42] They also found that the court circle, especially the Sultan's son, Raja Yakub, was very hostile to Kudin, who had been invited to come to Kuala Langat but was not present at the opening discussion,[43] Clarke let Yakub have his say but persisted in attempts to find out what Kudin's 'real position in the country was, a matter not quite free from obscurity.' As ever the Sultan preferred to avoid showing his hand, but Clarke put a direct question to him which he had to answer;- 'if there was any feeling on his part against Tuanku Kudin. . .to require that his authority as Viceroy should be cancelled.' The question probably conveyed to the Sultan, as was the case, that he had the choice between continued British support for his troubled and troublesome son-in-law or British consent to sending him packing; either would be decisive. Kudin was a smaller risk to the Sultan's authority than the alternative of some ineffectual group of his sons and more-or-less neutral figures such as Raja Bot; the recall of Mahdi would be really dangerous. He replied that, although he had not seen Kudin or his wife (the Sultan's daughter) for two years 'he had no complaint, and was very well disposed to the Tuanku.'[44]

Kudin who had been waiting in much apprehension on a naval vessel offshore was then invited to join the meeting, where he was warmly received by the Sultan 'with every appearance of delight.' No one wished to continue political discussions on the future government of the country at that point, and the meeting adjourned. Clarke and Braddell thus had the opportunity of a long private meeting with Kudin to 'review the history of his connection with Salangore.'[45] Braddell's record of what Kudin told them makes fascinating reading. It came from an intriguing personality, in both senses, but it seems to have satisfied them.

Clarke then sent a letter to the Sultan intimating that when they met again (on 10th February 1874) Clarke wished to move on to discuss the piracy. The eight men accused of the piracy had been identified by the one member of the trading vessel who had escaped and so survived the attack. The Sultan appointed a court to try them forthwith (they had been arrested while visiting Malacca). Kudin was to preside and three other Selangor notables were to sit with him, and also two British 'Commissioners' (assessors). One of these was J. G. Davidson, a prominent Singapore lawyer and also a financial backer of Kudin (he later became the first British Resident of Selangor); the other was J. F. A. McNair. The other members of the court invited Davidson 'to examine the witnesses' and so in effect he conducted the trial, of which he wrote a very full record, including notes of the evidence given.[46] The eight accused were allowed to call witnesses in their defence but they were not represented by an advocate and may have found the procedure puzzling. All were

convicted, and all but one, a juvenile, were sentenced to death and executed with a kris provided by the Sultan.

Swettenham, who was away in Perak at the time, but who came to live at Kuala Langat a few months later, disclosed some thirty years afterwards that he had in 1875 been told that the accused men had been falsely identified as guilty of a piracy actually committed by others. Is it likely however that the key prosecution witness, giving evidence in open court in the locality where others knew the truth, would have committed perjury and so risked dire consequences for himself?.[47]

Clarke left Selangor without proposing any formal agreement, such as the Perak Pangkor Engagement. It would have been difficult to frame a document to give effect to the arrangements proposed for Selangor. The Sultan had already delegated wide executive powers to Kudin under the 1868 letter. The Resident would be charged with tendering advice to the Sultan but it would fall to Kudin, as Viceroy, to implement that advice. It may be that Davidson, who was to be Resident, told Braddell that he could in practice deal more effectively with the situation, if not encumbered with a formal document; in particular Kudin was a personal friend.

Yet the existence of a dual source of Malay authority, the Sultan at Kuala Langat and the Viceroy at Klang, left the Sultan somewhat isolated, amid a court which was inherently hostile to Kudin; moreover Mahdi and his lieutenant, Mahmud, were hovering just over the border -- it was believed -- in Sungei Ujong. To fill the gap Clarke sent the young Frank Swettenham to reside at the royal capital, with the title of 'Assistant Resident'. Soon after his arrival, in August 1874, Swettenham tendered to the Sultan for signature a letter in which the Sultan informed the Governor that 'I should be glad if my friend would set my country right and collect all its taxes.' The Sultan also published a proclamation announcing that 'we have a British officer to live with us, and to aid and advise us.'[48]

At first Davidson and Swettenham found it useful to draw on Kudin's extensive knowledge of local affairs in Selangor. Very soon however they built up their own fund of expertise, all the more so as they travelled more widely in the State than Kudin had ever done. Kudin himself probably shared the feeling that 'if a man had no work he must in time lose the little intellect he possessed'; his position was, as Swettenham later observed, 'very curious....English protection has certainly complicated it.'[49] On a realistic view he no longer had any recognised power or status, such as had kept him struggling through his difficulties in earlier years. In his native Kedah dynastic problems, in which he himself would become immersed later, were looming up and so he was absent in Kedah for long periods up to 1878. In his absence Davidson and Swettenham had audiences with the Sultan and dealt direct with Malay chiefs, headmen and villagers. Kudin eventually relinquished his position of Viceroy in 1878 after some rather bitter debate as to how much should be paid to him in pension and in reimbursement of his expenditure during the civil war.

One of the incidental benefits to the modern historian of the presence of colonial officials was that they wrote reports for their superiors in Singapore and kept journals of their doings. These provide a fund of information of Selangor in the late 1870's, which is the main source of the survey in the following chapter.

Chronological Summary of the Main Events of the Selangor Civil War

Year/Month	
1866	In this, the last year of peace, Selangor was divided into five semi-autonomous districts:-

District	*Ruling Chief*
Bernam	Raja Hitam, a nephew of the Sultan, and great-grandson of Sultan Ibrahim
Selangor	Raja Muda Musa, the Sultan's eldest son and heir
Klang	Raja Abdullah, brother of Raja Jumaat
Langat	Sultan Abdul Samad
Lukut	Raja Bot, and his half-brother, Raja Yahya, sons of Raja Jumaat

1867	
March	Raja Mahdi drove Raja Abdullah out of Klang
1868	Tunku Dhiauddin ('Kudin') of Kedah married Raja Arfah, the
June	Sultan's daughter, and the Sultan granted the Langat district to Kudin to administer, with imprecise powers in the rest of the State
August	Liu Ngim Kong, Capitan China of Kuala Lumpur, died, and Yap Ah Loy, his assistant, succeeded him despite the opposition of the late Capitan's kinsmen
1869	Raja Mahdi formally installed Yap Ah Loy as Capitan China of
June	Kuala Lumpur
December	Raja Ismail, son of the late Raja Abdullah, seized the forts on the Klang River below the town to blockade Raja Mahdi
1870	Tunku Kudin, with troops from Kedah, joined forces with Raja
Jan-March	Ismail. In March Raja Mahdi was driven out and went to Pahang, where he assisted Wan Abdul Rahman in his war against Bendahara Ahmad of Pahang. Yap Ah Loy invaded Kanching and massacred many Chinese there
July	Raja Mahdi ousted Raja Muda Musa from control of Kuala Selangor

Sep/Oct	Kanching Chinese, led by Chong Chong and in alliance with Syed Mashhor, attacked Kuala Lumpur but were driven back to Ulu Selangor
1871	
May/June	Syed Mashhor and Chong Chong, with a combined force of about 2,000 men (some from Ulu Langat) again attacked Kuala Lumpur but were driven back to Ulu Selangor after heavy fighting
July	HMS 'Rinaldo' shelled the forts at Kuala Selangor in reprisal for an attack on a British vessel, the 'Kim Seng Cheong'. Mahdi was driven out and withdrew to Bernam. Kudin's forces occupied the forts at Kuala Selangor. Two British officials, Birch and Irving, with Kudin, secured from the Sultan confirmation of the powers first granted in 1868 to Kudin to act as 'Viceroy'
August	Kudin sent mercenaries under European officers to garrison Kuala Selangor and Kuala Lumpur
November	Syed Mashhor defeated Kudin's allies, mainly Pahang Malays, who withdrew from Ulu Selangor to Pahang
1872	
January	Raja Mahdi went to Bengkalis (Sumatra) to procure weapons, was expelled by the Dutch (at British request) and took refuge in Johor
mid 1872	The Sumatran (Rawa) allies of Kudin and Yap Ah Loy in Ulu Klang and Ulu Langat defected to Raja Mahdi who had returned to Selangor Pahang forces again came over the range to Ulu Selangor
July	Syed Mashhor encircled Kuala Lumpur, ambushed the mercenary garrison, as it tried to break out down river towards Klang, and destroyed the town of Kuala Lumpur
August	Syed Mashhor captured the forts at Kuala Selangor and massacred its garrison
1873	
March	Pahang forces and Chinese under Yap Ah Loy recaptured Kuala Lumpur
November	Kudin's forces, including a Pahang contingent, brought round by sea to Klang, recaptured Kuala Selangor. Other Pahang forces drove Mashhor out of Ulu Selangor.

Notes

1. To simplify the story of the numerous local encounters of the war an appendix to the chapter offers a 'chronological summary' of mainly military events between 1866 and 1873.

R.J.Wilkinson, *A History of the Peninsular Malays with Chapters on Perak and Selangor* (a revised version of his *Events Prior to British Ascendency* 1908) Kelly & Walsh, Singapore, 1920, reprinted in his Papers on Malay Subjects, ed. P.L.Burns, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1971, Chapter 13), is the first attempt at a comprehensive history of the Selangor civil war. R.O.Winstedt, 'A History of Selangor,' *JMBRAS* 12(3), 1934, is on the same lines; both tend to be 'colonial records history' (A.C.Milner, 'Colonial Records History: British Malaya', *Kajian Malaysia* 4(2), 1986) with a perspective of events which reflects the contemporary government archives used as the main source (though Winstedt also uses some Malay sources). No historian however can avoid using these sources extensively since they provide more detailed and fairly reliable information than any other.

S.M.Middlebrook, 'Yap Ah Loy (1837-1885),' *JMBRAS* 24(2). 1951, opens a new perspective in his use of Chinese language sources and traditions to describe in detail, for the first time, the important episodes of the war in the interior around the main mining centres.

There are two major studies of British intervention in Malaya by academic historians. These are C.N.Parkinson, *British Intervention in Malaya 1867-1877*, University of Malaya Press, 1960, and C.D.Cowan, *Nineteenth Century Malaya - the Origins of British Political Control*, Oxford University Press, London 1961. Another leading history by a professional historian is Khoo Kay Kim, *The Western Malay States 1850-1873 - the Effects of Commerce and Development on Malay Politics*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1972, which is more concerned with the internal political situation of the western Malay States, and the effect upon them of Chinese commercial interests.

Mohamed Amin Hassan, 'Raja Mahdi bin Raja Sulaiman', *Peninjau Sejarah* 1(2), 1966, and J.M.Gullick, 'Tunku Kudin in Selangor 1868-1878'. *JMBRAS* 59(2), 1986, revised and reprinted in the same author's *Glimpses of Selangor 1860-1898*, MBRAS Monograph No 25, 1993, are studies of the leaders of the two opposing coalitions of the civil war. Citations from the latter refer to the numbered pages of the 1993 version. Gullick's 'A Careless, Heathen Philosopher?' first published in *JMBRAS* 26(1), 1953, and reprinted, under the same title but as a completely rewritten text, in *Glimpses of Selangor*, is a study of Sultan Abdul Samad and the political situation during the civil war.

Thomas Braddell, SS Attorney-General 1867-1882, wrote the official report of the negotiations of February 1874 ('Second Continuation of Report on the Proceedings of Government relating to the Native States in the Malayan Peninsula', enclosed with SSD 24 February 1874). He introduces much background material on Selangor before his report of current events (printed in C 1111). Cited as 'Braddell, para...'

2. Letters of November and December 1865 cited by Khoo Kay Kim, *Western Malay States*, p.143.
3. Ibid. p.87. Both were influential political figures. Read was an unofficial member of the SS Legislative Council and Kim Cheng was Siamese Consul-General in Singapore and a justice of the peace. In his own Singapore Hokkien community he was the 'Capitan China'. C.M.Turnbull, *The Straits Settlements 1826-67: Indian Presidency to Crown Colony*, Athlone Press, London, 1972, p.32.
4. At the start, Raja Jumaat's reforms had led to disputes between Raja Abdullah and some Malacca traders. Khoo Kay Kim, *Western Malay States*, p.76. The introduction of Read and Kim Cheng, Singapore business heavyweights, doubtless obliged Abdullah to defer. See also Chapter 3 Note 52.
5. P.B.Maxwell, *Our Malay Conquests*, King, London, 1878, p.32, cited by Khoo Kay Kim, *Western Malay States*, p.152. Winstedt, *Selangor*, p.19, and Middlebrook, op.cit., pp.25-26, also deal with this dispute. There are differences of detail between these accounts, but the main thrust is clear, ie Mahdi had a grievance over the denial of a privilege to which he considered himself entitled.
6. Wan Mohamed Amin bin Wan Mohamed Said, *Pesaka Selangor* ed. Abdul Samad Ahmad, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, rumi ed. 1966 (Jawi 1937), p.7 (cited hereafter as 'Amin') is the primary source for Winstedt, *Selangor*, p.19. As a youth Amin lived with his father, a clerk in the service of Raja Mahdi at Kuala Lumpur and later at Klang until 1869. He wrote his book as a court official of Sultan Sulaiman, with whom he had been a school-fellow.

'Equal rank' from P.J.Begbie, *The Malayan Penisula* etc., Vepery Mission Press, Madras, 1834, reprinted Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1967, p.139.

7. Khoo Kay Kim, *Western Malay States*, p.153, demonstrates that Mahdi's capture of Klang was in March 1867, not March 1866, as Winstedt and other histories had stated. Ibid., p.154, on Abdullah's death.
8. Haji Buyong Adil, *Sejarah Selangor*, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur, 1971, p.64.
9. Middlebrook, op.cit., is the main source of all information on the warring Chinese and their leaders. It is impossible to provide estimates of the numbers of Chinese since they tended to move from one mining centre to another and there is a risk of double-counting. In general Sungei Ujong and Lukut lost population, by migration, partly because of local disturbances and partly because Kanching and Kuala Lumpur had richer tin deposits. Yap Ah Loy himself had moved to Kuala Lumpur as recently as 1862.

   In general the text avoids using 'Ulu Klang' for the upper reaches of the Klang River valley since, contrary to general usage, that term was applied to a particular locality on the borders of the Klang and Langat valleys. In the SS Europeans tended at this time to use 'Klang' to denote any part of the Klang river valley.
10. Yen Ching-hwang, *A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya 1800-1911*, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1986, is the leading modern study, comprehensive and systematic, of the social structure and leadership of the immigrant Chinese of Singapore and Malaya, though a great deal more has been written on the more specific topic of 'secret societies'. Although the experts (among whom the author of this book is not included) take different views, it seems to be generally accepted that ties of common language (Chinese dialect), common descent, real or putative clan and lineage organisation and common surnames, and the need for mutual protection in an emigrant society and a tradition of resistance to foreign authority in the homeland ('secret societies') all had some part in shaping the complex, and often overlapping, alignment of overseas Chinese into groups.

    Neither the Malay ruling class nor the first generation of colonial administrators could speak a Chinese dialect or read the script, and so they tended to leave the control of these hardworking but turbulent communities to their own leaders, with some surprising ignorance (see Chapter 5) of the real bases of power of men such as Yap Ah Loy.

    Khoo Kay Kim, *Western Malay States*, p.111f (p.158 on Kuala Lumpur) deals with the local situation in the Malay States.
11. Khoo Kay Kim, *Western Malay States*, p.158, analyses how the basic distinction between Fei Chew and Kah Yeng Chew Hakkas became blurred by personal and local animosities.
12. Middlebrook, op.cit., pp.36-41, describes the installation in some detail. It is one of the few glimpses of Raja Mahdi as an administrator; he seems to have grasped the essentials very shrewdly.
13. Ibid, pp.44-52. If the route through Klang was blocked, Kuala Lumpur tin could be carried over to Ulu Langat to be exported through Kuala Langat (thus augmenting the Sultan's local revenues to his immense satisfaction). There were so many enemies in Ulu Selangor that the Selangor River route was not a practicable alternative. Middlebrook emphasises at various points how Yap Ah Loy was at pains to keep on good terms with the Sultan, whose interest in the Kanching mines might otherwise have led him to view Yap Ah Loy as an opponent.
14. Gullick, *Kudin in Selangor*, is the third of four essays on Kudin's long and eventful career in Kedah and Selangor. 'Kedah 1821-1855 -- Years of Exile and Return', *JMBRAS* 56(2), 1983, deals with the circumstances of Kudin's childhood, when his father and grandfather were in exile; 'Kedah in the Reign of Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin II 1854-1879', JMBRAS 58(2), 1985, is an account of the reign of his elder brother, with whom Kudin was associated as Raja Muda; 'Tunku Kudin of Kedah', *JMBRAS*, 60(2), 1987, continues the story of Kudin from 1878 to his death, again in exile, in 1909.
15. Selangor forces had supported Kedah princes in a revolt (1770-1773) (Chapter 1). One of the wives of Sultan Ibrahim of Selangor was 'a princess of Kedah'. Chapter 3 Note 1.
16. Winstedt (*Selangor*, p.20) here refers to the often gory and melodramatic plays by Shakespeare, Ben Johnson, Marlowe and others.
17. There is a tradition that Mahdi once challenged Kudin to single combat, but this was shouted across the Langat River and Kudin declined. Gullick, *Kudin of Kedah*, n126.

Kudin's marriage to Raja Arfah was 'a cat and dog life when together (which was seldom)' according to E.Innes, The *Chersonese with the Gilding Off*, 2 vols., Richard Bentley & Sons, London, 1885, vol.1, p.88 -- a fascinating picture of the formidable Raja Arfah, who was held in such awe that at her death (in 1896) it was popularly believed in Kuala Langat that the Selangor regalia came out in beads of perspiration! W.W.Skeat, *Malay Magic* etc., MacMillan, London, 1900, p.41. The failure of the marriage contributed to the coolness between the Sultan and Kudin.

18. W.G.(Sir George) Maxwell, *AR Kedah 1909-10*, gives a full account of the traditional role of the Raja Muda of Kedah. On Kudin's activities see Gullick, *Reign of Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin*.

19. Gullick, *Kudin in Selangor*, pp.196-199, discusses at length the relations of Kudin with the Sultan and his sons. Some idea of the complexity of the dynastic situation can be obtained from the Sultan's relationship to the leading figures of the civil war. Kudin was his son-in-law and Mahdi his first cousin, once removed. Among Mahdi's principal lieutenants Syed Mashhor, the son of an Arab from Pontianak in Borneo, was through his mother a cousin of the Sultan and had been born at Kuala Langat; Raja Mahmud was a son of the Sultan's brother-in-law (but not his nephew). (See Notes 25 and 26 below). The ruling chiefs of the outlying districts of Bernam and Lukut, generally sympathetic to Raja Mahdi's cause but not directly involved in the fighting, were respectively a nephew and a first cousin, once removed, of the Sultan. See Table 2.

20. In 1878 a letter was circulated in the Bernam district, and local notables were invited to sign it. The letter stated that 'Raja Mahdi is the son of Raja Sulaiman' which one worthy took to mean that 'he had been deprived of his inheritance the State of Selangor'. Enclosure to SSD 13 June 1878 (printed in C 2410 of 1878). For the background see J.M.Gullick, 'The Bloomfield Douglas Diary 1876-1882', *JMBRAS* 48(2), 1975, reprinted in *Glimpses of Selangor*, pp.116 and 152, notes 64-65.

21. No copy of the Malay original survives. The English translation enclosed with SSD 28 July 1871 (CO 273/48) is quoted by Khoo Kay Kim, *Western Malay States*, p.155. Winstedt, *Selangor*, p.21, quotes a slightly different English text, but does not explain its provenance.

Modern historians have concluded that, except as regard Kuala Langat, Kudin was simply invited to make what opportunity he could of exerting influence in Selangor as a whole. The English text does not use the word 'Viceroy', which (see below) was Irving's translation of *Wakil Mutallak*, and the missing Malay original could not have included that Malay phrase, as there is nothing in the English text capable of bearing that sense. Wilkinson, op.cit., p.122; Cowan, *Nineteenth Century Malaya*, p.71; Gullick, *Kudin in Selangor*, p.201.

Raja Mahdi in 1869, and Raja Yakob in 1874, asserted that the letter was a forgery, but the Sultan confirmed its authenticity to British officials in 1871 and again in 1874 (see below).

22. Gullick, *Kudin in Selangor*, pp.202-203, gives the story of the siege at greater length, based mainly on an article by J.C.Pasqual, published in the *Singapore Sunday Times* of 14 October 1934.

Pasqual, formerly a tin miner in Selangor (and one of the sources for Middlebrook, op.cit.) later moved to Kedah and became a planter. In Kedah he was told the story (admittedly incorrect in some details) by one of the leaders of the Kedah forces which came to Selangor with Tunku Kudin late in 1869. His informant was Penghulu Hamzah of Padang Terap (Kedah). Pasqual was also a personal friend of Tunku Bahadur, a son of Kudin, and prominent in Kedah of his time. See also Khoo Kay Kim, 'Biographical sketches of certain Straits Chinese involved in the Klang war 1867-1874', *Peninjau Sejarah* 2(2), 1967.

Kudin himself gave a very different account of the matter to Sir Andrew Clarke (see note 45 below). Irving and Swettenham wrote memoranda (enclosed with SSD 18 June 1878 in CO 273/94) on what they knew of Kudin's involvement. Kudin told Irving that he had spent months 'among the mud swamps of Qualla Klang', and Irving added that he had first met Kudin at that time. This seems to conflict with the date of his arrival, 6 March 1870 (at the end of the six months' siege), given by Khoo Kay Kim, *Western Malay States*, p.155.

There is no doubt that from his arrival on the scene Kudin took the lead in driving Mahdi out of Klang. More conjectural is whether recruiting a force in Kedah and obtaining supplies from Malacca was part of a previous arrangement with the Malacca merchants and Haji Tahir, the Dato' Dagang of the Klang district, who was destined to be a leading figure in Selangor for many years

to come into the 1880's. At this stage Haji Tahir's name was 'Nonggek'; see Chapter 5 Note 18.

23. Penghulu Hamzah (Note 22) and Wan Amin (Note 6).
24. Gullick, *Kudin in Selangor*, p.206, based on a naval report of 6 August 1871 printed in C 466. It was de Fontaine who had the heavy guns dragged, on sledges, up to the high ground.
25. Mashhor was the son of a Arab of Pontianak, but his mother was a sister of the mother of Sultan Abdul Samad. J.W.W.Birch, *The Journals of J.W.W.Birch First British Resident to Perak 1874-1875*, ed P.L.Burns, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1976, p.150 (entry dated 8 December 1874, after meeting Mashhor then a refugee in Perak). As a Syed he ranked in the raja class everywhere and his maternal connection gave him an entrée in Selangor royal circles. After the Selangor civil war was lost (Note 38) he moved to Perak, where his family had settled.

    F.A.Swettenham, 'A Silhouette', *The Real Malay - Pen Pictures*, John Lane Bodley Head, London 1900, p.224, gives a vivid portrait of this formidable man, then penghulu of Kerling (Ulu Selangor) twenty years after the war. See also Chapter 9 Note 85.
26. Raja Mahmud (not to be confused with his namesake, the son of Sultan Mohamed) was the son of Raja Berkat, who held the post of Tunku Panglima Raja and was the brother-in-law and confidant of Sultan Abdul Samad (Mahmud was not a son of the Sultan's sister but of another wife). Both Swettenham and Clifford knew and liked Mahmud, though he seems to have been a rather bloodthirsty warrior. See J.M.Gullick, *Malay Society in the Late Nineteenth Century - the Beginnings of Change*, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1989, pp.81-84, on his long and troubled career. F.A.Swettenham, *British Malaya* etc., George Allen & Unwin, London, revised 1948, p.129, on 'three famous warriors' and p.191 for a romantic pen portrait of Mahmud.
27. Mohamed Amin Hassan, *Raja Mahdi*, and Note 12 above.
28. Gullick, *Kudin in Selangor*, p.207.
29. Cowan, *Nineteenth Century Malaya*, pp.85-87. Mahdi then withdrew to Bernam and Mashhor to Ulu Selangor.
30. J.de V.Allen, A.J.Stockwell and L.R.Wright, eds., *A Collection of Treaties and Other Documents Affecting the States of Malaysia 1761-1963*, 2 vols, Oceana Publications, London, 1963, vol 1, p.440, and Chapter 3 Note 43.
31. Cowan, *Nineteenth Century Malaya*, p.88.
32. Gullick, *Kudin in Selangor*, p.211, suggests that this was an interpretation pre-arranged between Kudin and Irving, who professed to be an expert on Malay affairs. Irving's report of the mission, the principal source, was enclosed with SSD 29 July 1871, and was printed with other papers on the Rinaldo affair in C 466 of 1872.
33. Gullick, *Kudin in Selangor*, p.211, and Khoo Kay Kim, *Western Malay States*, p.179. The exact sequence of events at Kuala Selangor and their timetable is uncertain, but there is no doubt that Musa, until then inclined to vacillate, became 'one more opponent' of Kudin. On the hostility of Raja Yakub see Note 43 below.
34. Mahdi himself complained that the British government 'had joined my enemy'. Letter quoted by Khoo Kay Kim, *Western Malay States*, p.178. Mahdi hit back by representations to Siam concerning the use of Kedah troops in Selangor, allegedly in breach of the Anglo-Siamese treaty of 1826. Gullick, *Kudin in Selangor*, p.208. This led the Sultan of Kedah to refuse to send fresh levies to Kudin to replace the original Kedah force, when it returned to Kedah.
35. Mohamed Ibrahim bin Abdullah Munshi, *The Voyages of Mohamed Ibrahim Munshi*, translated by A.Sweeney and N.Phillips, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1975, pp.60-88. Ibrahim acted as interpreter to Irving; later he became Minister of the Interior (Datuk Bentara Dalam) in Johor. His long account of the 1872 visit, and of Kudin's regime at Klang, is an invaluable source.
36. Middlebrook, op.cit., Chapters 13 and 14, is the most detailed account of the manoeuvres and fighting in the interior in 1872. See also Khoo Kay Kim, *Western Malay States*, p.189, and Cowan, *Nineteenth Century Malaya*, pp.104-105.
37. W.Linehan, 'A History of Pahang', *JMBRAS* 14(2), 1936, 'The Selangor War', is based largely on the anonymous *Hikayat Pahang*, written early in this century, and gives the most detailed account of the operations of the Pahang forces in the Selangor civil war. Anon, *Hikayat Pahang*, c.1932, ed. Kalthum Jeran, Penerbit Fajar Bakti, Petaling Jaya, 1986. See also Khoo Kay Kim, *Western Malay*

States, pp.196-199.

38. The involved story of the concession to mine throughout Selangor which Davidson obtained from Kudin, as the basis for floating the Selangor Tin Mining Company in London, is significant as one of the inducements to the Colonial Office to abandon the policy of non-intervention, but it is only peripheral to the domestic affairs of Selangor (since it never took effect) and is omitted here. See Cowan, *Nineteenth Century Malaya*, pp.166-168.
39. Modern historians have written at length, and often in disagreement, over the main causes of the *volte face* in British policy leading to the authority given to Clarke. Although the decision had major consequences for Selangor, its immediate causes were external. Straits Settlements economic involvement in Selangor tin production led to much pressure from commercial interests for intervention; see also Note 38 above.
40. See Cowan, *Nineteenth Century Malaya*, Chapter 5, Parkinson, op.cit., Chapter 6, P.B.Maxwell, op.cit. p.20f, and J.M.Gullick, *Rulers and Residents: Influence and Power in the Malay States 1870-1920*, Chapter 2, among the numerous studies of this subject. Allen, Stockwell and Wright, op.cit., vol 1, pp.390-392 (Pangkor Engagement) and pp.448-449 (Selangor letter and proclamation). Parkinson (p.134f) analyses the text of the Pangkor Engagement in detail.
41. Cowan, *Nineteenth Century Malaya*, pp.102-103, on Braddell and the Maharaja, who had given Mahdi asylum in 1872. In addition to Braddell's official report on Clarke's visit (see Note 1) R.H.Vetch, *Life of Lieutenant-General Sir Andrew Clarke*, Murray, London, 1905, pp.157-160 quotes from a letter written by Clarke and from the journal of his ADC.
42. Braddell, para 84. Gullick, *Careless Heathen Philosopher*, on the complexities of Sultan Abdul Samad's character. Swettenham reported that the Sultan 'rather encouraged the somewhat prevalent idea' that he was an imbecile incapable of ruling. Report of 8 December 1874 cited in his *Journal*, p.199, note 4. On the Sultan's age (69 in 1874) see Chapter 9 Note 11.
43. 'Tuanku Kudin was the cause of the disturbances', said Raja Yakub. Braddell, para 42. However Yakub himself was 'vehemently suspected of being the leader of a gang of pirates' and 'left an unfavourable impression on every one'. Ibid, para 85. Yakub and Tunku Kudin's wife, Raja Arfah (see Note 17 above), were children of the Sultan by the same mother, who had died 'a raving maniac'. F.A.Swettenham, *Sir Frank Swettenham Malayan Journals 1874-1876*, ed P.L.Burns and C.D.Cowan, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, p.145. Brother and sister both showed some signs of almost paranoid animosity, which may have been hereditary. On Yakub's jealousy of his half-brother, Raja Kahar, see Swettenham, *Journal*, p.172. There are no references to Yakub after 1879; presumably he had died about then.
44. Braddell, para 43. Since Clarke's object was 'to settle the government of the country' he could hardly have tolerated the upheaval to be expected if Mahdi and his supporters were allowed to return. Effectively it was a choice between Kudin and the group, including Raja Bot, whom the Sultan had unsuccessfully proposed to Birch and Irving in July 1871 as a sort of joint executive.
45. Braddell, paras 45-65. The gist of Kudin's version was that Selangor chiefs had challenged the authority given to him by the Sultan's letter of 1868, and that he had imported Kedah forces to uphold it and afford him protection. His intervention at the siege of Klang was initially an attempt to settle the dispute between Raja Ismail and Raja Mahdi and -- by implication -- not planned in advance. See Note 22 above.
46. Gullick, *Kudin in Selangor*, p.237 note 129, describes Davidson's character and career. He was a much respected lawyer, whose practice had brought him into touch with both Malays and Chinese. The Colonial Office objected to his becoming British Resident of Selangor because he had been one of Kudin's financial backers; in 1874 he probably knew more about Selangor than any other European. Hence his role in the trial lends weight to its verdict that the accused were guilty.
47. Swettenham, *Journal*, p.290 (entry of 28 August 1875) is his first record of a discovery made 'lately, little by little.' Even in the privacy of his journal he does not identify his informants nor give his reasons for accepting what they said.

J.M.Gullick, The Kuala Langat Piracy Trial,' *JMBRAS* 69(2), 1966, reviews at length Davidson's notes of the trial, Swettenham's assertions, in 1900, that there had been perjury, and, in 1906, that there had been an innocent mistake of identity by the main prosecution witness.

Parkinson's valiant (op.cit. p.114f) attempt to reconstruct the truth is contradicted on some points by Swettenham's 1875 diary entry, of which Parkinson, writing in 1960, was unaware.

There are two major difficulties over Swettenham's version:- the accused, in their questions to prosecution witnesses at the trial did not assert that they had been elsewhere at the time, as Swettenham believed, and it is unlikely that the sole survivor, who was the main prosecution witness, would have committed perjury at the trial in the presence of persons who knew the truth and could have exposed the falsity of his story (if it was untrue).

No one will now establish what was the truth. The question is whether Davidson, at the trial, or Swettenham, in his subsequent investigation, was deceived by an elaborate and widespread conspiracy of falsehood.

48. Allen, Stockwell and Wright, cited in Note 30 above.
49. Remark made by Raja Ismail, Kudin's ally since the siege of Klang, to Swettenham (*Journal*, p.154, entry of 21 November 1874).

Chapter Five

Selangor after the War

By the end of 1873 the civil war had burnt itself out, but in some districts the embers still glowed red and might yet be fanned back into flame. However the piracy trial and the summary execution of the convicted men was a dramatic event which probably had a more enduring effect than the demonstration of British naval power which supported Clarke in his discussions with the Sultan. Despite 'Salangore's ancient fame as a country of pirates with Langat for its chief stronghold' Swettenham noted that the Langat people 'still speak with awe of that trial and the executions....I have met with unvarying politeness from the Langat people.'[1] Beneath the surface however there was little goodwill to the intruders, including Tunku Kudin, who continued to perform his duties as Viceroy from Klang, visiting Bandar Langat infrequently and usually in the company of the Resident designate, J.G.Davidson. There seems to have been a desire to get rid of them held in check by uncertainty as to how this could be achieved.[2]

The sense of insecurity was increased by reports that Raja Mahdi had returned and was lying low in a village near the capital, and by the undeniable support being given to the Dato Shabandar of Sungei Ujong, leader of Malay resistance to British intervention there, by the rampageous Raja Mahmud, always spoiling for a fight.[3] Sultan Abdul Samad had agreed to publish a proclamation, stating -- among other things -- that 'we have a British officer....to live with us, and to aid and advise us,' Yet he kept aloof, residing for some weeks at Jugra Hill.[4] Swettenham, close at hand, might appreciate the reasons for the Sultan's vacillation, but to Davidson at Klang it looked like duplicity. These fears reached a climax in the autumn of 1875 with the rising in Ulu Langat and the crisis in Perak which led to the killing of the first British Resident, J.W.W.Birch.[5]

As the impact of the piracy trial faded, it was not apparent that British intervention had the means of upholding the authority of the Sultan's Viceroy, Tunku Kudin, and keeping the peace in this turbulent State. Even in the towns of Klang and Kuala Selangor there were serious though isolated outbreaks of violence owing to 'a great number of bad characters in the country who have been long accustomed to live by plundering.'[6] Those who feared or suffered by this disorder asserted that 'Selangor is under the English Govt., it is no longer under Malays', only to be told 'that was not the case.' It was becoming all too evident that the emperor had no clothes.[7]

State revenue in 1875 was only $115,651, which was wholly inadequate for existing expenditure. Yet if the regime was to survive, it must raise a police force. The improvised arrangements to meet this need brought to Selangor, where he served for the ensuing 22 years until his death in 1897, Harry Syers, one of the very few British officials whose individual performance merits mention in this short history of Selangor. Syers was only 22 when he arrived in March 1875, a private soldier released for six months by his regiment (a garrison unit in the Straits Settlements at that time). He had no relevant experience in his task of raising a police force; he relied on a practical flair, aided by an inherent empathy with Malays, becoming one of the best expatriate Malay speakers of his time. He was a working-class Londoner whose English speech jarred the genteel susceptibilities of middle-class European women, such as Emily Innes. His colleagues liked and respected a very genuine, genial figure who, more than any other pioneer, virtually invented the Malayan Police.[8]

At Klang there were about a hundred of the mercenaries who had served Kudin -- none too well -- as garrison troops during the civil war.[9] Even in 1872 they had been an unimpressive collection of 'Southern Indians, Bengalis, *peranakans*, and Malays....some of them were thin and sickly, and they came in all shapes and sizes....all shabby and dirty; some wore trousers, some sarongs; some wore jackets, others did not.' [10] When Syers took charge, this force had been abandoned by its officers, except for a French Creole named Ali Mamat. The government owed them several years' pay which it lacked the means to discharge; they had deteriorated into an opium-sodden rabble. Weeding out those who were beyond rehabilitation, Syers reduced their number to about fifty, and secured for them all a payment of their arrears in the form of promissory notes, which they promptly sold at a discount in the bazaar. A hundred new Malay recruits were brought in from the rural districts of Malacca, from which the SS government obtained most of its police. Discipline and training improved morale and efficiency, though there was a continuing lack of men suitable for promotion to non-commissioned rank.

The most controversial feature of the new Selangor police was the dispersal of a considerable number in small detachments to man rural police stations. By contrast the Perak police were mainly Sikhs and Punjabi Muslims, commanded by former Indian Army officers, who raised mountain batteries, cavalry detachments and styled their force '1st Perak Sikhs'. It was concentrated in two or three main towns as a striking force. In Selangor, however, the policy was to place a Malay police detachment in every important village in support of the local headman. As foreign (Malacca) Malays they were not popular, in the early years at least, and the whole concept of a Malay police was prejudiced by unhappy popular memories of the undisciplined 'followers' who attended every Malay chief in earlier days and the *budak raja* (royal pages) who were even worse. Nonetheless the incidence of disorder and crime diminished rapidly and public confidence increased, so that 'it is a common occurrence to meet a Chinaman carrying a bag of dollars through the jungle without any arms or weapons whatsoever.' [11] It was still an armed police, equipped with carbines, which was able, in the autumn of 1875, to join with Yap Ah Loy's fighting

The Earliest Extant Map of Kuala Lumpur

A Comparison of Swettenham's Sketch Map of 1875 and the actual topographical features.



Swettenham's map reproduced from his Journal (p. 219) by permission of the Oxford University Press

The actual position of certain features – a comparative sketch



Notes

1. Rivers Channels. In Swettenham's sketch there is no sign of the Gombak River. Instead the Klang River is shown swinging round on the line of the Gombak River, with the route to Ampang, which in fact follows the Klang River out of Kuala Lumpur, on that line.

2. Malay Quarter. Swettenham shows the Malay quarter extending along the river bank almost as far as the market square in front of Yap Ah Loy's house. The comparative sketch shows the situation as it is known to have been ten years later, when the line of what became Java Street (Jalan Tun Perak), shown by the broken line, marked the division between Malay and Chinese quarters until it approached the confluence.

men in suppressing a brief rising in Ulu Langat, led by Sootan Puasa, a Mandiling leader. These rebels fought from stockades, using cannon 'loaded to the muzzles with old nails and other rubbish', but their positions were easily outflanked.[12]

Although the sense of insecurity of 1874-1875 diminished, the next three years (1876-1878) were a grim struggle to survive the worst recession in living memory. In 1875 the world price of tin fell to a level which made tin mining, in the interior of Selangor, almost unprofitable. Sultan Abdul Samad, who preferred to hold his considerable personal reserves as tin ingots rather than silver dollars (he had no confidence whatever in bank notes) saw the price fall from $125 to $70 per *bahara*.[13] The decline of the mines, which provided a market for surplus produce, had indirect effects on peasant agriculture, and of course it was a disaster for state finances, burdened with war debts equal to two years' revenue.[14] It is now time to make a kind of conducted tour of Selangor as it entered the recession.

Bandar Langat and Klang were the centres of Malay authority and of British control respectively. Both depended upon the main mining centre of Kuala Lumpur, which even in hard times was the powerhouse of the State.[15] The recession had not yet come when, in mid 1873, Yap Ah Loy returned to view the ruins of what had been Kuala Lumpur and the flooded pools which had been mines. Under a less resolute leader the Chinese might well have abandoned such a scene of disaster, with its aura of persistent ill-fortune; they had left Lukut and Sungei Ujong to come to Kuala Lumpur some fifteen years earlier. Yap Ah Loy, however, drove them to rebuild the town and reopen the mines, so that in March 1875:- 'It is by far the best mining village I have seen, the streets wide, and excellently arranged, the shops most substantial, and the Capitan China's house would be no disgrace in Singapore. There is nothing like it in Laroot. The Town is divided into a Chinese Quarter and a Malay Quarter in the form in the margin; the Chinese near their Capitan and the Malays at the further end of the town. In front of the Capitan's house are the Gambling Booths and the Market. The backs of all the houses on the river side of the Town go down to the river so that boats can go up to the people's doors. There are about 1,000 Chinese in the Town and some 500 to 700 Malays. I think too much credit can hardly be given to the Capt. China, who has seen the town 3 times burnt down and has 3 times rebuilt it, when if he had lost heart certainly no one else would have had the courage to stay. If he did not lose heart he lost money, and it will take him many years of success to recover his lost fortune.'[16]

The mines at Sungai Puteh, Ampang and Ulu Klang were linked with Kuala Lumpur by 'first-rate bullock-cart roads over distances of eight miles and more'. There were also mines at Petaling some way down-river. In addition to tin mining Menangkabau settlers had planted tobacco which was 'doing exceedingly well'. The population of the area surrounding the town was about 5,000, including 1,500 newly arrived Chinese.'[17]

The leading Malay in Kuala Lumpur was Haji Tahir, generally known as Toh Dagang, ie headman of immigrant Malays in the Klang valley. He shared authority with Yap Ah Loy, and like him was entitled to a levy of $1 per *bahara* of tin produced, as a reward for his services.[18] Other Malay leaders of the war period had been

on Raja Mahdi's side at the end and had taken themselves off - Raja Asal to Perak and Sootan Puasa to Ulu Langat. Haji Tahir, however, had weathered the storm and stayed on to become a prominent figure in the smallholder community.[18]

Up to this time 'the interior of Salangore is doing extremely well' and it may have seemed to Yap Ah Loy, a man of sanguine temperament, that he was about to reap the 'years of success' which would enable him to pay off loans borrowed for rehabilitation and so accumulate capital. Then the sudden fall in the price of tin caused dismay among the miners who complained 'that it does not pay them to work for tin.'[19]

Downriver the town of Klang, with a population (in 1875) of about 800 was 'merely the port and seat of Government', though there were 'numbers of good cocoanut plantations up the river as far as Damansara.' A steamer from Malacca put in once a week, bringing opium, rice, tobacco etc. and loading return cargoes of tin and gutta percha.[20]

Although Davidson was not formally appointed Resident until the beginning of 1875, he had been at this seat of government, as adviser to Tunku Kudin, for most of 1874. There was a gradual transition by which effective control of the state government, such as it was, passed from Malay to British hands. Kudin, with his attention given to his native Kedah, made no demur, but Raja Ismail, son and heir of Raja Abdullah. who had brought in Kudin as his ally at the siege of Klang in 1870, now fretted in idleness.[21] In the emerging colonial regime the only Malay figure with an important role was Syed Zin, former chief of staff to Kudin during the war; his adaptability brought him charge of the embryo public works, survey and land departments. However Syed Zin, a Penang Arab businessman, was even more objectionable in the eyes of the Selangor ruling class than the aristocrat Viceroy from Kedah.

The Malays whose 'good cocoanut plantations' lay up river from the town were not the original owners, who had fled during the civil war, but immigrants from Sumatra, Pahang and Kedah and from the Straits Settlements, who had moved in to take up abandoned holdings.[22] While Kudin was still in control of Klang in 1874, he had issued a notice giving the refugee owners a period of three months in which to reassert their rights, before reallocating unclaimed holdings to 'his own people'.[23] Nothing is reported of the traditional Malay chief, To Engku Klang; he seems to have been a nonentity and it was a situation which offered him no effective role.[24]

Kuala Langat had not suffered the ravages of war, and so it was comparatively flourishing with a settled population of about 700 at Bandar Langat and nearby Jugra. There were 'a considerable number of shops kept by both Malays and Chinese.' Above Bandar Langat there were 'several large and flourishing Campongs on both banks' as far as Toh Alli, twelve miles up the river from the capital. However 'the lownesss of the situation' of Bandar Langat made it swampy and liable to flooding and to erosion of the river banks. 'The Langat people [were] poor, but too proud to work....they cannot however be turned in a day from pirates into peaceful husbandmen and traders.' The situation was improving from past times when 'murders were of almost weekly occurrence' ; after the salutary example of the piracy trial

there was 'no crime of any sort' for six months. Thereafter there were some thefts 'most of which have been traced, proved and punished.....[the people] have accepted the altered state of things apparently with pleasure, and there is probably more outcry now about the loss of a dollar than there ever was about the loss of a life.' With greater security 'native trade which had fallen off' showed a marked trend back towards its old level when twenty or thirty 'Malacca boats' were in the river at any one time. The commodities traded were much the same as at Klang but the volume was less, yielding a 'very small' but increasing customs revenue. The arrival of a consignment of tin from the interior was still quite an event.[25]

Control of the port and its trade was a bone of contention between the Shahbandar, whose customary authority in such matters had been displaced by the Sultan's decision to entrust the responsibility to the Dato' Dagang, Abu Said, who was evidently more likely to bring in revenue. Indeed his intention 'to tax all the imports, cloths, sarongs and every little thing they sold' made him very unpopular.[26] He was quite unabashed being 'one of those thick-skinned people whom it is impossible to sit upon.'[27]

The three adult sons of the Sultan, Raja Muda Musa, Raja Kahar and Raja Yakob, quarrelled with each other; they had little influence with their father or with anyone else.[28] Their disposition to assert their traditional privileges led to complaints that too little had changed under the new regime.[29]

Kuala Selangor in 1875 had only just begun to recover from the war. There had been some response to a royal proclamation of October 1874 calling on Selangor people to return and reoccupy their lands, but still 'for miles there are deserted cocoanut and sago plantations, on both sides of the river entirely untenanted, save by elephants, and they have done much damage to the sago trees.' The small bazaar was at the foot of the hill, on which stood the forts bombarded by the "Rinaldo" in 1871, and 'the larger place on the opposite bank....destroyed in the late disturbances....is now being rebuilt.' As an inducement to traders Kudin had promised that for a year there would be no change in the existing customs duties, on opium imported and on tin, gutta percha and sago exported.

There was a garrison of Pahang forces, commanded by Wanda, son of Bendahara Mutahir, until it was withdrawn by agreement with Bendahara Ahmad. Its presence may have been a disincentive to Chinese as much as Malays thinking of returning, and the total town population, on both sides, was still only about two hundred.[30]

Lukut likewise was a shadow of what it had been years before. It had yielded a monthly revenue of $15,000 to Raja Jumaat, but that had now fallen to a mere $300. Some said that this was because 'all the tin was worked out' but others asserted that Raja Bot and Raja Yahya, sons of Raja Jumaat, 'administered such unequal justice, and behaved so badly, that the Chinese left the place. Both stories are probably true in part.'[31] In a State which was desperately short of population, agriculture and mining only flourished where optimum conditions could be found.

Bernam, under Raja Hitam, was more flourishing, and had an estimated population of about a thousand, including some refugees from the Selangor River valley, who were planning to return there. On the lower stretches of the Bernam River

there were two substantial villages where 'the principal occupation of the people' was catching and curing fish. At Ulu Bernam a brother of Raja Hitam was promoting tin-mining and the collection of gutta percha. Some of the jungle produce was purchased by Malays from aborigine collectors, of whom there were a considerable number in the Ulu Bernam/Slim area. The obstacle to development of the interior was that it took ten days to move supplies up the river to Ulu Bernam. At the estuary Raja Hitam levied the usual duties, plus an export duty on salt fish. Although the authorities in Perak, who claimed the territory as far as the north bank of the Bernam River, allowed Raja Hitam to administer the valley as a single entity, it was border country and too remote to attract a larger population.[32]

The state of Selangor had a long coastline, as far as the north side of the Linggi River estuary, but did not include the districts of the interior south of the Langat valley, as they were Sungei Ujong (Negri Sembilan) territory.[33] Apart from Ulu Bernam, described above, the interior districts of Selangor were the upper valleys of the Selangor, Klang and Langat rivers, as far inland as the central range, beyond which was Pahang territory. Although there were tracks linking one district with another, across the low watersheds between them, their main communications were each with the port downstream along the river. Although the distance between the inland mines and the coast was little more than twenty miles as the crow flies, movement by the winding course of the river, especially upstream, was slow and costly. In the Klang valley the problem was more acute because between Damansara village, a few miles uopstream from Klang town, and Petaling, a few miles down river from Kuala Lumpur, the river makes a wide detour in a long bend southwards. There was a path through the jungle, made by Malays long before Kuala Lumpur was founded, which ran a direct course some fifteen miles from Damansara to Kuala Lumpur.

Between 1875 and 1878 the combined efforts of Yap Ah Loy and the Resident at Klang had improved the track to make 'the Damansara Road', in theory at least a route usable by bullock carts, and undoubtedly practicable as a bridlepath for travellers mounted on ponies. However as a route for the movement of supplies by bullock cart, an earth road simply could not support the traffic. The metal-rimmed wheels of the heavy carts cut up the surface; where the road went through swampy ground, it became a quagmire.[34]

The miners of the interior had therefore to contend with the heavy costs of bringing in the supplies which they needed, and of exporting their tin along slow and devious river lines. It was reckoned, for example, that by river the distance between the mines at Kuala Kubu (Ulu Selangor) and Kuala Selangor was eighty to ninety miles. The collapse in the price of tin in 1875 made existing mines unprofitable, and discouraged the opening of new ones. If there had not been a rapid rise in the tin price in the second half of 1879, Yap Ah Loy, by far the largest entrepreneur in Selangor, would probably have become bankrupt, since his creditors were threatening to cut off further supplies.[35]

There was a similar, if less dramatic, situation in the other inland mining districts. Kuala Kubu had some of the richest known tin deposits in the State. At

depths of six to twelve feet there were ore strata up to four feet thick.[36] Before the tin price fell in 1875 five mines had been opened and brought into production by a working population of about four hundred Malays and Chinese. There was also a substantial trade in gutta percha.

The mines around Kanching had been worked before those of Kuala Lumpur, but, after the bitter rivalry of the past, Kanching was now an outpost of Kuala Lumpur. Yap Ah Loy had built five miles of road between Kanching town (Bandar Kanching often referred to simply as 'Bandar') and the mines, which yielded a small quantity of gold as well as tin. In Kanching 'there are a number of good shops, built on purpose for the accommodation of traders who hire them during their stay.' Before the war there had been 'gardens' (smallholdings) along both sides of the road, but in 1875 they were derelict. On the hills above the mines there were camphor trees 'hitherto undisturbed as no one knows how to work them.'

The main Malay centre was Kuala Kubu, where there were three Pahang headmen, who derived their authority from Tunku Kudin (as part of his arrangements with Pahang). The Chinese headmen appointed by Yap Ah Loy were at Kanching. In 1876 there were 600 Chinese and 70 Malay miners at Kanching, where the Malay headman was an agent of Sheikh Mohamed Taib, brother of Sheikh Mohamed Ali of Ulu Klang - all signs of the Minangkabau economic hegemony of the Sumatran Malay miners of the interior at this time. However nearby at Batang Yam there was a settlement of 300 Rawas (Mandiling) under Sootan Kamala, who was organising an influx from Perak.[37] It was probably the Pahang occupation of this mining district which kept the peace between these Sumatran settlers; the Pahang men were there to enforce the remittance of the sums which Kudin had contracted to pay in return for the vital assistance which he had obtained from Pahang in the war.[38]

In contrast to Kanching, with its history of rivalry with Kuala Lumpur, the Ulu Langat district was a 'new country', endowed with tin deposits, gutta percha and rattan, 'riches, now lying neglected, but ready to mens' hands.'[39] The disincentive was insecurity. There were local discontents which blew up in the brief rising of October 1875, and there was conflict between the leading Malay chiefs across the disputed border with Sungei Ujong. In March 1875 Rekoh had a population of no more than a hundred, Malays, Bugis, Chinese and Korinchi, under a Bugis headman appointed by the ruling chief of Sungei Ujong. The headman evidently found this an unwelcome responsibility and had taken himself off to Singapore. The village 'had the appearance of having once been a very prosperous place. There are plenty of most substantial shops and houses built of plank and mud, as good native houses as I have seen anywhere, the Sungei Ujong style but better than the houses there....a first rate Bazaar for houses that is badly off for wares.'

Cheras too had 'a very forlorn appearance, what were once good and flourishing shops being now many of them deserted or tumbled down.' A year later Douglas noted that the headman was Minangkabau, a fellow-countryman and agent of Sheikh Mat Ali of Ulu Klang. A few miles downstream, at Kajang, there was a very mixed population - 20 Minangkabau, 15 Mandiling, 30 Padang Jawa, 7 from Kampar (Perak) but all the mining was in the hands of the 60 Chinese.



Nineteenth Century Ulu Langat
The villages shown, including those of the Klang valley, were mainly mining centres

Ulu Langat village was a more important mining centre, with 400 Chinese and 200 Malays (mainly Mandiling and Kampar men) at work, and some 30 Minangkabau smallholders. However the people 'are very discontented, talk of leaving the place, and evidently very much dislike R. Kahar.' The Chinese miners too were at loggerheads with the advancers, the mine headman cheating 'the merchant who advanced the money in every way he could.'[40]

Tunku Kudin made only one recorded visit to the interior. At Kuala Lumpur he had 'a great reception' but 'was very nearly burnt to death by the crackers on his arrival.'[41] Over the next three years the government at Klang, hard pressed by its own financial problems, left Yap Ah Loy and other miners to struggle on as best they could, with only infrequent visits. The one positive step was a reduction in the rate of export duty on tin.[42]

None the less it was a period of consolidation in which all concerned could come to terms with each other and the new situation created by British intervention in 1874. It is doubtful whether Sultan Abdul Samad viewed that event with the degree of satisfaction which British administrators complacently assumed. He was by then over the age of 70 and had survived twenty years of conflict and personal insecurity. He could see the advantages of stability, and he was clever enough to deflect the more unwelcome proposals of his foreign advisers, such as the removal of his royal capital to Klang (and after 1880 to Kuala Lumpur), so that Ruler and Resident would be together. As related above, Tunku Kudin, now in a 'very curious position' as Viceroy, withdrew to Kedah. Raja Muda Musa made no secret of his wish to be free of the intruders, but was powerless to achieve it. As heir to the throne, his attitude caused some concern.[43]

Selangor was not troubled, as Perak was, by a prolonged dispute over the abolition of 'slavery' ie traditional dependency through the mechanism of debt-bondage.[44] Before the civil war there had been debt-bondage in the main coastal centres under Malay aristocratic rule, but it now survived only in Kuala Langat, where -- after the piracy trial -- there was no disposition to invite further sanctions.[45] With characteristic adroitness the Sultan contrived to avoid inflaming Malay opposition by advising 'that all slavery should be quietly dropped and ignored' and agreeing that, contrary to custom, the value of bondsmens' services should count towards discharge of their debts. The policy of 'ignoring slavery' meant that a creditor could not, as in Perak, call on the police to arrest, and the courts to order the return of, runaway bondsmen. Faced with this situation few creditors persisted in claims against bondsmen. Selangor debt-bondage just withered on the vine, and the authorities in London expressed their satisfaction (and relief) by presenting to the Sultan a sword of honour.[46]

In the interior the Malay population were mainly Sumatran settlers of the peasant class, lacking the aristocratic pretensions which needed support by the services and attendance of 'followers' (bondsmen). There were still a few pockets of the Malay *ancien regime*, undisturbed by the war, in rural communities such as Jeram and Bernam on the coast. In Ulu Selangor the remaining Pahang headmen also asserted privileges customary in their home State. Hence there were isolated ap-

peals to the Resident, mainly from bondswomen wishing to be free of bondage which caused more hardship to them than to the men.[47]

Colonial rule had begun with a Resident at Klang and an Assistant Resident at Bandar Langat, and so the assertion that 'Selangor is under the English, it is no longer under Malays' exaggerated the capacity of the new regime to rule.[48] A withdrawal of the Pahang forces from Kuala Selangor led to the presence there of a third British administrator.[49] In the interior, apart from Yap Ah Loy's Kuala Lumpur power base, the local communities remained under Malay headmen.[50] In this situation people complained that 'we have in past times had so many masters, that we cannot tell who is the real head, other than the Sultan, and he is a long way off.' In more populous and long-settled States, such as Perak, the Sultan gave charge of districts to chiefs drawn from established families with hereditary claims to that office, and there were places on the Selangor coast, such as Bernam, Jeram and Lukut, where a similar system was emerging. The case for appointing Malay chiefs in the interior was evident; the problem was to find men likely to be 'intelligent, energetic and trustworthy heads' of inland districts, acceptable to the restless communities under their charge.[51]

Rather different considerations brought the Sultan to a similar conclusion. 'Political allowances' were now paid from state funds, in substitution for local tax collecting, to a number of members of the royal dynasty. The Sultan argued that the recipients should earn their keep (and -- he may have felt -- be kept out of mischief) by governing or at least developing parts of Selangor.[52] The Sumatran headmen of Ulu Langat may have protested too much at their experience of Raja Kahar as a district chief, but their complaints are informative. 'No one they said would come [ie settle] as long as there was a Raja in the Ulu either governing or trading. As governor they said the Rajas were without principle, unjust oppressors, favouring their own followers whether right or wrong, and using their power to rob the people. As traders they monopolised everything, not allowing other traders to sell merchandise until their own had first been bought, nor to sell at a lower price than that fixed by them. In buying it was the same.'[53]

The outcome was an unsatisfactory compromise by which a handful of Malay aristocrats were slotted in as 'penghulu' or 'native magistrate' without much expectation that they would function as sub-district administrators, alongside the more prominent local headmen, also styled 'penghulu'. The heterogeneity of the result appears in the following list (of June 1882) of Selangor chiefs and headmen:-

Raja Muda Musa, president of the mixed court (Jugra).
Raja Kahar - magistrate and collector of Ulu Langat.
Tunku Panglima Raja (brother-in-law of the Sultan) - headman of Kanchong (south of Jugra).
Raja Mahmud (son of the above) - headman and magistrate at Kuala Selangor.
Raja Hassan (son of Raja Abdullah) - headman of Klang.
Raja Amin - headman of Ja Mongit (Semenyeh?).
Haji Mat Salleh* - penghulu of Kanching.

Panglima Garang (Pahang man) - penghulu of Ulu Selangor (Kuala Kubu).
Haji Kechil* - penghulu of Petaling.
Dato Mangkok* - headman at 3rd mile Damansara Road.
Raja Sah (son of Sultan) - attached to Collector's office at Jugra.
Raja Ibrahim* - penghulu of Ulu Klang.
Raja Laut ibni Sultan Mohamed - native magistrate at Kuala Lumpur.
(* indicates that these were 'Minangkabau' ie Sumatran notables)

Their duties were 'to repress or prevent crime with the aid of the police; to settle or arbitrate in petty cases not to be brought before the courts; to assist the police....As a rule I cannot say that the Native Officers do perform these duties satisfactorily....at the same time the Native Chiefs, if properly controlled form a useful link between the Government under the Residential system and the ryots.' This was followed by a recommendation for the gradual replacement of 'lukewarm' Rajas who owed their appointment to Tunku Kudin, as a reward for services, by 'educated' Rajas.[54]

The Chinese, especially those in and around Kuala Lumpur, were left to their own devices under the charge of the leading mining entrepreneurs, such as Yap Ah Loy. The other important figure was Yap Ah Shak, whose mines were mainly at Petaling. In Ulu Selangor Ah Lin was Yap Ah Loy's 'Agent'. In Ulu Langat the most prominent Chinese was Chan Ah Chan.[55] The system was a licence for the domination of secret societies.

In the hard times of the recession the Chinese employers had encouraged the expansion of Malay agriculture since locally grown food was much cheaper than supplies imported from outside Selangor. In mid-1879 the economy of Selangor began to feel the favourable wind of rising tin prices, and this improved the morale of government officials and mining towkays (employers) alike. The situation was already a great deal better than it had been in the war-torn Selangor of 1875, but the State was ill-prepared for the rapid expansion which was now to come.

Notes

1. 'Report of Her Britannic Majesty's Acting Assistant Resident at Salangore,' dated 8 April 1875, enclosed with SSD 27 April 1875 (printed in C 1320 of 1875), cited hereafter as 'Swettenham 1875 report.' 'In those days the stroller by night....always carried a naked weapon, and, if he met another man, was apt to strike first, and then ask for explanations.' F.A.Swettenham, *The Real Malay - Pen Pictures*, John Lane Bodley Head, London, 1900, p.71 (a description of Bandar Langat in 1875). The Shahbandar, who was favourably disposed to the new regime (Note 26 below) 'complained bitterly of the lawlessness of the Langat people and the Sultan's unconcern but said he trusted it would be all right now.' F.A.Swettenham, *Sir Frank Swettenham's Malayan Journals 1874-1876*, edited by P.L.Burns and C.D.Cowan, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1975, p.119.
2. During the first few days of his time at Bandar Langat, in August 1874, Swettenham more than once sought confirmation from the Sultan, which he says was readily given, that his presence was welcome. Swettenham, *Journal*, p.108, 109 and 111.
3. Mahmud's half-sister was married to the Dato' Klana of Sungei Ujong, whom the Shahbandar was fighting. (Anon, 'Genealogical Table of the Royal Family of Selangor', *SJ* 3, p.62) but his political sympathies at this period were entirely with the opposition. Swettenham, *Journal*, for the period

from August to December 1874 gives a good contemporary account of the alarm felt at reports of Mahdi's presence, and of the efforts made to take possession of his three war boats, and of the successful measures to prevent him reactivating the war in Selangor. Although there was fighting in Sungei Ujong, there was none in Selangor, and so it is unnecessary to pursue the story in detail. See C.N.Parkinson, *British Intervention in Malaya 1867-1877*, University of Malaya Press, Singapore, 1960, Chapter 7, for an account of events in Sungei Ujong. Mahdi took refuge in Johor, but was arrested and remained in Singapore until his death in 1882. See also C.D.Cowan, *Nineteenth Century British Malaya - the Origins of British Control*, Oxford University Press, London, 1961, p.236.

4. J.de V.Allen, A.J.Stockwell, and L.R.Wright (eds.), *A Collection of Treaties and Other Documents Affecting the States of Malaysia 1761-1963*, 2 vols., Oceana Publications, London and New York, 1981, vol.1, p.448. See also Chapter 4 Note 48 above. Swettenham *Journal*, p.129 on the proclamation, and p.128 -- 'the Sultan being still at the Hill'. The Sultan returned to Bandar Langat in mid-October to observe the Fasting Month. Ibid., p.137.

5. In a report dated 27 October 1875 (C 1505) Davidson gives a long and involved account, based mainly on information obtained from possibly unreliable sources, of a freebooter, Raja Beroman, whose base was at Slim but who made a raid, with 35 armed men as far south as Ulu Klang. Another suspect was Sootan Puasa, who obtained from the Sultan a permit to bring 200 Mandiling men from Ulu Bernam to Ulu Langat. Raja Hamzah ('Kamza') had been to Pahang to seek support, and then obtained 20 kegs of gunpowder from the stores of Sultan Abdul Samad, ostensibly for use in Perak. See Note 12 below on the Ulu Langat rising led by Sootan Puasa.

6. Report of 22 February 1875 by Davidson, enclosed with SSD 27 April 1875 (C 1320), and Swettenham *Journal*, pp.169, 200, 209 and 278. J. M. Gullick, 'Syers and the Selangor Police 1875-1897', *JMBRAS* 51(2), 1978, revised and reprinted in J.M.Gullick, *Glimpses of Selangor 1860-1898*, MBRAS Monograph 25, 1993 (subsequent citations refer to the 1993 edition).

7. Swettenham *Journal*, p.283 (22 August 1875). 'But the Emperor has nothing on at all'. Hans Andersen, *The Emperor's New Clothes*, English edition, 1846.

8. Gullick, *Syers*, is a full length study of the man and his work.

P. Morrah, 'The History of the Malayan Police,' *JMBRAS* 36(2), 1963, for the background. As Syers was only 17 years of age when he enlisted in the Army, he cannot have had any experience of English police work. Gullick, *Syers*, pp.37-42, for this period of his career, and p.35 on his command of spoken Malay. State revenue for 1875 is given in Swettenham's audit report of 27 March 1880 (C 3095).

Gullick, *Syers*, p.31 (and Note 1 therein) needs correction. Syers landed from a *tongkang* (lighter) - and fell off it into the mud. Anon, 'Klang as it is,' *SJ* 2, p.288, 1894. He may of course have travelled from Malacca in a steamer, towing the *tongkang*.

9. Anon, 'An Account of the Selangor Police', *SJ* 1, 1892, p.85, is the main source for this passage. It seems probable (Gullick, *Syers*, p.39) that this article was written by Syers or on the basis of information supplied by Syers.

10. Mohamed Ibrahim bin Abdullah Munshi, *The Voyages of Mohamed Ibrahim Munshi*, translated and edited by A.Sweeney and N.Phillips, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1975, p.72. See also Chapter 4 Note 35.

Jawi Peranakan were Malays of part Indian descent, often from Penang.

11. As in Note 8. Quotation from a report by Syers on the Selangor Police dated 11 July 1878, enclosed with SSD 1 August 1878.

12. As Note 9. Sootan Puasa was sentenced to a term of imprisonment but released after nine months (on a $5,000 bond for his good behaviour) in 1876. He then settled at Gombak, on the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur, where he 'constructed a *tali ayer* [irrigation canal] and opened plantations'. These he abandoned, though, in the more prosperous times of 1879, he tried to secure official permission to reoccupy them. Unpublished diary of Bloomfield Douglas, British Resident Selangor (1876-1882), entry for 23 May 1879 (when Sootan Puasa's petition was considered by the Sultan).

13. The main reason for the collapse (in 1875) of the world price of tin was a substantial new source

of tin (from 1872) in alluvial deposits in Australia. However these were soon worked out - production ceased completely in the mid 1880's - and so there was an equally sudden rise in the price in 1879. Wong Lin Ken, *The Malayan Tin Industry to 1914*, University of Arizona Press, Tucson, 1965, pp.121-123.

14. Swettenham Journal, pp.127 and 152 on the war debts.

    Bloomfield Douglas, who succeeded Davidson as Resident in April 1876, and held that office until forced to retire in 1882, was much criticised for his financial administration. See Swettenham's audit report for 1879, enclosed with SSD 6 March 1879 (C 2410 of 1879). For a study of his career see J.M.Gullick, 'Selangor 1876-1882 - the Bloomfield Douglas Diary', *JMBRAS* 48(2), 1975, revised and reprinted in *Glimpses of Selangor* (Note 6 above). Both Isabella Bird and Emily Innes disliked him intensely as a person, and Swettenham wished to be Resident in his place.

15. F.A.Swettenham, *Footprints in Malaya*, Hutchinson, London, 1942, p.20, describes Kuala Lumpur in time of war in 1872. He revisited the town in March 1875. Swettenham Journal, pp.218-219 and his 1875 report (Note 1). W.T.Hornaday, *Two Years in the Jungle*, etc., Scribner's Sons, New York, 1885, Chapter 27, gives a colourful account of his visit, in company with Syers, to Kuala Lumpur in 1878. S. M. Middlebrook, 'Yap Ah Loy (1837-1885),' *JMBRAS* 24(2), 1951, draws on Chinese traditions to recount the career of Yap Ah Loy, who was Capitan China of Kuala Lumpur for almost twenty years until his death in 1885. J.M.Gullick, 'The Growth of Kuala Lumpur and of the Malay Community in Selangor before 1880,' *JMBRAS* 63(1), covers the period with which this chapter is concerned.

16. Swettenham *Journal*, p.219. He prefaces his description of the town in 1875 with 'Qualla Lumpor of today is a very different place to the Qualla Lumpor of 4 years ago.' Presumably he is contrasting the methodically rebuilt town he then saw with the town in wartime, after it had suffered a couple of attacks, in 1872.

    For his sketch map see Map 6 herein. The origin of 'Lumpur' (in the town's name) is uncertain and in dispute. See Gullick, *Growth of Kuala Lumpur*, p.17.

17. Swettenham 1875 report. Sungei Puteh was about eight miles from Kuala Lumpur but in a different direction from Ampang -- possibly at or near Batu on the north of the town. Swettenham gives the total population of the town and the surrounding mines and villages as 7,000.

18. J.M.Gullick, *Malay Society in the Late Nineteenth Century - the Beginnings of Change*, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1987, p.175, note 70, for a short biography of Haji Tahir (formerly Nonggek). He may have made the pilgrimage just after the civil war. He died c.1894.

    Haji Tahir was one of three Toh Dagang (his district was Klang and the others were Sumatran headmen in the Selangor and Langat valleys). E.Sadka, *The Protected Malay States 1874-1895*, University of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1968, p.14 note 4.

    The other Sumatran leaders of the war period were no longer there in 1875. On Sootan Puasa see Note 12 above. Raja Asal, perhaps the most influential figure during the war (his defection from Kudin's coalition swung the tide in 1872: see Chapter 4 Note 36), had gone off to Perak. Sheikh Mohamed Ali, headman of the Sumatran miners of Ulu Klang and influential in his locality, died in June 1879. See Note 53 below.

19. Swettenham 1875 report.

20. Ibid. Guthrie & Co had a monopoly of the purchase of gutta percha. Swettenham, *Journal*, pp.144 and 156.

21. Chapter 4 Note 49. J.M.Gullick, 'Tunku Kudin in Selangor,' *JMBRAS* 59(2), 1986, reprinted in *Glimpses of Selangor*, pp.222-224.

22. In connection with the abolition of debt-bondage (see Note 44 below) Davidson reported that there were few bondsmen in Klang. Governor Jervois added a note to the report on this change in the population, saying it was due to the civil war.

23. Swettenham 1875 report. As the holdings had been 'formerly occupied by T.Kudin's enemies', it is understandable that they did not return.

24. R. O. Winstedt, 'A History of Selangor,' *JMBRAS* 12(3), 1934, pp.112-113, on the office of To' Engku Klang. During the civil war the Engku Klang of that period had been 'closely associated'

with Tunku Panglima Raja (see Note 54 below), who, with his son, Raja Mahmud, had been at Kuala Selangor at the time of the bombardment by HMS 'Rinaldo' in 1871. Swettenham *Journal*, p.132 note 3. Although a minor figure the Engku Klang was probably among the opponents of Tunku Kudin.

25. Swettenham 1875 report. There were some 8 or 9 shops. Swettenham *Journal*, p.116.
26. Swettenham *Journal*, pp. 116 and 131.
27. Ibid., p.177. Later he overreached himself and Douglas insisted on his demotion. J.M.Gullick, *Rulers and Residents - Influence and Power in the Malay States 1870-1920*, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1992, pp.37-38.
28. Gullick, *Bloomfield Douglas*, pp.109-110, and *Kudin in Selangor*, p.198. When Swettenham first arrived at Bandar Langat Raja Muda Musa was absent. Swettenham *Journal*, p.120. Sultan Sulaiman, 'Royal Recollections,' etc., *MIH* 12(2), p.19, 1969.

    On Kahar in Ulu Langat see Swettenham *Journal*, pp.172 and 207 and Note 53 below. Raja Yakub, perhaps chastened by his undeserved escape from involvement in the piracy trial, tried to make himself useful to Swettenham initially (ibid. p.172), but soon faded from the scene. See Chapter 4 Note 43 on this erratic personality.
29. Swettenham *Journal*, p.272f. This was in August 1875, some months after Swettenham had written his 1875 report, with its perhaps over-optimistic assessment of the improving law and order situation. It was also the time of his discovery (Chapter 4 Note 47) of what he believed to be the truth about the piracy trial. One has the impression that, with the wider realisation that he might help complainants, they came to him more frequently with complaints and allegations, which may -- or may not -- have been attempts to manipulate him.
30. Swettenham 1875 report and *Journal*, pp.228 and 230. Some former Selangor people were refugees at Bernam. Note 32 below. Wanda, a former enemy had made his peace with the reigning Bendahara Ahmad.
31. Swettenham 1875 report.
32. Ibid. Swettenham *Journal*, p.234, on the Selangor refugees at Bernam. From Sabak Bernam, near the estuary, to Tanjong Malim in Ulu Bernam, a river journey took 14-21 days upstream and 6 days downstream. 'Resident's Tour Notes' 1894, SJ 2, p.202.
33. Swettenham 1875 report describes what were believed to be the boundaries of Selangor with neighbouring states, adding that there was 'much uncertainty as to the boundaries of Salangore in the interior'. Selangor did not claim territory above the high tide mark on rivers south of the Sepang River. In 1880 (Chapter 6) this coastline was ceded to Sungei Ujong, in exchange for the disputed territory along the upper reaches of the Langat River around its junction with the Labu River.
34. Gullick, *Growth of Kuala Lumpur*, Appendix A. The Damansara road was abandoned and replaced by a project for a railway line, completed in 1886. However it has left its traces in modern Kuala Lumpur, whose 'Damansara Heights' is the area where the road approached the town; Batu Limabelas (Mile 15), the Malay name of the Brickfields district, takes that name from the final milestone.
35. Ibid., Middlebrook, op,cit., Chapter 17, and J. M. Gullick, 'Kuala Lumpur 1880-1895', *JMBRAS*, 26(4), 1955,pp.15-16. Wong Lin Ken, op.cit., p.102. Anon, 'From Kuala to Ulu Selangor in 1882,' *SJ* 3, pp.26-32, is a diary of the first recorded ascent of the Buloh River (as the quickest route to the upper reaches of the Selangor River) since the ending of the war some years before; it is a vivid account of the obstacles to progress, in a trip which took several days.
36. Swettenham 1875 report -- where he again mentions the remains of the 'gigantic' mine (at Kuala Kubu) of some 80 years before. Chapter 2.
37. Ibid. and unpublished Douglas Diary, 21-22 July 1876, on Kanching and Batang Yam. Douglas had noted that Sheikh Mohamed Ali of Ulu Klang lived in baronial style in 'a sort of semi-fortified kubu' (fort).
38. W. Linehan, 'A History of Pahang,' *JMBRAS* 14(2), 1936, Chapter 8 'The Selangor War', p.100. Cowan, *Nineteenth Century Malaya*, pp.214-215.
39. Swettenham 1875 report.

40. Swettenham, *Journal*, pp.212-215. He 'sifted' the complaints against Raja Kahar (on which see also Note 53 below) and concluded that they were mainly 'fears of what he might do.' At Kajang Swettenham found that Raja Kahar 'was doing very well and trying to restore Kajang to its old prosperity, building some good shops.' Swettenham tried 'to get them into a settled state of feeling' as some 3,000 Minangkabau and Kampar men were reported to have moved to Jelebu. The local Malay headmen, with whom Swettenham had these discussions, were Malays at odds with both Raja Kahar (the Bugis ruling class) and with the Sumatran immigrants, and he thought they were making mischief.
Douglas Diary 17-18 July 1876 on Cheras and Kajang; ibid 16-17 July on Ulu Langat.
41. Swettenham *Journal*, pp.231-232.
42. See Note 14 above. Annual state revenue reached a peak (for this period) of $226,853 in 1877, and then declined to $189,897 in 1878 and $184,387 in 1879, before rising rapidly in the early 1880's to reach $566,411 in 1885 and $1,153,896 in 1887. F. A. Swettenham, *British Malaya* etc, John Lane Bodley Head, 1907, revised George Allen & Unwin, London, 1948, p.223.
Substantial passages from the diary of Bloomfield Douglas describing his tours of interior districts are printed in Gullick, *Glimpses of Selangor*, pp.113-139. See also Note 55 below.
43. J.M.Gullick, 'A Careless, Heathen Philosopher?', *JMBRAS* 26(1), 1951, rewritten and reprinted in *Glimpses of Selangor*, on the character of Sultan Abdul Samad. Gullick, *Bloomfield Douglas*, p.109, on Raja Muda Musa.
44. W.E.Maxwell, 'The Law Relating to Slavery Among the Malays', *JSBRAS* 22, 1890. Aminudin bin Baki, 'The Institution of Debt Slavery in Perak', *Peninjau Sejarah* 1(1), 1966. M. Yegar, 'The Abolition of Servitude in British Malaya', *Israeli Yearbook on Human Rights*, 1975. P. Loh Fook Seng, 'The British Approach to Slavery in the Straits Settlements and the Malay States 1819 to 1910', *JHSUM* 3, 1964-65.
Reports by Swettenham (30 June 1875), Davidson (23 August 1875) and Bloomfield Douglas (28 May 1878) were included, with other reports, in *Correspondence respecting Slavery in the Protected Malay States* (C 3285 and 3428 of 1882) and *Further Correspondence respecting Slavery in the Protected Malay States* (C 3429 of 1882). Much of this material is reproduced in Chai Hon-Chan, *The Development of British Malaya 1896-1910*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1964, Appendix B.
45. 'Slaves' in the strict sense were non-Muslim Batak, Malayan aborigines or Africans, obtained by capture or purchase. 'Debt-bondage' was the significant element of Malay culture because 'the Raja looks to the number of his following as the gauge of his power.' Swettenham 1875 report.
46. Davidson (report of 23 August 1875 cited in Note 43 above and see also Note 21) distinguishes Kuala Langat and Klang, explaining that on taking control of Klang Tunku Kudin 'set his face resolutely against all kinds of slavery.' At Kuala Selangor Davidson anticipated that, if the former inhabitants returned, they might reinstate slavery and debt-bondage, but in the event it did not happen.
A report by Hugh Low, dated 28 May 1878, in C 3285, reprinted in Chai Hon-Chan, pp.309-311, sets out the policy in Perak.
47. Some of these cases were appeals by women aborigines, whom the Pahang Malays regularly hunted and enslaved. Swettenham had acknowledged (1875 report) that debt-bondage 'was not nearly so great [an evil] in Salangor' as it was in Perak, partly because 'there are but few Rajahs, who can afford to keep followers.'
48. As Note 7.
49. At Kuala Selangor there was a rapid and sorry sequence of British administrators, who were incompetent or worse.
50. Raja Kahar had charge of Ulu Langat (Note 40). At Kuala Lumpur Haji Tahir was the local magnate (Note 18) and at Bernam Raja Hitam (Note 32). In Ulu Selangor there were Pahang headmen (Note 37).
51. Swettenham 1875 report.
52. Gullick, *Rulers and Residents*, p.37.
53. Swettenham, *Journal*, pp.274-275, reporting remarks made by Sheikh Mat Ali, headman of the

Ulu Klang mining settlement, and Tunku Sulong, who ran errands for Swettenham (*Journal*, p.97). He adds that others, including the Sultan's secretary, and an 'adviser' of Raja Kahar (who is probably the target of this tirade) said much the same.

54. Report by Douglas enclosed with SSD 28 May 1883 (CO 273/120).

55. Yap Ah Shak, who shunned a public role though he succeeded Yap Ah Loy as Capitan China when Ah Loy died in 1885, was a long time associate of Ah Loy. Middlebrook, op.cit., pp.16 and 91. Chan Ah Chan had the financial support of the Sultan in opening mines in Ulu Langat. Wong Lin Ken, op.cit., p.23. See also Chapter 3. In June 1876 he had 300-400 men working on his mines in Ulu Langat. Unpublished Douglas diary 28 June 1876. In December 1876, he applied to Douglas for a government loan but Douglas 'sent him back to Langat with a letter to the Sultan, who may assist him as he has done before'. Ibid. 13 December 1876. In March 1879 Douglas reported that he was 'oppressing the newly arrived miners at Rekoh'. Ibid. 26 March 1879. Apparently he demanded a royalty (*chukai*) of $2 per *bahara* on local tin output. Ibid. 22 August 1879.

Ah Lin was Yap Ah Loy's agent in Ulu Selangor. Ibid. 23 July 1876. He later borrowed money from Raja Hitam of Bernam, to open a mine at Ulu Bernam, on which some fifty men were working, and he then owed Raja Hitam $453. Ibid. 27-30 July 1879.

Chapter Six

A Modern Structure

In the 1880's the tempo of development and change accelerated. Between 1839 and 1880 the estimated population of Selangor (of all communities) had increased by one quarter from 12,000 to 15,000.[1] In 1891, the first systematic census of Selangor gave a total population of 81,592, a fivefold increase in a decade.[2] The sharp rise in the price of tin led, more gradually than in Perak, to a mining boom, which in turn increased the demand for foodstuffs, charcoal, timber and other building materials, and specialist services such as felling of jungle, which were provided by a wider segment of the working population, including the Malay villagers.

Some of the changes to be described in this chapter had their origins in the late 1870's. Even in a period of recession (1875-1878) the tin-producing districts of the interior had begun to draw trade and working population inland from the coastal fringe. Klang, in February 1879, 'looks as if half the houses were empty....there is no air of business energy, and the queerly mixed population saunters with limp movements.'[3] In March 1880 the administrative capital of the State was transferred from Klang to Kuala Lumpur.[4] It became more than ever essential to improve the communications between the two towns. The first attempt, the Damansara Road, was abandoned before completion, and was followed (in 1883) by an ambitious project for a railway line, completed in 1886.[5] It was a bold decision because the original estimated cost, $300,000, exceeded a year's public revenue at that time, and the outstanding state war debt was as much again. In the event the railway, despite some problems, both in construction and in operation of a system of transport previously unknown in Malaya, was an immediate success, soon yielding an annual operating surplus equal to one quarter of the capital cost.[6] As a result new lines were built north and south, from Kuala Lumpur to the mining districts of Ulu Selangor and Ulu Langat. These extensions ultimately became the Selangor sector of a west coast line between Penang and Singapore.[7] By a fortunate conjunction of enterprise and central location Kuala Lumpur became the railway capital of Malaya, with engineering and other ancillary installations, to the general benefit of Selangor.

To realise the full potential of a railway there must be a network of 'feeder' roads. The development of road transport was a more gradual process, in which the motor vehicle did not become an important part until after the first world war. In the late nineteenth century the mainstay of the system was the slow-moving bullock cart,



Tracing, prepared in 1883, from survey work done in 1876 and 1882. This was produced by the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, under the energetic guidance of W.E. Maxwell, then its Hon Sec.

The small insert sketch top-left is modern.

with wheels whose metal rims cut up the road surface; in some remote areas goods were still moved as porters' loads.[8] The development of routes to meet these needs was based on a three stage sequence. Uneven jungle tracks, steep, swampy and obstructed, were improved by clearing and levelling the surface to make 'bridletracks' over which travellers on foot or riding a pony could move without impediment. Then, if the traffic justified it, the path was widened to six feet and the steeper gradients eliminated to create a 'bridleroad'. The final stage, which only extended to important routes, was to broaden the track to sixteen feet and build permanent bridges, swamp causeways etc. To support cart traffic the more important roads were metalled with broken stone, ie 'macadamised'. This process extended into the 1890's but even in 1884 Selangor had main roads from Kuala Lumpur to its borders - 51 miles to the frontier with Perak, 32 miles to Sungei Ujong and 24 miles (by the Ginting Bidei pass) to Pahang. A decade later, in 1895, Perak and Selangor together had 1,500 miles of roads and bridlepaths, including 500 miles of metalled cart-roads.[9]

An incidental effect of this programme was employment at a wage in rural districts. At first the Selangor peasants would not demean themselves by taking such work, but in 1893 'one thing which particularly struck me was the number of Langat Malays working on the coast road. Among them were two "*Anak Rajas*". About ten years ago no inducement could tempt the Langat Malays to work on the roads and coolies had to be recruited from Malacca and Java. Times have changed.' [10] Immigrant settlers positively demanded these opportunities to support themselves while their newly cleared holdings came gradually into production - it took about three years. A guarantee of six months' paid work in each of the first four years, from taking up virgin jungle land, was as important as an indirect subsidy, and less of a burden on state funds.[11] They also preferred to settle within easy reach of mining districts, so that they had an accessible market for their produce. Land fronting on a footpath was always much in demand.[12]

Another consequence of improved roads was much increased demand for bullock carts, whose drivers sometimes travelled long distances - another new form of rural employment. Bullock cart 'buses' carried passengers to and from the nearby towns; at a fare of 50 cents for 23 miles, they could undercut the railway.[13]

Land, as an economic resource, became a new form of property. In former times it had been so abundant that the cultivator took a crop or two from newly-cleared virgin land and then abandoned it, when its fertility was exhausted, to repeat the operation; this was the familiar regime of shifting cultivation of a clearing (*ladang*). Long before there was any real shortage of land, the advantages of land on a road or near a market gave it a realisable value. The felling of timber for charcoal burning and other purposes also depleted accessible jungle land. The aim of the state government was to stabilise the rural population on permanent holdings, to promote the production of padi in order to reduce dependence on imported rice, and to extract revenue from the peasant cultivator. The banning of *ladang* cultivation encountered much resistance and was often ineffectual. The compilation of registers of occupiers of land was also unpopular, even though the issue of a document of

title' made it easier to sell the land.[14] Possible sale was very much an inducement to immigrants from various parts of what is now Indonesia - 'they give no preference to any particular description of cultivation, planting everything which commands a market. Their cultivation is, however, of a permanent type, generally consisting of fruit trees, coconuts, betel-nuts and coffee. A patient, law-abiding, laborious and industrious people, they make splendid agricultural pioneers.'[15] Although they created productive land from virgin jungle, they often sold it, having come to Malaya with the object of financing a pilgrimage to Mecca.

Permanent agricultural settlement, including the cultivation of new padi areas, is one of the themes of the next chapter, but it had its origins, on a limited scale in the 1880's. One of the most successful of the 'pioneers' was Haji Tahir, a veteran leader of the civil war period known at that time as the Dato' Dagang (headman of immigrants) of Kuala Lumpur and Klang. After some vicissitudes, Haji Tahir set out to grow indigo for export in 1884. Later, in 1887, he obtained a government loan of $4,000 to plant areca palm, durian, mangosteen and coconut. His areca palms did not flourish, but Haji Tahir 'with extraordinary energy....drained his land, and planted up a portion with coffee'. In this he had such success that he could sub-let portions of his land - he had several hundred acres - to Malay and Chinese cultivators at an annual rent of 50 cents an acre; he also sold land to European coffee planters.[16]

In this commercial environment it was more than ever necessary to record the occupation of land. Here there was a technical problem, ie permanent titles require defined boundaries of the land which they comprise. To issue individual 'agreements for lease' pending survey, with a rough sketch plan attached, created difficulties unless the boundaries were marked on the ground; it could happen that two such documents appeared to overlap in the land which they comprised. In the end the problem was solved by bringing in a number of surveyors to prepare comprehensive cadastral maps of areas, showing the plots comprised in them, with some stones, or other markers, on the ground.[17] The architect of the new system, and begetter of what is now the National Land Code, was W.E.(later Sir William) Maxwell, Resident of Selangor from 1889 to 1892, whose ideas and principles were clear enough, though they caused much anguish in the course of implementation.[18] In time the smallholder came to accept his obligation to pay 'quit-rent' as an unwelcome impost which was part of the system.

The issue of titles (Extracts from Mukim Register - 'EMR') for smallholdings was part of a wider system under which registered titles were issued for larger areas, for plantation agriculture or mining, and for town building plots.[19] It laid the foundation for coffee and then rubber cultivation and other forms of capitalist development later on.

Mining land had long been a fertile cause of disputes. Miners fell out over the ownership, boundaries and subletting of productive areas, and the use of running water to drive their chain pumps etc. Much depended on local custom, for which a knowledge of Chinese language and custom was essential. Hence the general solution was to ask the local magnate, especially the Capitan China, to act as arbitrator or conciliator. Yap Ah Loy was a titular 'magistrate' with jurisdiction limited to his

own community.[20] In 1879 a 'Mining Board' was established, a body of senior officials and Chinese capitalists, which heard and determined disputes, including claims to royalty (*chukai*) made by landowners against those who mined their land.[21]

The expansion of mining under the stimulus of a much higher price of tin drew in Chinese labourers in large numbers. The population of Kuala Lumpur had increased by almost a third in a single year, creating health and environmental problems to be described later.[22] The long-term effect was the partial replacement by machinery of the traditional, labour-intensive, mining practices, in which men scooped up soil, ore or surplus water and carried it away in baskets or buckets. The Chinese had brought with them the ingenious water-driven pump (*kinchir*) used in the rice-fields of southern China. Yap Ah Loy had imported an 8 hp steam engine into Selangor, during the slump of the late 1870's, to drive the mill of an experimental tapioca plantation, which had been a failure costing him, so he said, $40,000. However in late 1881, encouraged perhaps by reports of the profitable use of steam pumps on mines in Perak, Yap Ah Loy was installing a steam engine and pump on his large mine at Ampang. However he was too much of a traditionalist to view this newfangled contraption with enthusiasm and took the erection gang away to work at mining tin, which would yield a quicker profit - always the dominant consideration.[23] Tin output in Selangor increased fourfold between 1878 (42,293 *pikuls*) and 1890 (174,538 *pikuls*).[24] Much of that increase was undoubtedly due to a large labour force, but the importance of mechanisation appears in the reported number of steam engines in use.

The acquisition of steam engines was the unintended result of a brief, and disastrous, European incursion into Selangor mining.[25] These were rash and ill-directed ventures, launched in 1882 which - with one exception - 'soon came to grief' and closed down by the end of 1884.[26] However the *post mortem* on this fiasco discloses a good deal of the circumstances of mining in Selangor at this period.

It was generally reckoned that at least 12, in some instances 18 to 30 feet of non-productive overburden lay between the surface and the lode-bearing strata, which were perhaps 18" to 3' in thickness. There might be one, or even two more ore strata further down, but separated by a thick layer of soil. The essential feature, which the first European miners did not grasp, was that the ore strata, laid down aeons before as alluvial deposits, varied greatly in thickness from one spot to another. If by chance one hit a thick layer at one place it might have narrowed to almost nothing a few feet away. Chinese miners, aided by the mystique and expertise of a Malay *pawang*, first dug a comparatively small pit (a practice perhaps derived from the *lombong Siam* pits of an earlier period). If they thus hit a good thick stratum of ore, they slowly enlarged the pit sideways to follow the ore as far as it went in worthwhile quantity. The rough rule of thumb was that a mine would be profitable if each labourer employed recovered three *pikuls* of ore each year.[27] These were unscientific but very practical methods.

European enterprises took up concessions (at some cost) of 500 to 1,000 acres, compared with the 50-100 acre plots leased to Chinese. They then launched into major excavations without prospecting their sites.[28] Confident of large yields they

installed expensive machinery to pump out the mines and to lift the spoil from the pit. Chinese miners had other, less obvious, advantages not enjoyed by European enterprises. Yap Ah Loy, and the other Chinese employers, sold food etc. to the working miners on credit under a truck system, which yielded a considerable profit. They 'laid off' part of the risk by subletting sections of their mine to other Chinese, who undertook to pay a royalty on output and to sell their tin to the lessor at a discount on the market price. The only European mine (at Rawang) still in production in 1885 survived, for a time, by adopting this practice of subletting. As they closed, the European enterprises sold off their expensive machines to the Chinese miners at knockdown prices, thus spreading mechanisation into Chinese mining.

In the most celebrated episode, the contractors, Hill and Rathborne, bought Yap Ah Loy's Ampang mine at a handsome price, and then installed some costly machinery. They failed, however, to make a profit from it. A year or two later Hill and Rathborne sold the Ampang mine (with its equipment) back to Yap Ah Loy for $30,000, a sixth of the price they had paid for it. By the end of 1886 there were 28 steam engines on mines (all but one Chinese owned) in Selangor; 20 more engines were added in 1887 and 41 in 1888.[29]

However the Chinese miners had to raise capital to expand their enterprises, and 'the whole system of Chinese mining rests on credit'. Finding money for a long-term and risky mining project was not easy for them. Some Straits Settlements Chinese financiers preferred to invest their surplus funds in land and buildings in the colony. The more venturesome towkays of Penang found a richer field for investment in the Kinta tinfield of Perak, which was coming into full production in the mid 1880's.[30] In the interior of Selangor imported supplies were as costly as ever and local costs were rising. In particular charcoal, used in smelting, was becoming expensive as accessible supplies of suitable timber were exhausted. This problem was eased by the introduction of an improved type of smelter (*relau Tongka*) which was less extravagant in its consumption of fuel.[31]

European business found a more satisfactory role, in the later 1880's, in supplying services to meet the needs of Chinese mining. A reverberatory smelter established in Kuala Lumpur in 1884 was undercut by local Chinese smelters and closed in 1886. However in that year Sword and Muhlinghaus, predecessors of the Straits Trading Company, established a much larger smelter of that type in Singapore and secured from the Selangor government the exclusive right to export ore from the State. This privileged postion was granted because the European firm offered better terms (cash advances etc.) to financially hard-pressed miners and, if the tin was exported as ore not as ingots, the pressure on the supply of charcoal would be reduced.[32]

The Chartered Bank, after prolonged negotiations to secure advantages in the issue of currency notes, established a branch in Kuala Lumpur (and also at Taiping in Perak) in 1888; significantly the bank was housed above the Straits Trading Company's buying depot in Market Street, pending the construction of its own building. Earlier, in 1884, the Selangor government had for the first time - and in the teeth of local protests - awarded to Penang Hokkien interests the triennial tax-

farm. It was hoped thereby to introduce capital from Penang into Selangor, which had hitherto relied mainly on Singapore backing, direct or through Malacca merchants.[33] In these events one can find the beginnings of a western capitalist business system in Selangor.

Rapid expansion however exacted a fearful price in human lives. In 1884 the total Chinese population was estimated at 28,000, of whom four fifths were working on the mines of Selangor. Three years later the total Chinese population had increased to 73,000.[34] High mortality in his labour force was not a matter of indifference to the employer, to whom an imported labourer with an advance to repay was an investment, difficult to replace at short notice. Life was cheap but the inherent problem was ignorance. The high incidence of malaria on newly opened mines was accepted as an inexplicable fact of life. An outbreak of cholera was terrifying but its causes and prevention were not understood. Most baffling and lethal of all, in the 1880's, was beri-beri.[35]

If a miner fell sick of any disease, his comrades did what little they could to help him struggle through to recovery, if that were his fate. If however he seemed likely to die, he was removed from the communal *kongsi* house on the mine 'for the Chinese miners have a superstition against allowing their comrades to die in their houses, considering it a sure sign of misfortune....they carry the sick man out and put him in [a] little shelter, always ready and waiting for a new inmate, and here he is left alone for death to overtake him.'[36] A few were sent from the mines to Kuala Lumpur, where they reached the hospital on the verge of death. For beri-beri cases the hospital death rate in 1883 was 51%, most within 24 hours of admission. As the intake rose, the death rate fell, but it was still at the appalling level of 27% in 1884.[37]

European medicine would not discover the causes of beri-beri (a vitamin deficiency made acute by a diet of overmilled rice) for another twenty years. But, even where it had a successful treatment or preventive measure such as vaccination against smallpox, there were considerable cross-cultural problems. In general the local people judged western medicine in a pragmatic fashion by its results. Out-patient treatment, such as dressing wounds or giving drugs, was seen to be beneficial.[38] Treatment in hospital, in particular surgery, was dreaded. A sick man, and his friends or relatives, would only contemplate his going into hospital if he was at death's door. A high hospital mortality rate was self-reinforcing, since it seemed to bear out the grim predictions of its outcome - it was a Malay belief that hospital doctors poisoned their patients as soon as it was clear they could not cure them.[39]

Medical resources were very limited indeed. The first government doctor came to Selangor in 1882, with the treatment of government employees as his priority task.[40] As the working mine population increased, in the mid 1880's, even its limited contribution of hospital patients overwhelmed the modest facilities.[41] By 1887 the situation had reached crisis point - 'hospitals terriby overcrowded...buildings and staff unable to meet the demand on their resources...an apathetic people who do not yet understand the value of the simplest precautions...the death returns of the hospitals are swelled by a large proportion of patients who die within 24 hours of admission, crawling or being carried to the hospitals when literally *in extremis*.'[42]

For the first time however a will to do something and the money to pay for it were present. Government revenues (in 1887) had increased sixfold in a decade, the civil war debt had been paid off, and the railway built and paid for. As part of a programme to expand health services a new 'pauper' hospital (for indigent patients who could not pay fees) was built on the northern outskirts of Kuala Lumpur, with a sort of by-pass (known then as Circular Road and now as Jalan Tun Razak) to provide the most direct route from the mines to the hospitals for the bullock carts bringing in sick miners. It was found necessary to surround the hospital with a high fence to prevent patients from escaping as soon as they were well enough to walk.[43] The fear of vaccination had passed but the European surgeon was viewed as 'as cruel-hearted man, who delighted in blood.'[44]

Later the towkays, whose original contribution had been a dying-house in Kuala Lumpur, supported by a levy of $1 on every pig slaughtered, made more substantial contributions to establish and maintain the T'ung Shin Institution, a Chinese hospital in which Chinese doctors used traditional, mainly herbal, remedies in homaeopathic doses. By a fortunate chance Dr.E.A.O.Travers became head of the Selangor medical department in 1890, a post which he held for 18 years. More will be written later in this history of a remarkable man, whose interests extended far beyond medicine.[45]

The 1880's was the decade in which most of the apparatus of colonial government was developed. Police, surveys and land administration have already been mentioned, together with the medical services described above. Selangor's links with the international postal system were inaugurated in 1879, when Straits Settlements stamps, overprinted with an 'S' appeared. Selangor began to issue its own stamps (with a 2 cent stamp bearing the picture of a leaping tiger) in 1891. Selangor, together with the other Malay States, joined the international Postal Union in 1897.[46] The link with the international telegraph system (through Malacca) had been made in 1886.[47] Schools, courts and other institutions will make their appearance in due course.

Selangor, like the other States, had no written constitution, and its government was -- in form at least -- exercising the Sultan's prerogative powers on his behalf. None the less there was the practical problem of reconciling local magnates, Malay and Chinese, to loss of privileges and powers which the Sultan had allowed them to enjoy before 1874. This conflict had taken a more acute form in Perak, leading to the so-called 'Perak War' of 1875, and later to more serious disturbances in the mining districts. Even in Selangor the prospects of stability had been threatened -- so it seemed at the time (1875-1876) -- as long as Raja Mahdi was on the loose and threatening to raise his standard again on native soil. The State Councils, set up in Selangor and in Perak in 1877, were to be a forum in which the new regime could discuss its proposed changes with those whom they principally affected.[48] Although State Councils became a permanent feature of the constitutional structure, they had ceased, except on questions of special interest to the Malay community, to be a real influence on public policy and administration within very few years.[49]

Inevitably personal factors played their part. The Sultan of Selangor had no wish

to be involved in business which he found tiresome, and was content to have the conclusions of the State Council reported to him afterwards for his approval. In the period 1877-1878 his son-in-law and viceroy, Tunku Kudin, was president of the State council -- though often absent in Kedah. After Kudin's retirement, the duty -- it was something of a sinecure -- devolved on Raja Muda Musa, until his death in 1884. He too was rarely present at meetings, leaving the Resident to preside in his absence. After 1884, though only when the Council met at the royal capital of Kuala Langat, the Sultan took the chair.

The Resident, Bloomfield Douglas until 1882, used the State Council to secure formal approval of what he had already decided to do, though he was punctilious in reporting the proceedings to the Sultan, who earned the nickname of *Yam Tuan benar* from his habit of greeting each item with '*Benar, Benar*' (Quite right).[50] However the State Council was the scene of public humiliation for the overbearing Resident when he was obliged (by the Governor not the Sultan) to reinstate the Tunku Panglima Raja to membership of the Council after expelling him.[51] It was an episode which illustrates how membership of the State Council, ostensibly to advise the Sultan not the Resident, had become a much-prized dignity.[52]

The attitude of Swettenham (Resident 1882-1889) was ambivalent. His creed was that a Resident should always consult Malay opinion before taking action, but he rarely convened the Council for that purpose.[53] As the machinery of government became more and more technical towards the end of the 1880's, the Council (in Selangor and also other States) churned out complex legislation, drafted in English and summarized in Malay by the Resident for the information of Malay members, some of whom could not read Malay and most of whom did not speak English. In addition the Council dealt with the appointment of penghulus, grants towards the erection of mosques, recommending to the Sultan whether a pardon should be granted and whether death sentences should be confirmed or commuted, and listening to occasional appeals from the court of the chief magistrate (a British barrister).

Within the framework of law and administration, it was necessary to be certain where Selangor territory ended. It had begun as a strip of coast from the Bernam estuary to that of the Linggi River. From the eighteenth century onwards Sumatran settlers had moved into the interior. At the southern end of the State, these immigrants were of Minangkabau origin and had a cultural and sometimes political affinity with neighbouring Sungei Ujong. Since the natural highway to and from the interior was along the rivers, it was troublesome to have a sometimes rebellious community inland from the Bugis hegemony of the coast. At the northern end, the boundary with Perak had been fixed, by British decree in 1825, at the Bernam River, which bisected the natural unity of the Bernam valley.[54]

In the late 1870's the entire Bernam valley was under the supervision of the Resident of Selangor, but without prejudice to Perak's claim to the territory north of the river. It was an inconvenient arrangement since Sabak Bernam, the district town, was some way upriver and difficult of access from Klang. When the Selangor capital was moved to Kuala Lumpur in 1880, the Bernam district was transferred to

the charge of the Perak administrator, twenty miles away, at Durian Sabatang (Telok Anson). The district was only lightly populated and did not produce enough revenue to cover the cost of administration, so Selangor contributed a half share of the deficit.[55]

The logical territorial adjustment at the southern end was to transfer what is now the Coast (Port Dickson) district to Sungei Ujong and to compensate by assigning to Selangor the lower reaches of the Labu River, above its confluence with the Langat River, which the Sultan, like his forbears, regarded as his territory; in terms of cultural limits it was marginal. This adjustment proved more contentious and protracted since there were no natural features to provide an acceptable line of division and Malay rulers were reluctant to cede territory.[56] It was just a matter of swinging the state boundary round so that it ran inland more or less at right-angles with the coast, from a selected point (in fact the Sepang River). After an inconclusive attempt at a settlement by an official boundary commission in 1876, the proposed exchange was virtually imposed on the Sultan and on the Dato Klana, ruling chief of Sungei Ujong, in 1878.[57] However Raja Bot, son and heir of Raja Jumaat, objected that a previous Sultan of Selangor had granted the Lukut district to his father, and his heirs, in perpetuity, and so the Sultan no longer had the power to give up Lukut to someone else.[58] This dispute led to a long and interesting debate on the validity of a ruler's purported grant of territory of the state in perpetuity; could he, under Malay custom, bind his successors by such a disposition? The colonial authorities were not minded to allow Raja Bot to upset the apple cart (and the Sultan was affronted by a challenge to a decision taken on his authority), and in the end Bot had to be content with compensation.[59]

This chapter has shown how the momentum of economic development, which increased in the 1880's, led to a more bureaucratic style of government, the introduction of western capitalist enterprise and other related changes. There was some Malay involvement in this process, and some immigration of Javanese and Sumatran settlers. But the result was lopsided, moving the Resident to declare that ' the most urgent need of the State is the presence of a large agricultural population'[60] The next chapter is concerned mainly with that question.

Notes

1. T.J.Newbold, *Political and Statistical Account of the British Settlements....with a History of the Malayan States of the Peninsula in the Straits of Malacca*, 2 vols., Murray, London, 1839, reprinted as *British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1971, vol. 2, p.29. W.T.Hornaday, *Two Years in the Jungle: the Experiences of a Hunter and Naturalist in India, Ceylon, the Malay Peninsula and Borneo*, Scribner, New York, 1885, p.330, partially reprinted as *The Experiences of a Hunter and Naturalist in the Malay Peninsula and Borneo*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1993, p.40.
2. *AR FMS 1901*. By 1901 the Selangor population had doubled again to 168,789. The boundary adjustments c.1880 (see Note 56 below) with Sungei Ujong probably had a very small (but unquantifiable) net effect on Selangor population figures. Most of the increase came in the early 1880's; the total population had reached 46,568 (a rough census count) in 1884. *AR Selangor 1884*, para 108.

3. I.L.Bird (Mrs Bishop), *The Golden Chersonese and the Way Thither*, Murray, London, 1883, p.219. Swettenham, in his audit report of 27 March 1880 (printed in C 3095), makes similar comments on Klang.
4. See Chapter 8 below.
5. See Chapter 5 Note 34 on the Damansara Road. Amarjit Kaur, *Bridge and Barrier, Transport and Communications in Colonial Malaya 1870-1957*, Oxford University Press, Singapore 1985, pp.16-19, is an excellent account of the construction of the Klang-Kuala Lumpur railway, and of the circumstances surrounding it. Federated Malay States Railways, *Fifty Years of Railways in Malaya 1885-1935,* Kuala Lumpur, 1935, pp.9-12, reproduces informative contemporary newspaper reports, which are reprinted in J.M.Gullick, 'Kuala Lumpur 1880-1895', *JMBRAS* 28(4), 1955, pp.160-163.
6. Kaur, loc. cit. F.A. Swettenham, *British Malaya*, etc., John Lane Bodley Head, London, 1907, p.240. Estimated cost (including the bridge across the Klang River (the Connaught Bridge) which was in fact postponed until 1890) *AR Selangor 1883*, para 21. State revenue for 1882 was $300,423, though it had doubled by the time the railway was completed in 1886. Swettenham, ibid. A much shorter stretch of railway to link the Larut mines in Perak with Port Weld had been completed in 1885.
7. The 'west coast line' ran from Butterworth, on the mainland opposite Penang, to Johor Bahru (later carried by a causeway across the Johor Straits to Singapore itself). Owing to difficulties with the Johor government the Johor stretch of line was not completed until 1912.
8. Kaur, op.cit. Surfacing main roads, especially in Kuala Lumpur, with broken stone began in 1883. *AR Selangor 1883*, para 14. It appears however that much of the roadstone was of poor quality and broke up under the cart traffic. For ten years repair work was limited to irregular filling of potholes. In 1892, however, C.E.Spooner, on transfer from Ceylon, became State Engineer (head of the Public Works Dept) and he introduced what became known (with some derision in the correspondence columns of *SJ*) as 'the Ceylon system' of road maintenance (described in an appendix to *AR Selangor 1892*). Under this system measured quantities of road stone were stacked at intervals along the roads, and then spread evenly over the entire surface.

   Competition between road and rail for long distance goods traffic only became a serious issue in the period between the wars, when lorries had come into general use on Malayan roads.
9. *AR Selangor 1883*, para 12. *AR Selangor 1884*, paras 77 and 82. Kaur, op.cit. p.87.
10. Monthly report from Kuala Langat in *SGG* 1893, p.123. *Anak Raja* is a person of royal descent in the male line.
11. *AR Kuala Langat 1891*, para 39, in SGG 1982, p.654.
12. When smallholder resistance obliged the Selangor government to institute a three-year moratorium (1884-1886) on the collection of the detested quit-rent (Note 18 below), it did not extend this remission to the Kuala Lumpur district where 'the smallholders....paid their rent without difficulty, as they had a market for their produce.' *AR Selangor 1884*, para 19. J.M.Gullick, *Malay Society in the Late Nineteenth Century: the Beginnings of Change*, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1989, p.103f, on Malay attitudes to taking up land.
13. F.A.Swettenham, *About Perak*, Straits Times, Singapore, 1890, p.23. There is no reason to doubt that a similar situation existed in Selangor. Swettenham's specimen fare probably related to the journey from Kuala Kangsar to Taiping.
14. D.S.Y.Wong, *Tenure and Land Dealings in the Malay States*, Singapore University Press, Singapore, 1975, Chapters 2 and 3, gives an excellent general account of the first twenty years (1877-1897) of varied experiments in Perak, Selangor and Negri Sembilan in working out a system of registered title. It was a process much impeded by the prolonged and bitter controversy between Swettenham (Resident of Selangor and then of Perak over the period 1882-1894) and W.E.Maxwell, who, as Commissioner of Lands, Straits Settlements, had first introduced the 'Torrens system' (of South Australia) in the mid 1880's and then became Resident of Selangor (1889-1892) and acting Governor (1893-4); see Note 18 below.

   Maxwell argued, but Swettenham and others vehemently disagreed, that by Malay custom

the state, in the person of the ruler, was entitled to a tithe of the produce of agricultural land, so that the government quit-rent was merely a reformulation of a traditional impost. See J.M.Gullick, *Rulers and Residents: Influence and Power in the Malay States 1870-1920*, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1992, pp.44-46, for the Malay resistance in Perak to the new system.

15. Report dated 15 February 1894 by C.H.A.Turney, District Officer, Klang, in *SGG* 1894, p.117. Turney had been in Selangor since 1876. See also J.M.Gullick, 'The Entrepreneur in Late 19th Century Malay Peasant Society', *JMBRAS* 58(1), 1985, and Lim Teck Ghee, *Malay Peasants and Their Agricultural Economy in Colonial Malaya 1874-1941*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1977, Chapter 2.
16. Resident's tour notes of 22nd June 1894 in *SGG* 1894, pp.368-9 (reprinted in *SJ* 2, p.400, 1894), and *AR Selangor 1894*. He did export 200 *pikuls* of indigo in 1888. *AR Selangor 1888*, para 18. On his civil war career see Chapter 5 Note 18. He died c.1894.
17. In 1889 four Australian surveyors staying at the Kuala Lumpur Rest House 'were the advance guard of many other Australian and New Zealand surveyors who came later.' J.H.M.Robson, *Records and Recollections 1889-1934*, Kyle Palmer, 1934, pp.1-2. Australian surveyors would of course have worked within the framework of the Torrens system of registered title (see Note 14 above). The work lasted many years but eventually the expatriate surveyors (except for those in the Survey Dept itself) departed and each district 'Land Office' had one or more Malay Settlement Officers, who did the basic preliminary work in connection with applications for land.
18. J.M.Gullick, 'William Maxwell and the Study of Malay Society,' JMBRAS 64(2), 1991, for a picture of a talented autocrat. In Maxwell's original Selangor Land Regulations 1891 Muslim, ie Malay, landholders did not have a right to transfer, ie sell, their land, but this restriction was soon abandoned as impracticable, though the Malay Reservations Enactment 1913 (Chapter 10) in effect reinstated the restriction in a modified form.
19. J.M.Gullick, 'The Growth of Kuala Lumpur and of the Malay Community in Selangor before 1880', JMBRAS 63(1), 1990, pp.24 and 33 n61, mentions two of the earliest foreign plantations, both sited on the Damansara Road. Raja Muda Musa, and also Haji Tahir (Note 16) owned sizeable agricultural properties.
20. Successive holders of the office of Capitan China continued, until it was allowed to lapse in 1902, to act in this fashion, dealing with personal and matrimonial problems among other things. The last Capitan China, Yap Kwan Seng, had an official residence, with a hall of audience, in Jalan Pudu, Kuala Lumpur.
21. The unpublished diary of Bloomfield Douglas contains entries, from 1879 when the Board was set up, relating to meetings of the Board, on which the Resident and the head of the Lands Department represented the state government. Only the entry of 4th October 1881 gives any information of the disputes submitted to the Board.
22. Gullick, *Kuala Lumpur 1880-1895*, p.16.
23. Douglas (diary entry 25 November 1881) made an unsuccessful attempt to persuade Yap Ah Loy to take a longer term view. For the Selangor tin mines, and their incidental problems at this time, Wong Lin Ken, *The Malayan Tin Industry to 1914*, University of Arizona Press, Tucson, 1965, pp.101-107. J.C.Pasqual, 'Chinese Tin Mining in Selangor' (a series of articles in *SJ* 4 1895-1896) is an old-timer's knowledgeable account of the general practices and routine of Chinese mines at this period.
24. Gullick, *Kuala Lumpur 1880-1895*, p.57, where the figures are derived mainly from the Selangor annual reports. Wong Lin Ken, op.cit., p.104, gives a breakdown by districts. Most of the increase came from mines in the Klang valley. In 1884 Sungei Besi, with a workforce of 4,000 miners, was the most important centre. *AR Selangor 1884*, para 47.
25. Wong Lin Ken, op.cit., pp.146-148 and Gullick, *Kuala Lumpur 1880-1895*, p.57. The fiasco of the Selangor Tin Mining Company in 1875 (Chapter 4 Note 38) had discouraged London promoters from experimenting again in Selangor. The concessionaires of 1882 (Wong Lin Ken, loc.cit.) were mainly Singapore merchants, though they may of course have raised some capital in London by private arrangement.

26. Wong Lin Ken, op.cit., p.148.
27. The main source is *AR Selangor 1885*, paras 24-28. J.P.Rodger, acting Resident wrote the report. In his substantive capacity as Commissioner of Lands, Selangor, he had, since arriving in Selangor in 1882, made frequent visits to mines of all kinds and had excellent firsthand information.

    In addition to his articles on Chinese mining J.C.Pasqual (Chapter 4 Note 22) and Note 23 above had also written an article, 'Mining Notes in Selangor', *SJ* 3, pp.292-294, on Malay mining, in which he describes the role of the pawang and the origin of *lombong Siam*, concluding that the latter were 'old Malay workings dating as far back as a century ago.'
28. Concession areas - Wong Lin Ken, loc.cit., and *AR Selangor 1890*.

    In modern practice the standard prospecting procedure is to put down boreholes at regular intervals, on a geometric pattern. Rathborne, partner in Hill and Rathborne, noted that on Chinese mines 'the land is thoroughly tested and proved before extended operations are undertaken.' A.B.Rathborne, *Camping and Tramping in Malaya*, Swan Sonnenschein, London, 1898, p.118.
29. *AR Selangor 1885*. The figures of steam engines come from the Selangor annual reports of 1886-1888; it is significant that the Resident deemed the data worth including. Repurchase of the Ampang mine, *AR Selangor 1885*, para 29.
30. *AR Selangor 1889*, para 239, on tight credit. Wong Lin Ken, op.cit. pp.87-89 on development of the Kinta tinfield, where the output trebled between 1880 and 1885.
31. Wong Lin Ken, op.cit. p.157.
32. Ibid. p.163, and *AR Selangor 1886*. A reverberatory furnace had a curved roof to deflect the heat down on to the ore, which does not -- as in a Chinese type of smelter -- lie in direct contact with the furnace combustion.
33. Gullick, *Kuala Lumpur 1880-1895*, p.75. J.G.Butcher and H.Dick (eds.), *The Rise and Fall of Revenue Farming*, MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1993, includes essays by Butcher on tax-farming in Southeast Asia and on Loke Yew (Chapter 10 Note 30 below) a tax farmer in Selangor and, by the turn of the century, the leading Chinese businessman in Selangor. Tax farming was the letting of the right to collect a tax or to exercise a commercial monopoly, in return for a fixed periodic payment.
34. *AR Selangor 1884*, paras 46 and 108. *AR Selangor 1887*.
35. Institute of Medical Research, *The Institute for Medical Research 1900-1950*, Government Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1950, pp.98-118, on the gradual discovery (mainly by doctors in Selangor and Negri Sembilan) of the causes of beri-beri. Malay villagers, who did not decorticate their rice so thoroughly, and Indians, who preferred parboiled rice, did not suffer much from beri-beri, nor did Chinese convicts in gaol, whose diet was not the highly milled 'white rice' which they preferred. On Malcolm Watson's success in the control of malaria, see Chapter 10 Note 52.

    For a cholera epidemic E.Innes, *The Chersonese with the Gilding Off*, 2 vols., Richard Bentley & Sons, London, 1885, vol.1, p.147f.
36. Rathborne, op.cit., p.124. H.C.Clifford, 'Cholera on a Chinese Junk', *Malayan Monochromes*, Murray, London, 1913, p.57, recounts an actual episode (in 1894) in which the survivors threw the dead and dying overboard, as the junk approached Klang, in the hope of concealing the outbreak. H.C.Clifford, 'A Daughter of the Muhammadans', *In a Corner of Asia*, Fisher Unwin, London, 1899, tells how he found that a Malay with leprosy, and his wife who nursed him to the end, had been virtually ostracised from their village. An official report (*AR Selangor 1883*, para 38) states that some beri-beri cases were 'turned out by their friends to die on the roadside' - but this may well be an inaccurate impression of a wayside dying-house, as described by Rathborne.
37. *AR Selangor 1884*, para 94.
38. Innes, op.cit, pp.65-72, for an entertaining account of amateur doctoring by a district officer's wife.
39. C. W. Harrison (ed.), *An Illustrated Guide to the Federated Malay States*, Malay States Development Agency, London, 1911, p.125.
40. From about 1876 there had been a government dispenser, who did what he could (very little -- according to Innes (Note 38)). He had to run a small hospital and out-patients department, visit outstations, and take part in activities such as a vaccination campaign. The first government medi-

cal officer, 'Surgeon Jansz', had a drink problem -- one bout lasted 8 days. SSD 27 October 1882. His successor, Dr Sinclair, was lacking in drive.

41. Gullick, *Kuala Lumpur 1880-1895*, pp.90-92, draws on statistics and other information in the annual reports to present a grim picture.
42. *AR Selangor 1887*, para 63, written by Swettenham, to whom the Institute of Medical Research dedicated its memorial volume (cited in Note 35) as the man who 'saw the need and fostered the means for medical research in Malaya.'
43. *AR Selangor 1889*, para 45, and Harrison, op.cit., p.124.
44. Anon, 'The Pauper Hospital Kuala Lumpur', *SJ* 4, 1895-1896, p.196 -- a long and informative account of the hospital.
45. Anon, 'The T'ung Shin Institution', *SJ* 4, 1895-1896, p.95 - another excellent account. There are also references to it in the annual reports of the Selangor Medical Department, published in *SGG*.

    Bloomfield Douglas diary, entry for 19 December 1881, on the dying house; see also Gullick, *Kuala Lumpur 1880-1895*, p.90 (citing a Selangor secretariat file of 1883). On Dr. Travers see Chapter 10 Note 100.
46. *SJ* 4, 4 October 1895, 'Notes and News', p.18, and 'Selangor Stamps', ibid. p.166. Gullick, *Kuala Lumpur 1880-1895*, pp.98-100 (a passage contributed by C.A.Gibson-Hill).
47. *AR Selangor 1886*.
48. E.Sadka, *The Protected Malay States 1874-1895*, University of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur, Chapter 6, reproduces Sadka's earlier essay 'The State Councils in Perak and Selangor 1877-1895', K.G.Tregonning (ed.), *Papers on Malayan History*, Journal of South East Asian History, Singapore, 1962. Gullick, *Rulers and Residents*, pp.39-48 and 91-93, adds material from the Bloomfield Douglas diary not available to Sadka. Sadka, p.196, on Maxwell's view that the only legal basis for Residential action was that he acted on the ruler's behalf.
49. This became a retrospective issue in the 1920's when Guillemard sought to justify his 'decentralization' programme as a return to the State Councils of their former importance. Sir George Maxwell, who had begun his Malayan career in 1891, disagreed and wrote a memorandum, enclosed with SSD 18 February 1926, to demonstrate that by 1890 the State Councils were reduced to the role described in the passage of the main text which follows.
50. Sadka, *Protected Malay States*, p.118. 'There was little pretence of discussion'. Gullick, *Rulers and Residents*, p.36.
51. J.M.Gullick, 'Selangor 1876-1882 - the Bloomfield Douglas Diary', *JMBRAS* 48(2), 1975, revised and reprinted in J.M.Gullick, *Glimpses of Selangor 1860-1898*, MBRAS Monograph 25, 1993, pp.115-119, cites at length the official documents (printed in C 2410 of 1879) on this celebrated affair. Sadka, *Protected Malay States*, pp.182 and 188, treats it as an example of the domineering obtuseness of Douglas, though Loh Fook Seng (*The Malay States 1877-1895*, Singapore, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1969, p.22f), is more sympathetic. Douglas believed that Tunku Panglima Raja, and his son, Raja Mahmud the civil war leader, were instigating demands (in the Bernam area) for the return from exile of Raja Mahdi (see Chapter 4 Note 20), and he may have overreacted. The episode led to the issue of instructions to Residents (Sadka, p.102) that they were to behave as 'advisers not rulers' in the Malay States. Hugh Low, Resident of Perak, then demonstrated that this guidance was unrealistic as the Malay regime could not, without the Resident's intervention, act on the advice given to it.
52. The State Councils were 'a great safety valve'. Swettenham, *British Malaya*, p.226, where he lists the business which the Councils transacted very much in the same terms as George Maxwell (Note 49). 'The importance attaching to their [Malay members] membership.' SSD 10 September 1878, and Gullick, *Rulers and Residents*, p.51.
53. Swettenham, *British Malaya*, p.253, on consultation. yet in 1883, the first full year in which Swettenham was Resident of Selangor, the State Council met only once; in the following year four times. On his return in 1887 from a long absence there was again only one Council meeting in the year. Yet on average State Councils met about seven times a year. Sadka, *Protected Malay States*, p.182, and *AR Selangor 1887*, para 9.

54. Chapter 4, Notes 13 and 43.
55. *AR Selangor 1880*, para 13.
56. 'There were three things which, according to Malay law, a Ruler could not divide - the territory; 2nd subjects; 3rd, the regalia.' O. Cavenagh, *Reminiscences of an Indian Official*, W. H. Allen & Co, London, 1884, p.303. Cavenagh (Governor 1860-1867) is here reporting the opinion of a Pahang chief.
57. J.de V.Allen, A.J.Stockwell and L.R.Wright (eds), *A Collection of Treaties and Other Documetns affecting the States of Malaysia 1761-1963*, 2 vols., Oceana Publications, London and New York, 1981, vol 1., pp.299 and 307.
58. Chapter 3 Note 21.
59. Allen, Stockwell and Wright, op.cit, p.310. The most informative documents are enclosed with SSD 31 January 1879 and 8 January 1880. Raja Bot reappears later as a Kuala Lumpur notable (Chapter 9 Note 60).
60. *AR Selangor 1885*, para 95, by J.P.Rodger, acting Resident.

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Development of Agriculture

The late 1880's saw the beginning of a rapid increase in the Malay population of Selangor. which in the space of a generation multiplied fivefold. The census figures are:-[1]

(1) *Year*	(2) *Total* 'Malay and Other Malaysian'	(3) *Percentage* 'Other Malaysian' in Col (2)	(4) *Percentage* Increase over decade (in Col 2)
1884	17,856	-	-
1887	22,534	-	-
1891	26,578	10	-
1901	40,640	15	53
1911	65,062	30	60
1921	91,821	30	41

'Other Malaysians', as a census category, means broadly Indonesian immigrants. It was found that most local-born children of Indonesian immigrants declared themselves as 'Malays'; the major exception was the Javanese community, in which local-born children of Javanese immigrant parents declared themselves to be Javanese, though the grandchildren regarded themselves as 'Malay', ie the assimilation of Javanese took a generation longer.[2]

Even those who had become, in their own eyes, Malays continued to differentiate themselves, and their village community. from others of different origin, often showing some antipathy towards them.[3] Bugis, for example, were regarded as aggressive folk (*orang Bugis ta' sabar*), and Minangkabau men, who tended to monopolise Malay trading activities, were considered assertive and grasping. Korinchi, it was believed, could turn themselves at will into tigers in order to attack their neighbours.[4] Although there were villages of different origin close to each other, the over-all pattern of settlement in Selangor was Javanese on the coastal flats, and Sumatran, mainly Mandiling and Minangkabau, in the hills and streams of the inte-

rior districts. In addition to immigrants from what is now Indonesia, late nineteenth century Selangor also received an influx from Kelantan and Patani in the north-east of the Peninsula, who settled mainly in Kuala Selangor.

The process by which immigrants became part of the settled population was very gradual. They often came with the original intention of returning to their homelands, and some in fact did so. Many came as miners, labourers, traders and the like; if they tilled the land it was to produce food or cash crops to sustain them while working in some other occupation. Although immigration was a major factor in the massive increase in population of Selangor in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, there was (c.1880) a sizeable 'Selangor Malay' population of say 20,000, which had more in common with the immigrants in their general lifestyle than differences from them. By 1921 three out of four of the Malay population (in the broad sense) of Selangor had been born outside Peninsular Malaya, though a leaven of homogenisation, as peasant smallholders, was working through the heterogenous community.[5]

In this migration, as in most, a 'push-pull' combination of causes was at work. In their homelands Dutch or Siamese regimes were tightening their grip; pressure of population on the land was growing in Java; in Kelantan there had been natural disasters which impoverished the peasant class.[6] Less obvious, but pervasive, factors were social approval of young men going on their travels to seek a livelihood (*merantau*) and of Muslims accumulating capital to finance the pilgrimage to Mecca.

Selangor (like Perák) had a substantial mining industry and abundant land for agriculture. An immigrant could work at a wage, using his traditional skills in felling jungle or digging drainage ditches for higher reward than was available at home. If he grew crops, there was a market in which to sell his produce. If he turned jungle into cultivated land by the hard labour of years, he made an asset whose value he could realise (and take with him) by selling it. These opportunities were easier to exploit, and his existence in a foreign land was more secure, if he emigrated as a member of a working group, under the leadership or at the invitation of a headman who knew how to deal with the authorities, securing permission to take up land with financial help of some kind or another during the three or four years before it came into production.[7]

There were, however, differences between settlers and administrators which could not easily be reconciled. The immigrant might hope to make money by, for example, opening a clearing (*ladang*) to exploit its fertility -- and then move on. The aim of the government was to get land permanently settled, in particular by padi cultivation, so that home-grown rice would replace expensive imports in feeding miners and other non-agricultural elements of the population. It also seemed reasonable to extract from the settler part of the value of his production as a contribution to state revenues. In the short-term the immigrant had the stronger hand, since he could always move on. When the Selangor government first introduced the payment of quit-rent (land tax) on smallholdings in 1883, the peasants 'complained of being very poor, but they all had good fruit trees on their land'. The government had to retreat and 'men who were intending to leave Langat, and had gone so far as

to put their goods into *sampans*, when they were told that the land tax had been repealed, went back to their kampongs, not intending to go'.[8] In the longer term however the government prevailed, with judicious concessions, since the most productive use of the land was planting fruit trees, coconut palms, and eventually rubber, which the settler did not wish to abandon.

Each of the six main districts of Selangor, three on estuaries at the coast and three straddling the upper reaches of the Langat, Klang and Selangor rivers, had its own history which contributes to build up a picture of the whole. According to local tradition Malay settlement in Ulu Langat had begun in the time of Sultan Mohamed (r.1826-1857); in the 1890's the penghulu of the district town, Kajang, was a grandson of the founder to whom the Sultan had granted appropriate authority.[9] It had passed through hard times, so that when Swettenham first visited it in 1875 he found it run down and depopulated.[10]

In November 1882 the main centres were Rekoh, with 4 Chinese and 20 Malay shops, and Kajang, with 3 or 4 Chinese and 30 Malay shops. Some 900 men worked on the mines near Rekoh, but attempts to grow padi had failed due to lack of rain, and tobacco planted near Semenyih had been 'eaten by insects'. The leading Chinese miner in Ulu Langat village employed 80 coolies but said that lack of capital prevented him from increasing his labour force to say 1,000.[11] The rough census of 1884 gave a Malay population of 1,808 in the district (and 1,675 Chinese).[12] The numerous Malay shops probably sold rice, salt and other supplies to the miners, bought tin from the smaller mines and forest produce, such as rattans, from aborigine collectors. Some of the Malays felled jungle, which was a dangerous occupation requiring much skill, or burnt timber to make charcoal for which the crude Chinese smelters created a voracious demand. If one estimates that a total Malay population of 1,808 comprised perhaps a thousand adult males, some must have been engaged in shifting cultivation to grow dry padi and other foodstuffs for the mines.

As always an exceptional individual stands out of the mass. The penghulu of Cheras was Syed Yahya, an Acehnese and the son of one of the local pioneers who had become a legend. The tomb of his father, Tuan Syed Idris, at Rekoh was a *keramat* shrine. Syed Yahya had more than an interesting pedigree; he was 'a great advocate of pepper planting', for which Aceh was renowned. He practised what he preached, with three acres under pepper, but had failed in persuading his people to follow his example - 'the want of money is the stumbling block'.[13]

1890 saw a brief fall in the price of tin, which had an immediate effect in a marginal area such as Ulu Langat; 'quite a number of foreign Malays left the district, giving as their reason for doing so that they could not live by agriculture alone, and that, owing to the lessened activity in mining matters, they did not get as ready a sale for jungle produce, such as rattans and other building materials, as formerly'.[14] The permanently settled Malay population, however, took a longer view, subscribing to build a mosque at Kajang, and another at Beranang. Those of Mandiling origin were 'inclined to be liberal' in contrast to 'Menang Kaboo people [who] are very well off, but they hoard all their money; they will not even build respectable

houses for themselves.'[15]

The three-year moratorium (1884-1886) on collection of quit-rent had passed without abating the resistance to paying this detested impost. One woman had 'removed even her cups and saucers and mosquito curtains' to avoid distraint; she had perhaps heard that at the house of a former penghulu jewellery and buffaloes had been seized.[16] The loss of the oxen was particularly serious because the herds had been decimated by rinderpest, so that 'a cart is almost unprocurable'. Even in these hard times Malays 'crying out for work and complaining of their poverty' would not accept less than the previous going rate for felling jungle on Chinese land. The concept of a fair wage dies hard.

1894 was probably the turning point in the wavering fortunes of Ulu Langat. A programme of road construction, to open up the district and improve its communications with Kuala Lumpur, had begun in 1889. It produced a cart-road, 16 feet in width, between the state capital and the main Ulu Langat villages. As will be related later, the wild boom in coffee planting, which began around Kuala Lumpur, had an overspill into adjoining areas where good land was available and now accessible. The Kindersley brothers, destined to be famous as the first to plant rubber in Selangor, applied for two blocks, each of 500 acres, of land near Kajang. Clearing this land (initially for coffee) provided employment for gangs of Sumatrans, some of whom settled down in Ulu Langat. There is also mention of areas under padi, at Paya Kajang and near Semenhih, totalling 500 acres, and including (at Semenyih) 170 acres of padi sawah. At both places the padi growers were Sumatrans of one group or another. It was the beginning of a trend which gradually raised the total padi acreage of the district to 8,000 acres, most of it around Beranang.[17]

Down-river the Kuala Langat district presented an entirely different scenario. There was no tin-mining; the land was flat and swampy, the Sultan and some members of his family were the leaders in encouraging local agriculture, and the foreign Indonesian settlers were Javanese. Sultan Abdul Samad was content to leave the government of the state in European hands, but agriculture, particularly padi growing, was the absorbing interest of this period of his long life. Although otherwise very careful with his money -- some called him a hoarder -- he readily made grants and loans to padi growers, and was often out and about to see how they fared. He usually carried a *parang* (chopper) 'for he likes it to be seen that he does his own gardening and knows how to use a parang.' On occasion he had been seen down in the mud, supervising if not working at planting out padi seedlings and sago palms. After opening a new padi area with 'a few primitive dykes and sluices' the Sultan built 'a house for his second wife, who lives there and superintends operations'. He was so sprightly that in 1894 the Resident under-estimated his age (65 instead of 90) by 25 years![18]

Sultan Abdul Samad was continuing the practice of his predecessor, Sultan Mohamed.[19] His eldest son, Raja Muda Musa, a moody and eccentric figure, sustained the tradition until his death in 1884. He had about a thousand acres on which he first grew coconut palms, and later experimented with sugar cane, using paid labour. He sent his young son, Raja Sulaiman, to learn the technique of sugar

production on a European estate (Batu Kawan) in Province Wellesley.

In other respects Raja Musa refused to move with the times. When the exasperated district officer tackled him about his unpaid quit-rent 'to this Raja Musa answered nothing but went on splitting rattans'. At the time of his death in July 1884 he was talking about taking on an additional two or three hundred men to open up 'a very large tract of land'.[20] However he bequeathed to his son, Raja Muda (later Sultan) Sulaiman, a rather neglected holding which Sulaiman struggled to get into better order, for we hear later on (in 1889) that 'the Raja Muda has done no new planting during the year. He will have to spend a large amount of money on his coconut garden shortly if he does not wish to lose all his trees. At present they are much overgrown with jungle and the drains are all choked up. The trees also, I am told, are planted to closely together to bear well'.[21] The sugar cane area was another liability. Sulaiman applied to his grandfather for 'another $300 to make his ovens and chimney etc. for preparing sugar', but the old Sultan enquired whether he had yet got a prospective buyer in view to take his sugar; in the end the Sultan did no more than give a vague blessing to his grandson's application to the state government for a loan of $2,000.[22]

In Selangor, as in Perak, official attempts to extend the growing of padi exposed the problems without achieving a great deal in solving them.[23] Lack of rain in a dry season or damage by pests might deprive the grower of his crop. At Kuala Langat in 1883 'the head men and a great many people about here...said...that their padi crops had failed for the last three years'.[24] Up in Perak the state government was about to launch the first, and for many years the only, major Malayan drainage and irrigation scheme at Krian. It was a traumatic experience which exhausted all official zest for such difficult projects (and cost much more money than had been budgetted for).[25] Even when, as happened about one year in three, the cultivator got his crop, it was a poor return for his labour and the government subventions which had induced him to keep at it. The growers simply gave it up. 'I noticed lots of deserted kampongs on my way up river', and when the district officer reached Sungai Rambai, on the Langat River, and made an offer of $300 'to help men plant their padi' the harassed penghulu responded with a demand for $1,200 as 'men are leaving S Rambai to find money, and will not in all probability return'.[26]

The best prospect of agricultural development on the Kuala Langat swamp lands lay in the arrival of gangs of Javanese labourers, who had come under their own headmen to offer their services in felling jungle, constructing roads, and above all digging drains, in which their special expertise found full scope in the coastal districts of Selangor. This zone became (with the similar terrain further south in Johor) the Javanese home from home.[27]

A Javanese village was a glad sight for sore official eyes -- at Tanjong Duabelas 'I visited all the *dusuns*...there are some very fine ones, with many kinds of fruit trees all full grown. the kampongs and drains are finer and in better order than any in the district....and the houses far superior to most Malay houses'.[28] If it seemed profitable, they would even plant padi -- 'a great success last year, and he himself [the headman] has about 60 *pikuls* [but] there is difficulty in selling the padi just now or

the Penghulu would pay back his Govt loan of $150.'[29] Everything depended on a fine balance of commercial considerations, which was not often tilted in favour of padi. By 1889 'no rice to speak of was planted in the district,' as the Javanese were concentrating on the export of *durian* to the lucrative market in Singapore, and complaining about the unreliability of the coastal steamers upon which they relied to ship their fruit.[30]

Much depended on the headman. At Tanjong Duabelas, once the show piece of Javanese settlement in Kuala Langat, the headman, Haji Abdullah, absconded -- probably to evade his personal liability for the government loan. His people 'were not exerting themselves in the absence of their headman at Muar.' Some of them abandoned their holdings and moved to the Javanese settlement at Klanang, where the headman, Kei Kadir, saw to it that his people were 'a hard-working lot'.[31] Even at Klanang, however, the industrious Javanese proved no less reluctant to 'pay up Government advances and rents' and by 1894 'a number of planted up holdings had been abandoned by the Javanese settlers'. On other holdings 'well grown coconut palms were being cut down to make way for coffee' -- a new route to riches to which the Javanese were quick to respond.[32]

In the coastal villages of Kuala Langat there were some useful subsidiary industries. There was a steady demand for rattans of different kinds, used as a binding material, in substitution for rope or cord, in houses, fences, fish-traps and even boats. The standard roofing material was *atap* made by stripping and interweaving the fronds of the *nipah* palm. There was also an export trade in *atap* to Deli in Sumatra, where they were used as shade on tobacco estates. *Atap* afforded 'congenial employment for all members of the Malay family.' The man cut the palm fronds in the swamps; his wife and children plaited them. The export of *atap* was in the hands of Chinese. Bugis vessels came in to load cargoes of mangrove bark, from which a decoction was made for use in tanning leather in Singapore and elsewhere. In the season men turned their hands to making *belacan* (shrimp paste) used to add flavour to a rice meal.[33]

The Klang valley was by far the most developed region of the state, since it had the two largest towns, Kuala Lumpur and Klang, linked by a railway, and was the largest centre of tin-mining, with more than four fifths of the Chinese population (in 1884) concentrated in the Kuala Lumpur administrative district.[34] Although Kuala Lumpur itself was surrounded by a belt of Chinese market gardens, it also drew substantial supplies of produce from Malay smallholdings, situated along the roads between the town and the major mining centres. As far back as 1875 a traveller along the road from Ulu Langat to Kuala Lumpur saw 'acres and acres of plantations on both sides of the road, mostly owned by Malays'.[35] In 1878 a visitor found the town market well stocked with 'sweet potatoes, yams of various kinds, beans, melons, cucumbers, radishes, Chinese cabbage, onions, egg-plant and "lady's fingers"...durian, mangosteen, pineapple, banana, and plantain, oranges (of foreign growth), limes, "*papayah*" etc.[36]

The mining boom which began in 1880 increased the demand for produce but also encroached on agricultural land taken over for mining. There was some padi


SELANGOR RIVER VALLEY IN THE LATE 1880'S
This sketch shows the continuing importance of river communications in the pattern of settlement. In the early 1890's there was a radical change, when a railway line linked Kuala Kubu, Serendah and Rawang with Kuala Lumpur. Roads were built between Kuala Selangor and Rawang, and along the coast southwards to Klang.
SCALE: 1" = 10 miles (approx)
Kerling River
Kuala Kubu
Tanjong Karang
swamp
KUALA SELANGOR
Batang Berjuntai
ULU SELANGOR
Serendah
Selangor River
Rawang
Kuala Selangor
Api Api
Kuang
Kanching
Buloh River
Ijok
Straits of Malacca
Jeram
Kuala Lumpur

cultivation, though it may not have yielded a surplus for sale. In the Setapak valley, north of Kuala Lumpur, there were 'several hundred Sumatrans under Datoh Sati...well acquainted with irrigated cultivation, having cut a channel from the river for that purpose'. There were also padi lands in the vicinity of Gombak, Petaling and Batu.[37] In 1888 there were 1,155 acres under padi in the Kuala Lumpur district but there were only 1,170 acres in 1893.[38]

In the 1880's Klang town and its neighbourhood recovered from the depopulation induced by the rapid growth of Kuala Lumpur.[39] It was, however, a commercial rather than an agricultural revival. Projects in the 1880's for producing sago and pepper as estate crops did not prosper.[40] Smallholders would not plant padi but preferred to grow coconut and betel palms and fruit trees.[41] At Puchong on the Klang River a Sumatran village had 'neatly built, clean houses and well-kept gardens...the people live by agriculture, and in the expectation of the success of the Ayer Hitam mine'.[42] Officials were convinced that the 'great Klang alluvial flat' was 'magnificent soil', only needing development -- we shall come to the 'Klang fiasco' in coffee later.[43] Like parts of Kuala Langat, this was terrain congenial to the Javanese; by 1891 the Javanese of Klang outnumbered those of the other coastal districts combined.[44] The construction of a road parallel with the coast led to settlement in previously unpopulated places and created a continuous coastal belt.[45]

The Selangor valley (Ulu and Kuala Selangor) was less flourishing. In 1884 it had 31% of the Malay population of Selangor, 6% of the Chinese and 20% of the cultivated area.[46] It had suffered badly from the Pahang invasion of 1872-1873 and the intermittent fighting for control of Kuala Selangor between 1871 and 1873.[47] A visitor to Ulu Selangor in 1882 had found that 'agriculture is now nearly abandoned for the more remunerative occupation of mining'. The very modest 837 acres of cultivated land in the district in 1884 bears out this judgment.[48] At Kuang which was later developed by an irrigation scheme, [49] there were only eight houses and twenty inhabitants who 'eke out a livelihood by planting padi, working at *lampans* ('useful but aesthetically objectionable') or burning charcoal for the Rawang miners'. Lack of capital could strangle the mines themselves; in 1882 'a mine on a large scale' of which 'great hopes were entertained' was abandoned at an early stage as 'no more funds were forthcoming'.[50]

However the decade from the mid-1880's to the mid-1890's saw a remarkable expansion in Ulu Selangor in development and settlement; the two were interdependent, as new land was made accessible. The main driving force was the construction of roads and railways, which brought Ulu Selangor into much closer connection with Kuala Lumpur, and extended its economic hinterland into Ulu Pahang, where there were important mines, by a road which crossed the central range of hills. By 1894 'a considerable quantity of land is being taken up by foreign Malays for coffee and garden produce and for padi planting...for the reason that they find a ready local market in a mining district.' Villagers found it worthwhile to construct smallscale irrigation works; a stream or small river was dammed upstream, a distribution channel (*tali ayer*) was cut over a distance of a mile or more, to provide a reliable supply of water to 100-200 acres of padi land down the valley. A railway

station made what had been small villages, Serendah, Rawang (which absorbed what had been Bandar Kanching) and even Kuang, into small towns. As the new road was built from Rawang towards Kuala Selangor, a distance of 33 miles, 'large new clearings of Menangkerbau Malays' appeared along it.[51]

In the Kuala Selangor district along the lower reaches of the river it took longer to rebuild an agricultural economy which had been shattered by the displacement of rural population during the civil war. From Batang Berjuntai, where the Kuang river runs into the main Selangor valley, to Kuala Selangor itself, there had been, in Sultan Mohamed's reign, a thriving comunity. However in the early 1890's it was still almost empty. 'Durien and other fruit trees show that Batang Berjuntai was once a somewhat flourishing kampong.' Further downstream was Kampong Asahan, 'an old settlement of Selangor Malays who, with padi, cultivate a few sago trees, the pith of which they extract with a rude rasp.' At Pasangan, near the estuary, the Resident on tour passed 'through an open and extensive plain...bounded only by the horizon, which will accommodate more rice cultivators than can probably be prevailed upon to migrate into Selangor for many years to come.' This was one of the reasons why there was no progress, at that time, in the vast Tanjong Karang swamp zone, some 50,000 acres of potential padi land, to the north of the Selangor valley. Its drainage to the sea was obstructed by sandy ridges, and so it would cost vast sums to make usable.[52]

The river itself was still the main route to the interior. Malay and Chines boats, of four to eight tons burden, charged $22 per *koyan* (say 2 tons) for the laborious trip upstream, a journey which took five to ten days to complete. However the journey downstream from Ulu Selangor could be completed in two or three days and freight charges, at 80 cents per *bahara* (say $5 per *koyan*) were much cheaper. Although the new railways could carry freight more rapidly to Kuala Lumpur, they would 'have to pay attention to their freight charges if they wish to secure all the traffic now on the river.'[53]

One method of attracting Selangor Malays back to the ancient capital of the state might be to restore the traditional local leadership. There was no possibility of persuading Sultan Abdul Samad to resume the seat of his forebears, but his son and heir, Raja Muda Musa, had had titular charge of Kuala Selangor until driven out during the civil war.[54] In 1877 there was talk of Raja Musa returning to live at Kuala Selangor, but nothing came of it.[55] A few years later Raja Mahmud, the Sultan's kinsman and a celebrated figure in the civil war, was moved from the comparative obscurity of Sepang to become penghulu of Kuala Selangor. He held the post from 1882 to 1887 but proved a rather stiff-necked character, who 'quarrelled with successive District Officers in Kuala Selangor', and contributed nothing significant to Malay settlement, for which he had no flair.[56] Another famous veteran of the civil war, Syed Mashhor, became penghulu of Ulu Kerling in Ulu Selangor in 1882 and remained there for almost twenty years. He was not a man to be idle and initial reports of his work were favourable, but he too was a traditionalist unfitted to the demands of the new era with its 'cash economy'.[57]

The Malay settlers who did come in planted some padi but suffered discourag-

ing setbacks. The padi acreage in the Kuala Selangor district was nil in 1887, 600 acres in 1888, 1,775 in 1889, but a total failure in 1890 so that in 1891 only 120 acres were planted -- and that late in the season.[58] Methods of cultivation were somewhat haphazard:- 'An area of land is selected and the vegetation...is cut down and burnt off. The padi is then thrown broadcast amongst the refuse and has to take its chance with the weeds, which grow up with it, but being of quicker growth it is ready for harvest before the weeds become strong enough to choke it. In places where the seed had not germinated, young rice plants are rooted in the soil by means of the implement called the "*kuku kambing*" which is used with great skill by the Malays -- vermin get the best of the crop'.[59]

A new era began (c.1892) with the arrival of Che Mat from Kelantan; with government aid he began to bring in settlers to Kuala Selangor from Kelantan; they took up land at Batang Berjuntai and Api Api.[60] In these places there had been flourishing padi planting in 'old Malay times' when, it was remembered, 'all the planters had buffaloes'. A devastating epidemic of rinderpest had begun the decline; thereafter (until the civil war) the local villagers had preferred to base their economy on coconut growing.[61] The Kelantan settlers brought back a tradition of padi growing, using buffaloes to trample the padi swamps in preparation for planting. The initial results were dramatic, with the padi standing almost six feet high in the fields.[62] Other villages began to import buffaloes from Jelebu and Pahang.[63] The penghulu of Api Api applied to the Sultan, as the padi growers' universal provider, for buffaloes, and the Sultan acquired a herd of wild buffaloes for domestication.[64] At Kuala Langat, however, this 'large herd of half or wholly wild buffaloes [were] a terror to the peasants, who talk of leaving the locality.'[65] The Kelantan settlers continued to earn praise -- 'their work has been good in every respect' and the Sultan conferred on Che Mat the title of Dato' Dagang, which gave him higher status than a mere penghulu.[66]

The intermittent loss of crop in dry or excessively wet seasons was still too much of a discouragement. By 1896 'there is very little *sawah* cultivation in the district now....but immediately any irrigation scheme is started they will be only too glad to take up land for the purpose and have expressed a willingness to pay heavy quit-rent or water tax.'[67]

Fortunately there were other crops and activities to sustain the peasant economy. Che Mat's Kelantan settlers planted maize as well as rice. 'The Selangor Malay as a rule owns a coconut plantation in the vicinity of the sea and also a boat for fishing.'[68] Kuala Selangor, even more than Kuala Langat, was a centre of *atap* making for export. The middleman bought *ataps* at $5 per thousand and resold at $10.[69] There was in addition work at a wage on timber felling and road-making.

This was also the main fishing district. In the bad old days villagers had feared to expose themselves in the shallow waters of the Straits to the risk of capture and enslavement by pirates. In more peaceful times fishing had revived. Some fishermen used nets or hooked lines (*rawai*) to catch small fish, for immediate consumption or export as salt fish. The catch might occasionally include stingray, sharks and crocodiles.[70] Kuala Selangor had shelving beaches suitable for fish-traps, made of

bamboo stakes into which the fish were swept by the tide. *Belat lengkong* were temporary fences built in a curve across an estuary or bay in which the fish were caught as the tide receded. *Jermal* were larger and more permanent traps, further out into the shallow water; the fences on either side offered a wide 'mouth' but converged to end in a trap. This was a platform on stilts above a floor of bamboo matting which could be raised to lift the catch. Constructing a trap of this size, which inevitably suffered damage in storms, took time. Malay fishermen obtained advances of money or supplies from Chinese fish-dealers, for their support while building or repairing their traps. The catch might amount to as much as 25 *pikuls* when successful and it was delivered to the dealer to repay the debt. Such arrangements were negotiated between a manager, who also performed the ritual necessary to ensure success (he was known as the *pawang* owing to his expertise as a magician) and the dealer. Thus there was a complex economic relationship between *pawang*, advancer and members of the *pawang*'s gang who worked the trap. To settle possible disputes a 'code of practice' was adopted, with the district officer as supervisor.

The fishing villages of Kuala Selangor stretched southwards along the coast from Kuala Selangor town to Jeram. When an ice factory was established (in Kuala Lumpur) in the early 1890's 'enterprising Chinese' saw the opportunity to ship ice down to Klang by rail, thence by boat to 'the chief fishing centres on the coast, pack the fish in ice, return to Klang and send their ice-packed fish to the market at Kuala Lumpur by rail.'[71]

Finally we come to the shortlived coffee boom, which is best regarded as a curtain-raiser for the introduction of rubber growing.[72] The beginning of coffee, and of plantation enterprise in Selangor, may be told here and the rest later (Chapter 10). The earliest recorded estates in Selangor had been two small ventures in tobacco growing on land sited alongside the Damansara Road, which traversed much the same area as the railway built later. Both lasted only a short time (1877-1879).[73] At about the same time Ceylon planters left their coffee estates, ravaged by disease, and came to prospect in Malaya. The first on the scene in Selangor was Bircham, but he lacked sufficient financial resources.[74] The real pioneer was Thomas Heslop Hill, in partnership with Ambrose Rathborne and, for a time, with Martin Lister. Their first coffee estates were established in Sungei Ujong in the late 1870's, but they extended their activities to Selangor when, in 1881, they acquired, from a Ceylon planter (Downall) who had just established it, what was to be Weld Hill Estate on the edge of Kuala Lumpur.[75] Two other leading pioneers were F.A.Toynbee and Walter Stephenson.[76] There were soon a number of coffee estates around Kuala Lumpur and along the railway line to Klang. There were also over-hasty ventures into coffee planting in the coastal belt on land which proved unsuitable. The Selangor government was reproached with 'fostering a little boom' by imprudent encouragement.[77] To promote and protect their collective interests the planters formed the Selangor Planters Association.[78]

A similar fever for coffee planting swept through the Malay villages from about 1893. In 1894 coffee was replacing pepper and coconut as the preferred source of

cash in the Klang district. In Ulu Selangor 'the greater part of the land newly opened was for coffee.'[79] Two years later 'almost every Malay in Rawang and Serendah, who is old enough to have the sense, and the little capital necessary, is going in most enthusiastically for planting coffee...in a downright, earnest and businesslike manner.'[80] But by 1898 many of these coffee plots had been abandoned and were reverting to jungle.[81] Low prices and disease were the main problems, as will be related later (Chapter 10).

Despite their setbacks the proprietors of coffee estates had found a new prospective bonanza in rubber, which they interplanted to shade their coffee or as a supplementary crop on land not under coffee. Smallholders, however, having burnt their fingers and exhausted their capital in growing coffee, were more cautious, though in the end they followed down the same road.

In 1900 agricultural development and rural settlement had made considerable progress, leading to the 50% increase in Malay (and Malaysian) population in a decade (1891-1901) as shown at the start of this chapter. The stage was set for a rapid growth in rubber planting, both as an estate crop and as a major element in the smallholder economy.

Notes

1. M.V.del Tufo, *Federation of Malaya and Colony of Singapore - A Report on the 1947 Census of Population*, Crown Agents, London, 1949, gives the basic figures, on which the percentages have been calculated by the author.
2. C.A.Vlieland, *British Malaya - A Report on the 1931 Census* etc., Crown Agents, London, 1932, para 266. 'Other Malaysians' also includes aborigines whose numbers do not significantly affect the totals.
3. P.J.Wilson, *A Malay Village and Malaysia*, HRAF Press, New Haven, 1967, p.20, writes that 'contact between the two villages of Jendram Hilir and Jendram Ulu is minimal', because these two villages, only a mile apart in the Langat valley, were of Mendiling and Minangkabau origin. They would not even gather to use the same weekly medical clinic. Wilson's fieldwork was done in the 1960's, but the two communities had existed for a generation or two.
4. A.B.Cobden Ramsay, 'Indonesians in Malaya', *JMBRAS* 29(1), 1956, p.120 (Bugis) and p.123 (Minangkabau). Ramsay had been District Officer, Klang, just after the Second World War. H.C.Clifford, 'The Were Tiger', *The Further Side of Silence*, Doubleday, Page & Co., New York, 1927 (Korinchi).
5. Vlieland, op.cit.
6. Khazin Mohamed Tamrin, *Orang Jawa di-Selangor - Penghijrahan dan Penempatan 1880-1940*, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur, 1984, Chapter 2, *'Sebab Penghijrahan'*, In Sumatra the Dutch were fighting a prolonged war at the end of the nineteenth century to conquer Aceh, which may have had indirect effects on central Sumatra, from which most of the migrants came. Report on a visit to Kelantan in 1888 by C.F.Bozzolo, enclosed with SSD 31 January 1889. A.Teeuw and D.K.Wyatt, *Hikayat Patani - the Story of Patani*, M.Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970, pp.23-24,
7. Chapter 6 Notes 11 and 12.
8. Journal (unpublished) of the Collector (District Officer), Kuala Langat, 1882-1885, entries dated 21 September 1883 and 19 March 1884. Cited below as 'Langat Journal'. When the 3-year moratorium expired, it was replaced by an initial exemption from quit-rent of new holdings for the first three years.
9. Anon, 'Traditions of Ulu Langat', *SJ* 5, 1897, pp.305-309. The initials 'W.S.' appended to the article identify the author as W. W. Skeat, who had been DO Ulu Langat c.1892. He mentions a

traditional Malay chief, To Langat, but he must have been a minor dignitary, subordinate to the Penghulu Aru, who was the major chief of the interior. T.J.Newbold, *Political and Statistical Account of the British Settlements...[and] the Malayan States*, 2 vols., Murray, London, 1839, reprinted, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1971, vol 2., p.29.

10. Chapter 3, Note 29, Chapter 4 Note 36, Chapter 5 Note 12.
11. Langat Journal, entries for 21-26 November 1882. The newly arrived Collector of Kuala Langat went up-river to inspect the unadministered Ulu Langat district, which was the main source of the export duty collected at Kuala Langat. The first DO Ulu Langat (G.C.Bellamy) was appointed in 1883.
12. *AR Selangor 1884*.
13. Monthly report (June 1890) by DO Ulu Langat in *SGG* 1890. When Selangor began to publish its own government gazette ('*SGG*') in 1890, it was the practice for some years to include in it extracts from the monthly reports by district officers to the Resident. Citation of *SGG* indicates a monthly report unless otherwise stated.

    Syed Yahya had 7,000 pepper vines, supported by 3,000 dedaps (posts). *SGG* 1892, p.393, and p.596. His father's tomb is mentioned in *SGG* 1894 and in *SJ* 2, p.346, 1894.
14. *AR Ulu Langat 1890* in *SGG* 1891, p.489. However 'certain leading men....made small fortunes' from the sale of *durian* and other fruit collected from unclaimed trees. Ibid.
15. *SGG* 1891, p.834.
16. SGG 1891, p.686.
17. 'Notes of the Resident's Visits to Districts in 1894', published in *SGG* 1894 and reprinted in *SJ* 2, 1894, pp.342-346 and 359-362 (for Ulu Langat), and Ramsay, op.cit., p.121. W.H.(later Sir William) Treacher became Resident in January 1893. He had not served previously in Selangor, and it appears that, having settled in, he made a series of visits to out-districts to see the situation for himself. These notes, cited as 'Resident's Notes 1894', are a valuable conspectus of Selangor at that time and of some events of the past.

    The Kindersley brothers had three estates in Ulu Langat, Inch Kenneth (named after the part of Scotland from which they came), Reko Hill and Dunedin. In 1895 they applied for 320 acres, for coffee planting, on the Rekoh road. Rekoh village was at that time 'the most woe-begone village in Selangor,' according to the district officer. *SJ* 4, 1895, p.159.

    AR Selangor 1905, para 47, for 8,000 acres under padi.
18. J.M.Gullick, 'A Careless, Heathen Philosopher?', *JMBRAS* 26(1), revised and reprinted in Glimpses of Selangor 1860-1898, MBRAS Monograph 25, 1993, especially pp.17-18. *AR Selangor 1892*, para 80. *SGG* 1892, p.609 (second wife). *SJ* 2, p.431 on his age; he had been born c.1805. On other under-estimates of his age see Chapter 9 Note 11.
19. Chapter 3 Note 32.
20. Langat Journal, entries for 28 February and 23 May 1884. Sultan Sulaiman, 'Royal Recollections', *MIH* 12(2), 1969, is a reprint of part of a talk given by the Sultan in 1936 to the Kuala Lumpur Rotary Club.
21. *AR Kuala Langat 1889*, in *SGG* 1890, p.356.
22. Langat Journal, 3 October 1884 and 20 February 1885. Ten years later there were merely 'the remains of a sugar factory started by Raja Sulaiman's father, but which did not prove a success'. Resident's Notes 1894, *SJ* 2, 1894, p.430. Sultan Sulaiman (loc.cit. in Note 20) attributed the failure of Malayan sugar growing to the import of cheap sugar from Java.
23. 'Reports Furnished by Order of His Excellency the Governor upon the Best Means of Encouraging the Cultivation of Rice in the Malay Peninsula', *Proceedings of the Straits Settlements Legislative Council*, Paper No 6 of 1893. See also J.M.Gullick, *Malay Society in the Late Nineteenth Century - the Beginnings of Change*, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1989, especially pp.128-130.
24. Langat Journal, 2 January 1883. The district officer had called the meeting to discuss the introduction of the new land regulations under which quit-rent became payable. He responded to the remarks quoted with 'if they weeded and attended to their *ladangs* a little more than they do, their padi crops would not be so likely to fail', and urged them to produce poultry and vegetables for

sale in Kuala Lumpur, although this was obviously impracticable owing to the distance. The local people replied that this was *banyak susah* (very difficult).

25. R.D.Hill, *Rice in Malaya - A Study in Historical Geography*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1977, pp.113-115.
26. Langat Journal, 16 September 1883 and 26 January 1884.
27. Khazin, op.cit., chapters 2 and 3, and his map, *Kawasan penempatan utama orang Jawa 1880-1940*, at p.86.
28. Langat Journal, 13 March 1884.
29. Ibid., 18 February 1885.
30. *AR Kuala Langat 1889*, in *SGG* 1890, p.356, and monthly report for June 1890 in SGG 1890, p.416.
31. *AR Kuala Langat 1890*, para 28, in *1891*, p.573. *AR Kuala Langat 1889*, in *SGG* 1890, p.356. *Kri* (or *kiai*) was a Javanese term of respect (prefixed to names as with the Malay '*dato*'). R.J.Wilkinson, *Malay-English Dictionary (Romanised)*, Salavopoulos and Kinderlis, Mytilene, 1932, 2 Parts, Part 1, p.595.
32. Resident's Notes 1894, *SJ* 2, p.431.
33. Gullick, *Malay Society*, pp.152-153, on rattans. A.B.Rathborne, *Camping and Tramping in Malaya*, Swan Sonnenschein, London, 1898, pp.259 and 284, and *AR Kuala Langat 1899*, paras 10-11 in *SGG* 1900 on *atap*. Langat Journal, 6 November 1883 and 23 February and 6-7 September 1884, on mangrove bark. On one occasion a Bugis vessel, overloaded with bark, sank in the Jugra inlet. Ibid 23 February 1884. Ibid 25 August 1884 on *belacan*.
34. Out of 28,236 Chinese in Selangor 23,827 were in the Kuala Lumpur district in 1884. Ulu Langat and Ulu Selangor, the other mining districts, had about 1,600 each. *AR Selangor 1884*.
35. F.A.Swettenham, *Sir Frank Swettenham's Malayan Journals 1874-1876*, ed. P.L.Burns and C.D.Cowan, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1975, p.218. Bloomfield Douglas too was 'immensely gratified by the excellent cultivation of the land between Qualla Lumpor and Ampang'. Unpublished diary of Bloomfield Douglas, 1876-1882, entry for 14 July 1877. *AR Selangor 1884*, para 37, on Chinese market gardens.
36. W.T.Hornaday, *Two Years in the Jungle - Experiences of a Hunter and Naturalist in India, Ceylon, the Malay Peninsula and Borneo*, Scribner, New York, 1885, p.315, partly reprinted, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1993, as *The Experiences of a Hunter and Naturalist in the Malay Peninsula and Borneo*, p.25. Hornaday visited Kuala Lumpur in July 1878.
37. Hill, op.cit.,, p.146, citing *AR Selangor Lands Department 1888* and *AR Selangor 1893*. There had been an increase in the villages within a 10 mile radius of Kuala Lumpur. *AR Selangor 1887*, para 18.
38. Hill, op.cit., p.147. Hill analyses the size of holdings (under padi and other crops) and the apparent social status of the owners, to show a significant 'middle class' element. Dato Sati was probably an employer as well as a community leader, and a member of the Malay entrepreneurial class. See J.M.Gullick, 'The Entrepreneur in Late 19th Century Malay Peasant Society', *JMBRAS* 58(1), 1985. Dato Sati died in 1889 and his estate was valued, for letters of administration, at $14,000. *SGG* 1889. His successor as penghulu of Setapak was Khatib Koyan, also a 'middle-class' type but from a different immigrant group, which weakened his authority with Sati's followers. He was deemed 'an intelligent man [but] wants a good deal of stirring up'. *AR Selangor Lands Department 1890*, in *SGG* 1891, p.396.
39. Chapter 5 Note 20.
40. Hill, op.cit., p.155. Resident's Notes 1894, *SJ* 2, 1894, pp.411-412. *SGG* 1891, p.461.
41. *AR Klang 1889* in *SGG* 1890, p.280.
42. Report from Klang for September 1891, *SGG* 1891, p.867.
43. Resident's Notes 1894, *SJ* 2, 1894, p.430.
44. In 1891 there were 359 Javanese in the Klang district, 160 in Kuala Langat and 193 in Kuala Selangor. Vlieland, op.cit. *AR Klang 1894, SGG* 1895, p.152.
45. Langat Journal, 11 February 1884. SJ 2 1894, p.431.

46. The figures (*AR Selangor 1884*) were:-

Category	*Ulu Selangor*	*Kuala Selangor*	*State Total (Selangor)*
Malays	1,971	3,343	17,097
Chinese	1,600	227	28,236
Cultivated Area (acres)	837	2,000	13,704

Bernam was administered as part of Perak (Chapter 6 Note 55).

47. Chapter 4 Notes 29-37.
48. C.H.A.Turney, 'From Kuala to Ulu Selangor in 1882', *SJ* 3, 1894, p.31.
49. Hill, op.cit., p.146. *AR Kuala Selangor 1900,* para 10.
50. Turney, op.cit., p.30. Resident's Tour Notes, *SJ* 2, p.203 on *lampans*.
51. Resident's Tour Notes, *SJ* 2, pp.202-203.
52. Chapter 3 Note 32. Chapter 5 Note 30. Resident's Tour Notes, *SJ* 2, , p.257. Hill, op.cit., p.154.
53. Resident's Tour Notes, loc. cit..
54. Chapter 4 Note 29. J. M. Gullick, 'Tunku Kudin in Selangor 1868-1878', *JMBRAS* 59(2), 1986, revised and reprinted in *Glimpses of Selangor* (Note 18), p.198.
55. Unpublished Douglas diary (Note 35), 23 February 1877. This passage is not explicit but it appears that, without the Sultan's knowledge (he had a low opinion of Musa's administrative abilities), members of the court circle at Kuala Langat told the Pahang Malay headmen in Ulu Selangor that Musa would return to Kuala Selangor.
56. R.Stevenson, *Cultivators and Administrators - British Educational Policy towards the Malays 1875-1906*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1975, p.138 n12. See ibid, pp.121-125, on Mahmud and the local Malay school. For Mahmud's no less controversial later career, see Chapter 9 below.
57. Swettenham, who had known Syed Mashhor since the troubled times of 1875, wrote in his valedictory report as Resident that he 'takes a great interest in his work'. *AR Selangor 1888*, para 11. But in 1891 an exasperated DO commented that 'he does nothing for the place' [his *mukim*]. *AR Ulu Selangor 1891* in *SGG* 1892, p.357. He retired, at the age of 62, in 1899, *SGG* 1899, p.16. There are signs that he had aged rapidly. See also Chapter 4 Note 25 and Chapter 9 Note 85.
58. *AR Kuala Selangor 1889*, in *SGG* 1890, p.304. *AR Kuala Selangor 1890*, in *SGG* 1891, p.636. *AR Kuala Selangor 1892,* in *SGG* 1893.
59. Report from Kuala Selangor in *SGG* 1892, p.727. A '*kuku kambing*' (literally 'goat's foot') was a two-pronged fork by which the individual rice seedlings were thrust into the flooded padi land. Wilkinson, *Malay-English Dictionary (Romanised)*, Pt. 1, p.621.
60. Ibid., *SGG* 1893, p.124 and p.803, and *SGG* 1892, p.357.
61. Chapter 3 Note 32.
62. *SGG* 1893, p.124. *AR Kuala Selangor 1898*, para 29, in *SGG* 1899.
63. *SGG* 1893, p.714.
64. *SGG* 1893, p.327.
65. Resident's Notes 1894, *SJ* 2, 1894, p.430. Turney, who had been DO Kuala Langat intermittently since 1876, diplomatically suggested to the Sultan that 'sportsmen from Kuala Lumpur should be invited to thin out the herd'. Ibid. In the end, 'after some little discussion', the Sultan agreed to hand over the unruly herd to his grandson, Raja Muda Sulaiman, to be 'fenced in and attended to by two herdsmen who would milk them and obtain ghee from the butter.' Turney predicted that this reorganisation would take some months to implement. Report from Kuala Langat for February 1896, in *SGG* 1896, p.164.
66. AR Kuala Selangor 1895, in SGG 1896. Resident's Notes 1894, *SJ* 2, 1894, pp.256-257.
67. Report from Kuala Selangor, in *SGG* 1896. This may have been the origin of the ill-starred Kuang irrigation scheme (Note 50 above). In 1894 the Resident had identified 'a large area of land which, probably, could without difficulty be irrigated and converted into rich padi land' drawing the

water from the Kuang, a tributary of the Selangor River. The Kuang scheme was opened in 1900 and abandoned in 1910. Chapter 9 Note 86 and 10 Note 67.

68. *AR Kuala Selangor 1896*, in *SGG* 1897, p.463.
69. *AR Kuala Selangor 1890*, paras 6 and 9, in *SGG* 1891.
70. Report from Kuala Selangor, in *SGG* 1893, p.327.
71. Chapter 3 Note 33. *SGG* 1893, p.505. F.A.Swettenham, *The Real Malay - Pen Pictures*, John Lane Bodley Head, London, 1900, pp.119-120, gives the *modus operandi* of a *jermal* type of trap in operation on the coast of Province Wellesley, and W.W.Skeat, *Malay Magic* etc., MacMillan, London, 1900, pp.310-317, describes a Selangor fishing *pawang*'s ritual. The code of practice was first formulated in 1882, fell into disuse but was revived and is printed in *SJ* 1, pp.285-288, 1893, as Anon. 'Fishing in Kuala Selangor.' Resident's Tour Notes, *SJ* 2, p.258, on iced fish.
72. J.C Jackson, *Planters and Speculators - Chinese and European Agricultural Enterprise in Malaya 1786-1921*, University of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1968, Chapter 9, 'European Coffee Estates', and J.M.Gullick, 'Kuala Lumpur 1880-1895', *JMBRAS* 28(4), 1955, pp.62-67 (a passage written by C.A.Gibson-Hill). On coffee as a smallholder crop Lim Teck Ghee, *Peasants and Their Agricultural Economy in Colonial Malaya 1874-1941*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1977 (see index entries under 'Coffee cultivation/industry'). D.H.Grist, *An Outline of Malayan Agriculture*, Dept of Agriculture, Kuala Lumpur, 1936, Chapter 7 'Coffee' deals with the botanical aspects, including the technical requirements and limitations which have relegated coffee to being a 'minor crop' in Malayan agriculture. Out of a total Malayan coffee acreage of 17,528 acres in 1934, 6,626 acres were in Selangor, and only 3,537 acres (in Malaya) were grown as a 'sole crop'. It had become one element of mixed cultivation, mainly on smallholdings and small estates. Because it requires intensive cultivation, coffee, even as an estate crop, was usually grown on a limited acreage; the standard area for the land granted to estates in the 1890's was 320 acres (half a square mile). See also I.H.Burkill, *A Dictionary of the Economic Products of the Malay Peninsula*, 2 vols., Ministry of Agriculture, Kuala Lumpur, revised edition 1966, vol 1, pp.627-637, for a wide-ranging survey.
73. Unpublished diary of Bloomfield Douglas, entries for 12 July and 20 September 1878, and 9 June 1879. The Bukit Bangkong estate (near Damansara village) was opened by a Dutch planter, Limberg, and the other by a German, Limke (or Zemke), financed by the Singapore businessman, Syed Mohamed Alsagoff. In a report on Selangor in 1879 (dated 27 March 1880 and printed in C 3095) Swettenham attributes the failure of these ventures to 'the inexperience of those entrusted with their management'. See also Jackson, op.cit. p.89, on the problems of growing tobacco in Malaya.
74. Douglas diary, May-June 1879. Bircham had impressive letters of introduction but no money.
75. Jackson, op.cit., p.180. Hill had sent Martin Lister from Sungei Ujong to make trial coffee plantings, and he himself soon followed. Douglas diary, July-August (Lister) and November (Hill) 1881. Hill and Rathborne took part in the brief European mining venture (Chapter 6 Notes 28-29) and were contractors to the government for railway supplies and road construction. Hill finally made a fortune by selling estate land (originally coffee, later rubber) to various companies. J.H.Drabble, *Rubber in Malaya 1876-1922 The Genesis of the Industry*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1973, p.80.
76. F.A.Toynbee, 'Coffee', *SJ* 2, 1893, p.238f and 292, gives an account of the early ventures in coffee planting in Selangor. On Stephenson, see Gullick, *Kuala Lumpur 1880-1895*, p.63.
77. Jackson, op.cit., pp.196-197.
78. The minutes of meetings and annual reports of the Selangor Planters Association, together with various practical articles on coffe planting, were published in *SJ* 1-5 (1892-1897). The first president, E.V.Carey, vied with Heslop Hill as leader of the planting community.
79. *AR Klang 1894*, in SGG 1895 p.181, and *AR Ulu Selangor 1894*, para 54 at p.212.
80. Report from Ulu Selangor in *SGG* 1896, p.100.
81. Ibid. *SGG*, 1898 p.139.

Chapter Eight

State Capital

The capital of a Malay state is where its government has its main centre of authority. In pre-colonial times it was wherever the ruler had his seat, so that Kuala Selangor was the traditional royal capital.[1] In the reign of Sultan Abdul Samad (r.1857-1898) Bandar Langat was the ruler's place of residence, though from about 1870 his deputy (Tunku Kudin as viceroy) lived at Klang. When Sultan Sulaiman came to the throne in 1898, he chose to make his capital at Klang, where a new astana was built for his use, though as Raja Muda he had owned and frequently resided in a house at Kuala Lumpur. However, like his grandfather, Sultan Sulaiman preferred not to make his royal capital in the bustling, mercantile town of Kuala Lumpur, where the state government had its headquarters. In modern times the Sultan has his capital at Shah Alam.

Most of this chapter is concerned with the inexorable rise of Kuala Lumpur. from the time when the Resident moved up-river from Klang in 1880, later becoming the FMS federal capital in 1896 (and the national capital in 1946). However the importance of Kuala Lumpur should not overshadow the significance of the royal capital. When Sultan Abdul Samad made one of his infrequent visits to Kuala Lumpur in 1892, an observer watched his reception at the railway station, with due pomp, and commented that 'the scene made one realise the fact, which one is sometimes apt to forget here, that this is after all a Malay State with a Malay Sultan at its head.'[2] The Residents tried, but without success, to persuade Sultan Abdul Samad to enhance still further the status of Kuala Lumpur, by making it his place of residence. As it was, when it was necessary to consult the ruler, under the protocol of the 'Residential system', the Resident, whether based at Klang or Kuala Lumpur, set off for Bandar Langat to seek an audience with the Sultan. Major Malay ceremonies, a funeral or enthronement of a ruler, were held in the royal capital.[3]

The rise of Kuala Lumpur, from its origin as a small and remote trading post (c.1857) to its eventual preeminence, was the result of the increasing official and business activity; the growth of population entailed a new regime of municipal administration and the reconstruction of buildings, streets, layout and other infrastructure, which made the town quite unique in the Malay Peninsula of that time.[4]

We may pick up the story at 1880, since earlier chapters have touched incidentally on the first twenty odd years of Kuala Lumpur's history.[5] To this day downtown Chinatown, from modern Jalan Tun Perak south along the east bank of the

Klang River, preserves the layout of the original settlement as it was c.1860. The river boats, bringing in men and supplies from Klang, and taking away tin, loaded and unloaded on to the east bank, since the mines were mostly on that side, though at a distance of a few miles away. The original course of the river included a number of bends, which obstructed the flow so that in the season of heavy rain the level of the river could rise several feet above normal. Hence the main street was a hundred yards or so from the river bank, running parallel with the river but on higher ground. The tradition is that it was called 'High Street' (now Jalan Tun H S Lee) because it was above the river level. From this thoroughfare short paths ran down to the riverside, and longer tracks, which Yap Ah Loy improved to make them passable by bullock carts, branched out to the mining villages -- Ampang, Batu, Pudu, Petaling and so on -- which gave their names to the roads out of the town, as they still do.[6]

When European officials moved from Klang to Kuala Lumpur in 1880, they were apprehensive of attacks by the Chinese.[7] So they established themselves on the other (west) side of the Klang River, to make it a barrier between the two quarters. Along the west bank was an uneven, swampy flat area, with a few vegetable gardeners' huts. The first police barracks stood on the edge of this open space, and the police used it as a parade ground; the name was later changed to 'the Padang' (now Merdeka Square). The government offices and bungalows stood on higher ground, along which ran a track known as Bluff Road.[8] The Residency was sited on a hill at the north end of the official quarter, where the Prime Minister's Office Complex now stands; from the vantage point of the Residency lawn Bloomfield Douglas, who called the Residency his 'redoubt', could demonstrate to his guests, by lobbing howitzer shells into selected targets in the jungle beyond, that he could, in case of need bring down a bombardment on the Chinese town.[9] However the fear that 'the natives are restless' soon passed, as both parties became better acquainted. A more typical example of later years was the practice of the Resident (Rodger) in 1897 of riding on an inspection through the town, escorted only by his syce who held the pony's head when he dismounted to chat with local people whom he had known for 15 years.[10]

As soon as the new regime had installed itself, in some rather makeshift buildings, on the other side of the river, it had to improve living conditions in the congested town across the river.[11] There were three major hazards -- epidemic disease caused by overcrowding and by an insanitary environment, and extensive damage by fire or flood. At the beginning of 1881 a fire had destroyed almost the entire town. The flimsy huts were soon rebuilt, but in December of the same year, the river rose in flood, and swept away the main bridge (the Market Street crossing) and much of the town, including the large house of Yap Ah Loy. However the indomitable Capitan China brought in labourers from the mines, and the town was again rebuilt.[12]

Sanitary conditions became steadily worse, so that when Governor Weld paid a visit in October 1882 he found gangs of labourers, with bullock carts, struggling to remove the accumulated filth from the 'pestilential' streets.[13]

In the mid-1880's the entire town was rebuilt, using bricks and tiles in place of

wood and *atap*, and setting the frontages along the streets further back to widen them. This reconstruction had to be phased over two or three years to spread the demand for building materials; a street at a time was prescribed for the replacement of all buildings along it, and when that was done, the operation moved to the next one.[14] In the official quarter there was also a rebuilding programme, by which the inferior timber buildings moved from Klang and re-erected were replaced by more substantial, though still unpretentious, brick and tile-roofed buildings.[15] In 1887 there were 518 brick houses in Kuala Lumpur and only one was more than five years old, and by 1889 it was possible to prohibit entirely the use of *atap* buildings in the town area.[16]

An incidental consequence of the building programme was a rapid expansion of brick kilns, timber mills and other sources of building materials, sited on the outskirts of the town. Returning again in 1886 Weld commented that a town which, in 1882, had been 'dirty and disreputable looking' was now the 'neatest and prettiest Chinese and Malay town' to be seen in the Straits Settlements or the Malay States, since it had 'picturesque houses and shops, brightly painted, and often ornamented with carving and gilding.' [17] Later on there was an unpaid fire brigade, organised by Bellamy, the head of the public works department, with steam pumps, water tanks and long hoses, on carts drawn by large shire horses such as pulled brewers' drays in England. Bellamy on the box, taking his brigade to a fire, was a sight to astonish as well as reassure the local population.[18]

Severe floods continued to devastate the town, though at long intervals, for half a century. From the 1880's onwards the course of the river through the town and beyond was straightened by degrees, and the vulnerable places were embanked. The final stage, after the celebrated flood of 1926, successfully withstood the test of another flood in 1930. Then the surging water swept between the high banks, taking with it a tiger which had fallen in -- the last time a tiger, more or less at liberty, was seen in the town.[19]

The initial problems had been surmounted by 1887 and there was money for more ambitious projects. The new hospital buildings, completed in 1890, and the development of the railway and road communications have been described.[20] The site of the railway station on the west bank was chosen for the convenience of passengers. In consequence of its central position, the lines branched out through the town, with a number of incidental effects. At one time, for example, a railway line ran down the centre of what is now Jalan Tan Cheng Lock, so that it is wider than most of the older streets. The culmination of railway development in the town was the present railway station, completed in 1911. Its so-called 'Mahometan style', borrowed from similar architectural trends in India, was first introduced to Kuala Lumpur by the new government offices (now the Bangunan Sultan Abdul Samad) in 1897 as a deliberate attempt to improve the general appearance of the town by constructing a substantial and striking building of original design.[21]

The town also spread outwards, partly to accommodate an increased population, but still more to make possible for the well-to-do of all communities a different style of living. Yap Ah Loy, and his contemporaries, had lived in the town centre; it

was convenient, safer, and they could oversee their commercial property against the risk of theft and arson. A visitor described Yap Ah Loy's house in 1877 as 'a fairly good loose board house occupied by the Capitan China, the most hospitable of men'.[22] Ah Loy entertained the Resident, and on one occasion the Sultan, and splendid hospitality it was. For his European guests he offered a choice of champagne and beer, and improvised spoons and forks by beating silver dollars into the required shape.[23] But his guests also complained of 'the intense heat, stuffiness and smells'.[24]

The new lifestyle was made possible by the roads over which pony traps (and rickshaws -- the poor man's taxi) could pass smoothly. Thus it became possible to live, in greater amenity, at a distance from the place of business. Official reports of 1886-1887 noted the 'villa residences, horses and carriages' of the towkays.[25] These suburban residences were built along the roads out of town, especially Ampang Road, where in later years millionaires had palatial houses, as much for show as occupation. Another select residential area was Batu Road (Jalan Raja Laut), which had a more mixed group of the well-to-do, including Raja Muda Sulaiman, and Indian and European businessmen, as well as Chinese.[26] There was a good deal of pretentious display. When, for example, Ah Yeok, leader of the Cantonese community and a member of the State Council, died in 1892 his coffin lay in state in his house under 'a magnificent pall of blue silk embroidered in gold.' A son of Yap Ah Loy drove through the town in a four-in-hand drag.[27]

The European residential quarter extended westwards around the fringe of the Lake Gardens, an area of 200 acres opened in 1889, perhaps the finest amenity bequeathed by 19th century Kuala Lumpur to its successors.[28] A network of suburban roads linked these houses, with their spacious compounds, gardens and stables, with the town, where the government offices were now grouped along the west bank of the river. In the central business district of the town shophouses became the standard structure. These had become a feature of all Malayan towns, in which town planning limited the size of building plots to a rectangle, with a narrow street frontage and greater depth; there was access to the rear, for nightsoil and rubbish removal and -- when necessary -- a fire engine. Building regulations required the occupier to set back his building so that there was space for a pavement ('the five-foot way') for pedestrians passing along the street. The building might project to the street frontage at first floor level (used for domestic accommodation), thus providing cover from rain for the path below. The pavement was often obstructed with the shopkeeper's goods, or by itinerant street traders who had set up their stalls. The front of a shophouse, especially the first and any higher floors, gave scope for decoration ('Chinese roccoco' etc.), often very attractive.[29]

The town with its congested central thoroughfares and expanding suburbs presented problems of public health, sanitation, traffic control, street lighting at night, and general municipal administration, which hardly arose -- on this scale at least -- in smaller towns and large villages. This situation led to the establishment, in 1890, of the Kuala Lumpur Sanitary Board, the first municipal body in the Malay states. The Board was required to provide, and to coordinate, public services such as street



Kuala Lumpur in 1895. Redrawn by K. M. Foong from a map prepared by the Federal Town Planning Department (1950). The coolie depot was a transit camp for newly arrived labourers.

cleaning and maintenance, building regulations, traffic control, urban policing and rudimentary town planning. Its members included prominent figures from local communities, so that the Board served as a means of consulting local opinion before official action was taken on matters which affected the lives and livelihoods of the population. In this respect the Board was a useful supplement to the State Council, established in 1877.[30]

A new spirit of civic interest was both the cause and the consequence of improving the urban environment. When, for example, the Lake Gardens were first laid out, Ah Yeok, the Cantonese leader, contributed one hundred white *chempaka* (frangipanni) and orange trees to the planting programme. Money was also found to plant trees along the sides of suburban roads. What had been the police parade ground was levelled and drained to make it the Padang (now Merdeka Square), for use as a cricket and sports ground and the scene of major public occasions such as the celebration of Queen Victoria's Jubilee in 1897.[31] There was also extensive drainage of swamps and other improvements along the low-lying east bank of the Klang River, when eventually -- in the early 1890's -- disputes between Yap Ah Loy's executors and the authorities over the claims of his estate to various plots had been resolved.[32]

A visitor to Kuala Lumpur in 1899 was taken shopping:- 'One after another we passed the pawnshops, where we caught glimpses of fascinating jewellery and curiosities of all sorts. "Hammer, hammer, hammer" resounded from the tin shops where the metal was being welded into all sorts and conditions of designs. Here, in front of a silk shop, a little shrivelled-up owner sat smoking his opium pipe; there outside a barber's were Chinese having their heads shaved and their ears cleaned with silver utensils'.[33]

There were grimmer scenes of squalor and overcrowding hidden behind the facades of the shops. In a Chinese community in which men outnumbered women by ten to one, brothels, with their dark and windowless cubicles, could not have been suppressed, and were in fact subject to a regime of licensing and medical inspection.[34] The same imbalance created lodging houses in which labourers sometimes shared the use of a bunk on a shift basis. Cohabitation of this kind encouraged mutual help in times of sickness and unemployment, but it strengthened the hold of the secret societies on the working class, despite official attempts at suppression. Although there was comparatively little local crime, the incursions of armed criminal gangs, under pressure in the Straits Settlements, occasionally led to a local crime wave.[35]

During the hard times of the late 1870's Yap Ah Loy had encouraged local production of foodstuffs in the zone around Kuala Lumpur to obtain substitutes for expensive imports, and this trend continued. The produce was brought in for sale in a flourishing market sited in what was afterwards known as Old Market Square (Medan Pasar), sited in front of his 'palatial residence' on the south side of the square.[36] In Yap Ah Loy's time the market stalls, housed in 'a very insecure shed', were all part of his commercial property. He obtained some $250--$300 pm in rents from stallholders, although (in 1882) 'the filth of the market is indescribable'.[37]

This became one of the key areas of pressure for improvement in the general clean-up of this period. Yap Ah Loy tenaciously maintained his claim to the market, but undertook to rebuild it, with a galvanised iron roof on brick pillars, but the result was far from satisfactory. It had been agreed that he should be treated as the owner of the market in his lifetime, but at his death it would become public property with compensation for his improvements. When he died (in 1885) his executors demanded $9,586.85 in compensation but eventually settled for $2,500.[38]

While the wrangle went on, a decision was taken to make the original market an open space and to build a new market with better prospects of maintaining hygienic conditions. The market on this site, rebuilt in 1936 and considerably modified in 1986 to make it a tourist attraction, still stands in Jalan Hang Kasturi (Rodger Street). As built in the 1880's it was 250' by 90', with a washable tiled floor on a concrete base, wooden walls and a corrugated iron roof.

Old Market Square had been the site of another of Yap Ah Loy's municipal monopolies, a gambling shed. Deeming abolition impracticable for the time being, the colonial authorities induced Yap Ah Loy to move this enterprise to another site. While it was still in Old Market Square a visitor in 1878 saw the original booth 'crowded with Chinamen earnestly engaged in the noble pastime'.[39] To round off this brief account of local monopolies, used as a means of raising revenue, there were exclusive rights of import of spirits and of opium, which under the new regime were let on contract to Yap Ah Loy and his partners as 'farmers'.

To keep the town clean it was necessary to remove the nightsoil and rubbish under a better system than prevailed in Yap Ah Loy's time, when it was left to householders to make their own arrangements -- often no more than throwing it into the street or the drains. The Sanitary Board inherited and improved a patchy collection service, and let a contract for a comprehensive collection by bullock cart, which 'made a transformation' of the town.[40]

Householders either drew their water from wells or from the river, both badly contaminated. The first stage in improving the situation was the installation of storage tanks in the market and at other central sites, supplied by the indispensable bullock carts from sources of clean water outside the town; the public could draw water from these tanks. At the new market there was a wash house, used by both sexes, for ablutions. The same storage tank provided water for sluicing down the floor of the market, in which meat as well as fruit and vegetables were sold.[41] In 1892 plans were made for the construction of a large reservoir in the hills, at Ulu Klang, where a river was dammed to make a reservoir. These works, and the laying of supply pipes to distribution reservoirs in the town were soon completed, but as late as 1904 many households still relied on local standpipes or deliveries by bullock cart into domestic tanks. Eventually a complete network provided piped water wherever needed.[42]

As the town grew, it became necessary to confine some activities to particular areas, ie a system of zoning of land use began. An area on the east bank of the Klang River below the town had the self-explanatory name of 'Brickfields', from the late 1870's when Yap Ah Loy had experimented with the manufacture of bricks and tiles

for local use and for export, in the hope of employing labourers more profitably than by work on the tin mines.[43] The railway goods yard and engineering works were located nearby, and in the 1890's the 'government factory' for the manufacture of building materials, to supply its growing construction programme, was also erected at Brickfields, which became the first industrial zone.[44] Piggeries, slaughterhouses, and lime kilns were confined to the same area. In the 1880's the first street lighting had been provided by coconut oil lamps on wooden posts along the streets. Then, in the 1890's, imported paraffin came into use for domestic and street lighting; the storage tanks were located in Brickfields to reduce the fire risk.[45] A less obvious problem was the overnight stabling of the bullocks and ponies which pulled the carts and carriages, to carry people and goods through the town. A compound (Kandang Kerbau - the cattle byre) was set aside, inevitably in Brickfields, and owners of draught oxen etc. were encouraged to build stables in the compound, to an approved design. In seeking approval for building projects, the applicant had to ask for express permission to include a stable, if that was his intention. It appears that substantial shops in the town, and of course houses in the suburbs, were permitted to have their own stables.[46]

The system of street maintenance, although improved in 1892, was essentially to spread laterite across the surface. Under heavy traffic this material crumbled, throwing up red dust especially in dry weather. Gangs of convicts, occasionally in chains, swept the streets and sometimes watered them to lay the dust. However the flow of traffic increased from year to year until, in 1896, the Sanitary Board professed itself unable to cope with traffic control. The situation was particularly acute at the northern exit from the railway goods yard, where men pulling rickshaws and handcarts put their heads down and surged uncontrollably into Market Street, just opposite the point at which the Straits Trading Company, the sole buyer of tin ore for export, had its premises.[47] Minor measures included the licensing of rickshaws and gharries, for which 'stands' were prescribed while awaiting a fare.

Within the environment of regulation described above each community followed its own way of life. From Yap Ah Loy's time the Chinese and the Malays had occupied separate 'quarters' of the town, to avoid disputes over Chinese piggeries etc. The Europeans, joined later by some well-to-do Asian leaders, lived at a distance. No one was looking for trouble, especially as the police seemed well prepared to deal with any disturbances. Everyone was more concerned with his own business than with the activities of strangers, unless these impinged on his existence. It was a sign of this attitude that each community celebrated its own festivals, had its own places of worship and, if there were children to be educated, sent them to be taught in their own language in their own schools.

The Chinese celebrated their New Year with processions along Petaling Street, in the heart of the Chinese quarter. If they needed supernatural aid, they tended to seek it in their temples. Different dialect groups, Hokkien, Hakka, Cantonese and so on, vied in the size, cost and appearance of a new temple. The Indians had the Hindu Mariamman temple in the High Street and later made a shrine in the Batu Caves, north of Kuala Lumpur, for the celebration of Thaipusam. In the Malay

quarter, at the northern end of the original village settlement, there was a mosque and a school, and in the triangle formed by the confluence of the Gombak and Klang Rivers, a Muslim cemetery. Attendance at the Anglican church on Sunday morning was more or less obligatory; the Resident was disposed to enquire if a junior official absented himself. The first church was in the main European residential area on Bluff Road, but in the mid 1890's a more substantial St Mary's Church (now Cathedral) was built to a nineteenth century Gothic design at the north end of the Padang.[48] Other Christian denominations, in particular the Roman Catholic and Methodist missions, had set up in Kuala Lumpur with the main purpose of making converts among the Asian communities (other than the Muslim Malays who did not welcome such attentions).

Recreation and sport however provided attractions which the communities began to share, thus drawing together. The European officials brought with them from their own country and from the Straits Settlements an inclination to gather in clubs, both for social occasions and to play organised games. The Selangor Club established in 1884 (where the church later stood) began in 'a plank building with an atap roof', though in 1890 it moved to more pretentious premises in the Tudor style, on the west side of the Padang (where it still stands). Here the members could play cricket, although the ground was rough and uneven.[49] In the early years it was not an exclusively European club, though the handful of Asian notables among its members did not often attend its gatherings. An old hand later wrote that 'racial distinctions were unknown here in the early days'.[50] For 'unknown' one should perhaps substitute 'not overtly expressed'; the situation changed rapidly around the turn of the century, as will be related in a later chapter. In the 1890's the State Treasurer played billiards with his chief clerk at the Selangor Club, which could not have happened later. The Selangor Golf Club was formed in 1893.

Cricket and golf remained unappealing mysteries to the Asian community until well into the present century. However association football ('soccer') and horse racing were an immediate attraction. Soccer made such an impact in Malay villages that a primary school had to have a soccer pitch if it was to maintain attendance figures at a satisfactory level. In Kuala Lumpur the Malay community, after some half-hearted beginnings, provided teams which played in fierce competition with European and other teams in the town league.

Horse racing, already well established in the towns of the Straits Settlements, appealed to Asian businessmen, who liked the prestige of owning and leading in winners, and still more the opportunity of a flutter on the gee-gees. The meetings of the Selangor Turf Club two or three times a year were the major inter-communal events of the annual calendar, drawing large attendances from all communities and classes. On race days the Kuala Lumpur branch of the Chartered Bank closed its business premises 'and took all their clerks etc. to the Turf Club and ran the betting part. Malay royalty and heads of the Chinese and Indian communities came to the European side being members of the club and owners of race horses...at 5 pm when the last race was run people strolled about the Padang to get good views of all the dresses....Tea with ice cream was served.'[51]

The Malay vernacular schools in the villages were the only government education service. Each of the main communities had at least one vernacular primary school in Kuala Lumpur. A new era began in 1893 with the foundation of the Victoria Institution, an English language secondary school for pupils of all communities. It had its origin and took its name from the celebration of Queen Victoria's Jubilee in 1887; the unexpended balance of the public subscriptions to fund the celebrations was, by general consent, made the nucleus of a new appeal fund to provide such a secondary school.[52] The Christian missions each set up their own secondary schools, to meet the demands and to attract the support of local communities.

It is instructive to compare the emergence of Kuala Lumpur as a major town with the situation in Perak where Taiping became the administrative capital c.1890, when the Resident moved his offices from the royal capital of Kuala Kangsar. Taiping (Larut) had been an important mining centre for fully as long as Kuala Lumpur, but it did not towards the end of the 19th century achieve the commercial momentum of Kuala Lumpur.

As Kuala Lumpur grew and developed it tended both to draw apart from the rest of Selangor in its unique character, and yet to draw Selangor with it in its commercial success. What had begun as an aggregate of different ethnic communities, each living in its own part of the town, gradually moved towards a measure, albeit very selective, of integration, especially among the official and commercial privileged minority.

When the Federated Malay States was established in 1896, Sultan Idris of Perak made strenuous efforts to secure for Kuala Kangsar the status of federal capital. If it had been a simple choice between the capital of Perak and of Selangor, he might have succeeded. However Kuala Lumpur, more centrally placed, better served by communications, equipped with more impressive buildings, and a major centre of commercial activity, was better suited to be a capital of the federation, providing economic momentum. By coincidence the new rubber industry was about to explode into frenetic progress and economic expansion, in which Selangor had a leading part.

Notes

1. In Perak each ruler chose a different capital from that of his predecessor. R. O. Winstedt, *The Malays: A Cultural History*, Kelly & Walsh, Singapore, 1947, p.53. He attributes 'the custom of vacating the palace of a dead king and starting a new capital' to pre-Hindu cultural traditions. A ruler might also move his capital; the last Malay Sultan of Malacca, driven out by the Portuguese in 1511 AD, eventually established his new capital at Johor Lama.
2. *SJ* 1, 1892, p.49 -- a comment probably by the editor, J.Russell, who was the Government Printer.
3. Bloomfield Douglas (Resident 1876-1882), often criticised by contemporaries and by historians as an overbearing administrator, was more assiduous in this practice than his successors, visiting Bandar Langat once a month or more. Although they did not make such frequent visits Swettenham (Resident 1882-1889) and Rodger, who deputised in Swettenham's lengthy absences, went down to discuss with the Sultan, and seek his consent to the negotiations to borrow money, a major new state liability, to finance the construction of the Klang-Kuala Lumpur railway (Chapter 6 Note 6).

Khoo Kay Kim, 'Raja Lumu/Sultan Salehuddin: the Founding of the Selangor Dynasty', *JMBRAS* 58(2), 1985, reprints from the *Malay Mail* of 6 November 1903 a lengthy description (probably by J.H.M. Robson, who owned and edited the newspaper) of the installation at Klang of Sultan Sulaiman and his consort in the presence of the Resident-General and other officials and of Malay dignitaries from Selangor and from other states. The funeral of the Sultan's predecessor was held at his capital, Bandar Langat, with a similar distinguished attendance. *SGG* 1898, pp.71-74.

4. The growth of Kuala Lumpur has been a special interest of the author of this history. J.M.Gullick, 'Kuala Lumpur 1880-1895', *JMBRAS* 28(4), 1955, reprinted Heritage of Malaysia Trust, Kuala Lumpur, 1988. J.M.Gullick, 'The Growth of Kuala Lumpur and of the Malay Community in Selangor before 1880', *JMBRAS* 63(1), 1990. J.M.Gullick, 'The Bangunan Sultan Abdul Samad', *JMBRAS* 65(1), 1992. J.M.Gullick, *The Story of Kuala Lumpur (1857-1939)*, Eastern Universities Press, Singapore, 1983. J.M.Gullick, *Old Kuala Lumpur*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1994 (with a preface which relates how the history of the town before 1880, almost unknown until 1951, was gradually discovered).

S.M.Middlebrook, 'Yap Ah Loy (1837-1885)', *JMBRAS* 24(2), 1951, was the pioneer in this field since he drew, for the first time, on Chinese traditions and memoirs. J.H.M.Robson, *Records and Recollections 1889-1934*, Kyle Palmer, Kuala Lumpur 1934, is the memoirs of the founder of the *Malay Mail* newspaper (in 1896); Robson spent most of the years from 1889 to 1942 in Kuala Lumpur, as a civil servant, editor and businessman. He begins his memoirs with a tour of the town as it was in 1889. The *Selangor Journal* ('*SJ*'), published fortnightly between 1892 and 1897, contains historical as well as contemporary material. G.T.Tickell, 'Early Days in Selangor (1888-89)', *British Malaya*, January-February 1928, are recollections of the author's first encounter with Kuala Lumpur, as District Officer; he was later an energetic but controversial Chairman of the Kuala Lumpur Sanitary Board early in this century. Stratton Brown (cited in Note 10) wrote of her recollections of the town when she first arrived in 1896; she was still in Kuala Lumpur in 1954. Butcher (cited in Note 49) offers a comprehensive account of European social life, especially at the turn of the century.

A number of geographers and other specialists in related subjects have published studies. Pao Chun Tsou, *Urban Landscape of Kuala Lumpur: A Geographical Survey*, Institute of Southeast Asia, Nanyang University, Singapore, 1967, provides technical information but also opinions and conclusions for which there is little supporting evidence. T.G.McGee, *The Urbanizarion Process in the Third World: Explorations in Search of a Theory*, G. Bell & Sons, London 1971, takes Kuala Lumpur as a specimen case but deals mainly with the period after the second world war. J.C.Jackson, 'Kuala Lumpur in the 1880's: The Contribution of Bloomfield Douglas', *JSEAH* 4(2), 1963, deals with the earliest, and largely unaccomplished, plans of British officials to regulate and develope the town immediately after 1880. Sarah Maxim, 'The Resemblance in External Appearance; the Colonial Project in Kuala Lumpur and Rangoon', unpublished PhD thesis, Cornell, 1992 (copy in the Library of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London) is based on thorough research of the archives of the early colonial period.

Pertubuhan Akitek Malaysia, *A Guide to Kuala Lumpur Notable Buildings*, Kuala Lumpur, 1976, illustrates and describes 71 buildings erected between 1880 and 1974. V.Chin and C.Hoffmann, *Kuala Lumpur Chinatown 1: A Walking Tour* is an annotated and illustrated map of outstanding calibre in its clarity and historical scholarship. Conventional tourist guides are too numerous to list. In forty years since independence (in 1957) there has been a complete change of street names; the text endeavours to link old and new names where appropriate.

There may well be unpublished student essays in the libraries of Malaysian universities, and there is certainly a mass of detailed material in the Selangor Secretariat files now held in the Arkib Negara in Kuala Lumpur; the annual reports (from 1890) of the Kuala Lumpur Sanitary Board and other public bodies are the primary archive sources.

In view of this abundance of source and published material, the author of this history, working within the constraints of a single chapter of a state history, has tried to identify and describe the

more important sociological and physical elements of the history of Kuala Lumpur in the last two decades of the 19th century.

5. Chapter 3 Note 31. Chapter 4 Notes 6, 11, 36, 37. Chapter 5 Notes 16, 17, 34. Chapter 6 Notes 4 and 43. Chapter 7 Notes 34-37. Middlebrook, op.cit.
6. The Malay quarter of Kuala Lumpur, north of Java Street (Jalan Tun Perak) had houses at the river bank, since they were built in Malay fashion on posts well above ground ie flood level. W.T.Hornaday, *Two Years in the Jungle: the Experiences of a Hunter and Naturalist in India, Ceylon, the Malay Peninsula and Borneo,* Scribner, New York, 1885, p.315, partly reprinted as *The Experiences of a Hunter and Naturalist in the Malay Peninsula and Borneo*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1993, p.25.
7. This anxiety was possibly based on episodes such as the attack on the isolated administrative post on Pangkor Island in 1878, and, much earlier, a major assault on Kuching, capital of Sarawak, in 1857. E.Innes, *The Chersonese with the Gilding Off,* 2 vols., Richard Bentley & Sons, London, 1885, vol. 2, chapters 5 and 6, and H.McDougall, *Sketches of Our Life at Sarawak,* Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, London, 1882, chapters 11 and 12, are vivid accounts by European women, each of whom narrowly escaped death in one of these episodes. Douglas was well aware of both stories since he had served in Sarawak and was a relative of Sir James Brooke, and Emily Innes had (in 1880) just returned to Selangor from Perak, with her husband (cited in Note 22) to resume her life at Bandar Langat.
8. The modern Jalan Sultan Hishamuddin runs more or less through the area formerly approached by Bluff Road, overlooking the Padang.
9. Gullick, *Growth of Kuala Lumpur,* p.28.
10. E. Stratton Brown, 'Looking Back at Selangor in the Nineties', *50 Years of Progress 1904-1954, Malay Mail Supplement*, 1954, on Rodger's tours of the town. Rodger, who had come to Selangor with Swettenham in 1882 as Commissioner of Lands, was a grandee (an old Etonian who owned a castle in Kent), but a kindly man who was generally well liked. For a hostile portrait R.O.Winstedt, *Start from Alif, Count from One - An Autobiographical Memoire*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1969, pp.44-46 (where Rodger, then Resident of Perak, is 'the Great One').
11. Jackson, *Kuala Lumpur*, pp.122-127, describes the first attempts at improving the layout of the town, in which the mining boom, which had begun in 1880, had much increased the problems of overcrowding and sanitation. Douglas put proposals to the State Council in 1881 and 1882, but by then events were in train which would cause the enforced retirement of Douglas in 1882. Governor Weld declined to approve these proposals, preferring that the next Resident (Swettenham) should tackle them. It is an open question whether Douglas could have implemented his scheme even if he had been given approval.
12. *AR Selangor 1881,* para 12. *AR Selangor 1882,* para 6.

    There are Selangor Secretariat files (Note 4) on the damage done by the fire, which was followed by another in August 1881. A.B.Rathborne, *Camping and Tramping in Malaya,* Swan Sonnenschein, London, 1898, pp.108-109, for an account of the panic and looting resulting from a major fire. The unpublished diary of Bloomfield Douglas has passages (especially 23 December 1881) on the flood. Yap Ah Loy refused to evacuate his 'fine new house' as the water level rose, and tried to keep the water out -- but without success -- by constructing a dyke. The water swept in and buried much valuable property, including a new billiard table still in its packing case.
13. SSD 27 October 1882.
14. By the end of 1884 234 houses had been rebuilt (or newly built), and another 218 in 1885, with 159 in 1886. *AR Selangor 1884--1886.*
15. The new government offices built in Bluff Road in 1884 cost $30,000. *AR Selangor 1885,* para 46.
16. Gullick *Kuala Lumpur 1880--1895,* p.40.
17. SSD 15 March 1886. In 1887 there were 33 brickfields and 16 lime kilns around Kuala Lumpur, and mechanical sawing of jungle logs was replacing sawpits with hand-pulled saws. *AR Selangor 1888.*
18. *AR Selangor 1888,* and Gullick, *Kuala Lumpur 1880--1895,* p.43. The annual reports of the fire brigade were published in SGG, and there are references to it in SJ.

19. On the first stages of straightening the river *AR Selangor 1887* and *1888*. There were further cuts in the early 1890's to accommodate the railway goods yard and engineering workshops. After the great flood of December 1926 had inundated much of the centre of the town (R.J.H.Sidney, *In British Malaya Today,* Hutchinson, London, n.d., chapters 21 and 22)) a major work (the Lornie Cut) straightened the channel below the town.
20. Chapter 6, Notes 5--9 and 43.
21. Gullick, *Bangunan Sultan Abdul Samad,* on the problems and controversies. C.E.Spooner (Chapter 6 Note 8) made his mark on Kuala Lumpur by this and other buildings, such as the General Post Office and the Town Hall (*Bandaraya*). He had begun his career as a railway engineer, and eventually left his post as State Engineer, Selangor, c.1900, to take up the new post of General Manager, EM.S. Railways; here he pushed through the integration of state railway systems in central Malaya and linked them with Penang, and eventually with Singapore, to create the west coast railway network. He died in office in 1909.
22. J.Innes, 'Selangor Past and Present', *SJ* 3, 1894, p.7. He had served in Selangor between 1876 and 1881, and had visited Kuala Lumpur c.1877; he was the husband of Emily Innes (Note 7)

    'More pretentious and more solidly built' than the general mass of 'thatched hovels.' F.A.Swettenham, *Footprints in Malaya,* Hutchinson, London, 1942, p.21 (describing Yap Ah Loy's previous house in 1872). In 1875 Swettenham made his second visit to Kuala Lumpur (see Map 6). After an arduous journey he found Yap Ah Loy's house 'a palatial residence....with (almost) all the luxuries of civilized life.' F.A.Swettenham, *Sir Frank Swettenham's Malayan Journals 1874-1876,* ed. P.L.Burns and C.D.Cowan, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1975, p.219.
23. Swettenham, *Journal,* loc. cit., and *Footprints,* loc. cit. Hornaday (op. cit., p.316 (and reprint p.26)) discovered a shop in Kuala Lumpur in 1878 where he could buy champagne and other European food and drink at remarkably cheap prices.
24. Bloomfield Douglas, op.cit., entry for 7 May 1879. On that occasion the noise of a Chinese *wayang* (theatre) made sleep impossible until the small hours. Apart from the risk of fire and the drains clogged with filth, Yap Ah Loy had his piggeries at the back of his house.
25. *AR Selangor 1886* and *1887*.
26. Stratton Brown, op.cit., Anon, *Twelve under Fours,* Selangor Golf Club, p.2.
27. *SJ* 1, 1892, p.81 (Ah Yeok). SSD 20 May 1889. Yap Ah Loy's son was notoriously extravagant and by 1920 the inherited fortune had been dissipated. A drag is a light carriage, with seats inside and out, used to take sportsmen out shooting etc.
28. Gullick, *Kuala Lumpur 1880--1895,* pp.1--2, describes how A.R.Venning, then State Treasurer but formerly a Ceylon planter, laid out the gardens partly as an amenity and partly for botanical trials. In later years the residence of the Resident-General (Carcosa built in 1897) and of the High Commissioner (King's House built in 1913) overlooked the Lake Gardens, and the Lake Club stood nearby. Since Merdeka (1957) the National Memorial and the Parliament building have been built in the gardens.
29. Jon H. S. Lim, 'Shophouse Rafflesia', *JMBRAS* 66(1), 1993, and Gullick, *Old Kuala Lumpur* (which has some illustrations of shophouse frontages).
30. The members, official and unofficial, were appointed by the Resident for a year at a time, but were usually reappointed for another term. The public works, health and police departments were represented by their heads. In the early years the chairman was A.R.Venning (Note 28) whose flair for environmental improvement contributed to the success of the Board. The minutes of meetings of the Board, and its annual reports were published in *SGG*, and are a mine of information. Much of the later passages of Gullick, *Kuala Lumpur 1880--1895,* is drawn from these sources, and from *SJ*.
31. Anon ('Thesaurius'), 'The Public Gardens', *SJ* 2, 1893, p.9. The *non-de-plume* identifies the author as Venning (State Treasurer and Chairman of the Sanitary Board). The annual reports of the Public Gardens Committee (inevitably Venning was its chairman) were published in *SGG.*

    AR Selangor 1892, and the annual reports of the Sanitary Board on the levelling and draining of the Padang. Here the moving spirit was E.W.(later Sir Ernest) Birch (ag, Resident 1892-1893) who was a keen cricketer.

32. Gullick, *Kuala Lumpur 1880--1895,* pp.42 and 84.
33. E. Douglas Hume, *The Globular Jottings of Griselda* William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh, 1907, p.54, recording her impressions during a visit (to stay with her brother, a government official) in 1899.
34. Gullick, *Kuala Lumpur 1880--1895*, p.95, drawing on reports in Sel Sec files and Sanitary Board minutes. J.F.Warren, *Ah Ku and Karayuki-San -- Prostitution in Singapore 1870--1940*, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1993, describes the complexities of the problem and the vacillations of official policy on prostitution in a similar, though much larger and more cosmopolitan, community. *Mutatis mutandis* Warren's account is probably applicable to Kuala Lumpur (and other larger towns of the Peninsula).
35. J. F. Warren, *Rickshaw Coolie: A People's History of Singapore (1880--1940)*, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1986, is another excellent study of working class urban life, applicable to conditions in Kuala Lumpur.

    On crime Gullick, *Kuala Lumpur 1880--1895,* pp.86--88, and J.M.Gullick, 'Syers and the Selangor Police 1875-1897', *JMBRAS* 51(2), 1978, revised and reprinted in *Glimpses of Selangor 1860-1898*, MBRAS Monograph 25, 1993; see especially pp. 64f and 76f of the 1993 reprint.
36. Chapter 7 Note 36 and Note 22 above.
37. Gullick, *Kuala Lumpur 1880--1895,* p.42, drawing on Sel Sec files.
38. Ibid. and *AR Selangor 1887,* para 52.
39. Hornaday, loc. cit. in Note 6.
40. *AR Selangor 1890.* In 1893 the contract for this service was let for the modest charge of $18 pm. *AR Kuala Lumpur Sanitary Board 1893.*
41. *AR Kuala Lumpur Sanitary Board 1890* and *1892*, on wells and bathhouses. Gullick, *Kuala Lumpur 1880--1895,* p.73, quotes a horrific report on the water used in the three bakeries of the town (from *SGG* 1890, 16 May 1890).
42. H. C. Paxon, 'Some Notes on Kuala Lumpur Water Supply', *SJ* 2, 1893, pp.42-45, is an informative account of the project by the engineer in charge of it. Anon, 'Opening of the Waterworks,' *SJ* 4, pp.271-4, reports the speeches, which contain additional detail. Ng Seo Buck, 'Recollections of Kuala Lumpur Fifty Years Ago', *MHJ* 1(1), 1954, p.31, on conditions in 1904.
43. Report dated 6 March 1879 by F.A.Swettenham, printed in C2410, and quoted in Gullick, *Growth of Kuala Lumpur,* p.23.
44. *AR Selangor 1892,* para 197. *AR Public Works Department Selangor 1893--1895.*
45. Minutes of the Kuala Lumpur Sanitary Board, 3 August 1893, *SGG* 1893. There was inconclusive discussion at this time of the possibility of a hydro-electric plant (on the Klang River) to supply electricity, but (Chapter 10 below) there was no town electricity supply until 1905.
46. In 1891 the Sanitary Board issued licenses for 906 bullock carts and 44 hand carts. *AR Kuala Lumpur Sanitary Board 1891.* The minutes and annual reports contain numerous references to the control of livestock and the erection of stables. Bullocks, for example, had to have a wooden bar across the tips of their horns, for the safety of other road users. *AR Kuala Lumpur Sanitary Board 1894.*
47. *AR Kuala Lumpur Sanitary Board 1895* and *1896.*
48. Gullick, *Kuala Lumpur 1880--1895,* pp.104-108, for more detail.
49. Ibid., p.111. Anon, 'The Selangor Club', *SJ* 1, 1892, p.37, for an account of its early history. J.G.Butcher, *The British in Malaya 1880--1941 - The Social History of a European Community in Colonial South-East Asia,* Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1979 (index entries under 'Clubs, social'), gives a more comprehensive account.
50. Robson, op.cit., p.50. The Lake Club, founded in 1890, confined its membership to the upper crust of European society by setting its fees at a level which less well-paid Europeans could not afford. In 1952 however Sir Gerald Templer, then High Commissioner, indicated that until the club opened its membership to Asians, he would not attend its functions; the walls of Jericho crashed with a bang. D.J.M.Tate, *The Lake Club 1890--1990,* Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1990.

51. Stratton Brown, op.cit., 'Padang' here means the racecourse in front of the stands. Gullick, *Old Kuala Lumpur,* p.42, has a contemporary photograph.
52. There had been a small 'Raja School' for the sons of Malay aristocrats since 1890. The leaders of the other communities asked the Resident (W.H.(later Sir William) Treacher) for a similar school for their sons. The Raja School, which had not flourished, was merged in the Victoria Institution, under a new headmaster. Until the 1920's the VI was an independent school under the control of trustees; it then became a government school. Gullick, *Kuala Lumpur 1880--1895,* pp.101-104.

    Miss Edith Stratton (later Mrs Stratton Brown, cited in Note 51 and other notes) was the first headmistress of a short-lived government secondary school for girls. It was a project born before there was general acceptance of the need to educate girls. The school closed and its premises were transferred for use as a mission school.

Chapter Nine

A Troubled Dynasty

Sultan Abdul Samad came to the throne of Selangor in 1857, when he had passed his fiftieth birthday. His accession provoked such resentment that he had fears of assassination which haunted him, long after he had passed into calmer waters.[1] No one would then have predicted that he would reign for 41 years (1857-1898), live to the age of 93, and die in his bed, a kindly and venerated ruler, who seems to have earned the genuine loyalty of his subjects and the affectionate respect of British officials who, since 1875, had governed Selangor in his name.

Unheroic realism led him to avoid taking sides in the turbulent power struggle which led to the civil war of 1867-1873. 'Each party in turn and each individual leader made periodical visits to the old Sultan, complained bitterly of the other side....to all comers from whatever quarter, the Sultan seemed always to signify his approval.'[2] He also detached himself from the act of piracy which led to British intervention in 1874 and from the final spasm of Malay resistance in 1875, while tolerating the presence of Raja Mahdi near his capital.[3] Thereafter the Sultan was, or at least professed to be, content that eccentric foreigners relieved him of the burden of government.[4]

Towards his sons and other close kinsmen the Sultan's attitude ranged from indifference -- they must look after themselves -- to exasperation, if they annoyed him or drew their political allowances without making themselves useful in some way. This was particularly evident in his dealings with his eldest son, and heir apparent, Raja Muda Musa. Like his father, Musa is not an easy character to read from a distance of more than a century after his death. His failure to maintain his authority at Kuala Selangor during the civil war suggests that he was ineffectual.[5] Douglas found him 'a dour sort of fellow but sharp enough in some matters'.[6] He was strict in his observance of Islamic rules of conduct, and on occasion wore the garb of a returned pilgrim to Mecca although he had not made the pilgrimage.[7] He also said that, on becoming Sultan, he would 'drive the white men into the sea', although he took no part in the cabals and manoeuvres of 1875.[8] The only lay activity in which Musa exerted himself was agriculture, but here he made rather a mess of it.[9] When Musa died, at the age of 43, in July 1884, the Sultan 'did not seem in low spirits'.[10] It is not uncommon for a monarch and his son and heir to live apart, if not at odds with each other. However Musa's death, although it removed a man who had not wielded power or influence in his lifetime, did create a problem. The Sultan was then almost 80 years old and there was now no obvious or unchallengeable heir to

the throne. Yet this vacuum does not seem to have caused concern, either in court or in official circles.

One possible explanation is that British officials underestimated the Sultan's age by ten years or more.[11] However among Malay Rajas there were some interested parties who raised the question -- who would now become Raja Muda.[12] The title 'Raja Muda' denotes a deputy or assistant ruler rather than an heir apparent.[13] Nonetheless the Raja Muda, by virtue of his office, did have stronger claims to succession than anyone else, when the throne fell vacant.[14] There was no binding rule, such as primogeniture, for determining the priority of claims of rival candidates, who comprised -- in theory at least -- all male descendants of any previous ruler, but the Raja Muda had a head start, unless too old or too young, or otherwise personally not a strong candidate.[15] It was likely that the British would prevent the turbulence of a power struggle and at least acquiesce in the succession of a suitable Raja Muda.[16]

Among the Sultan's sons and grandsons, Raja Sulaiman, elder son of the late Raja Muda Musa, was the favourite candidate, but in 1884 he was 21 and deemed still too young for immediate elevation to his father's office. He did become Raja Muda in 1887 but in the meantime there was a vacuum which may have raised the hopes of some older Rajas.[17] When Sultan Abdul Samad had acceded in 1857 he was no more than the nephew (and son-in-law) of his predecessor, and the grandson of a former Sultan. Hence Raja Mahmud, the celebrated warrior of the civil war, might base his claims on precedent. He was related to Sultan Abdul Samad through his father, and was (probably) a great grandson of Sultan Ibrahim. Moreover he was a friend and protege of Swettenham, the incumbent Resident.[18] It appears that Raja Mahmud was, or regarded himself as, the leading contender outside the Sultan's direct descendants for the post of Raja Muda.[19] Apart from his prowess in the war he now held a position of considerable dignity as penghulu of Kuala Selangor (from 1882), which had once been the royal capital.[20] His father held the post of Tunku Panglima Raja, which was now an honorific title rather than an executive office, was a member of the State Council and a confidant of the Sultan.[21]

Mahmud's hopes were to be disappointed, and there are signs that this setback caused a personal crisis. Early in 1887, while the post of Raja Muda of Selangor was still vacant, Hugh Clifford was sent as British agent to the court of the still independent state of Pahang. Raja Mahmud accompanied him as commander of his bodyguard and Malay adviser.[22] Mahmud may have found Pekan a congenial return to an environment of intrigue and violence. Then disaster struck. His father, with whom he had strong ties of affection, died of natural causes in Selangor, and at about the same time the coveted position of Raja Muda was given to the Sultan's grandson, Raja Sulaiman.[23] However on Mahmud's return to Selangor there were substantial consolations; he succeeded his father as Tunku Panglima Besar and as a member of the State Council. A man of more stable temperament and wiser judgement might have built on this base to become in time perhaps the leading member of Sulaiman's court circle when he acceded.[24] As it was, Mahmud soon showed his lack of politi-

cal acumen by becoming involved in a dispute, and open conflict with the colonial regime, over a matter in which he had no direct personal interest, probably being the tool of others. It was the more serious because Swettenham had now been replaced as Resident by William Maxwell.[25]

The ostensible dispute was over the appointment of a Capitan China following the death of Yap Ah Shak.[26] There was rivalry within the Chinese community. Yap Ah Shak, and Yap Ah Loy before him, came from the largest and most powerful group, the Hakka Chinese. The leading Hakka candidate was Yap Kwan Seng, of the same clan though not related to his predecessors, but the Cantonese headman, Cheow Ah Yeok, was a respected and influential figure (probably a secret society leader like the previous Hakka Capitans). The rivalry between Hakkas and Cantonese went back a generation; more recently Hokkien towkays had come in from Penang with expectations of achieving the preeminence to which they were accustomed in the Straits Settlements. In the official view a choice had to be made between Yap Kwan Seng and Cheow Ah Yeok, but the Sultan was said to favour Yap Hon Chin, son of Yap Ah Loy but something of a lightweight in the contest. Raja Muda Sulaiman was believed to have promised the Sultan that he would support the appointment of Yap Hon Chin. Maxwell decided in favour of Yap Kwan Seng, on the grounds that he would be a more effective Capitan China, and intermediary between the government and the Chinese community as a whole, than anyone else. Mahmud apparently saw an opportunity of making mischief between the Sultan and Raja Muda Sulaiman, over the latter's failure to fight to the bitter end for Yap Hon Chin. The masterful Maxwell could not induce Mahmud to acquiesce in his decision, and thereafter persuaded the Sultan to the informal banishment of Mahmud from Selangor and his removal from the offices which he held. Although the breach between Mahmud and Raja Muda Sulaiman was eventually healed, Mahmud did not return to reside permanently in Selangor for more than twenty years, and did not re-enter public life until 1916, as will be related in this chapter.[27]

The new Raja Muda had a much easier relationship with his grandfather, the Sultan, than his father, Raja Muda Musa, had had. Despite a gap of almost sixty years in age and a marked difference both in temperament and lifestyle, they worked together harmoniously for some ten years.[28] Sulaiman was a quiet, serious and likeable man, though lacking firmness in dealing with his troublesome family. He had been born in 1866 and as a young boy had been a pupil at the Raffles Institution for three years, when his father, Raja Muda Musa, had withdrawn to Singapore after losing his hold on Kuala Selangor in the civil war. Twenty years later, as a young married man Sulaiman went back to school, becoming a pupil at the short-lived (1890-1893) Raja School at Kuala Lumpur.[29] He and other pupils of the School boarded with Raja Bot, in his house on the Batu Road in Kuala Lumpur. This period was probably the beginning of the close ties which led to Raja Bot becoming the confidant of Sultan Sulaiman when he acceded to the throne in 1898. In the mid 1890's Sulaiman continued to visit Kuala Lumpur and to occupy a house of his own, also on the Batu Road.[30]

Apart from his own studies, which included Islamic subjects, Raja Sulaiman

took an active interest in Malay education, especially schools for Malay girls. Under his auspices a Malay girls' school was opened at Bandar Langat in 1895. It offered instruction in the Koran, reading and writing, weaving, sewing, knitting and other needlework, and cookery. In addition to a financial subsidy Sulaiman arranged for the girls to be taken to and from school in a covered bullock-cart, to reassure anxious parents that their daughters would not be exposed to contact with those fascinating objects, Malay boys.[31]

Sulaiman was a devout but progressive Muslim. In later years he was described as 'an authority on the Koran and Mohamedan law...he has himself written and published a large number of religious books which are in daily use in the Malay schools -- the only Malay Sultan in the Peninsula who is an author. It is due to his initiative that schoolmasters have undertaken a religious education, which was formerly confined to the learning of the Koran in Arabic.'[32] One of his earliest efforts in this field was a pamphlet making proposals for the reform and codification of Islamic law on matrimonial subjects, on which he held traditional rather than advanced views.[33]

He was also influential in the institutional changes of the mid-1880's by which a state *kadhi*, and an assistant, were appointed for the first time in Selangor to provide a link, and some degree of supervision, between the *imam* of more or less autonomous mosque congregations and the Sultan as temporal head of the Muslim community of the state.[34]

The agricultural legacy to the Raja Muda from his father has already been mentioned.[35] Years later, when there was federal legislation to set aside land for padi cultivation and to establish Malay Reservations, Sultan Sulaiman is found -- active, concerned, but as ever not very effective.[36]

Like his father and his grandfather, he could use his hands. He became a skilled wood carver 'who carved the ornamental wood-work and extracts from the Koran which can be seen at the top of the *mimba*, the pulpit in the mosque from which he on occasion preaches to his people.'[37] He also drew the designs for other craftsmen engaged on the embellishment of the mosque. His most ambitious project was the design for a new royal *istana* in Kuala Lumpur. It was to be a spacious complex of six buildings, surrounded by a walled enclosure and including offices and quarters for members of the household of various degrees and also accommodation for European guests.[38] In this scheme old Sultan Abdul Samad was content to allow his grandson, and some equally eager officials, to indulge their fancies for 'a stately pleasure dome' which he had no intention of ever occupying. It was never built.[39]

Like some other Malay royal personages at the turn of the century Sulaiman was a bridge between the traditional lifestyle of a Malay court, which his grandfather personified, and western innovations which were being selectively adopted. Sulaiman, for example, often appeared in public wearing a suit but added to it a sarong around his midriff as Malay decorum required.[40] He seems to have mixed unobtrusively in European social activity in Kuala Lumpur, and we hear of him, taking his wife, who shared his tastes in this respect, to a circus performance at Klang. When he had accompanied his grandfather, in 1879, on the momentous royal visit to Kuala

Lumpur, the party came up from Bandar Langat to Klang at the commencement of the journey. Here the daughters of Bloomfield Douglas introduced Sulaiman to tennis. Years later, in 1897, he 'laid out a tennis lawn' at the Malay school at Kuala Langat 'and intends teaching the boys the game'.[41]

During the final years of Sultan Abdul Samad's reign Sulaiman spent a good deal of time at the royal capital, in which he had grown up, both to superintend his own ventures and to assist the Sultan in receiving European visitors. If the visitor was important, the Governor for example, he was received at the landing stage by Rajas Kahar and Abunusah, the Sultan's sons, and then 'when about half way [to the istana] he will be met by the Raja Muda, dressed in European fashion but with sarong added, with him most probably will be 40 or 50 followers all dressed in their best, who fall in behind'.[42] There were less formal but useful services too such as resolving the problems created by the Sultan's unruly herd of buffaloes.[43] On another occasion, the celebration of Hari Raya at the istana, the programme was 'arranged by the Raja Muda' and the Sultan took his seat 'looking quite pleased and cheerful'.[44] A new mosque was built near the istana in 1897 which had 'inside a nicely carved chair surmounted on both sides with two tattered banners from Mecca' and on the outside wall a plaque recording that the decorations of the building had been arranged by the Raja Muda, and that the Sultan had formally inaugurated the building for worship.[45] There is no mention of any disagreement between Sultan and Raja Muda. The old Sultan was probably pleased to have a congenial grandson and heir apparent to help him through the peaceful years at the end of a long and sometimes stressful life.

Unfortunately for Raja Muda Sulaiman his own reign would be almost as long (just 40 years) but clouded at intervals to the end (in 1938) by family and financial problems. This quiet, conscientious and pious man was to be notable for his 'attention to detail', his good works and his 'abstemious life' but the family genes were likely to produce relatives of a different character. Apart from family matters he lived beyond his income which, according to Micawber's financial principles, was 'result misery'. The Sultan however could be a shade more philosophical since, when the crisis threatened to get out of hand, his state government baled him out. Family worries were less easy to deal with.[46]

His troubles began when, in March 1891, he married his cousin, Raja (more often Tunku) Mahrum, daughter of Tunku Kudin of Kedah and of Raja Arfah, daughter of Sultan Abdul Samad.[47] The wedding at Klang was a splendid affair. The Selangor police band led the bridgroom's procession, in which a 'yellow silk umbrella of state' and a dowry of $1,000 in silver was carried on four large brass trays lined with yellow cloth. After these emblems of royalty came '25 Malay ladies of rank....Rajas, Elders, Penghulus, Imams, Hajis and others, numbering 700 people.' On arrival at the Klang residence of the bride's father ' the party was received by Raja Kahar, the uncle of the bride and other Rajas and Chiefs.'[48] Europeans sometimes referred to the bride as 'a beautiful princess' -- she must have been strikingly handsome.[49] She may have inherited her good looks from her mother, Raja Arfah, whom Emily Innes had sourly described as 'a tolerably good-looking woman for a

Malay'. Apart from looks she had her mother's temperament, wilful and passionate.[50] She must also have had a difficult childhood since her parents were an ill-matched couple, often at loggerheads. When Tunku Kudin left Selangor to return to Kedah in 1878, Raja Arfah accompanied him but found the rather western lifestyle of Alor Star, exemplified in her husband, utterly uncongenial. She soon gave up the struggle and returned to live with her father at Langat, where she died, an embittered figure held in awe by the Malays, in 1896.[51] Tunku Mahrum had no difficulty in accommodating the semi-western lifestyle of her father and her husband, but she shared the objections, growing among Malay women of her time, to polygamous marriage.[52] However for the first seven years (1891-1898) that situation did not arise in her marriage to Raja Sulaiman, though one senses -- from what followed -- that although Tunku Mahrum was a chaste and dutiful wife, there was no strong bond of affection in the union.

The young newly weds settled at Klang, which offered more amusements than the rural backwater of Bandar Langat. Sulaiman seems to have been away from home a good deal, on duty visits to his grandfather or educational and social activities in Kuala Lumpur.[53] Tunku Mahrum appears occasionally in the record of the time. In 1896, for example, when the district officer visited the Malay girls' school at Klang which her husband, ever concerned about female education, had established, it was Tunku Mahrum who received him and showed him the pupils' handiwork.[54] Her only son, Tunku Musa'eddin, was born in 1893, and a sequence of four daughters followed. She had done her duty and produced for her husband a male heir, as she pointed out later.

In 1898 a new chapter began for the royal couple with the death of Sultan Abdul Samad and the accession of Sulaiman, who soon became immersed in matters which had been held in abeyance during the reign of his predecessor.[55] As we have seen Sultan Abdul Samad lived in real fear of assassination fearing that when his enemies came close to him in making their obeisance at court ceremonies, they would seize the opportunity to strike him down.[56] There had been no formal installation and, so it appears, very few other court ceremonies.[57] As court offices fell vacant on the death of the holder, no replacement was appointed. Apart from the lack of court officials in 1898, there were said to be no regalia (*kebesaran*) such as were required at an installation. The story was that in the reign of Sultan Mohamed (1826-1857) a muslim zealot, Sheikh Abdul Ghani, had descended on Selangor, like a Malay Savonarola, to impose a brief period of puritanical extremism, including the destruction of the regalia as fool's baubles.[58]

In preparation for his installation -- the first since 1826 -- Sultan Sulaiman appointed eight *orang besar*, whose elaborate induction into office at Jugra in October 1898 was a curtain-raiser to what was to follow. The Sultan arrived 'in a yellow-painted dog-cart, with a syce in charge, the gorgeousness of whose livery beggars description'. The new *orang besar* were 'all dressed alike in dark blue and gold Malay dress and all wore krises'. A herald read out a proclamation and the officers swore allegiance, making formal obeisance (*sembah*) in the council chamber.[59]

Raja Bot had been prominent at this impressive occasion, and he was also des-

patched to Riau, the original Bugis power base in Malaya, to undertake some research into the proper ceremonial for the installation of a Selangor ruler of Bugis descent, since no one now alive could remember what had been done in 1826 and earlier occasions. Craftsmen were set to work to make some splendid -- and expensive -- new regalia.

In the eyes of many Selangor aristocrats Raja Bot, whose father and grandfather had come from Riau, was an interloper -- though his mother had been a daughter of Sultan Mohamed. He had also fallen out with Sultan Abdul Samad, and with the colonial regime, by opposing the cession of his patrimonial fief of Lukut to Sungei Ujong under the frontier adjustment of 1880.[60] His rise to a position of influence with the new Sultan may, as suggested above, have begun when the latter was lodging with him in Kuala Lumpur as a pupil at the Raja School in the early 1890's.[61] Even at the time of Sultan Abdul Samad's funeral it was remarked that as 'chief friend and adviser' of the next ruler, Raja Bot was 'not exactly *persona grata* to sons of Sultan Mohamed'.[62] There was nothing inherently controversial in a Malay ruler having a confidant and adviser in the court circle. In the previous reign Tunku Panglima Raja Berkat, brother-in-law of Sultan Abdul Samad, had filled such a role until his death in 1887.[63] It behoves a royal favourite to show becoming modesty, but Raja Bot did not have it in his nature to do this. On the contrary he earned the official verdict that he was 'a busybody, well-meaning perhaps...the Sultan's principal adviser. . .and sadly wanting in discretion'.[64] It is of course an indication of the new Sultan's lack of self-confidence that he relied, for some years at least, on a man such as Raja Bot. As will be seen, personal failings as much as unpopularity were Raja Bot's undoing. In the context of these tensions, the new Sultan was advised to appoint Raja Laut to the post of Raja Muda which he had vacated on his accession to the throne. It may have been a move to forestall the rivalries which had occurred over the selection of a successor to Raja Muda Musa in the 1880's. Raja Laut (so-named because he had been born at sea) was one of those sons of Sultan Mohamed whose dislike of Raja Bot was so evident, and in elevating him to become Raja Muda a gesture had been made to placate Raja Bot's critics. Raja Laut was considerably older than the new ruler, whose only son (in 1898) was about five years old. Hence it might be anticipated that Raja Laut would die before the Sultan, creating a vacancy again at a time when the Sultan's eldest son was of an age to fill the position of Raja Muda. If this was the calculation, it was neatly fulfilled by the death of Raja Laut in 1913.

The official line was that Raja Laut's appointment as Raja Muda was a mere compliment to a senior member of the royal dynasty, and without political significance. There was no formal installation ceremony such as might have been expected.[65] In all this one may detect the hand of Swettenham, who was then (1899) Resident-General FMS. It had long been his practice to make use of Malay aristocrats as a source of information, and occasionally as a means of indirect intervention at Malay courts.[66] In this fashion Swettenham had apparently found Raja Laut useful in the past.[67]

Although there was no ceremony, Raja Laut's appointment had been quietly

promulgated in 1898. The protests began in 1903 when the long-delayed installation of Sultan Sulaiman included a suitable and prominent role for Raja Laut as the mightiest of the monarch's subjects.[68] When this became apparent there were vehement objections that Raja Laut's position as Raja Muda was a 'secret appointment by British officials' and invalid because he had not be ceremonially installed. The objectors were said to be 'major chiefs' (unidentified in the record though no doubt well known). Their weakness was that, unlike the 1936 succession crisis (Chapter 11), they were on this occasion facing the united front of royal authority and colonial dictate. Hence they failed to get the appointment set aside.[69] The indignation of the protestors may well have been further inflamed when Raja Laut accepted an official invitation to review the performance of the Selangor penghulus, many of whom were of the raja class.[70] The ill-feeling seems to have lingered on until the death of Raja Laut in 1913 removed its cause. To the end the colonial regime recognised Raja Laut as Raja Muda.[71]

To revert to the beginning of the century, the preparations for installing a Sultan normally took a year or two and there was a wish to outdo similar ceremonies in other states. The interval of five years (1898- 1903) between accession and installation in this case was unusual. It arose from the fact that the Sultan's consort, Tunku Ampuan Mahrum, had a prominent part to play in the ceremony which for some time she declined to undertake, being seriously estranged from her husband.[72] Until his accession in 1898 the new Sultan had remained monogamous. It is unlikely that Sultan Abdul Samad, who had at least two wives, would have objected in principle to his grandson's second marriage, but he may have been opposed to his choice of partner. At all events, soon after his accession, Sultan Sulaiman married a second wife who came from a respectable but non-aristocratic family at Klang.[73] Again, one can find contemporary precedents, such as Sultan Idris of Perak, who had married seven wives at different times, and in his later years treated one of the three wives of that time, who was not of aristocratic birth, as his closest partner.[74]

In a vain attempt to mollify Tunku Mahrum, Sultan Sulaiman quit the royal istana at Klang and went to live at Jugra, in Kuala Langat, with his new wife. However Tunku Mahrum also departed, leaving the empty splendours of the new istana in the care of disconsolate court officials. She went off to join her father, Tunku Kudin of Kedah, who was living in some state -- though in voluntary exile from Kedah -- in Georgetown on Penang island.[75] Perhaps to avoid gossip in the mixed circles in which he moved at Georgetown, Kudin arranged for his daughter to live in privacy in one of his fine mansions situated at Tanjong Dawai in south Kedah. Here Tunku Mahrum gave birth, in February 1899, to her fifth child (and fourth daughter).

After an interval of some months Sultan Sulaiman sent a letter, by hand of the indispensable Raja Bot, inviting his wife to return under the escort of Raja Bot. Tunku Kudin, who had had more than one wife at a time, evidently found his daughter's presence an embarassment and was probably shrewd enough to see that she risked losing her position as a royal wife altogether. But she was deaf to his advice also. Then the Sultan came to see his new daughter, but his efforts to per-

suade his wife to return with him also failed. Finally, in 1901, the Sultan sent a peremptory letter to his wife, bidding her to return, with the implied threat of divorce if she again refused. To avoid the risk of another humiliating rebuff to an envoy of high status, this letter was brought by a Selangor court official, and historian, Mohamed Amin.[76] Amin did not immediately deliver the letter but sent his own sister to warn Tunku Mahrum that, unless she yielded, the ultimatum must come.

In finally giving way the defiant Tunku Ampuan was able to demonstrate that she would not be rushed. A party of Selangor dignitaries arrived at Penang to escort her back. She first took them on to Alor Star, escorted by her half-brother, Tunku Bahadur, son of Tunku Kudin and an intimate of her cousin, the Sultan of Kedah. On arriving at the Kedah capital she was received by the Sultan, and had an audience with his formidable mother, Mak Wan Besar. She also visited the tombs of her Kedah forbears at Kota Langgar. When she had made the point that she was coming back on her own terms, she made a splendid re-entry into Selangor society at Klang. Not only the Sultan but also the Resident, and many more besides came to welcome her. Wan Amin, relieved that his agonising mission was drawing to its close, remarked that the carriages and rickshaws were there in droves.[77]

Preparations for the installation then resumed their leisurely course. When the ceremony eventually took place, the Tunku Ampuan had all the honours accorded to a royal consort. After that there was an interval in the Sultan's matrimonial progress until 1910, when he married Raja Zubaidah, daughter of the Raja Muda of Perak.[78] This marriage, like the other two, produced a son, so that there were to be three half-brothers to compete for the succession in the 1930's.[79]

In 1908-1909 the Sultan had been prominent in ceremonies of a different kind. The original Malay mosque at Kuala Lumpur had been a modest affair, built for the needs of a pious but inconspicuous congregation. Although it was not the royal capital, Kuala Lumpur needed something in the nature of a state mosque to mark its status as the seat of government. In 1908 the Sultan laid the foundation stone of a mosque, which still stands as the Jaime Mosque at the confluence of the rivers from which Kuala Lumpur takes its name. It was designed by A.B.Hubback, now the leading architect in Kuala Lumpur, who was responsible for a number of public buildings in the 'Mahomedan style', including the central railway station. The Malay community subscribed $12,000 towards its estimated cost of $32,615, and a large assembly of Malays from all over Selangor attended the the ceremony of 1908. On 23rd December 1909 the Sultan formally inaugurated the completed building for worship. There was again a very large gathering of Malays, and the Resident and other officials attended the part of the ceremony held outside the building.[80]

No doubt the Sultan had made his personal donation to the mosque fund, as he did to other such funds and muslim endowments.[81] He had also to support a household for each wife, and bear the cost of maintaining and educating a growing family. Unlike Sultan Idris of Perak, and some other rulers, he had no substantial private fortune. His grandfather, Sultan Abdul Samad, had accumulated possessions of considerable value, but the late ruler's entire estate was shared by his widows and sur-

viving children, as Islamic law provided.[82] By 1909 Sultan Sulaiman's finances were in crisis. He handed over his account books to the Resident for inspection, which disclosed that the Sultan's family expenses alone slightly exceeded the monthly income of $2,000 which he received from state funds. He had nothing left for his personal expenditure or the cost of educating his sons.[83] His 'civil list' was duly increased but, by 1918, he had a bank overdraft of $167,000.[84] The early years of this century were a period in which the lifestyle of Malay aristocrats tended to become more lavish than their incomes could support. In part this situation arose from the passing of older men and the arrival of a spendthrift younger generation.

Syed Mashhor, famous as Raja Mahdi's principal lieutenant, lived on in traditional style in his rural retreat of Ulu Kerling (Ulu Selangor). However age told on him, and so at the relatively early age of 62 he was pensioned off from duty as penghulu in 1899. For another 17 years, however, he remained a member of the State Council, and then in 1916 'being no longer capable of attending to business, [he] had to be relieved of his duties.' 1916 also saw the retirement of a less conspicuous figure, Raja Hassan, after 36 years' membership of the Council.[85]

In the same year (1916) Raja Bot died. First as chief of Lukut until 1878 (Chapter 6) and then in various other capacities, referred to above, Bot had been a busy man, and something of a busybody, for as long as anyone could remember. Deprived of the ancestral fief of Lukut he had in 1887 obtained the post of penghulu of Sungei Buloh, with responsibility for the Malay settlements along the Buloh valley; he appears to have had a hand in the unsuccessful experiment in irrigation at Kuang up the valley. He was always promoting projects which called for government loans or subsidies, but 'never resides in the place and visits it rarely.' He was eased out of Sungei Buloh in 1895. Meanwhile he had become a member of the State Council (1888), and of the Kuala Lumpur Sanitary Board (1890). In the State Council he was indefatigable in proposals and amendments to legislation. He had travelled in India and imparted to the Council expertise on the Indian railways; health, trade, schools, fisheries and Islamic law also engaged his attention. He does not seem to have maintained his personal influence with the Sultan once the latter had settled in to his routine. It must be said that Raja Bot turned his hand to some useful things; he had himself trained as a vaccinator in order to encourage his fwllow Malays to submit to this precaution. He had increased his status by making a pilgrimage to Mecca. Apart from an almost unbroken sequence of unsuccessful business ventures, he ran into debt as an inveterate gambler. This addiction he sought to conceal by going off to Singapore to have a flutter. When he died his executors obtained a government loan of $9,000 towards the discharge of his debts.[86]

With the departure of Raja Bot from the scene, his old rival, Raja Mahmud, could emerge from the shadows. He became a member of the State Council in 1916. However he did not survive long. At his death in 1919, he was remembered as 'an old man who in his youth in the early seventies had written his name largely in the history of the State and was held in great respect by Malays throughout the Peninsula.'[87] There are worse obituaries than that.

In the history of the Selangor dynasty a new chapter opened in 1919, with the

appointment of the Sultan's eldest son, Raja Musa'eddin, to be a member of the State Council and also Raja Muda. He was installed with suitable ceremony in the latter position in January 1920.[88] It was inevitable that the young man should have his chance and be groomed to succeed his father in due course. He was, however, quite unlike the Sultan, who rose at 6 am to begin a long working day of public duties, good causes and religious observances. The extravagance and irresponsibility of the new Raja Muda would lead to his downfall, and much distress for his father, as will be related elsewhere (Chapter 11).

Notes

1. Chapter 3 Notes 43-44.
2. F.A.Swettenham, *British Malaya,* etc., John Lane, Bodley Head, London, 1906, revised George Allen and Unwin, London, 1948, p.130.
3. Chapter 5 Notes 3--5.
4. 'White people were very strange. Some....hired themselves out to rule countries, which was very convenient for those who owned them.' A.L.Keyser, *People and Places: A Life in Five Continents,* Murray, London, 1922, p.102. He showed 'peevishness when expected to exercise his royal prerogatives instead of my discharging such duties for him, since it was for this, he inferred, that I was paid.' A.L.Keyser, *Trifles and Travels,* Murray, London, 1923, p.133. Keyser was district officer at Kuala Langat in the 1890's, and received from Kuala Lumpur official state documents so that the royal seal might be affixed to them. He sent the papers up to the *istana*, and the Sultan returned them unsealed, but with his official seal, so that Keyser might attend to it. However it was generally agreed that to the end of his life the Sultan took an active interest in matters which he thought important. Like most traditional Malay rulers, he regarded paperwork as a task for clerks.
5. Chapter 4 Note 33. Chapter 7 Notes 55--57. J.M.Gullick, 'Selangor 1876--1882 : the Bloomfield Douglas Diary', *JMBRAS* 48(2), 1975, revised and reprinted in J.M.Gullick, *Glimpses of Selangor 1860-1898*, MBRAS Monograph 25, 1993, p.109. Until 1878, when Tunku Kudin gave up his position as viceroy, Musa felt slighted by being displaced by a rival. However he then succeeded Kudin as President of the State Council, but in this capacity also failed to establish himself as an effective deputy for his aged father.
6. Unpublished diary of Bloomfield Douglas, entry for 8 February 1877.
7. I.L.Bird, *The Golden Chersonese and the Way Thither*, Murray, London, 1883, p.226. The privilege of donning a haji's garb without having made the pilgrimage was reserved to Rajas, but it was considered rather an affectation for them to do this. J.M.Gullick, *Malay Society in the Late Nineteenth Century - the Beginnings of Change*, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1987, p.192.
8. Bird, op.cit., p.226, reporting Bloomfield Douglas. This threat led Douglas into elephantine -- and quite unsuccessful -- manoeuvres to induce the Sultan to make a will, which it was hoped would incorporate a declaration that the Anglo-Selangor agreement of 1874 was binding on his successors. Gullick, *Bloomfield Douglas* 1993), p.106.
9. Chapter 7 Note 20.
10. Unpublished diary of the District Officer Kuala Langat, entry for 9 July 1884 by J.A.G.Campbell, who was a very kind man (obituary in *SJ* 1, 1893, p.328). On hearing of the death of Raja Musa Campbell went at once to condole with Musa's elder son, Raja Sulaiman, and in a practical way made him an advance towards the funeral expenses. On the following day Campbell went 'to have a chat' with the Sultan, noting that he seemed unmoved by his loss -- he may of course have preferred to keep his grief to himself. Musa's age at death is given in *AR Selangor 1884*, para 25, with the comment that he had been 'interested in all matters connected with the Mahomedan religion and was also an enterprising and industrious planter....[and] Native Magistrate at Langat.'
11. In Braddell's report on Sir Andrew Clarke's visit to Kuala Langat in February 1874 (the first time Braddell had met the Sultan) he wrote that the Sultan was 'fifty-five or sixty years of age'. Memo-

randum enclosed with SSD 24 February 1874, para 84. In fact the Sultan was then about 70 since, at his death in 1898, his grandson, Raja Muda Sulaiman, said that he was then aged 93, ie he had been born about 1805.

Emily Innes (meeting him in 1876) described him as 'a curiously withered-looking little old man' surprisingly 'nimble' for his 'advanced age'. E Innes, *The Chersonese with the Gilding Off*, 2 vols, Richard Bentley & Sons, London, 1885, vol.1, p.39. Isabella Bird (op.cit., pp.230-231) in 1879 found him 'elderly' but 'very active'. In July 1894, a new Resident thought he was 'about 65 years old' (in fact almost 90). Chapter 7 Note 18.

These are signs that the Sultan himself was concealing his true age, possibly to avoid British interference in the succession. When Governor Clementi Smith met the Sultan in 1889, the ruler said that 'he could not recollect his own age' but believed that he was 60 or 70 years old (in fact 84). SSD 20 May 1889. He does not seem to have altered in appearance over the quarter century of his close contacts with Europeans, but they knew that he had been elderly in 1874. His survival in generally good health was the more remarkable because he smoked opium regularly. Anon, 'H.H.Sultan Abdul Samad K.C.M.G. at Home,' *SJ* 1, p.5. It is less certain that he was 'a great smoker'. He took a pipe each night before going to bed. Ibid.

12. Three days after Musa's death Raja Mahmud and Raja Daud (of Sungai Raya) called on the District Officer Kuala Langat, saying that 'they were anxious for me to express an opinion as regards a new Raja Muda'. Kuala Langat diary (Note 10 above), 11th July 1884. Campbell does not record what reply he gave; presumably he said they must wait and see.
13. W.G.(Sir George) Maxwell, in his first annual report as British Adviser Kedah (*AR Kedah 1909*) sets out at length this aspect of the position of the Raja Muda of Kedah. Tunku Kudin had held that post when he first came to Selangor in 1868.
14. 'There was really no hard and fast rule on the selection of a new ruler.' Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, 'Thrones, Claims, Claimants, Rulers and Rules', *JMBRAS* 66(2), 1993, p.9. On the other hand 'a Malay ruler....nominated his Heir Apparent, the Raja Muda or Young Raja, during his life-time... normally his eldest son, but preferably the son of a royal consort'. R.O.Winstedt, *The Malays - A Cultural History*, Kelly & Walsh, Singapore, 1947, p.60. The actual record of events supports Kobkua; Winstedt merely states a norm which did not always prevail.
15. In 1857 Raja Muda Mahmud had been passed over as too young. Chapter 3 Note 42. Mahdi's ambitions in the 1870's were based on being a grandson of a previous (not the reigning) Sultan, though his father had been born to a secondary wife of the ruler. Chapter 4 Note 20. In Perak in 1871 the leading chiefs were at loggerheads with Raja Muda Abdullah, who had not attended the late Sultan's funeral as custom required, and so they preferred to elect as Sultan Raja Ismail, who was a member of the dynasty only through his mother.
16. At this early stage (1884) the British did not claim (as they did in the 1930's -- Chapter 11 Note 21) to be the arbiters of the general suitability of heirs to the throne of Selangor, though they did stipulate (in 1887), for the guidance of the conclave of Selangor chiefs to whom the choice was formally delegated, that 'the candidate (elected) must not be addicted to... opium-smoking, gambling, drinking and cockfighting' and this, according to Sultan Sulaiman, had narrowed the choice to himself, as the only one not addicted to cock-fighting. Yeo Kim Wah, 'The Selangor Succession Dispute, 1933-38,' *JSEAS* 2(2), 1971, p.170.
17. *AR Selangor 1887*, para 84, in recording Sulaiman's installation states that it had been postponed for some months owing to the recent death of Tunku Panglima Raja Berkat (Note 23 below), Apart from the recently deceased Raja Muda Musa, Sultan Abdul Samad had three sons, one of whom, Raja Abunusah ('Raja Sah') was younger than the Sultan's grandson, Raja Sulaiman. Raja Yakob ('Tunku Alang') seems to have died before Raja Musa. If he had survived, his reputation for piracy would have inclined the British to veto him. Chapter 4 Note 43. Raja Kahar, although regarded in later years as a genial nonentity, (he died in 1898) had in the late 1870's made himself thoroughly unpopular in Ulu Langat (Chapter 5 Note 40).
18. On Raja Mahmud's career and personality see Gullick, *Malay Society*, pp.81--84. The full name of his father was Raja Berkat bin Raja Hussein. Innes, op.cit. vol 1, p.102. Was this also the 'Raja Hussein of Salangore', who was the leader of the Selangor forces in Perak in 1826? Chapter 2

Note 42. It is known that one of the numerous sons of Sultan Ibrahim was 'Raja Husain'. Raja Ali Haji, *Tuhfat-al-Nafis*, translated and annotated by V. Matheson and B. W. Andaya, *The Precious Gift*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1982, p.41. If, which is surmise, these references both relate to the father of Raja Berkat, then Raja Mahmud was the great-grandson of Sultan Ibrahim. Raja Berkat married a sister of Sultan Abdul Samad, but his son, Raja Mahmud, was born to another wife.

19. See Note 12 above on Mahmud's interest in the choice of a new Raja Muda. He was certainly more forceful than the two surviving sons of Sultan Mohamed, Raja Mahmud and Raja Laut. The former of these half-brothers had been Raja Muda (Note 15) and the latter would succeed Raja Sulaiman in that office in 1898. In 1884 or fairly soon afterwards, the former would become penghulu of Semenyeh (Ulu Langat) and the latter 'Native Magistrate' of Kuala Lumpur.
20. Chapter 7 Note 56.
21. Chapter 3 Note 42. The sons of the Riau Rajas Jumaat and Abdullah were not 'in contention' since they were regarded as interlopers, and Raja Bot was out of favour at both the *istana* and the Residency; Note 60 below. Raja Ismail and Raja Hassan, sons of Raja Abdullah, were not important figures, though the latter had been a member of the State Council since 1880. See Note 85 below.
22. One may detect the hand of Swettenham, then Resident of Selangor, in this move. Although he took a protective interest in Mahmud, it was advisable to send him out of the State at a time when Raja Sulaiman was about to become Raja Muda. Clifford too was a protégé who had begun his Malayan career in Perak under Swettenham, as acting Resident, a few years before.
Swettenham, *British Malaya* p.191, and H.C.Clifford, *In Court and Kampong*, etc, Richards, London, 1897, 'The Experiences of Raja Haji Hamid', p.30f, on Mahmud. In the 'Autobiographical Preface' to the 1927 edition of his book Clifford (p.30) explicitly identifies the 'Raja Haji Hamid' of his stories as Raja Mahmud.
23. On hearing the news of his father's death, Clifford had difficulty in restraining Mahmud from 'running amok in the streets of Pekan', the conventional outlet from misery, despair or humiliation for a man of Mahmud's temperament and upbringing. Although Clifford does not mention it, Mahmud may have already been brooding on news or rumours that Sulaiman would dash his hopes by becoming Raja Muda.
24. Note 63 below on the rise of Raja Bot in 1898 illustrates what was possible. Mahmud might have been preferred to Raja Laut as the new Raja Muda: Note 65 below. In Perak the Sri Adika Raja was for many years the indispensable confidant of Sultan Idris. J.M.Gullick, *Rulers and Residents - Influence and Power in the Malay States 1870-1920*, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1992,pp.99 and 299. Mahmud's prospects in this role were all the better because his father had held a similar position in Sultan Abdul Samad's circle until his death. But Mahmud had grown up in the tradition of *orang Bugis ta' sabar* (Bugis are impatient). Chapter 7 Note 4.
25. E.Sadka, *The Protected Malay States 1874-1895*, p.305, cites Sel.Sec. 157/90 on the origins of Mahmud's downfall. Raja Mahmud 'took up an attitude of determined hostility to the Raja Muda in the beginning of the year [1890]'. He was deprived of his title and of his seat on the Council but continued to draw his political allowance while in exile in Singapore and elsewhere. The Governor, the Sultan and 'the principal Rajas' had concurred in this drastic punishment. *AR Selangor 1890*, para 176.

    There is no direct evidence that Maxwell had any personal animosity towards Mahmud. They had both been in Perak in the troubled period of the 'Perak War' of 1875--1876; Mahmud had then been with Swettenham, and his looting and destruction (while serving as a 'scout' with Swettenham's party) had attracted criticism. Gullick, *Malay Society*, p.82. Maxwell probably regarded Mahmud as inherently an undisciplined character whose defiance of Maxwell's attempt to reason with him sealed his fate. J.M.Gullick, 'William Maxwell and the Study of Malay Society', *JMBRAS* 64(2) offers a portrait of this formidable autocrat, who was a fair man but no friend of any friend of Swettenham, with whom he had a well-known personal feud.
26. On the death of Yap Ah Loy in 1885, his long-time associate (not a kinsman) Yap Ah Shak had become the second Capitan China. Sadka, op.cit., p.304.

27. Sadka, op.cit., p.305 (see Note 25 above).
28. On the return of Raja Muda Musa from his exile in Singapore (Note 5 above) he settled down, for the ensuing eight years until his death in 1884, at the royal capital. His elder son, Raja Sulaiman, was then about ten or eleven years of age, and for a time attended a Malay school, in the same class as the future court official and historian, Mohamed Amin (Note 55 below). Although the Sultan and Raja Muda Musa were not on close terms, the Sultan obviously took a liking to his grandson. When the Sultan made his first visit to Kuala Lumpur in 1879, Sulaiman was included in the party (see Note 41 below). Emily Innes, who knew him from 1876 to 1882, found him 'charming. . .a bright, gentle-mannered and amiable boy of about eleven, who could both read and write Malay fluently -- a most unusual accomplishment with Malays of rank.' Innes, op.cit. vol.1, pp.158-159. Sulaiman was one of the few Malays at Kuala Langat who knew some English; one wonders whether he helped Emily with her study of the Malay language.
29. The origin of the Raja School was a plan by Maxwell to provide Sulaiman with an English tutor. It was then decided that the tutor, who was also the newly appointed Anglican chaplain (Rev E Haines), should also teach a group of about a dozen Malay boys of the Raja class together with Raja Sulaiman. R. Stevenson, *Cultivators and Administrators - British Educational Policy towards the Malays 1875--1906*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1975, p.149, citing Sel.Sec 164/90. Ibid., p.169 on Sulaiman's previous education in Singapore.
30. Stevenson, op.cit., p.153.
31. Gullick, *Malay Society*, pp.268--269. Stevenson, op.cit., pp.92--93. *AR Kuala Langat 1896* in *SGG* 1897, p.454.

    Although Sulaiman moved away from Bandar Langat, to live at Klang and Kuala Lumpur, in the 1890's, his continued interest in the Malay girls' school which he had established kept it going at a time when similar ventures elsewhere were failing. *AR Selangor 1898*, para 25. *AR Selangor 1899*, para 30. *AR Selangor 1900*, para 32, and *AR Selangor 1903*, para 51.(closure). At Klang Sulaiman promoted another Malay girls' school in a house which he lent for the purpose. *AR Selangor 1903*, para 51, and *Singapore Sunday Times*, 9 September 1934, p.13 (a character study of the Sultan in later years). See also Note 54 below.
32. *Singapore Sunday Times* (Note 31 above).
33. Pamphlet enclosed with SSD 25 September 1894. Gullick, *Malay Society*, p.293. In 1893 Sulaiman was reading a matrimonial code from Sibu as a possible model for Selangor. *SGG* 1893, p.759.

    Sultan Idris of Perak and Yam Tuan Mohamed of Negri Sembilan shared Sulaiman's concern for putting Islamic law and its enforcement in their States on a better footing. Gullick, *Malay Society*, loc.cit. It proved difficult to devise a code which was both orthodox and workable. After much discussion a uniform Mohammedan Laws Enactment was passed by each of the four State Councils of the FMS, to enact as much as the rulers and their advisers could agree upon.
34. Gullick, *Malay Society*, p.287 (the sources are cited at p.306, Notes 57-59). *SGG* 1895, p.494.
35. Chapter 7 Notes 21--22.
36. Gullick, *Rulers and Residents*, pp.203 and 240.
37. As Note 32. His 'hobbies were religion, cookery and wood-carving" R.O.Winstedt, *Alif, Count from One*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1969, p.5.
38. The plans were based on 'a sketch by H.H. the Raja Muda'. *SJ* 1, 1893, p.131.
39. 'In Xanadu did Kubla Khan a stately pleasure dome decree'. S. T. Coleridge, *Kubla Khan*.
40. Gullick, *Malay Society*, pp.58, 193 and 205 n78. Although Douglas kitted out old Sultan Abdul Samad in a sort of hussar's uniform for court ceremonies, he soon doffed it. Bird, op.cit., pp.231 and 234. In wearing Malay dress he often discarded the tunic (*baju*) and, when making his round of his village capital, 'was usually dressed in nothing bu a very scanty little cotton kilt, or a pair of still scantier bathing-drawers.' Innes, op.cit., vol.1, p.38. On arrival at Kuala Lumpur in November 1892, by train, he deferred putting on his tunic until the last moment and was observed 'struggling with his baju'. *SJ* 1, 1892, p.49. When, in July 1897, in the last year of his long life, and 'in a weak state of health' the Sultan went to the durbar of FMS Rulers at Kuala Kangsar, he did not attend the sequence of dinner parties and other entertainments which Sultan Idris provided for his guests, Malay and European, but took his meals quietly in Malay fashion. *AR Selangor*

1897. Report of the durbar enclosed with SSD 20 August 1897, para 7. Gullick, *Malay Society*, p.69 n87.

41. *SGG* 1891, p.398 (circus). On tennis unpublished diary of Bloomfield Douglas, 5 May 1879, and *AR Kuala Langat 1896* in *SGG* 1897, p.484.
42. Anon (probably J.H.M. Robson), *Sultan Abdul Samad, K.C.M.G., at Home*, *SJ* 1, p.6.
43. Chapter 7 Note 65.
44. Report for April 1894 from Kuala Langat in *SGG* 1894, p.340.
45. *Malay Mail*, 18 May 1897 'Jugra Revisited' (Robson).
46. As Note 32. 'result misery' (from income £20 and expenditure £20.os.6d). Charles Dickens, *David Copperfield*, chapter 12.
47. Sulaiman's father and Tunku Mahrum's mother were both children of Sultan Abdul Samad, though by different mothers. The wedding is described in *SGG* 1891, pp.228--230. See also *AR Selangor 1891*, para 225.

    'Mahrum' seems to have been the most common spelling of the bride's name. She was sometimes 'Raja' (Selangor style) but more often 'Tunku' (like her father, Tunku Kudin of Kedah).
48. It appears that neither the Sultan nor the bride's father, Tunku Kudin, was present. Yet Kudin went to the circus with the young couple a few days later (Note 41 above). His estrangement from the bride's mother, Raja Arfah, may have led to some polite pretext for his absence.
49. 'Married to a very beautiful Malay Princess'. Resident's Tour Notes in *SGG* 1894, reprinted in *SJ* 2, 1894, p.431.
50. E. Innes, op.cit., p.91. When Arfah came to see Emily Innes, Arfah brought the infant Mahrum (her only child) and was '...dressed rather like one of Raffaele's Madonnas, with a gauze veil of emerald or "arsenic" green, covered with gold spangles, falling half over her forehead'. Ibid. There are no extant photographs. She had declined an invitation to be photographed by J.W.W. Birch (an enthusiastic amateur) in April 1874. J.W.W.Birch, *The Journals of J.W.W.Birch First British Resident to Perak 1874-1875*, edited by P. L. Burns, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur 1976, p.48. Emily Innes (loc.cit.) says that Arfah ate too much and became fat. Inherited good looks came from both parents as Tunku Mahrum's father, Tunku Kudin, 'was young and good-looking.' Ibid., p.173.

    E. Innes (ibid. pp.87-96) wrote of Raja Arfah that 'she was reputed to have the temper of a tigress' (of which a murderous story is told by way of illustration), 'hated the English' and 'lived....a cat-and-dog life' with her husband, Tunku Kudin, whose European habits, including drinking alcohol, were an abomination to her. None the less, despite her 'ferocious temper' Emily rather admired Arfah, as 'one of the few respectable women in Langat', who stuck to her principles. See also Chapter 4 Notes 17 and 43.
51. J.M.Gullick, 'Tunku Kudin of Kedah', *JMBRAS* 60(2), 1987, p.86.
52. Gullick, *Malay Society*, p.225 (on polygamy).
53. Report from Klang in *SGG* 1893, p.469. Chapter 8 Note 26. Notes 42-45 above.
54. Report from Klang in *SGG* 1896, p.353.
55. Wan Mohamed Amin bin Wan Mohamed Said, *Pesaka Selangor*, published in Jawi in 1927, and later in Rumi, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur, 1966. Cited hereafter as 'Amin.' He is also referred to by his court title of 'Dato Amar'. Zainal Abidin bin Ahmad ('Zaba'), 'Recent Malay Literature', *JMBRAS* 19(1), 1941, p.7.
56. Chapter 3 Note 43.
57. Emily Innes saw one *sembah* (obeisance) ceremony (in 1876 or a later year), and remarks that 'he was no longer afraid for his life on homage day'. Innes, op.cit., vo; 1, pp.43-44. Swettenham, who lived intermittently at the royal capital for 18 months (1874--1875) once mentions a *sembah* in his journal, in November 1874 - on the occasion of Hari Raya, when 'it is the custom'. EA.Swettenham, *Sir Frank Swettenham's Malayan Journals 1874-1876*, edited by P.L.Burns and C.D.Cowan,, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1975, p.147. It is a reasonable surmise that at this period, when the risk of assassination had passed, there was a *sembah* once a year at Hari Raya (end of Ramadan).
58. Amin, op.cit., pp.74 and 89. According to Amin, Sheikh Abdul Ghani came from Sumatra. How-

ever he may have been the *alim* of that name who troubled the peace of Province Wellesley. Gullick, *Malay Society*, p.46 n65, where the sources are cited.

The tradition that the regalia had been destroyed conflicts with Skeat, who as district officer at Kuala Langat in the 1890's, had inspected and photographed the Selangor regalia. W.W. Skeat, *Malay Magic*, etc. MacMillan, London, 1900, p.40. The items seen by Skeat are not very impressive as valuables. It may have been the more precious items, of gold or silver, which were lost. Savonarola (1452-1498) was a Dominican friar who for a time held Florence (in Italy) under a reign of terror owing to his strict and drastic puritanism, including a 'bonfire of vanities'. Oliver Cromwell, in dismissing the English Rump Parliament in 1653, ordered the removal of the mace, which lies on the table when the House of Commons is in session, calling it a 'fool's bauble'.

59. Amin, op.cit., p.75. *Malay Mail* 21 October 1898. Wan Amin himself became Bentara Kiri Amar di-Raja, abbreviated to 'Dato Amar'. Then or later he was also appointed Penghulu Istiadat, ie court master of ceremonies, which carried executive responsibilities. He may well have written his *Pesaka Selangor* on royal instructions.
60. Chapter 3 Note 18. Chapter 6 Note 58.
61. Note 30 above.
62. *Malay Mail* 8 February 1898. This comment is by J.H.M.Robson who was proprietor, editor and the only reporter of his newspaper at that time. He had been district officer at Kuala Langat a few years before. The surviving sons of Sultan Mohamed were Raja Laut and Raja Mahmud. Note 19 above.
63. Chapter 3 Note 42, and Notes 21 and 24 above.
64. SSD 11 December 1902, a comment by Swettenham (then Governor) who had known Raja Bot since 1874, and had been involved in the controversy over the cession of Lukut. The comment of 1902 was prompted by Bot's instigating the Sultan to ask for a European private secretary on the government payroll, to provide a post for a retired member of the Selangor Civil Service, G.C.Bellamy. Gullick, *Rulers ad Residents*, p.120 n24.

See also Mohamed Amin bin Hassan, 'Raja Bot bin Raja Jumaat', *JMBRAS* 40(2), 1967, especially p.82f on Bot's activities as a member of the Selangor State Council from 1888. See also Note 86 below.

65. Amin, op.cit., p.78. There had been a formal installation of Raja Sulaiman as Raja Muda in 1887, *AR Selangor 1887*, para 84, and there was a similar ceremony in Perak in 1908. *AR Perak 1906*, para 46.
66. See J. M. Gullick, 'A Careless Heathen Philosopher?', *JMBRAS* 26(1), 1953, rewritten and published under the same title in *Glimpses of Selangor 1868-1898*, MBRAS Monograph 25, 1993, p.25 n83 on Raja Bidin at the Selangor court in the late 1870's. See also Gullick, *Rulers and Residents*, pp.56, 99 and 188, on Swettenham's use of the Sri Adika Raja of Perak.
67. H.S.Barlow, *Swettenham*, Southdene, Kuala Lumpur, 1995, p.236. In 1936 it was recollected that Swettenham had 'played a prominent part' in the appointment of Raja Laut to be Raja Muda. S.C.Smith, *British Relations with the Malay Rulers from Decentralization to Malayan Independence 1930-1957*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1995, p.40 n134.
68. The appointment is recorded in *AR Selangor 1899*, para 45, and may well have been notified in *SGG* 1899. Neither would have been widely read in Selangor Malay aristocratic circles. The ceremonial installation of Sultan Sulaiman was reported in the *Malay Mail* of 6 November 1903, and the report is reprinted in Khoo Kay Kim, 'Raja Lumu/Sultan Salehuddin: the Founding of the Selangor Dynasty,' *JMBRAS* 58(20, 1985. Sultan Idris of Perak had been installed in 1889, two years after his accession, with celebrations which lasted a month. SSD 4 November 1889. Political expediency did not (in 1895) permit a long delay in the installation of Sultan Ibrahim of Johor, but it had also been elaborate, with 'a curious mixture of Oriental and European customs.' SSD 4 November 1895. Gullick, *Malay Society*, pp.33-35.
69. W. R. Roff, *The Origins of Malay Nationalism*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967, revised edition, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1994, p.70, says that the appointment was 'finally reversed in the face of implacable opposition.' Sultan Sulaiman may have found it expedient, like his grandfather, to placate whoever came to see him by signifying approval without meaning

to sustain it (Note 2). The State Government, however, continued to treat Raja Laut as Raja Muda. See Note 71 below.

70. Chapter 5 Note 54. Gullick, *Malay Society*, p.110.
71. The death of Raja Laut, 'the Raja Muda', is recorded in *AR Selangor 1913*, para 91.
72. Bugis royal traditions seem to have accorded to the ruler's wife unusual prominence in the installation ceremony. When the 1903 installation at long last took place, Tunku Mahrum certainly was a major figure. See also Note 68.
73. Amin, op.cit., p.79.
74. Gullick, *Malay Society*, p.217, and *Rulers and Residents*, p.278f.
75. Amin, op.cit., p.79. Gullick, *Kudin of Kedah*, pp.87-88.
76. Amin, op.cit., p.82. Previously Swettenham (R-G FMS) and Rodger (Resident) had tried to persuade Raja Laut (Note 66) to try his hand at this thankless task, but he had pleaded that the death of a daughter prevented him from undertaking it. Ibid. p.81.
77. *kereta kuda dan becha berpuloh2 buah menanti*. Ibid.
78. *AR Perak 1910*, para 38. This wife was styled 'Tunku Ampuan', ie royal consort, It must be assumed that Tunku Mahrum had died meamwhile. Raja Zubaidah, the bride of 1910, died in the influenza epidemic of 1919. *AR Selangor 1919*, para 192. In 1921 the uxorious Sultan Sulaiman took yet another wife from Perak, Raja Fatimah, a daughter of the late Sultan Idris. *AR Selangor 1921*, para 99.
79. *AR Selangor 1911*, para 150.
80. *AR Selangor 1908*, para 111, and *AR Selangor 1909*, para 116.
81. Like other FMS Rulers the Sultan's income from state funds was augmented by an allowance for charitable gifts. Gullick, *Malay Society*, p.285.
82. English rules on distribution of intestate estates permit the offspring of a child who has died in the lifetime of the owner of the estate (in this case Raja Musa (a son) had died in 1884) to take the share which would, if he had survived, come to the deceased child. Islamic law has no such principle of 'representation' of a deceased beneficiary by a remoter descendant and the share lapses and goes into the pool for the benefit of surviving heirs.

    See Gullick, *Malay Society*, p.66 n44, on the estate of Sultan Abdul Samad.

    Sultan Sulaiman's agricultural property at Kuala Langat did not yield any income. Chapter 7 Notes 21-22. He had owned some mining land but that too had by this stage ceased to bring in anything to him.
83. SSD 1 June 1909, and Gullick, *Malay Society*, pp.61--62.
84. SSD 13 April 1918. The Selangor government increased the Sultan's allowance to $3,500 pm, and paid off his overdraft. By this time the heaviest burden on the royal finances was the three sons' expenditure and debts, notably Tunku Musa'eddin. Chapter 11.
85. *AR Selangor 1916/1919*, and *SGG* 1899. See Chapter 4 Note 25 and Chapter 7 Note 57, and Note 21 on Raja Hassan, son of Raja Abdullah of Klang, who had become the representative in public life of that branch of the ruling family, following the departure from Selangor of his brother, Raja Ismail, ally of Tunku Kudin in the civil war. Chapter 4 Note 7.
86. Mohamed Amin Hassan, *Raja Bot bin Raja Jumaat*, pp.82-93, gives a full account, derived mainly from the Selangor Secretariat files, of Raja Bot's activities, varied but uniformly unremunerative, from 1887 to 1916. On Kuang see Chapter 7 Note 67.
87. *AR Selangor 1919*, para 6, a passage written by A.H.Lemon, one of the few British Residents of this period who had a real interest in Malay history and affairs. Yeo Kim Wah, *Decentralization*, p.165.
88. *AR Selangor 1919*, paras 6 and 231.

Chapter Ten

Into the Twentieth Century

Two main factors shaped the progress of Selangor over the twenty years to 1914. These were its incorporation in the Federated Malay States ('FMS') in 1896, and the rapid expansion of rubber growing from about 1900, in which Selangor had a leading part.

The FMS was intended to remedy divergences of government policy in the different states on a variety of matters of common interest, especially the alienation of land for agricultural and other uses.[1] As a result the authorities in Selangor, as in other states of the FMS, were constrained by central direction of policy and administration in a number of fields and (from 1909) the State Councils were displaced by the new FMS Federal Council in the process of legislation on all but matters peculiar to one state. Selangor was thus deprived of much of its previous independence and initiative in public affairs, and in the long term the Unfederated Malay States, which came under formal British control between 1909 and 1914, refused to enter an enlarged FMS.

The controversy over the excessive centralization of the FMS, ie the relationship between the federal and state governments distracted attention from the no less important question of local perceptions in each state of its relations with other states. This aspect came to view in 1897 when the rulers of the four states gathered, for the first time, at Kuala Kangsar in Perak for a 'durbar'. Despite some matrimonial and political alliances there was conflict rather than common interest between the rulers and their subjects in their attitude towards other states.[2] Even within a state the settled population regarded immigrants (*orang dagang*) as unwelcome foreigners.[3] It is true that Malays who left their homes to go out into distant places travelled within a 'Malay world', in which language, monarchy and Islam were familiar cultural features, but in terms of identity and political loyalty, there was no sense of unity.[4]

Hence it was predicted that a gathering of the four FMS rulers, each with his entourage, at Kuala Kangsar would lead to 'some unpleasant incident', as each group sought to assert that its state and ruler took precedence over the others.[5] Partly because the hospitable Sultan Idris gave his guests such splendid entertainment, this first -- and seminal -- assembly passed off in an atmosphere of enjoyment and good feeling. Sultan Idris himself was gratified that several thousand people had passed a week in his capital 'without any quarrelling, crime or accident', and the

official impression was that it had 'aroused...an interest in the general weal...in a union of mutual interest and personal friendship'.[6] The second durbar was held at Kuala Lumpur in 1903, and the four delegations were accommodated in style in temporary buildings in the Lake Gardens. This assembly too passed off in a similar atmosphere, with an awareness that the participants had discussed matters of common interest. The only cloud was the rulers' sense of loss of independence to the federal regime.[7] The next stage was the formation, in 1909, of an FMS Federal Council. It brought the same group of rulers, advisers and officials together twice a year.[8]

There were other, more demotic, influences tending in the same direction. The gradual expansion of Malay vernacular education created a readership for Malay newspapers, and incidentally a demand for school textbooks for common use.[9] Improved facilities for the pilgrimage to Mecca led to an increase in the number of Malays and Indonesians who shared an experience which imparted a sense of common identity in a wide Islamic community.[10] The training of teachers for Malay schools brought together, at an impressionable age, intelligent men who returned to spend their working lives as influential figures in the villages from which they came.[11]

The Chinese and other immigrant communities were never identified with or restricted in their outlook to particular Malay states. Yap Ah Loy, for example, came to Selangor from Sungei Ujong, and he became the leader of a Selangor Chinese community which included Chinese who had been driven out of the Larut mining district of Perak.[12] As Kuala Lumpur rose to become the commercial capital of the FMS, communal leadership -- associations, chambers of commerce etc. -- tended to have its base there.

The rapid growth of the rubber industry is a Malayan rather than a Selangor theme.[13] In the context of this state history it suffices to describe how Selangor played a leading part, by reason of its particular circumstances, in the formative years of the rubber industry.

In the last two decades of the nineteenth century the cultivation of coffee had tended to concentrate in the Klang valley, where the railway line ran through suitable areas of land. Travelling to the capital by train in 1899 a visitor saw 'a regular tangle of jungle, interrrupted every now and then by prim-looking coffee estates.' Coffee required meticulous, labour-intensive care and so the estates were relatively small areas managed by a working owner ('proprietary estates'), often a planter who had migrated from Ceylon. Malay smallholders joined in what seemed -- for a time -- to be a bonanza.[14] When the time came for the introduction of rubber growing, much of it was a conversion of former coffee estates, and so Selangor had a head start.[15] The first signs of a serious setback for coffee came in 1894, when pests and diseases, including the dreaded *hemileia vastatrix*, created problems which planters could not eradicate, and an increase in Brazilian exports of coffee flooded the market so that, by 1899, the world price had fallen by 60 per cent from five years before.[16]

However coffee planters had come through bad times before. They did not yet

despair of coffee and they were still sceptical about rubber, of which so much had been predicted since experimental cultivation had begun twenty years before. Even in 1900 a recovery in the coffee price was 'confidently foreseen by those whose experience lends weight to their opinion'.[17] There was still much uncertainty about rubber, what and how to grow and whether it had enduring prospects of commercial success. There had been so many disappointments with other crops in the past. The coffee planter knew that *hevea braziliensis*, imported from Brazil, offered the highest yields, and apparently it flourished in Malayan conditions. It had been grown both in the Singapore Botanic Gardens and at Kuala Kangsar in Perak, where there was a Resident (Hugh Low) who had begun his career as a botanist. But was it a better proposition than the indigenous 'native rubber' [*rambong* or *ficus elastica*]? There were moreover recent memories of the virtual extinction of gutta percha (*palaquium gutta*) in Malayan forests because of destructive tapping.[18] It was said that the energetic Curator of the Singapore Botanic Gardens, H.N.Ridley, had discovered how to tap *hevea* trees without killing them, but Ridley's sheer enthusiasm cast doubts on his work. The whole subject of technique moved the Resident of Selangor, in 1899, to lament the present lack of 'a practical working knowledge of the most effective and economical methods of collecting, treating and shipping' rubber.[19]

What then should the coffee planter do? Typically his estate was a block of only 320 acres (half a square mile), of which some 200 acres might be plantable. In practice shortages of capital and labour had kept the planted area to less than that.[20] He had originally selected it because it fronted on to a railway line or a public road, but it was not easy to add to it.[21] The state government was now offering land for rubber planting at special reduced rates, but even so, to develope more land by rubber planting would require capital which the planter hesitated, if indeed he had it at all, to invest when coffee prices were so abysmal.[22] Some did, though on a very limited scale; the Kindersley brothers had planted only 5 acres with rubber on their Inch Kenneth estate in Ulu Langat.[23] There were other, larger ventures afoot, especially among the Chinese planters in Malacca, and there were reports of rapidly increasing demand for rubber to make bicycle, or even motor car, tyres. However rubber seeds, if planted now would not produce a crop for another seven years, when it might all seem different.

The safest course, and the one adopted by most Selangor coffee planters, was to interplant rubber between the rows of coffee bushes, so that they might serve as shade for the coffee, if not worthwhile in their own right. Meanwhile the price of coffee rose to remunerative levels again and the planters began to plant the 'robusta' variety of coffee (*canephora*) which had some resistance to disease.[24] By 1901 all European coffee estates in Malaya had been interplanted with rubber.[25]

With rubber interplanted, or grown apart on small experimental plots, estimates of acreage under rubber can only be tentative. On that basis the entire rubber planted acreage of the FMS in 1897 was only 345 acres.[26] For a year or two after 1900 the price of rubber weakened slightly but then, between 1902 and 1905, it doubled -- and the rush was on. By 1906 Selangor alone had an estimated 44,821 acres under

rubber out of an FMS total of almost 100,000. With planted areas of this size, the scale and nature of the industry was becoming quite different from the model of the small proprietary coffee estate. Limited companies were formed in London, or in Ceylon or Hong Kong, to raise capital from the public and to acquire, if possible, two thousand acres or more of land for development over a period of years. Recruitng, housing and retaining the required labour force for operations on this scale also took on a new dimension.[27] The new estates however followed the established practice of selecting land adjacent to a road or a railway line. Good communications were a universal imperative.

Rubber would soon overshadow tin mining as the major industry of Selangor. As it happened, the latter was undergoing major structural changes and adapting to new conditions. The price of tin had peaked in 1888. Thereafter it fell steadily until in 1896 it was at the level which had brought Yap Ah Loy to his knees in 1878. Much had changed since then -- mechanisation, better communications, depletion of richer and more accessible ore deposits, changes in the relationship between employers and labourers and in the terms of government leases for mining land. The effect of the fall in the tin price to the mid-1890's was a sustained, slow fall in production and in numbers employed. As mines were worked out, they were not replaced by new ones on the same scale. Selangor tin output reached its highest annual level (22,953 tons) in 1894 and then declined year by year to 15,103 tons in 1914.[28] The number of Chinese entering Selangor, mainly to work on the mines, fell and the number leaving rose, so that in 1897 there was a net depletion. The tin price rose sharply in 1900 but soon fell back to a less exciting level.

Labour relations now reflected a more even balance. In the good -- or bad -- old days, Yap Ah Loy, and his fellow entrepreneurs, had been secret society headmen and suppliers of foodstuffs and opium to their labourers at exorbitant prices under a truck system (payment of wages in kind). Even in the 1880's imported labourers had been 'tied to the mines'.[29]

In the 1890's, with low prices and less productive ground, it did not suit entrepreneurs to put up the 'front-end money', ie the capital risked to open a large mine over a period of say six months before the ore-bearing stratum was reached. Instead the owner of the mining lease allowed small groups of labourers to work selected areas on a tribute system, by which they paid a ten per cent royalty to him. The tributors naturally selected what seemed the richest deposits and thus 'picked the eyes' out of the site, reducing the potential value of the site as a whole. The holder of the mining lease was not required to manage the operation nor to provide capital. Hence taking up a lease, speculative as it still was, appealed more to an absentee town businessman than to the mining tycoon of the past, who took greater risks but spread them over many mines.

The career of Loke Yew, who was for thirty years (mid-1880's to 1917) the most outstanding figure in the Selangor Chinese business community, is an instructive example. In the 1870's he had made -- and sometimes lost -- fortunes in tin mining in Perak. About 1886 he moved to Selangor, where he developed some successful mines in Ulu Selangor, and later took up new concessions in Pahang, at first in the

hitherto undeveloped Bentong district and later at Kuantan. He probably made more money out of his role in the partnerships which held the tax farms in Selangor. In his later years he invested substantially in shops and houses to let in Kuala Lumpur, and other towns, and in rubber estates.[30]

The same factors, ie higher labour costs and lower recovery of ore, tended to make the long-established open pit mine (*lombong*) obsolete.[31] The heavy cost of excavating down to the ore bearing stratum increased as it became necessary to dig deeper and deeper to recover less (per cubic yard). Moreover digging out more and more soil increased the quantity of waste material ('tailings') which the miner discarded at surface level. In former, happy-go-lucky, days tailings were allowed to get into the nearest stream. The result was a clogging up of the rivers and covering agricultural land with barren material. By 1914 progressively stricter restrictions on the discharge of tailings had become a disincentive to the opening of new mines.[32]

Between the wars the dredge, which could work huge quantities of soil and return its tailings into the deep pool (or embanked areas) behind it, provided a solution to these problems -- on large sites at least. But to build and launch a dredge cost more money than Chinese miners were accustomed to expend, and it required expertise which they lacked. It was not a universal panacea since its cost could only be recovered by working over a large site for say twenty years, and geological conditions, such as limestone pillars below ground might make it technically unworkable. An early attempt to raise capital for a dredge in Selangor met a poor response, and no further attempts were made before 1914.[33]

There were some experiments in other technical innovations. The cost of bringing material up to surface level was reduced by the use of lifting gear, or building inclined ramps for elephants or coolies pushing wheelbarrows. The vast Sungei Besi mining pit, with a surface area of 12 acres and 200 feet depth, remains to illustrate how far such techniques could go.[34] As an alternative, the cost of removing the overburden from the entire pit was avoided by 'shaft' or 'underground' mining. Essentially this was a modernised form of the Malay technique (*lombong Siam*) of former times. A small pit, revetted if necessary, was dug down to the ore stratum; at its foot the workings extended outwards underground. There was of course a high risk of subsidence causing death.[35] However, in spite of official misgivings, there were still four thousand miners working 'underground mines' in Selangor in 1914.[36] A simpler method was just to 'fossick' (*lampan*) for tin by breaking down the vertical working surface into a sluice or stream, so that the water carried away the soil and left the heavier ore. Tributors, who had little capital, often used this method until it was banned in 1899, as a source of uncontrolled tailings.[37] Hydraulic mining was a more sophisticated use of water power, but it required suitable conditions of terrain which were not often found in Selangor, and so there was only one (European) hydraulic mine in the State.[38] Hydraulic mining, like dredging, had its origin in gold mining in California. A dam above ground was built to retain a conmsiderable amount of water, which was piped down into the mine, where a powerful jet was directed on to the vertical working face to break it down into slurry.[39]

The same principle, ie excavation by water power as a jet, underlay the 'gravel



PORT SWETTENHAM
The alternative site, now the site of the modern Port Kelang was originally known as Sungai Dua (Two Rivers), which can be seen at the top lefthand corner of the map. (From Mon bin Jamaluddin, A History of Port Swettenham)

pump' mine. In this case there was no reservoir above ground; instead a pump driven by a steam engine provided the water jet. The pump also raised the slurry to an inclined sluicebox on stilts (the familiar *palong*) at ground level to separate the ore.[40] This was originally a European mining technique but it suited the Chinese miners who made it their solution. Since European methods, with high capital costs, were only economic on large sites, official policy was to reserve such areas for European enterprises at the expense (in terms of opportunity) of the smaller, Chinese concern.[41]

One of the complaints made by mining entrepreneurs was that the labourers would not work the long hours which the former had been accustomed to demand. In 1902 an attempt to impose a minimum seven hour working day led to 'major riots' at Rawang and Rasa in Ulu Selangor.[42]

Although the general trend was towards shedding labour, especially by mechanisation on the mines, there was at most times a shortage of labour, because the rubber estates and ancillary activities provided new jobs. As a result the population continued to increase by immigration. The census figures[43], for the population, are a rough guide:-

Selangor Population
('000)

Census Year	*Malays**	*Chinese*	*Indians*
1891	27	51	3
1901	41	109	17
1911	65	151	74
1921	92	171	133

(* 'Malays' include 'Other Malaysians', ie Indonesians)

The rapid increase in government revenue and expenditure indicates a corresponding expansion of public services. In 1900 Selangor government revenue exceeded $6 million for the first time; a decade later, in 1910, it had doubled to $12 million. This upward trend was irregular and clearly the rubber booms of 1905 and 1910 were a dominant feature. The volatility of revenue derived from such a fluctuating source was not yet realised. In 1914 expenditure exceeded $20 million but with revenue at only $14 million (a slight decline). Surpluses of previous years could cover the substantial deficit but such a level could not be sustained. The war imposed a standstill on many expenditure projects, but in the 1920's there was to be a real crisis, and significant retrenchment.[44]

Until restriction under the Stevenson scheme imposed a check (in 1922) the output -- and export -- of rubber increased, year by year, as the large areas newly planted with rubber from about 1900 onwards came into bearing. In 1906 a mere 681,000 lbs. of rubber was shipped out of Port Swettenham; only four years later the volume had increased twelvefold to more than eight million lbs.[45] This exposed the errors which had been made in developing Port Swettenham, the only significant port on the Selangor coast. As the railway extended north and south from Kuala Lumpur, it tended to draw in freight to be carried over the original line

between Kuala Lumpur and Klang, for shipment at Port Swettenham.

Klang town, some miles upstream from the estuary of the Klang River, was not the place for a port. It was simply a town near the estuary with a stone jetty from which it got its traditional name (*Pengkalan Batu*). However, in the straightened circumstances of 1886, the railway ended at Klang, on the north bank facing the town.[46] Apart from native craft small coastal steamers could with difficulty come upriver to Klang. The master of such a vessel wrote that 'In my time [the turn of the century] you rushed your ship up the stream on top of the flood tide, with parrots screaming in the rigging, and the crocodiles lying like a guard of honour on either shore. The river was too narrow for a ship to turn. The manoeuvre, if that is not too neat a word, necessary to bring the ship's head round for the return journey, was to charge the mud bank, then, with the bow fixed, let the tide sweep the stern round, and back out. When the water was high the bow went far into the jungle amid the protesting monkeys and parrots, and the look-out men skipped and squealed as hornets' nests, dislodged from the trees, fell on the deck.'[47]

The first step towards a port on the coast was the Connaught Bridge, completed in 1890, which carried the railway over the river to Klang town. Thence it was easy to extend the line across flat, if swampy, land some six miles to the coast. The most direct extension would bring the line to the coast at the point where Port Swettenham was in fact built. There were two disadvantages to this site.[48] It did not face the open waters of the Straits of Malacca but was in the midst of an 'island studded estuary', on what was known as the Klang Straits, between the coast and an offshore island. The narrow channel to Port Swettenham from the sea was barely navigable by steamships of any size. Secondly the Klang Strait at the site of the port was shallow and the shore was soft mud. The inadequate remedies for this problem were the construction of a wharf, about a thousand feet in length, parallel with the shore and at a short distance out from it. It was connected with the shore by four bridgeheads, across which railway wagons carried cargo to and from some 'small and inadequate transit sheds' built on the mainland. Building godowns on a larger wharf on piles had been ruled out on account of the cost of piling. An expert, reviewing the situation in 1951, wrote -- somewhat charitably -- that the 'technical limitations of the site may not have been appreciated' and the port itself was 'built without much regard to a satisfatory layout of the harbur as a whole...the choice was wrong and shortsighted.'[49] Jetties were also built so that lighters and local craft could work their cargoes to and from the shore direct.

As a small coastal port Port Swettenham sufficed when it was built in 1901. However freight passing through it increased from 131,285 tons in 1902 to 207,337 tons in 1910. The movement of goods on to and off the wharf may have been a railwayman's dream; they were a stevedore's nightmare, causing acute congestion and delay, despite the use of lighters by ships berthed offshore. When it was decided to enlarge the port in 1911, so that it could become a third major port, to rival Singapore and Penang, there were vehement, but unavailing, demands that a completely new port should be built at the alternative site, considered but rejected ten years before, at the north end of the Klang Straits, where there was open sea and

deep water alongside the coast.[50] Only in modern times has the mistake been rectified by the construction of Port Kelang at that much more favourable site.[51]

Apart from its defects as a port, Port Swettenham became notorious for its devastating incidence of malaria. Here there was a happier outcome, since the government medical officer at Klang was Dr. (later Sir Malcolm) Watson, whose local research and experiments led to the decisive breakthough in control of malaria by measures to prevent the breeding of the mosquitoes which carry it.[52] This was a period when medical research in Selangor made its mark in world history. Apart from malaria, doctors working in Selangor (and Negri Sembilan), based on the Institute for Medical Research in Kuala Lumpur, discovered that *beri-beri*, which had killed so many thousands of Chinese labourers on the mines, was associated with a vitamin deficiency, caused by eating over-milled rice.[53]

Another consequence of the rubber boom was a rapid increase in the Indian population. Indian labour became the mainstay of the rubber estates. In addition they found employment in government departments, especially on railway construction work, and to some extent in the tin industry, which, by 1914, was employing almost six thousand Indians.[54]

There was a similar, though less noticeable influx of Javanese. Many of them arrived to work as labourers, moved on — perhaps to make the pilgrimage to Mecca — and did not return. However an increasing proportion settled down as smallholders, especially in the coastal districts of Selangor, which had been, from the 1880's, their preferred location.[55]

Life in the villages was now very different from what it had been a generation or so before. It was secure but much more closely regulated than in the past. The nearest agents of government were the village police station and the penghulu of the *mukim* (sub-district). The police were outsiders. In 1902 one third of the 318 Malays in the Selangor police were from Malacca and only 14 were local born Selangor Malays.[56] In Ulu Selangor 'a respectable man did not care for a constable to come near his house, whilst he would have refused to entertain the idea of giving his daughter in marriage to a man who wore the objectionable uniform.'[57]

The penghulu was, even if a local man — which was not always the case — immersed in official duties.[58] There had been an overhaul of the penghulu cadre, with brisker, younger minor bureaucrats replacing the ageing, ineffectual worthies, of whom their superiors had complained so much.[59]

The most significant area of contact between villagers and higher authority was the use and ownership of land. Apart from paying quit-rent on his existing holding, the smallholder had to apply for some form of title or permit if he wished to occupy new land. Shifting cultivation was no longer permitted. A title to land for permanent cultivation specified the crop which he must plant and required him to develope it within a specified time. Smallholders did not rush into planting rubber early in the century, though they made up for this later. The immediate effect of the opening of the new rubber estates was the opportunity of short-term employment for the villager, using his traditional expertise in felling jungle. He was also tempted to sell his existing holding, to which he had a marketable title, to estates eager to

extend their boundaries to the public roads. As first-comers smallholders had often taken up this land, and the estates had to begin with back land. These sales caused much concern to higher authorities, who feared the social consequences of a landless peasantry. A new policy was introduced whereby land with road frontage was set aside for plantation development.[60]

Coffee had proved a disaster for the smallholder and 'no one could foresee how long the rubber prosperity would last.'[61] Rubber cultivation was an unfamiliar technique and the seven year period before it came into bearing was another disincentive. Like the owners of coffee estates, the smallholder made his first tentative experiments with rubber planting it on existing holdings.[62] It had the incidental advantage of enhancing the value of the land if it were sold to an estate. On the other hand the powers-that-be used their considerable influence against smallholder participation in rubber growing.[63] None the less the tide of smallholder rubber growing began to flow strongly under the stimulus of the 1910 rubber boom. By 1914 there were some 70,000 acres of rubber smallholdings in Selangor.[64]

The federal Malay Reservations Enactment of 1913 provided for the reservation to Malay ownership of existing Malay land, and also unalienated land to be reserved for future occupation as demand increased. It was a reaction to Malay sales of land to rubber estates, but did not expressly prohibit Malay planting of rubber. In practice it was used as the legal instrument for such a prohibition, since new land (within a reservation) was granted on the condition that some other crop than rubber was to be planted on it. Malay opinion, expressed by the Malay rulers in the debate on the enactment of 1913, was hesitant over the advantages, perceived by officials, of putting a ring fence round Malay land. In Selangor it was feared that there would be claims for compensation, on the grounds that land reserved had fallen in value. Hence there was some delay in deciding which land in Selangor was to be Malay Reservation land. It was one of the areas of policy in which Sultan Sulaiman, with characteristic carefulness, took an active interest.[65] The exciting prospects of rubber did not entirely distract the smallholder from his more traditional agricultural interests, especially coconuts.[66]

No official encouragement could persuade the Selangor smallholder to plant *padi* for any more than the grower's domestic needs, though there were some early experiments in the construction of irrigation works, notably at Kuang in the Selangor valley.[67] It simply was not viewed as a worthwhile activity, though there was the familiar official threnody over lack of cultural incentives. 'The State is practically devoid of a native population of its own, the Malays being of foreign extraction... are under no hereditary obligation to occupy and till ground as their fathers have done before them...these people come into the country to make money, and turn naturally to mining and trading as the obvious way of attaining that end.' Only small patches of padi were grown 'in a half-hearted manner.'[68]

There was also concern about the minimal Malay share in the expanding government services, and the decline of traditional Malay handicraft industries. There was still a substantial Malay element in the police, and all teachers in Malay vernacular schools were of course Malays. In other government offices the messengers (*peons*)

were usually Malay, but clerical posts, for which a good knowledge of English was deemed essential, were filled by Indians (including Ceylon Tamils).[69] As a practical measure an area was set aside in Kuala Lumpur as a 'Malay Agricultural Settlement' (known in modern times as 'Kampong Bahru'). It was intended to be a Malay craft centre, in which the inhabitants could still 'live their natural village life almost within the precincts of a large town.' In the event it provided congenial living space for Malay office staff and other urban workers, but was a failure as a craft centre.[70]

The large majority of the Malay population lived in villages and avoided the towns, even though a network of roads and bullock-cart buses permitted some visits.[71] This attitude arose partly because a large town, such as Kuala Lumpur, was predominantly a place of foreigners (*orang asing*) where, despite the new settlement, even Malays did not 'live their natural village life.'

The working class Chinese, whether town dwellers or employed on mines and estates, also lived in a changing social environment. On the whole, health and living conditions, and terms of employment were less awful than they had been. But there was still severe overcrowding in urban lodging houses and the like. There was a government agency, the Chinese Protectorate, with staff who spoke Chinese and understood the customs and 'Spanish practices' of overseas Chinese communal life. In general the police, although the force had no Chinese members other than a handful of detectives, kept a firm grip on law and order.

Occasionally however there was a riot. In the 1890's an ineptly managed attempt to eliminate false weighing from Chinese street trading led to the *daching* riots.[72] The 'pigtail' (*tauchang*) riot of 1912 had wider implications. The overthrow of the imperial dynasty of China in 1911 had owed something to the support given to Sun Yat Sen by the overseas Chinese.[73] Branches of his organisation had been established at Kuala Lumpur in 1906 and at Klang before 1910.[74] The social reforms advocated by Sun Yat Sen caused controversy among the Malayan Chinese of all classes.[75] The queue ('pigtail') had become a symbol. In mid-nineteenth century the leaders of the Tai'ping rebellion against the Manchu had urged their followers to abandon the queue as an act of defiance.[76] However many Malayan Chinese, from Baba gentlemen to immigrant workers, preserved the queue as part of their cultural tradition.

At Chinese New Year in 1912 what began as a joke ended with serious faction fighting in Kuala Lumpur, lasting a week. In Petaling Street, near the reform party headquarters, some Hokkien rickshaw pullers were 'forcibly taken to barbers' shops where their *tauchangs* (queues) were removed.' The ensuing fighting was 'almost a reign of terror', and the volunteer force and the Malay States Guides were brought in to suppress it.[77] At one point a thousand men 'carrying two flags, the Revolution flag and the new Chinese flag' came marching up Petaling Street from the direction of the Selangor Chinese Chamber of Commerce, and the police opened fire on them. Middle-class Chinese women and children were evacuated to a place of safety, and on a mine at Ampang there was a fight between gangs, with and without queues.[78] It was generally believed that 'old scores' and 'the antagonism between the Khehs and Hokiens' underlay the conflict.[79] The Chinese Chamber of Commerce con-

vened a peacemaking assembly of community leaders, and proposals were made for establishing a Chinese Advisory Board (to advise the government) such as had been established in Singapore and Penang in 1889, at the time when secret societies were first officially proscribed.[80]

Before colonial rule of the western Malay states animosity between clan and dialect groups had fuelled the power struggle between secret societies.[81] Secret societies had long been proscribed in those states but survived as criminal rather than communal bodies. In 1906 and again in 1908 Selangor Chinese had been punished for involvement in secret societies.[82] In 1909 the police got information of plans to hold the largest meeting of secret society leaders for a decade at the Chinese temple at Pudu, on the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur. The police surrounded the building and there was a ferocious gun battle.[83]

Although the 'farming' of revenue collection and monopolies was coming to an end in the early years of this century, so long as it lasted the police acted to protect the exclusive rights given to the farmers. Raids on unlicensed gaming houses could be exciting. In one such operation the future Sultan Iskander of Perak, then a police officer, entered a gaming house in the guise of a patron, but his identity was suspected and he dived under the table as the main body of police broke in.[84]

In the late nineteenth century social relations between Europeans and well-to-do Asians had been amicable, though hardly intimate. After 1900 the situation deteriorated seriously.[85] The European community had always had a privileged position, but their small numbers, less than two hundred in Selangor in 1891, had disposed them to social contact with Asians on a selective basis; race meetings, for example, brought them together in a common recreation.[86] Choo Kia Peng, educated at an English language secondary school at Penang, began his meteoric business career as a clerk and then as manager of Loke Yew's varied interests in Ulu Selangor, where — in the early 1900's — the old relationship survived. He, and Chinese government employees, were members of the Kuala Kubu (European) club, made welcome as companions and not least as cricketers. The district officer reckoned that Kia Peng's closest friend, chief clerk of the government treasury, could have kept wicket for an English minor county team. Kia Peng also remembered an uproarious dinner at the district officer's house, to bid farewell to an officer going on transfer, after which 'we all marched with the Selangor State Band through Serendah town'.[87]

Apart from Loke Yew the most conspicuous Asian notable in mixed society was Thambusamy Pillai, who had come to Selangor in 1875 as clerk to the first Resident. The expanding economy of the 1880's offered him wider opportunities. He gave up his government post to go into business as a miner and contractor for work such as road construction, often in association with Loke Yew. In his prime in the 1890's he was 'a leading light at the Selangor Club...keenly interested in racing...a curry tiffin at his house on the Batu Road was something to remember.'[88] In his own community he was generous with his money, and he built the Mariamman Hindu temple in what is now Jalan Tun H.S.Lee.[89] His death (c.1902) removed one of the leading bridgebuilders of Selangor society.

The European community, always concentrated in Kuala Lumpur, grew rapidly. Between 1901 and 1911 the number of Europeans in Selangor almost trebled from 487 to 1,348, and in the next decade (1911-1921) it almost doubled again to 2,467.[90] The government bureaucracy, now including the swelling ranks of the FMS federal departments, made its contribution, but there was an even sharper increase, from a lower base, in the number of European planters and businessmen. In the towns at least improved living conditions induced a rise in the proportion of women.[91] The majority of this enlarged community came from the British middle-class, and they were very class-conscious among themselves as much as to outsiders. There was, said one embittered observer, 'a doosid lot of side.'[92]

They became an inward-looking group, beset by their own lack of tolerance. For example 'the Victorian social etiquette of "dropping cards" was most strictly observed on pain of something like social *felo-de-se*.'[93] For a European woman the daily round might begin with a patronising morning drive into Chinatown to do some shopping. After 'the noise and dust in the native town' she took an afternoon siesta during the hours of maximum heat. Social life took off in the early evening with some outing or gentle sporting activity before sunset. Then they went to the club to read the newspapers (with the news of Edwardian high society at home) or to play cards. Finally they returned to their house, or went to someone else's, for a late dinner — and so to bed.[94]

Unlike their predecessors the Europeans in Selangor in the early years of this century found no pleasure in the company of notables of the Asian community. Inasmuch as the latter were wealthier, there was an inclination to assert European superiority by claiming a more refined lifestyle. There were offensive demands for segregation from the uncouth Asian, in government resthouses and hospitals and in first-class railway carriages. Of the small number of Asians, who had moved easily if infrequently in European society in the 1890's, few now remained. Thambusamy Pillai and the last Capitan China, Yap Kwan Seng, had died in 1902. The leading Chinese were Loke Yew and Yap Hon Chin, son of Yap Ah Loy.[95] Sultan, formerly Raja Muda, Sulaiman, now lived at Klang and was immersed in his role as ruler.[96] Loke Yew, unlike a number of his colleagues of the Selangor Chinese Chamber of Commerce, was — by European as much as Chinese standards — a man of charm and sophistication, a personal friend of Swettenham (Governor until 1904) who had travelled to Europe. He both protested, in restrained terms, at social apartheid and tried to induce his own people to adapt to European foibles at points of contact.[97] However the atmosphere remained sour until, in the 1920's, some bridges were built, notably the foundation of the Kuala Lumpur branch of the International Rotary Club.[98]

The European community was particularly sensitive to anything felt to lower its status. The Hollywood film, with its tales of adultery and the like, showed that European standards were in some respects inferior to those of Asians — but the cinema did not make a major impact until the 1920's, when censorship was imposed. Nearer home the trial of Ethel Proudlock in Kuala Lumpur touched this aspect of European society; she was convicted of murdering the man who was prob-



Main Rail and Road Links in early 20th century Selangor

The original (1886) railway line between Klang and Kuala Lumpur was extended to Port Swettenham by 1900. Extensions north and south towards the Perak and Negri Sembilan boundaries were begun in the 1890's. Owing to high ground at Mantin the southern line originally ended at Kajang; it was completed as far as Seremban by 1903.

The north south main road ran almost parallel with the railway. After a projected railway line to Kuala Selangor had been found too costly, a road was built from Rawang along the Kuang and Selangor river valleys to Kuala Selangor. Secondary roads were built to link Klang and Kuala Selangor and Kajang and Bagan Datoh (Kuala Langat).

(Sketch map, not to scale.)

ably her lover. The outcry over the Proudlock trial in 1911 was revived later on when Somerset Maugham adapted the affair as the basis of his most celebrated Malayan short story, 'The Letter'.[99]

Among the Europeans there were some 'old hands' who maintained the more creditable attitude which they carried on from the 1890's. Outstanding among them were Dr.E.A.O. Travers and J.H.M.Robson. Travers, head of the government medical service in Selangor from 1890 to 1908, had many interests 'professional, sporting, social, commercial and financial', and he was, according to Robson, 'the life and soul of the European community'.[100] Early in his career Travers had founded the Selangor Recreation Club, believing that young salaried Asian government employees, to whom the Selangor Club was effectually closed by expense if not by membership rules, needed somewhere more salubrious to meet in than the drinkshops of the town.[101]

Robson came to Selangor, after a brief spell in Ceylon as a planter, in 1889, to become an administrator. He gave up this career in 1896 to found the *Malay Mail* newspaper (with the aid of a loan from Loke Yew). For a decade he ran his paper singlehanded, writing leading articles and reporting on the advancement of the Malays among other subjects. In later life he was a prominent public figure, an articulate member of the FMS Federal Council during the 'decentralization' controversy of the 1920's, and a successful businessman.[102]

Another who deserves honourable mention was John Russell, who became Government Printer in 1890, and founded and edited the *Selangor Journal* (1892-1897). A fortnightly magazine which might so easily have been merely a trivial record of ephemeral European social gossip, under Russell's guidance, widened its outlook to provide a wide-ranging record of the Selangor of his time and before. Here one will find Malay state history, the ups and downs of the coffee industry, the material which Walter Skeat later published in his celebrated ethnographic survey, *Malay Magic*, and the disappearing customs and practices of pioneer Chinese tin mining.[103]

The rubber booms did as much as anything to make Kuala Lumpur the commercial capital of the Malay Peninsula. The town now had local branches of the three leading banks, and of the Singapore 'agency houses' which imported manufactured goods from abroad and managed the local business affairs of the new rubber companies. In 1896 the Selangor Government had reluctantly granted to professional advocates the right to appear in lawsuits before its courts. There was now a local 'inns of court' precinct in Klyne Street, down the road from the High Court, and plenty of commercial work to keep the legal eagles busy. The rubber estates, with their large labour force, had to maintain estate hospitals, under the charge of 'dressers'. These were supervised by 'visiting medical officers', private medical practitioners based in Kuala Lumpur and Klang, where there were also pharmacies. There were civil engineers, architects and 'engineering works', making machines and metal artefacts for the estates and other customers. Printers also produced newssheets on commercial subjects, and in some cases had photographic studios. Apart from the long-established trades of Chinatown, there were specialist estab-

lishments, including a 'horse repository' and cycle (later motor car) dealers. With the general use of paraffin for lighting and of petroleum products for fuel, the oil companies had set up storage depots on the edge of Kuala Lumpur (to minimise fire risks). The Singapore Cold Storage offered imported fresh foods, and other firms made ice and aerated waters. There had been a grocery shop and liquor store since the time when William Hornaday, in 1878, had bought champagne at ridiculously cheap prices; by now it was Chow Kit's emporium, to which everyone resorted. There were of course tailors, outfitter and drapers, as well as textile dealers.[104]

In the rural areas the increasing number of rubber estates of substantial size introduced a new form of organisation and lifestyle. Estates, unlike mines, had a predominantly Indian labour force, which included whole immigrant families, since there was work - as tappers and weeders - for wives and older children. For the accommodation of their labourers the estates built 'labour lines', sheds divided into cubicles and allocated to family units. These communities lived on the property of their employers and usually at a distance of some miles from the nearest village, town and public road. Hence they had an isolated existence under the control of the estate management but under the leadership of traditional headmen (*kanganies*). The management was required by law ('the Labour Code') to provide rudimentary medical services and elementary schools and some other welfare measures. The estate manager usually had the help of several European assistants and more numerous Asian supervisors, who formed a separate group. Although the estate was often owned by a company or other absentee proprietor, the estate manager had an interest in maximising profits, by the exercise of strict control over the labourers, and expenditure on wages and benefits. Officers of the Labour Department, by periodic inspections, sought to enforce minimum standards, and to ensure due observance of contractual obligations on both sides. In daily life the authority of the manager was paramount. These, however, are themes not peculiar to Selangor.[105]

As it turned out, 1910 was the highwater mark of prosperity in Selangor in the period which came to an abrupt end when war in Europe broke out in 1914. After 1910 the price of rubber fell, and in 1914 the price of tin also — inevitably public revenue also declined.[106] Perhaps because it was so unexpected, in Malaya at least, the outbreak of war caused a loss of confidence. The Selangor Chamber of Commerce held an emergency meeting on 2 August 1914 and sent a committee to propose to the Chief Secretary (executive head of the FMS Government) wartime measures such as restrictions on the withdrawal of money from the banks, price control of foodstuffs, compulsory food cultivation on estates and mobilisation of the local volunteer force. However the Chief Secretary, Sir Edward Brockman, did not welcome intervention in government policy-making and gave these ideas a 'polite but somewhat chilly' reception.[107]

Yet the mandarins had to recognise that it was no longer business as usual. The London tin market suspended dealings and the FMS Government had to intervene and offer to buy in tin at $60 per *pikul* to keep the mines going. This passing jolt came at an awkward time since the price of tin had fallen from $95.25 in February

to $57 in October 1914.[108] During the year the numbers employed on the mines fell by a quarter and some ten thousand Chinese, 'many of them decrepits', were repatriated.[109] By 1914 the London price of rubber had fallen to 2/3½d per lb., only a quarter of the level (8/9d) of 1910. It was dawning on those who had promoted rubber companies in the frantic boom of 1910 that their enterprises were overcapitalized and their forecasts over-optimistic.[110]

The guns were a long way off but the raid on Penang in October 1914 of the German cruiser 'Emden', and the mutiny (instigated it was believed by German prisoners) of an Indian regiment in Singapore in February 1915 were a sobering reminder that the war was not entirely out of range. The editor of the *Malay Mail*, reporting the news of the war, made it 'the most optimistic journal in Malaya'. Many of his readers had friends, relatives or former colleagues in the carnage and read the casualty lists with anxiety. No one knew how it would end, but for Selangor, as for the rest, it would be a different world after the war.[111]

Notes

1. J.M.Gullick, *Rulers and Residents - Influence and Power in the Malay States 1870-1920*, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1992, especially pp.93-95, but see also index entries 'Federated Malay States', offers this author's view of the objectives and effects of the formation and subsequent development of the FMS.
   See also R.Emerson, *Malaysia: A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule*, MacMillan, London, 1967, J.S.Sidhu, *Administration in the Federated Malay States 1896-1920*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1980, Chai Hon-Chan, *The Development of British Malaya 1896-1909*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1964, and F.A.Swettenham, *British Malaya*, etc. John Lane Bodley Head, London, 1906, revised, Allen & Unwin, London, 1948. These are only some of the numerous studies of FMS structure and history. In addition the efforts, between the wars, to 'decentralize' the FMS have generated much commentary.
2. Chapter 2 Notes 37 and 43. Chapter 4 Note 48. Chapter 6 Notes 55-59.
3. Chapter 7 Note 3, and J.M.Gullick, *Malay Society in the Late Nineteenth Century: the Beginnings of Change*, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1987, p.226.
4. A. C. Milner, *Kerajaan: Malay Political Culture on the Eve of Colonial Rule*, University of Arizona Press, Tucson, 1982, pp.2 and 118 n11.
5. *AR Pahang 1897*, para 74 - a comment by Hugh Clifford, then Resident of Pahang.
6. 'Report of the Resident-General FMS on the Durbar of 1897', enclosed with SSD 20 August 1897, reprinted as *CO Eastern Pamphlet 24A*. Both Swettenham and Sultan Idris had their reasons for proclaiming that the gathering had been a success, but the comment on a sense of common interest and identity is significant.
7. The official report of the 1903 Durbar, a much photographed occasion, was printed in *SGG* 1903, p.778f. On the celebrated speech by the disenchanted Sultan Idris see Gullick, *Rulers and Residents*, p.60.
8. Gullick, ibid., p.66f, and E.Thio, *British Policy in the Malay Peninsula 1880-1910*, vol.1, University of Malaya Press, Singapore, 1969, Chapter 8.
9. As early as 1879 a British official, E.W.(Sir Ernest) Birch had noted 'the recent appearance of a Vernacular Press in this Colony [Straits Settlements]', E. W. Birch, .The Vernacular Press in the Straits', *JSBRAS* 4, 1879. See also W.R.Roff, *The Origins of Malay Nationalism*, Yale University Press, 1967, pp.43-55, and A.C.Milner, *The Invention of Politics in Colonial Malaya* etc., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Chapter 4.
10. C.S.Hurgronje, *Mekka in the Latter part of the 19th Century* translated by J. H. Monahan, Brill,

Leiden, 1931, J.Vredenbregt, 'The Haddj: Some of its Features and Functions in Indonesia', *BKI* 118, 1962, Roff, op.cit., pp.38-43, Milner, *Invention of Politics*, under index entries 'Islam - pilgrims', and Gullick, *Malay Society*, p.300.

11. See Appendix 3.
12. S.M.Middlebrook, 'Yap Ah Loy (1837-1885)', *JMBRAS* 24(2), 1951, pp.20-21.
13. J.C.Jackson, *Planters and Speculators: Chinese and European Agricultural Enterprise in Malaya 1786-1921*, University of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1968, Chapter 10, and J. H. Drabble, *Rubber in Malaya 1876-1922: The Genesis of an Industry*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lump 1973. D.J.M.Tate, *The RGA History f the Plantation Industry in the Malay Peninsula*, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1996.
14. Chapter 7 Notes 72-81, and E.D.Hume, *Globular Jottings of Griselda*, William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh, 1907, p.38, for the quotation.
15. The concentration of the Malayan coffee industry in Selangor is evidenced by the volume of annual exports, which peaked in the first years of this century at 50,000 *pikuls* from Selangor, 10,000 from Negri Sembilan and 5,000 from Perak. Jackson, op.cit., Figure 33 (based on figures taken from Residents' annual administration reports). Planted acreage under coffee in Selangor had reached its highest level (about 10,000 acres) a few years before, when there were 60 coffee estates in Selangor. Annual Report of the Selangor Planters Association for 1896, printed in *SJ* 5, p.196.
16. Drabble, op.cit., p.17.
'Planters have paid much attention to rubber, especially the Para variety (*Hevea Brasiliensis*) of which a number of plants approaching one million were put out in 1899. The trees have been in some places set among the coffee, in others they are in plantations by themselves. The cultivation of the indigenous native rubber, *Rambong* (*Ficus Elastica*), has also received attention'. But much coffee planted by smallholders had been abandoned and was 'now too far gone to be capable of resuscitation'. *AR Selangor 1899*, para 9.
17. *AR Selangor 1900*, para 3. Planters in Selangor were still planting coffee as late as 1907, after the first rubber boom of 1905 had come and gone. *AR Selangor 1907*, para 5.
18. Gullick, *Malay Society*, p.154, gives a brief account of the hectic exploitation and rapid destruction of the wild gutta percha trees in Malayan forests, induced by the use of gutta to protect submarine telegraph cables, which were being laid across the world in the late 19th century.
19. *AR Selangor 1899*, para 51. Drabble, op.cit., pp.6-8.
20. Of 60 coffee estates in Selangor in 1896 (Note 15), about one third had planted areas in excess of 200 acres, but these may have included other crops, such as tapioca (or confuse total with planted acreage - a common mistake at this time). Another third were below 100 acres. By this time it was government policy to alienate new land for coffee estates in 320 acres blocks, but planters reckoned that this gave them a maximum plantable area of 200 acres. Minutes of a General Meeting of the Selangor Planters Association held on 15 December 1894, para 7, printed in *SJ* 3, p.129. Drabble, op.cit., p.23, citing SSD 12 January 1896.
21. See Note 14 above on estates along the railway. During the first rubber boom of 1905 smallholders who owned land fronting on a road and adjoining a European estate (sometimes between the estate and the road) showed a shrewd grasp of their advantageous position, paying their quit-rent promptly (to avoid forfeiture) and waiting until the price of rubber (and the planters' frenzy) had reached their peak. *AR Selangor 1906*, para 13. In the previous year it had become government policy not to alienate land fronting on roads to smallholders, but to reserve it for estates. *AR Selangor 1905*, para 13. But this was shutting the stable door after the horse had bolted. See Drabble, op.cit., p.72.
22. Drabble, op.cit., p.24. The government estimated that planting 500 acres with rubber and bringing it to maturity in the sixth year from planting would cost £9,000, with an additional working expenditure in the 6-8th years of £13,650, but forecast a prospective gross return (wildly optimistic as it turned out) of £60,000 to the end of the eighth year. Ibid. p.25.
23. Chapter 7 Note 17. Jackson, op.cit., p.218.
24. Whether coffee required or benefitted from being shaded from the full sun was debated long after

coffee ceased to be a major economic crop in Malaya. In a series of articles on coffee growing by 'A Planter', published in *SJ* 3 (1894-95), the author declared (p.162) himself 'a firm believer *in the absolute necessity*...[of] light shade' for Liberian coffee. A generation later, however, D.Grist, a government botanist (*An Outline of Malayan Agriculture*, Dept of Agriculture, Kuala Lumpur, 1936, p.190) wrote that 'the value of shade to coffee is doubtful' and shade trees should not be planted where Liberian coffee was grown. The modern view is that 'light permanent shade is usually beneficial'. H.S.Barlow, I.Enoch and R.A.Russell, in the revised [6th] edition of MacMillan's *Tropical Planting and Gardening*, Malayan Nature Society, Kuala Lumpur, 1991, p.396.
The Selangor total area planted with coffee had increased from 5,532 acres in 1910 to 9,953 acres in 1914. *AR Selangor 1910*, para 12, and 1914, para 14. On interplanting coffee and rubber see *AR Selangor 1911*, para 12, and *AR Selangor 1899*, para 9 (quoted in Note 16 above).

25. I.H.Burkill, *A Dictionary of the Economic Products of the Malay Peninsula*, 2 vols, revised 1935, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Kuala Lumpur, 1966, vol 1, p.631.
26. Jackson, op.cit., citing *AR Agriculture FMS 1907*, para 7. By 1901 the total had increased almost twentyfold to 5,965 acres. Ibid.
27. Selangor acreage Ibid., p.231. Drabble, op.cit., Appx 1, p.213, gives the maximum, minimum and average London prices of rubber from 1877 to 1922. The wide variation within a year shown by these figures is instructive of the instability of the market.

    The shortage of Indian and other labourers for estates and other employers was a much-discussed problem at this time, and resulted in a rapid growth in the Indian population of Selangor, which increased twentyfold between 1891 and 1911. Note 43 below and *AR Selangor 1911*, para 145. This is another area where Selangor shared a Malayan problem and its consequences in recruitment procedure etc. (Note 54 below).
28. This passage is based on Wong Lin Ken, *The Malayan Tin Industry to 1914*, University of Arizona Press, Tucson, 1965, Chapter 4, 'The Years of Transition 1896-1914', which gives a very detailed and illuminating picture of the interplay of factors which can only briefly be mentioned here.

    In 1897 the average London price of Straits tin was £61.14.4 per ton, as compared with £61.6.4 in 1878. In 1888 it had been £117.6.6, significantly higher than the prices of the early 1880's, which had saved Yap Ah Loy from ruin. Wong Lin Ken, op.cit., p.243 (prices) and p.249 (Selangor output), and Chapter 5 Note 35.
29. Wong Lin Ken, op.cit. p.258 (migration) and p.95 (labour relations).
30. J.G.Butcher, 'Loke Yew', in J.G.Butcher and H.Dick (eds), *The Rise and Fall of Revenue Farming* etc., MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1993. J.H.M.Robson, *Records and Recollections 1889-1934*, Kyle Palmer, Kuala Lumpur, 1934, pp.29-32. G.Hawkins, 'The Man who Built Bentong', J.Gullick and G.Hawkins, *Malayan Pioneers*, Eastern Universities Press, Singapore, 1958.
31. Chapter 3 Note 11.
32. *AR Selangor 1914*, paras 27 and 46. The silting problem was particularly acute in the Ulu Selangor district.
33. Yip Yat Yoong, *The Development of the Tin Mining Industry of Malaya*, University of Malaya Press, Singapore, 1969, pp.132f and 400. Wong Lin Ken, op.cit., p.202. *AR Selangor 1901*, para 21 (failure of dredge company flotation). There were no dredges working in Selangor up to 1914. Yip Yat Yoong, op. cit. pp.127-129, is an informative review of the different mining techniques. Wong Lin Ken, op.cit., p.218f, on Chinese experiments with European mining methods of the time.
34. An elephant could carry half a ton of ore, though 4-6 cwt was a more practicable load. J.F.A.McNair, *Perak and the Malays: Sarong and Keris*, Tinsley Bros, London, 1878, p.122. The use of elephants to carry people or loads had, in the pre-colonial period, been confined to northern Malaya and was not common in Selangor. Gullick, *Malay Society*, p.198. When Governor Mitchell visited mines at Ipoh in 1894, he 'found a parade of 52 elephants awaiting me', though he was told that coolies pushing wheelbarrows were cheaper. SSD 22 March 1894.

    Wong Lin Ken, op.cit., p.207, mentions trucks pushed on rails up slopes and 'winding machines'.

There are photographs (c.1907) of the Sungei Besi mine in A.Wright and H.A.Cartwright, *Twentieth Century Impressions of British Malaya*, Lloyds Publishing, London, 1908, pp.527 and 530, and the dimensions of the mine are given at p.527.

35. Chapter 3 Note 12 (*lombong Siam*). Chinese miners called these pits 'ta lung'. Wong Lin Ken, op.cit., pp.196-97, quotes an 1898 Mines Dept description and (p.278) has a photograph showing the windlass used for hoisting. It was 'an enterprise of a very speculative nature' in the official view. *AR Selangor 1901*, para 21.
36. *AR Selangor 1914*, para 20. This was only 8% of the mining labour force as there were upwards of 40,000 men at work on opencast mines and almost 10,000 on hydraulic and *lampan* mines. Ibid.
37. Wong Lin Ken, op.cit., pp.43 and 180.
38. Ibid. ,pp.150-51 and 201. There were a number of hydraulic mines in Perak and in Negri Sembilan. Ibid., p.201. See also Yip Yat Yoong, op.cit. p.130.
39. The slurry had to be treated to separate the heavier ore from the unproductive gravel. Wong Lin Ken, op.cit., pp.150-51.
40. Yip Yat Yoong, op.cit.,p.131.
41. In granting mining leases it was normal to impose a condition requiring the lessee, within six months, to employ at least 2 labourers per acre or install equivalent machinery (1 hp = 8 labourers). Ibid., p.173. To recover large areas already granted to Chinese miners, who could not or did not choose to comply with the condition, it became official policy to forfeit the lease, so that the land could be re-let to a European company. Yip Yat Yoong, op.cit., p.152.
42. Wong Lin Ken, op.cit., p.207, citing Sel.Sec 1470, 1528 and 1540 of 1902. Choo Kia Peng, in his unpublished memoirs, gives an account of the miners' grievances, to which the 7 hour day was only the last straw. Choo was at this period manager of Loke Yew's mines in Ulu Selangor.
43. *Census Reports* 1891, 1901, 1911 and 1921.
44. *Manual of Statistics Relating to the Federated Malay States 1920*, Government Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1920, extracted in Wong Lin Ken, op.cit., pp.261-62. Lim Teck Ghee, *Peasants and their Agricultural Economy in Colonial Malaya 1874-1941*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1977, discusses (p.105) the effects of unstable commodity prices on public finance.
45. *AR Selangor 1910*, para 12. Some of the rubber passing through Port Swettenham had come in (over the railway network) from areas of Perak and Negri Sembilan adjoining Selangor. One sixth of 1910 exports came from outside Selangor. Ibid.

    103,053 tons of goods came to Port Swettenham for shipment in 1902; by 1910 the figure had risen by 70% to 174,659 tons, cited in Mon bin Jamaluddin, *A History of Port Swettenham*, Malaya Publishing House, Singapore, 1963, p.9. Mon and Allen (Note 47 below) are the principal sources for this passage.

    In 1906, the area planted with rubber in Selangor was 44,821 acres, of which two fifths, 19,063 acres, had been planted in that year (following the first rubber boom of 1905). Jackson, op.cit., p.231, citing *AR Agriculture FMS 1906*. It can therefore be deduced that in 1910, when the planted area had increased to 225,000 acres, only 25,758 acres (44,821 less 19,063) was five or more years old, and almost 200,000 acres (225,013 less 25,758) had not yet begun to produce rubber. Six or seven years is the normal interval between planting and productive maturity.
46. Chapter 6 Note 6.
47. W.Blain, *Home is the Sailor - the Sea Life of William Brown, Master Mariner and Penang Pilot*, Hurst & Blackett, London, 1940, quoted in K. G. Tregonning, Home Port Singapore: *A History of the Straits Steamship Company 1890-1965*, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1967, p.31. Blain was master of coastal steamships based at Penang from 1898 to 1906, when he became a Penang pilot. He must therefore be describing taking vessels up and down the Klang River c.1900.

    Rather than face these adventures coastal steamships often anchored at the estuary of the Klang River using lighters to carry their cargo to or from the land. D.F.Allen, *Report on the Major Ports of Malaya*, Government Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1951, p.34 para 85.
48. Mon, op.cit. has a sketchmap, reproduced as Map 11 herein.
49. Allen, loc.cit.The forceful and respected C.E.Spooner, former State Engineer (Chapter 6 Note 8

and Chapter 8 Note 21), had become General Manager, FMS Railways, when the state railways systems were amalgamated under the FMS regime and held the post until his death in office in 1909. He had in 1893 recommended the site actually chosen in preference to 'Deepwater Point' (modern Port Kelang). Mon, loc.cit. Spooner had begun his career building railways in north Wales.

50. Allen, op.cit., p.34. The shipping companies effectively discouraged the use of Port Swettenham as a 'base' port (for direct shipment of cargo to be exported from Malaya) by imposing a surcharge of 5/- per ton (from which rubber however was excluded). Ibid.

51. In the 1890's debate on the choice of a site, the business community had advocated the better situated Deepwater Point site. In 1911 the Selangor Chamber of Commerce again protested vigorously against expanding Port Swettenham instead of building a new port at the alternative site, and apparently ventilated the prevalent allegations that the 'final choice [of the Port Swettenham site] was influenced by questions of land ownership'. Allen, loc.cit. This was a shaft aimed at Swettenham, whose involvement in other land transactions is clear. H.S.Barlow, *Swettenham*, Southdene, Kuala Lumpur, 1995, Chapter 30, 'Land Speculation', and pp.507-508 on the port site.

J.de V.Allen, 'Johore 1901-1914 - the Railway Concession' etc, *JMBRAS* 45(2), 1972, p.5, in introducing other allegations against Swettenham, concedes that any improper influence by him on the choice of site for Port Swettenham 'has never. . .been conclusively proved, but there is a good prima facie case for believing it true'. This is rather harsh since, unlike some other matters, there is no evidence that Swettenham owned land in the area of Port Swettenham or sought to influence the choice of site. He was absent from Selangor from 1889 to 1895 (as Resident of Perak), and the chosen site for the new port had been submitted to the Colonial Office for approval in 1894. Mon, loc.cit. He exposed himself to his critics by complacently agreeing (as Governor 1901-1904) that the new port should bear his name. In this, as in his general defiance of strictures on ownership of land by officials in Malaya, he was imprudent and his own worst enemy. In this case the decisive voice seems to have been Spooner, and reasons have been suggested for his views (Note 49); Spooner's integrity was never in question.

52. *AR Selangor 1901*, para 53. J.A.Reid, 'Malaria', *The Institute for Medical Research 1900-1950*, Government Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1951, p.158, citing M.Watson, *The Prevention of Malaria in the Federated Malay States*, 2nd ed, 1921.

Optimum breeding conditions are not the same for all kinds of mosquito, and so control measures first developed by Watson on the coast proved ineffective against mosquitoes inland at Kuala Lumpur. Further research discovered how to control mosquitoes in inland areas.

53. F.E.Byron, 'Beri Beri', in the IMR History (Note 52). Much of the credit was due to the talented but cantankerous Dr. W.L.Braddon, at the time head of the Negri Sembilan Medical Dept. By his Durian Tipus experiment Braddon showed that the incidence of beri beri varied with the kind of rice consumed by labourers. It took the researchers at the IMR some years to show that 'white rice', which the labourers preferred, had been overmilled and so deprived of the vitamin C in its cortex. The IMR, dedicated its history to Swettenham, since he as Resident-General FMS had taken the decision to establish it. As Resident of Selangor (1882-89) he had seen the appalling mortality among labourers at that time (Chapter 6 Note 35f), and he took an active interest in improving medical services.

54. *AR Mines Dept 1914*, p.5, cited by Wong Lin Ken, op.cit., p.219; see also Note 27 above. On the mines Indians were only a small proportion of the total labour force, which still numbered 171,799 in 1914. They formed a larger part of the employees on European mines.

In 1900 five thousand Indian labourers were recruited for work in Selangor. *AR Selangor 1900*, para 52. From 1907 there was a coordinated recruitment system funded by employers' contributions.

55. See Chapter 7 Note 2 on factors which make it difficult to establish how many 'Javanese' in the census figures were first generation immigrants. However the census figures for 1891 and 1931 show what a massive increase of Javanese in Selangor occurred within a span of forty years, and its

concentration in coastal districts:-

Javanese in Selangor

District	*1891*	*1931*
Kuala Lumpur	284	*1,889
Ulu Selangor	69	564
Ulu Langat	46	2,075
Klang	359	9,261
Kuala Langat	607	7788
Kuala Selangor	193	11,835
Total (Selangor)	1,111	33,412

(*1,071 in Kuala Lumpur town)

This is a thirtyfold increase of Javanese as compared with a fifteenfold increase (1,717 to 25,090) over the same period in 'Other Malaysians' (excluding Javanese), ie Sumatran immigrants.

56. *AR Selangor 1902*, para 96. The general Malay attitude towards the police was no doubt affected by the preference shown by the successors to H.C.Syers (Chapter 5 Note 8) after Syers' death in 1897 for recruitng Sikhs and Punjabi Muslims. J.M.Gullick, 'Syers and the Selangor Police 1875-1897', *JMBRAS* 51(2), reprinted in *Glimpses of Selangor 1860-1898*, MBRAS Monograph No 25, pp.65, 78 and 83. 'The Indians provided the backbone of the Malayan Police but such a situation was anomalous, and itself a source of distrust in the country at large'. P.Morrah, 'The History of the Malayan Police', *JMBRAS* 36(2), 1963, p.102. However at about this time the appointment of Raja Alang (later Sultan Iskander of Perak 1918-38) as an Assistant Commissioner of Police, charged with improving Malay recruitment, proved an inspired, and inspiring, solution.
57. J.H.M.Robson, *People in a Native State*, Singapore Free Press, Singapore, 1894, p.23. Under Syers' regime the police detachments in districts were under the administrative charge of the district officer. Robson, while serving in Ulu Selangor in the 1890's, had thus been in close contact with his Malay police.

    There was a similar prejudice in Pahang against Malay police recruited from Kelantan and Trengganu. *AR Pahang 1889*, paras 23-24.
58. In *AR Perak 1909*, para 22, Ernest Birch quotes from Winstedt, then DO Matang, a comparison of the old and new type of penghulu - a passage partly reproduced in Gullick, *Malay Society*, p.101.
59. Chapter 5 Note 54 and Chapter 9 Note 70. The most energetic reformer was E.W.(Sir Ernest) Birch, as Resident of Perak (1904-10), who was very proud of reorganising penghulus into four grades, differentiated by salary scales and selected by a formal procedure. *AR Perak 1906*, para 8. A similar policy was adopted in Selangor, though as late as 1899 almost half the 47 penghulus bore titles (Raja, Dato or Syed) indicating aristocratic origin. *AR Selangor 1899*. Despite the growing pressure of official business, such as keeping records of applications for land (*AR Selangor Lands Dept 1897*, in *SGG* 1898) the penghulus of the old school were reluctant to retire. As examples, Syed Mashhor, a civil war leader (Chapter 4 Note 25), was penghulu of Kerling in Ulu Selangor from c.1882 until his enforced retirement (aged 62) in 1899. *SGG* 1899, p.16; and Raja Bot, an absentee penghulu of Sungei Buloh (1887-1895) also had to be eased out. Chapter 9 Notes 85-86. In both cases membership of the State Council, a distinction without executive duties, softened the blow.
60. Note 21.
61. Lim Teck Ghee, op.cit., p.74.
62 Ibid., citing *AR Selangor 1909*.
63. Ibid. Although the declared purpose of the Malay Reservations Enactment (Note 65 below) was to reserve Malay holdings (and adjacent vacant land) for Malay occupation, it was used to impose restrictions on smallholder planting of rubber. Gullick, *Rulers and Residents*, p.201.

    In 1911 the Selangor government had introduced, as a precursor to the federal enactment of 1913, a scheme for restricting the ownership of Malay 'ancestral lands' to Malays and a prohibition

on planting rubber on them. P.H.Kratoska, "Ends that we cannot foresee"; Malay Reservations in British Malaya', *JSEAS* 14(1), 1983, p.153, and Sidhu, op.cit., p.162.

These practices reflected the views of H.C.(Sir Henry) Belfield, Resident of Selangor from 1903 to 1910, upon whom had fallen the mantle of being the leading exponent of official land policy. See Drabble and also Sidhu, op.cit., index entries 'Belfield'.

64. 71,882 acres of mature rubber on smallholdings in Selangor in 1921 (Jackson, *Planters and Speculators*, p.265), must have been planted not later than 1914, but 'smallholdings' in these statistics probably include holdings up to 100 acres in size, ie small estates of the proprietary type, with both European and Asian owners. The ratio of estates of less than 100 acres to smallholdings for Malaya as a whole was about 1:8 in 1921 (derived from Drabble, op.cit., p.217).

Jackson's source is D.M.Figgart, *The Plantation Rubber Industry in the Middle East*, US Dept of Commerce, Washington, 1925, Tables 129-131. It is believed that Figgart derived his figures from a survey made by an American company (General Rubber Company) in 1916-17, but its basis of ascertaining the area of Asian holdings is unknown and somewhat suspect. Drabble, loc.cit. From 1922 onwards the regulatory regime under the Stevenson restriction scheme inaugurated in that year, produced more reliable data.

In addition to the mature smallholder acreage under rubber in Selangor in 1921, there were 45,000 acres of immature smallholders rubber, planted between 1914 and 1921. Jackson, loc.cit.

65. Lim Teck Ghee, op.cit., pp.113-14. *AR Selangor 1913*, para 141 (Sultan Sulaiman), and *AR Selangor 1915*, para 22 (claims for compensation). A district officer in Selangor estimated that reservation of a holding under the 1913 enactment reduced its market value by up to 50%. As the law restricted ownership but not occupation, its intention was widely evaded. Kratoska, op.cit. p.117.

66. *AR Selangor 1907*, para 14. *AR Selangor 1908*, para 14. Between 1910 and 1914 the area under coconuts in Selangor increased from 28,667 to 35,092 acres. *AR Selangor 1910*, para 14, and *AR Selangor 1914*, para 14. In 1910 a 'European syndicate' took up land for coconut planting (1910 report loc.cit.) but this can hardly have increased the total by a quarter.

67. *AR Selangor 1900*, para 10. Lim Teck Ghee, op.cit., pp.44, 83 and 100n. By 1910 the scheme was declared a failure and the land opened to mining. Lim, p.100.

68. *AR Selangor 1902*, para 15. The same conclusion is given in *AR Selangor 1908*. In 1914 the total *padi* acreage in Selangor was only 9,448 acres. *AR Selangor 1914*, para 14.

The shortage of imported rice during and after the 1914-1918 war led to renewed efforts to encourage local cultivation of padi, another cause to which Sultan Sulaiman lent his support, proposing that 3 acres per man should be allocated to 10,000 Malays in Selangor who wished to plant *padi* but had no suitable land. *AR Selangor 1917*. para 157, *Proceedings of the FMS Federal Council*, 17 November 1917, Sidhu, op.cit., p.100 and Lim Teck Ghee, op.cit., p.119. See also Chapter 7 Notes 24-26.

69. The second assembly (durbar) of FMS Rulers in 1903 (Note 7 above), in its discussions of this topic, was mainly concerned with finding employment for young Malays of aristocratic birth, and recognised that education was the key factor. It led on ultimately to the foundation of the Malay College at Kuala Kangsar in 1905. R. Stevenson, *Cultivators and Administrators: British Educational Policy towards the Malays 1875-1906*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1975, Chapter 8. Gullick, *Malay Society*, p.169, on more general questions of Malays in government service.

70. *AR Selangor 1901*, para 141, and *AR Selangor 1902*, para 130. J.Hands, 'Malay Agricultural Settlement, Kuala Lumpur', *MHJ* 2(2), 1955, and Sidhu, op.cit., p.158.

71. Many Malay town dwellers had grown up in villages, kept in touch with their kinsfolk there, and often retired to village life later on. But Selangor villagers, as recently as the 1960's, tended to regard Malay townsmen as 'alien'. P.J.Wilson, *A Malay Village and Malaysia*, HRAF Press, New Haven, 1967, p.45f, see especially p.48. The author did his fieldwork in Kuala Langat. Chapter 7 Note 3.

72. J.H.M.Robson, *Records and Recollections*, p.178. A *daching* is a steelyard (pivoted balance scale) whose accuracy depends on correct calibration. As there were fraudulent scales in use, street traders were required to buy new ones from the only supplier in Kuala Lumpur. They professed to be outraged at compulsory purchase from a monopoly supplier. When the trouble started. rickshaws

disappeared from the streets 'as if by magic' and bricks were thrown at the windows of the supplier. The police dispersed the mob by making a bayonet charge, but they gathered elsewhere. The Resident and the Protector of Chinese went down in a 'dog-cart' (light carriage) and from that podium harangued them, warning of serious consequences. By then tempers had cooled and they dispersed.

73. Sun Yat Sen made a dozen visits to Singapore in the decade before 1911, and organised a local party to support his cause, the T'ung Meng Hui ('TMH'). However the Chinese Chambers of Commerce gave no less vehement support to the imperial dynasty. C.F.Yong and R.B.McKenna, *The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya 1912-1949*, Singapore University Press, Singapore, 1990, pp.10-12.
74. Ibid., p.13.
75. V.Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia*, Oxford University Press, London, 2nd edition, 1965, Chapters 29-31, deals comprehensively with these matters, and also education, labour relations and other social questions. See also his earlier, *The Chinese in Malaya*, Oxford University Press, London, 1948, especially Chapters 10-12. These are Malayan themes, which affected Selangor but not in any way differently from other parts of Malaya.
76. J. D. Vaughan, *The Manners and Customs of the Chinese of the Straits Settlements*, Mission Press, Singapore, 1879, reprinted Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1971, p.3.
77. Robson, *Records and Recollections*, pp.179-180. The FMS Volunteer Force, predominantly European, was a part-time defence unit raised in the patriotic aftermath of the Anglo-Boer war (1899-1902). When the FMS was formed, some of the large Indian element in the police (Note 56 above) had been hived off to form the Malay States Guides, as a military reserve to be used in support of the police when required. Gullick, *Syers*, p.77. Wright and Cartwright, op.cit., p.587 (Malay States Guides) and p.597 (volunteer force). The Guides were disbanded after some rather unheroic conduct in the 1914-18 war. Gullick, *Rulers and Residents*, p.258 n36.
78. Robson, *Records and Recollections*, pp.184-87.
79. Ibid., pp.190 and 193.
80. Ibid., p.190. W.L.Blythe, *The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies*, etc, Oxford University Press, London, 1969, pp.233-34.
81. Chapter 4 Note 11. Chapter 9 Note 26. Blythe, op.cit., p.255f.
82. Blythe, op.cit., p.291.
83. Morrah, op.cit., pp.113-14.
84. Ibid., p.110 (the clash). Note 56 above (Sultan Iskander).
85. Chapter 8 Note 49.
86. The 1891 census figure for the Selangor European population was 190. Chapter 8 Note 51 (race meetings).
87. Choo Kia Peng, op.cit. (Note 42). See also Note 30 on Loke Yew's career.

    Choo Kia Peng withdrew from public life after the 1939-45 war, as his prominence during the Japanese occupation had damaged his reputation. He wrote his memoirs to vindicate himself, and to emphasise his friendly relations with the British. However some corroboration of Choo's general picture of Asian social relations with Europeans in the 1890's, is given by Robson (Note 102 below) in his *Records and Recollections*, and by many items in *SJ*. Robson, like Choo, had lived in Ulu Selangor (Note 57).

    The Selangor State Band (Philippino musicians) was part of the Selangor state police force but accepted invitations to play on public occasions and at social events. Gullick, *Syers*, p.71, on the 'Manila Band'.
88. Robson, *Records and Recollections*, p.50.
89. Until 1924, when there was a furious row, the management of the temple was treated as a sort of hereditary right of Thambusamy's heirs and associates. *Report of the Proceedings of a Meeting held on 6 January 1924*, probably privately printed, Kuala Lumpur, 1924.
90. This passage is derived mainly from J.G.Butcher, *The British in Malaya 1880-1941: the Social History of a European Community in Colonial South-East Asia*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1979. Population figures from census reports.

91. In Kuala Lumpur the ratio of European women to men increased from 31:100 to 61:100 between 1891 and 1911. Butcher, p.209, using census figures.
92. *SJ* 2, p.306. See Chapter 6 Note 50 on the Lake Club, an early but striking example of the changing trend to exclusiveness within the European community. The small number who were not of British middle-class origin, mainly railway engine drivers and prison warders, were excluded from the social life of the bourgeois majority. Butcher, p.94. Even the popular and respected Commissioner of Police, H.C.Syers, was notably reticent about his working-class origins. Gullick, *Syers*, Appendix 1, 'Syers' Origins'.
93. Selangor Golf Club, *Twelve Under Fours - an informal history of the Selangor Golf Club*, printed for private circulation, Kuala Lumpur, 1953, p.4. *Felo-de-se* is a legal term for suicide.
94. E.D.Hume, op.cit, pp.54-58. A longer extract from this passage, describing the social round, is printed in J.M.Gullick (ed.), *They Came to Malaya - A Travellers' Anthology*, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1993, pp.87-89.
95. Butcher, *British in Malaya*, p.67. Yap Hon Chin was an extravagant playboy, who had little standing in his own community. On Loke Yew see Note 30 above, and on Yap Hon Chin Chapter 9 Note 27.
96. Chapter 9 Note 69f.
97. Butcher, *British in Malaya*, p.99.

    With the lapse of the office of Capitan China -- no successor to Yap Kwan Seng was appointed after his death in 1902 -- the Selangor Chinese Chamber of Commerce, formed in 1904 (to replace informal meetings over which Loke Yew presided) became the recognised forum of consultation among prominent towkays and channel of communication with the government. The Chamber was, for example, given the right to nominate two members of the Kuala Lumpur Sanitary Board, the municipal authority (Chapter 8 Note 30).

    Wright and Cartwright, op.cit., p.855, provide an informative list of the names of the original committee of management of the Chamber, headed by Loke Yew as chairman. On the death of Loke Yew, in 1917, leadership of the Selangor Chinese community devolved on Choo Kia Peng (Notes 42 and 87 above), who had served a term as an unofficial member of the FMS Federal Council when it was formed in 1909, and was again a member between the wars. Other associates of Loke Yew, who were prominent in their time were Chan Sow Lin (d.1919) and Loke Chow, proprietor of 'Chow Kit', the Europeans' grocer (Note 104 below).
98. Butcher, *British in Malaya*, p.188, quoting G.Hawkins and W.S.Thaddeus (eds.), *Rotary International Jubilee 1905-1955*, Rotary Club Kuala Lumpur, 1955, and the *Malay Mail*.
99. R. Stevenson, 'Cinema and Censorship in Colonial Malaya', *JSEAS* 5(2), 1974. Butcher, *British in Malaya*, p.171. Mrs Proudlock had worked as a teacher at the Methodists Girls School in Kuala Lumpur, where the headmistress was convinced of her innocence. M.Marsh, *Hard Scrabble: Memoirs of Malaysia 1910-1960*, probably printed for private circulation, 1966, p.43-44. Marsh describes her as 'a pretty blond Eurasian woman', and reports that, after being deported she went to live in New York. R.O.Winstedt, *Start from Alif, Count from One: an Autobiographical Memoire*, Oxford University Press, 1969, p.5, describes her as an avid cinemagoer lost in her dreams of romance. She had however engaged in 'assiduous revolver practice' before the shooting which she said was an unpremeditated defence of her honour against a rapist. E.Lawlor of Houston, Texas, is engaged in extensive research, with a view to publishing a book on the Proudlock Case and related matters. He (private comm.) has discovered that Ethel was the daughter, possibly not legitimate, of an overseer in the Selangor PWD, named Charter. After the marriage to Proudlock, the newly weds went on leave to England, where a daughter was born to them early in 1908.

    In the controversy over the trial much was made of the fact that there was no trial by jury in the Malay States (owing to European distrust of Asian jurymen). Somerset Maugham, when he visited Malaya in 1922 was the house guest of the lawyer who had defended Mrs Proudlock. There are major differences between the actual facts and 'The Letter'. In real life there was no letter, whose suppression secured an acquittal. She was convicted by a judge sitting with two assessors, pardoned by Sultan Sulaiman (ostensibly entirely of his own initiative -- see Winstedt, loc.cit) and hastily shipped out of Malaya. See Butcher, Appendix 2.

100. Robson, *Records and Recollections*, p.14.
101. *SJ* 3, pp.236, 266, 314, SJ 4, pp.34, 74, 358 and 418. To give the new club prestige Travers asked - and had to fight hard for it - that a site facing on to the Padang (like the Selangor Club) should be provided. He also had a struggle to raise the money to build it.

Travers resigned his government post in 1908, ostensibly in a dispute over fees earned by services to private patients, but perhaps to enter the promising new field of medical inspection of hospitals on rubber estates (Note 105 below). After a year or two he made a fortune in the 1910 rubber boom and retired to England, where he served in the RAMC during the 1914-18 war. In the post-war slump he lost his money and returned to take up a post as a mere medical officer in the department of which he had once been head. In that capacity he devoted himself to improving conditions in the Kuala Lumpur leper settlement, until then a neglected thieves' kitchen. Under Travers it became a centre of excellence, which attracted lepers from other states for treatment. He planned the move to the Sungai Buloh leper settlement, which under the no less renowned Dr Ryrie, offered decent living conditions, as an agricultural settlement, while treatment took its slow course. Travers retired from Malaya c.1924 and died ten years later. R.Green 'Leprosy' in the IMR history (Note 52 above) and his obituary, written by Dr J.A.McCloskey, who had worked with him in Selangor, in *The Times*, 22 November 1934.

102. Robson, *Records and Recollections*, especially Chapter 4 ('Federal Council') and Chapter 6 ('Newspaper Enterprise'). Robson was a pioneer enthusiast in the use of the motor car, on which he wrote 'Hints for Motorists' in C.W.Harrison (ed.) *Illustrated Guide to the Federated Malay States*, Malay States Development Agency, London, 1911. He was a frequent, though often anonymous, contributor to the *Selangor Journal* (1892-1897). As editor and the only reporter on the staff of the *Malay Mail* for some ten years from its foundation in 1896, he produced almost all its entire original content (much was cabled foreign news or advertisements). His *Records and Recollections* includes a series of character studies of his contemporaries, notably Loke Yew.
103. P.Clague, *John Russell 1855-1930: A tale of early days in the Malay States*, T.B.Russell, Kuala Lumpur, 1993. One of John Russell's sons (he had five) founded the well-known and still existing firm of J.A.Russell & Co Sdn Bhd, which developed and managed a tea estate and a number of other Selangor enterprises.
104. *Singapore and Straits Directory*, Singapore, 1914. W.T.Hornaday, *Two Years in the Jungle: the Experiences of a Hunter and Naturalist in India, Ceylon, the Malay Peninsula and Borneo*, Scribner, New York, 1885, p.316.
105. Two of the best accounts of life on Malayan plantations, from very different standpoints, relate to Selangor estates. R.V.Jain, *South Indians on the Plantation Frontier in Malaya*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1970, had collected his material on an old established Selangor estate in the 1960's, and had lived for some months among the labourers. In this environment tradition was strong and much of Jain's picture would probably be true of an earlier generation. A more general description, not confined to Selangor, is found in S. Arasaratnam, *Indians in Malaya and Singapore*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, revised 1979, Chapter III 'Indian Society in Malaya 1880-1945.'

The other Selangor estate classic is H.Fauconnier, *The Soul of Malaya*, translated from French by E.Sutton, Mathew, Elkin and Marrot, London, 1931. Fauconnier had been one of the early rubber planters in Selangor, and his book is of higher literary quality than most memoirs of its kind.
106. FMS revenues peaked at $44 million in 1913, and then declined to a level of about $40 million in 1914-15. As the initial economic dislocation of the war diminished, and the extensive rubber acreage planted between 1905 and 1910 (Note 27 above) came into bearing revenue rose, until, in the equally severe setback at the end of the war, it fell again in 1921. See Lim Teck Ghee, op.cit., pp.249-50.
107. Robson, *Records and Recollections*, p.64. 'Alarmist proposals. . .fears without foundation' was the official view. *AR Selangor 1914*, para 141.
108. *AR Selangor 1914*. para 19.
109. Ibid., para 20.

110. Drabble, op.cit., Chapter 4, gives a detailed exposition of over-capitalisation, increased quit-rent and rising production on a falling market.
111. Robson, *Records and Recollections*, p.170. By this time Robson had relinquished the editorship of his newspaper to a professional journalist. 'A very steadying influence through some of the darkest hours of the great world struggle'. Ibid.

About one fifth of the European civil servants in Malaya in 1914 went off to serve in the armed forces in Europe and elsewhere, and a quarter of those were killed in action. W.Makepeace, G.E.Brooke and R.St.J.Braddell (eds.), *One Hundred Years of Singapore being Some Account of the Capital of the Straits Settlements...to the 6th February 1919*, 2 vols, Murray, London, 1921, vol 1, p.123. There is no reason to suppose that the British exodus from other walks of life was on any less a scale.

A less obvious effect of the war in Europe was the elimination of German business enterprise from Malaya. However the German business community was found mainly in Singapore and Penang, though a few prominent figures disappeared from the Selangor scene.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

An Epilogue
Selangor 1914-1939

By 1914 Selangor, like the other states of the FMS, was firmly held within the federal structure of government. Looking back from the end of the twentieth century, with the benefit of hindsight, it is evident that colonial rule would end and that the natural aspirations of the people of Malaya would require a viable nation state on a larger scale than a single Malay state. The concept of bringing the Peninsular states into closer association than mere proximity was sound, but the methods used (down to 1945) were clumsy and insensitive.

In the period between the wars the Malay rulers, and still more their Residents, hoped to regain their pre-federal position, a sort of mythical golden age in which Ruler and Resident, sitting in State Council, responded wisely to local needs and circumstances.[1] The business community, for whom, as much as anyone, FMS Federal Council was set up in 1909, argued that any weakening of the federal government would undermine the management of the economy in a period which external circumstances had made difficult enough. The High Commissioner, and the Colonial Office, saw a decentralization of the FMS as a means of tempting the UMS rulers into it, but they were too canny to be drawn in.[2]

In this prolonged, and ultimately inconclusive, debate Sultan Sulaiman, beset by family and financial problems, was apparently content to let more forceful and articulate Sultans of Perak, Idris (1887-1916) and Iskander (1918-1938), make the running.

The ups and downs of the decade before 1914 had shown how vulnerable was the economy of Selangor, as in other states, since the world prices of rubber and tin, fluctuating widely, had considerable local effects, both direct and indirect. Although the world slump, at its worst in 1932, is better remembered in the perspective of history, local recollections in Selangor dwelt on the post-war slump of 1921 as the more painful experience. The explanation is perhaps that, up to the 1920's, capitalist enterprises simply imported labour, Chinese and Indian, as they required it and then repatriated the surplus when the economy turned down. It had happened in 1914 and it recurred in 1921, when some 30,000 Chinese labourers were sent back to China from Selangor alone, within a space of only two or three months.[3] Gradually however the immigrant labourers were taking root in the country, so that by

1932 there was less repatriation but more unemployment.

At the time the remedy for instability was seen in commodity stabilisation schemes. The rubber industry began with the ill-balanced Stevenson scheme (1922-1928) and, sadder and wiser, tried again with the International Rubber Regulation Agreement of 1934. In 1931 the world tin producers had set up their stabilisation scheme. These arrangements helped the producers to survive but exacted severe social costs. In the late 1930's Selangor, in particular, had strikes on its only (Batu Arang) colliery, and on some of its rubber estates.[4] The employers had added to these stresses by determined efforts to reduce costs -- and wages -- in difficult times. The result was so alarming that in 1937 the police reported that the 'FMS was within an ace of dissolving into temporary chaos as a result of communist intrigue'.[5] On rubber estates Indian labourers showed their defiance by ceasing to go barefoot and 'wore shoes before the European bosses'.[6]

Another disastrous legacy from the economic hardships of the 1930's was the dispersal of unemployed Chinese to become squatters in unauthorised occupation of vacant land, often in remote places, where they made a precarious living by market gardening until opportunities of employment on mines and estates drew them back.[7]

By 1914 there was no restraining the Selangor smallholder from planting rubber, wherever he had or could obtain land on permanent title. A general suspension of the alienation of state land for rubber cultivation in 1930 simply increased the tendency to plant rubber on existing holdings in place of other crops. As the two rubber stabilisation schemes required a restriction of output, the smallholder had to bear his share -- probably an unfairly large share.[8]

The Malay Reservations Enactment 1913 had been passed to prevent the depletion of land in Malay ownership, but it did not restrict non-Malay occupation of that land. In 1933 a more comprehensive reservations system sought to plug the gap. There were two major problems. Although the 1913 law prevented outright transfer, it did not prohibit the leasing of Malay holdings to non-Malays. Secondly the Malay owner could mortgage his land as security for a loan. The slump of 1932 exposed the extent of Malay indebtedness to Chettiar moneylenders, who claimed that they had outstanding loans of $25 million.[9] They objected to the 1933 enactment, whose 'intention...was to eliminate all interests of non-Malays in Malay Reservation land'. The comparative laxness of the 1913 law had been in part an expression of the liberal economic policy of the time. The 1933 amendment 'was but one of a series of government measures....involved in the planning and control of economic activity'. It was a precursor to the interventionist policies of the period after the 1939-1945 war, with their replanting schemes and five year development plans. From the outset in 1913 there had been doubts as to whether isolating the Malay smallholder from the economic mainstream was beneficial or likely to succeed.[10]

A more positive aspect of the interventionist policy was active encouragement of rural cooperative societies, in which it was hoped the Malay villagers would find collective strength in their dealings with outside economic pressures.[11] The results were patchy. Moreover much of the work of the Cooperative Department was di-

rected to seasonal credit societies in the Krian padi area of Perak and to thrift and loan societies among Indian estate labourers, which are not pertinent here. However Selangor had some Malay smallholders cooperative societies, and one of the most successful of them, at Ijok in Kuala Selangor, was still active in the period after World War II, perhaps because of its unusual origin and organisation. Many years before, a gang of Javanese had come to Selangor to work at felling jungle and other tasks incidental to opening rubber estates. They had settled down at Ijok and then developed their own rubber smallholdings. In due time they were encouraged to form a cooperative society to process their latex at a communal centre (rather than produce rubber of poor quality on individual holdings) and then sell their sheet rubber to dealers as a group on better terms.[12]

The Ijok society differed from most others in two respects. First, the leadership of the society was in the firm and familiar hands of the headman who had led them to the promised land as a logging gang in the early days; he, not the society, owned the smokehouse in which they cured their rubber. The headman, Dato Muskam, was credited with 'semi-magical' attributes, due to a personal regime of total abstinence from sexual intercourse. On a public occasion 'no Javanese ever approached [him] other than in suppliant posture, which they would certainly not have adopted to the Sultan of Selangor.' Secondly, the members did not sell all their rubber through the society, but held back some of it to sell as individuals so that they preserved their links with Chinese rubber dealers, as a source of credit which the society might refuse to give.[13] This pragmatic accommodation of a new organisation to old traditions strengthened the society, in the short-term at least.

The largest development in smallholder agriculture in Selangor was the Tanjong Karang *padi* scheme. This did not come to completion until after the war but it had its beginnings in the 1930's, when there was a belated realisation that exhortation would not suffice if local *padi* cultivation was to be more than an interesting but minor part of the traditional Malay way of life.[14] Periodic crises in the supply of imported rice were a reminder that an economy based on export of rubber and tin was very vulnerable to shortages of foodstuffs.[15] Yet when the world prices of these key export commodities fell sharply towards the end of the 1920's Malaya was still importing two thirds of the rice required to feed its growing population. Policy then swung back towards systematic and large-scale projects for opening additional land for *padi* growing. The Tanjong Karang swamp, some 50,000 acres or more on the coast north of Kuala Selangor town, had been identified as a possible area for *padi* cultivation as far back as 1895.[16] However the terrain presented formidable problems, costly to resolve; in essence a ridge between the swamps and the sea impeded drainage, so that in wet weather the land was inundated. The land on the coastal side of the ridge was subject to tidal flooding. As a result this part of Selangor was almost uninhabited.

The first task of the newly established Drainage and Irrigation Department in the mid-1930's was to construct a 50-mile bund along the north Selangor coast, with sluice gates at intervals and drains running towards them, so as to control the water level. It was then possible to colonise a first instalment of 15,000 acres at

Panchang Bedina; this was completed by 1937. Work on the remainder of the area was interrupted by the war and completed soon after 1950.[17]

Sultan Sulaiman had reached the age of 60 in 1926. He had by then outlived the kinsmen and contemporaries, Raja Laut (d.1913), Raja Bot (d.1917) and Raja Mahmud (d.1919), who had been prominent in the first half of his reign. Of his eleven sons only three were likely contenders for succession to the throne, and the eldest of the three, Tunku Musa'eddin, seemed a clear favourite; he was a son by Tunku Mahrum, the consort who had caused the Sultan so much trouble at the time of his installation. The title of Raja Muda had been conferred on Musa'eddin in 1920, and when the number of Malay unofficial members of the FMS Federal Council was increased to four in 1927, he took the place reserved for a Selangor representative.[18] If he had been of a steady temperament he would undoubtedly have succeeded to the throne when it fell vacant in 1938. Unfortunately he was very extravagant and heavily in debt to moneylenders. Under this financial pressure he began to behave discreditably, so that in 1933 he was replaced in the Federal Council and, in the following year, stripped of the title of Raja Muda, which he had refused to relinquish.[19]

Thus began an acrimonious dispute, with widespread repercussions for Anglo-Malay relations generally, over the choice of a new heir to the throne of Selangor.[20] It was accepted that one or other of two other sons eligible by birth would be chosen, and that Malay custom did not impose any priority by age. The selection of a successor rested formally with a council of Malay chiefs of Selangor, but the colonial regime intervened to impose its preference for the younger of the two sons in preference to the older, who was deemed 'extremely stupid and unable...to comprehend modern ideas.'[21] This decision openly arrogated to the protecting power the right to choose a candidate acceptable to it, regardless of the views of the reigning Sultan and his chiefs.[22] Such action was offensive to Malay opinion, gave an opportunity for intrigue within the Selangor ruling dynasty, reviving ancient emnities which had not died with Raja Bot and Raja Mahmud; it also led to divisions among present and retired British officials.[23] The Sultan, who went to London late in 1936 for medical treatment, threatened to protest to King George, and the Resident, T.S.(Sir Theodore) Adams had to be transferred out of Malaya before the Sultan's return. The bitterness none the less continued until the Sultan's death in 1938, when the candidate favoured by the British, succeeded as Sultan Alam Shah.[24]

There were more substantial issues than the personal conflicts thus exposed. 'Malay custom', which undoubtedly included the choice of a successor to the throne, was expressly excluded from the subjects on which the protecting power was by treaty entitled to intervene.[25] This little difficulty was however evaded by laying down qualifications which a chosen successor must possess if Britain was to recognise him as ruler of his state.[26] In 1934 the British requirement (as in 1887) narrowed the field to one candidate; it was that the prospective new ruler must have travelled abroad and so broadened his outlook.[27] The official reasoning was that the 'Residential system' required cooperation between Ruler and Resident, and was unworkable if the Ruler was not at ease in the system.[28] On a higher plane of argument it

was suggested that Britain had a duty to preserve Malay monarchy as worthy of respect among the subjects of the ruler. 'We have got to be very careful that these dynasties are not disgraced by unworthy personnel'.[29]

That argument was in turn related to another aspect of British policy. A decade before, in 1927, Hugh Clifford, addressing the FMS Federal Council as High Commissioner (1927-1929), had stated that 'no mandate has ever been extended to us. ..to vary the system of government...and I feel it incumbent upon me to emphasise. ..the utter inapplicability of any form of democratic or popular government.'[30] The Malay Ruler could not be transmuted into a constitutional monarch presiding over a democratic government because that would entail a grant of electoral rights to the other communities, which then (in total) outnumbered the Malays. The Sultan and his Malay subjects would object vehemently to such a change. Yet the other communities, still regarded by Malays as immigrant, alien and transient, were increasingly local-born, and were beginning to ask for political rights, in addition to their economic opportunities. If absolute Malay monarchy and colonial autocracy was to continue, to avoid the perils of democratisation, the monarch must be visibly worthy of his office (in terms of western value judgements) and willing to accommodate himself to his role in the Anglo-Malay dyarchy.[31]

In the 1930's the Malay community, conscious that it had lost ground both in numbers and in economic matters, was less concerned with any personal shortcomings of a Sultan than with the threat of Chinese political hegemony added to commercial power. These fears had been increased by criticism, on the part of Chinese leaders in the Straits Settlements, of the modest decentralization of the FMS, giving back powers to the state governments, and of the exclusion of all but Malays from the higher ranks of the civil service.[32]

Although Malay nationalism was hardly a major political force until the formation of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) in 1946, it had its origins in the inter-war period, and found its leadership in the Malay Associations which were formed, first in the Straits Settlements and then in the Malay States. The Selangor Malay Association was formed on 5 June 1938, and sent representatives to the 'national congress' held in Kuala Lumpur, in 1939, and in Singapore in 1940.[33] The Selangor Malay Association was studiously moderate. It was formed under the leadership of a Malay lawyer, practising in Kuala Lumpur but by origin from the ruling dynasty of Negri Sembilan. Raja Uda, brother-in-law of the new Sultan of Selangor and a rising figure in the Malayan Civil Service, came to the inaugural meeting, but on learning that the new body was to be a 'political organisation', withdrew stating that 'it would be improper for a senior government official to take part in such an enterprise'.[34] The Selangor Malay Association was at pains to show itself 'unswervingly loyal not only to the traditional Malay establishment but to the British', especially after the outbreak of war in 1939.[35] Its president, Tunku Ismail, was elected chairman of the second national congress, and might have been a prominent UMNO leader after the war, if he had not died -- of a heart attack -- in 1942.

In promoting and advancing Malay interests in Selangor, the Association was

carrying on a campaign which the Malay unofficial members of the FMS Federal Council had waged since their appointment to that council in 1927. Tunku Musa'eddin (1927-1933) was succeeded in the Council by Raja Uda, articulate, intelligent, discreet (as we have seen), perhaps too much of a diplomat by temperament and an establishment figure by descent to shine in political debate.[36]

There was a good deal of rather noisier political activity among the leaders of the Chinese and Indian communities in Selangor, but this was directed more to events in China and India than to local affairs. It was the period when the overseas Chinese were understandably preoccupied with supporting national resistance, in what was still their home country, to Japanese aggression. Malayan Indians were much concerned with the Indian Congress campaign for self-government in India. Inasmuch as Malay pressure for what later became Malay 'special rights' in the government service and in commerce, threatened the interests of other communities, the reaction was restrained and low-key. The Malays argued that the non-Malay communities had come to Malaya like 'masons engaged to build a house, well paid for doing so...[but]...not thereby entitled to a share in ownership'. So long as the Anglo-Malay dyarchy held the reigns of power, there was little disposition to dispute this view.[37] 1942 and then 1945 would begin a new ball game.

Although the threat of war in Europe had begun to cast its shadow over Europe, there is little sign that, apart from some inept defence planning in high places, it caused much concern in Malaya.[38]

Looking back from 1939 over a period of almost two centuries to the emergence of Sultan Sallehuddin as the first acknowledged ruler of Selangor, the question arises whether the history of Selangor over that period exposes a continuing or dominant trend or theme. There are no doubt several answers to that question depending on the view taken of what was significant. In 1766 Sultan Sallehuddin had no defined or secure kingdom, very few subjects and exercised a personal rather than a dynastic authority. For a century thereafter the existence of Selangor, in troubled times, was preserved as it became an important producer of tin, a staple commodity of the local trade system. As the demand for Malayan tin shifted from China to the industrialising nations of the West, the Dutch and then the British drew Selangor into their sphere of influence. Political intervention in 1874 seemed, at the time, a sudden shift of policy, but it was the product of pressure increasing over a period, like a dam which eventually gives way under the rising tide of water. One element of that pressure had been the influx, since the mid-nineteenth century, of Chinese labour to work the mines. They imported their own social organisation, which was quite as disruptive as the Malay struggle for power; out of this came the coalitions opposed in the civil war (1867-1873). By 1874 there was also a large element, among a comparatively small Malay population, of immigrant Sumatrans. Upon this amalgam of peoples was imposed a colonial administrative structure, which created conditions favourable to further immigration, both Malay (in the broad sense), Chinese and later Javanese and Indian. It was a regime which Raja Lumu would have found uncongenial, as did his spiritual heir and great-great grandson, Raja Mahdi. However the dynasty bowed to the changing times, and Sultan Abdul Samad, great

grandson of Raja Lumu, had few reservations.

As a separate entity Selangor reached its apogee in the period from 1882 to 1895. Its economy expanded rapidly and its working population increased apace. The Residents of those years, Swettenham, Rodger, Maxwell, Birch and Treacher, were the ablest who ever guided the fortunes of Selangor during the colonial period. Their superiors, with occasional misgivings, gave them a free hand. However the same tendencies which moved Selangor (and also Perak) along at a brisk pace required that there should be some larger area than a single state if the momentum was to be maintained. Ernest Birch, who was in Selangor in the early 1890's, recollected that all the key figures of the colonial regime in Malaya were agreed upon the need for some form of association and coordination of policy.[39]

With the benefit of hindsight one can see that the FMS was not the best structure for this purpose. If there had been something like the Conference of Residents, under the chairmanship of the High Commissioner, to discuss and agree upon a uniform approach to common problems, it would have been a sufficient and acceptable (though perhaps not to the architects of the FMS) first step, and when the UMS came under British control (1909-1914) the Rulers of those states would not have had grounds for refusing to join a looser confederation, which several of them agreed had a higher standard of state government than they had yet attained.[40] In the FMS as it was, coordination of Residential policy was in the hands of a Resident-General, supported by a bevy of advisers who soon assumed executive functions throughout the FMS. Thus the federal juggernaut began to roll over the independence of Rulers and Residents. Selangor, like the other states, was submerged, one might say flattened, under the federal bureaucracy. When the reaction came, in the period between the world wars, the whole machine came to a halt while long and inconclusive discussions took place, without finding a solution which satisfied the Rulers of FMS or UMS.

When a solution was found in the Federation of Malaya of 1948 it showed that the era of the Malay State as an independent unit of government had long since ended. The FMS was not wrong in all respects; it was just an advance too soon towards a bridge too far. In spite of federal domination Selangor in 1939 was still a Malay state which had its own dynasty, under a Sultan whose sovereignty had been recognised by the British government, and a state government which retained control of its finances. It had a general cohesion which had been lacking in the first century of its existence.[41] The constitutional changes of 1948 and 1957 gave better definition to that situation without altering its essential nature.

Notes

1. Yeo Kim Wah, *The Politics of Decentralization: Colonial Controversy in Malaya 1920-1929*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1982, pp.140f, analyses the divergence of objectives. The crunch of the matter was whether powers transferred from the federal centre should pass to the Ruler in Council, somewhat after the model of government by advice in the UMS, or to the Resident from whom they had been taken after 1896. On the rosy retrospective view of State Councils before

1896 see J.M.Gullick, *Rulers and Residents: Influence and Power in the Malay States 1870-1920*, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1992, p.50, and Yeo Kim Wah, *Decentralization*, p.275.

2. R.Emerson, *Malaysia: A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule*, MacMillan, London, 1937, is the classic analysis of the differences between the FMS and UMS systems of government. Yeo Kim Wah, *Decentralization*, p.139, quotes Sir George Maxwell's well-known contrast between a Resident who administers (in the FMS) and an Adviser who advises the Ruler on his government (in the UMS). He had been both Resident and Adviser.
3. Chapter 10 Note 108. Choo Kia Peng, in his unpublished memoirs, recalled that in 1921 'people used to rush into the office' of the Secretary for Chinese Affairs in High Street, Kuala Lumpur, and 'some of them tried to rush through the windows'.
4. M.R.Stenson, *Industrial Conflict in Malaya: Prelude to the Communist Revolt of 1948*, Oxford University Press, London, 1970, Chapter 2, gives a useful and concise account of labour relations in Malaya in the 1930's. See also J.N.Parmer, 'Chinese Estate Workers' Strikes in Malaya in March 1937', in C.D.Cowan (ed.), *The Economic Development of South-East Asia: Studies in Economic History and Political Economy*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1964.
5. R.Onraet, *Singapore: A Police Background*, Crisp, London, 1947, p.116, quoting an official report. Quoted also in Stenson, op.cit,, pp.14-15.
6. R.K.Jain, *South Indians on the Plantation Frontier in Malaya*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1970, p.230, reporting an episode in a strike on a Selangor rubber estate in the late 1930's.
7. The squatter problem became more important and received more attention during the Emergency (1948-1960) in which the squatters, out of sympathy or under threat, gave support and information to the MPAJA insurgents, until their transfer to 'New Villages' severed the link. K.S.Sandhu, 'The Saga of the Malayan Squatter', *JSEAS* 5(1), 1964, p.147 dates the origin of squatter occupation of land to the recession during the first World War. Squatter numbers much increased during the Japanese occupation (1942-1945), when the majority of estates and mines ceased production. By 1945 the number of squatters in Malaya was estimated at 400,000. F.Loh Kok Wah, *Beyond the Tin Mines: Coolies, Squatters and New Villages in the Kinta Valley, Malaysia, 1880-1980*, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1988, pp.23-37 (on the period to 1939). Han Suyin, *And the Rain my Drink*, Cape, London, 1956, is a novel which gives vivid detail of the unhappy situation of squatters during the Emergency period.
8. P.T.Bauer, *The Rubber Industry: A Study of Competition and Monopoly*, Longmans Green, London, 1948, is a forthright critic of the working of the rubber regulation system as applied to smallholders. The inspecting officers were generally former planters whose experience of rubber cultivation on estates often misled them in assessing the potential of smallholdings where rubber was grown in conditions which would not have been tolerated on well-managed estates, but which were effective in their way. Lim Teck Ghee, *Peasants and their Agricultural Economy in Colonial Malaya 1874-1941*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1977, blames (p.144) the colonial regime for 'a total sell-out of peasant interests'.

   J.H.Drabble, *Malayan Rubber - the Inter-War Years*, MacMillan, London, 1991, pp.203-220, gives a balanced analysis of the working of the assessment system, concluding that the colonial regime trimmed its sails to the wind and made concessions to smallholder protests as 'an exercise in domestic diplomacy' (p.220) sufficient to avoid outright revolt.
9. P. H. Kratoska, '"Ends that we cannot foresee" - Malay Reservations in British Malaya', *JSEAS* 14(1), pp.153-168, on the factors leading to the 1933 Enactment.
10. Ibid., pp.163 and 167. Early in 1933 the Resident of Selangor, attending a Conference of FMS Residents, had been in a minority in arguing against 'discrimination between Malays and other nationalities which might prejudice the comparative commercial developments of the former', but he was not alone in the wider circle of officials. There was also a practical dilemma. It was hardly fair to apply the new stricter 1933 rules to existing transactions undertaken without foreknowledge, and yet to exclude existing loan transactions (in 1933) must create anomalies.
11. The basic source of information is the annual reports of the Cooperative Department. L.A.Mills, *British Rule in Eastern Asia*, etc., Oxford University Press, London, 1942, pp.275-290, is a useful

summary, including debates in the FMS Federal Council. See also Lim Teck Ghee, op.cit., pp.155-158.

12. These were standard methods of improving the quality of smallholder rubber and increasing the price obtained for it. See C.Barlow, *The Natural Rubber Industry*, etc. Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1978. index entries 'Smallholdings'.
13. A.B.Ramsay, 'Indonesians in Malaya,' *JMBRAS* 29(1), 1956, p.122, on Dato' Muskam. Background information obtained by the author c.1950, when an official of the Rural and Industrial Development Authority (RIDA). By then Dato' Muskam was dead but his shadow persisted.
14. R.D.Hill, *Rice in Malaya: A Study in Historical Geography*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1977, pp.113-115, and Lim Teck Ghee, op.cit., index entries 'Krian Irrigation Scheme', on the only previous major scheme. The original (1896) estimated cost of the Krian scheme was $400,000 and, when completed, several years late, in 1906 it had cost four times as much, ie $1.6 million. Chai Hon-Chan, *The Development of British Malaya 1896-1909*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1964, p.148. See Chapter 10 Note 67 on the unsuccessful Kuang irrigation scheme in Ulu Selangor.
15. There was an acute crisis in 1921 when, following a crop failure, Siam prohibited the export of its rice, and the Government of India, which then had responsibility for Burma, imposed an export ban on Burmese rice to secure supplies for India. Mills, op.cit., p.253.
16. In 1895-1896 a scheme for the construction of works to cover 5,000 acres of the Tanjong Karang area was abandoned, as the estimated annual return on its cost was only 2%. Hill, op.cit., p.154, citing contemporary official reports.
17. Cheng Siok Hwa, 'The Rice Industry of Malaya: A Historical Survey', *JMBRAS* 42(2), 1969, p.138.
18. Chapter 9 Note 88 and *AR Selangor 1919*, para 231, reporting the installation early in 1920. In 1924 Musa'eddin accompanied the High Commissioner to London to represent the Malays at the Wembley Exhibition. W.R.Roff, *The Origins of Malay Nationalism*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967, p.199 n61.

    In 1927 the four FMS Rulers withdrew from attendance at meetings of the FMS Federal Council and the number of Malay unofficial members was increased from one (Raja Chulan of Perak) to four. Roff ibid. and Yeo Kim Wah, *Decentralization*, p.313.
19. Yeo Kim Wah, 'The Selangor Succession Dispute, 1933-1938', *JSEAS* 2(2), 1971, pp.169-170. This is the main source for this passage.
20. Under British official pressure the Sultan himself had agreed, though with reluctance, to the supersession of Musa'eddin, but he expected that his second son, Tunku Panglima Besar, rather than his third son, Tunku Laksamana, would replace him. Ibid.

    Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, 'Thrones, Claims, Claimants, Ruler and Rules: Problems of Succession in the Malay Sultanates', *JMBRAS* 66(2), 1993, p.9, on the absence of any rule of seniority by age. See Chapter 9 Note 4.
21. Yeo Kim Wah, *Selangor Succession*, p.170. As the three leading contenders were sons of the Sultan by different wives (Chapter 9 Notes 70-76), their seniority by age was much less material than if they had been born of the same mother.
22. It was not an innovation. In the last years of Sultan Idris of Perak (r.1887-1916) the colonial regime had vetoed Raja Chulan, as likely to cause trouble to it if he became Sultan. Gullick, *Rulers and Residents*, p.287f. But this episode came before the stirrings of Malay nationalism in the 1930's.
23. Yeo Kim Wah, *Selangor Succession*, p.171. A retired MCS official, F.W.Douglas, who was private secretary and financial comptroller to the Sultan, joined forces with Musa'eddin. Douglas, to whom was attributed much of the resistance to official wishes, was believed to be at odds with Adams, the Resident of Selangor (1932-1936). When the Sultan came to London, the aged Swettenham enraged the Colonial Office, especially E. J. (Sir Edward) Gent then head of the Far Eastern Department, by offering to mediate between it and the Sultan. CO 717/51570/2 of 1936. S.C.Smith, *British Relations with the Malay Rulers from Decentralization to Malayan Independence 1930-1957*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1995, pp.30-31 and p.40 n134.

Adams was transferred, ostensibly on promotion, to the post of Chief Commissioner of Northern Nigeria.

24. At the meeting of chiefs to elect a new Sultan, Adams' successor, S.W.Jones, preempted the decision by stating that the British Government 'desired to see the Raja Muda [Shah Alam] succeed to the throne'. After he had plainly lost all hope of succession Musa'eddin turned over a new leaf and behaved with exemplary helpfulness. He had, as a consolation prize, been given the title of Tengku Klana, with responsbility for Islamic and court affairs, and he had been reappointed to the State Council and given the task of organising the coronation. The Japanese sought to exploit Malay resentment by deposing Shah Alam and installing Musa'eddin as Sultan; he had to step down again in 1945, was sent into exile (1945-1946) and required, as a condition of his return, to abstain from any involvement in the political activity of the post-war period. Smith, op.cit., p.80 n99.
25. J.de V.Allen, A.J.Stockwell and L.R.Wright (eds.), *A Collection of Treaties and Other Documents affecting the States of Malaysia 1761-1963*, 2 vols, Oceana Publications, New York, 1981, vol 1, p.391, for the Anglo-Perak 'Pangkor Engagement' of 1874. There was no similar treaty with Selangor (Chapter 4 Note 48) but by long usage it had come to be accepted that the Pangkor formula applied to British relations with all Rulers. Ibid.,p.446.
26. Chapter 9 Note 16 and Note 22 above.
27. Yeo Kim Wah, *Selangor Succession* p.171. The criteria for selecting a Raja Muda were announced by Adams in a speech to the meeting of Selangor chiefs on 27 November 1934.
28. After only a few months of conflict, Sultan Sulaiman of Trengganu had been forced to abdicate, ostensibly on health grounds, in 1920. The strong-minded Ruler was not always the loser. The alternative (as in the case of T.S.Adams) was to replace the Resident or Adviser. Gullick, *Rulers and Residents*, p.162 (Trengganu), p.142 (Kedah) and p.209 (Kelantan) on the departure of British Advisers as the outcome of similar clashes.
29. W.G.A. Ormsby-Gore, Secretary of State for the Colonies (1936-1937) in a letter of 6 November 1936 declining Swettenham's offer to mediate (Note 23 above).
30. *Proceedings of the FMS Federal Council* 1927, p.B113.
31. A.C.Milner, *The Invention of Politics in Colonial Malaya*, etc. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, Chapter 8 'Kerajaan Self Reform', and Smith, op.cit., Chapters 2 and 3.
32. Roff, *Malay Nationalism*, pp.208-209. The most articulate Chinese spokesman, and a member of the Straits Settlements Legislative Council, was [Tun] Tan Cheng Lock, later President of the Malayan Chinese Association.

    The Malayan Civil Service was the Division 1 (senior) administrative service, to which Malays, in very small numbers, had been promoted (from the Division 2 Malay Administrative Service) since the 1920's. In 1922 (partly to fill MCS posts vacant as a result of the absence on war service or retirement of British officials) there were 18 Malay officers in MCS posts, but only two of them had been substantively promoted to the MCS. Khasnor Johan, *The Emergence of the Modern Malay Administrative Elite*, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1984, Chapter 6, especially p.102. One of these two was Hamzah bin Abdullah, who became (in 1948) the first Selangor Mentri Besar (Chief Minister) under the new constitution. Sir Gerald Templer, High Commissioner (1952-1954), secured the reluctant agreement of the Rulers to appointing non-Malay Asians to the MCS in the ratio (Malay: non-Malay) of 4:1.
33. Roff, *Malay Nationalism*, pp.237-244, and W.R.Roff, 'The Persatuan Melayu Selangor: an Early Malay Political Association'. *JSEAH* 9(1), 1968.
34. Roff, *Persatuan Melayu Selangor*, p.124.
35. Roff, *Malay Nationalism*, p.240.
36. In due time Raja Uda succeeded Hamzah bin Abdullah (Note 32) as Mentri Besar of Selangor. Raja Tun Sir Uda, as he became, was at various times (1957-1967) Malaysian High Commissioner in London, Speaker of the Federal Council and Governor of Penang. The author, who knew him slightly, remembers him as a man of great charm and dignity; as his career shows he had 'a safe pair of hands' in public life.

37. The mason analogy was 'a very frequently expressed Malay view' [in the press]. Roff, *Malay Nationalism*, p.209.
38. P.Elphick, *Singapore: The Pregnable City: A Study in Deception, Discord and Desertion*, Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1995, is the latest addition to the vast literature on the military debacle of 1941-1942. In his opening chapters Elphick, using contemporary archives which have only recently been opened to researchers, gives a devastating exposure of the petty discords which destroyed whatever chance there was of coherent defence planning. However Selangor, midway between the northern frontier and the main base, was not an area of significant strategic importance to the planners.
39. 'Journal of a Voyage to the Malay Peninsula 1920-21', unpublished autobiography of Sir Ernest Birch written while returning by sea from a business trip to Malaya. Rhodes House Library MSS Ind Ocn s 242/3. Birch mentions in this consensus Sir Cecil Clementi Smith (Governor 1887-1893), Sir Frederick Dickson (CS SS and OAG 1886-1891), and Sir William Maxwell (CS SS and OAG 1892-1894). Clementi Smith had been CS SS and OAG (1878-1885). Maxwell and Swettenham, who claimed that the FMS project was his design, had served as Assistant Resident or Resident in Perak or Selangor at various times between 1874 and 1894. There was no lack of experience of the working of the Residential system as it had evolved over the years.

    F.A.Swettenham, *British Malaya*, etc., John Lane Bodley Head, London 1906; revised Allen and Unwin, London, 1948, Appendix, pp.363-364., on his disputed claim to have been 'the only begetter' of the Federation concept.

    Birch had come to Selangor to be Commissioner of Lands under Maxwell and, when Maxwell left in 1892, stayed on as acting Resident until Treacher arrived as the next substantive Resident in 1893.
40. The 'Administrative Council' which Anderson (High Commissioner 1904-1910) proposed as part of his reforms of the FMS, combined with reducing the status and powers of the Resident-General, who became Chief Secretary FMS, illustrate what might have been. However the Colonial Office, which did not fully understand what Anderson was about, vetoed the Administrative Council as superfluous. E.Thio, *British Policy in the Malay Peninsula 1880-1910*, vol 1, University of Malaya Press, Singapore, 1969, pp.195-198.
41. A.Lau, *The Malayan Union Controversy 1942-1948*, Oxford University Press, Singapore 1991, begins his study with an excellent analysis of the issue of the 'sovereignty' of the Malay Rulers. See also Emerson, *Malaysia*, on the manner in which the FMS was governed.

Appendix I

Rulers and Residents of Selangor (years in office)

RULERS

Sultan Sallehuddin ibni Yam Tuan Muda Daeng Cellak	(1766-1782)
Sultan Ibrahim ibni Sultan Sallehuddin	(1782-1826)
Sultan Mohamed ibni Sultan Ibrahim	(1826-1857)
Sultan Abdul Samad ibni Raja Abdullah	(1857-1898)
Sultan Sulaiman ibni Raja Muda Musa	(1898-1938)

RESIDENTS
(substantive only)

James Guthrie Davidson	(1875-1876)
William Bloomfield Douglas	(1876-1882)
Frank Athelstan Swettenham	(1882-1889)
William Edward Maxwell	(1889-1892)
William Hood Treacher	(1893-1896)
John Pickersgill Rodger	(1896-1901)
Henry Conway Belfield	(1902-1910)
Edward George Broadrick	(1910-1918)
Arthur Henry Lemon	(1919-1920)
Oswald Francis Gerald Stonor	(1921-1926)
James Lornie	(1926-1931)
Theodore Samuel Adams	(1932-1936)
Stanley Wilson Jones	(1936-1938)

Appendix 2

The Government of Selangor in the 19th Century

The form and practice of government in the state was a factor in its history which cannot be ignored but should not be over-estimated. The purpose of this Appendix is to bring together as a continuous, but brief summary, the main course of development of state government during a century in which considerable changes both in the situation in Selangor and in the form of its government were taking place.

Of the four Sultans of Selangor who reigned in sequence between 1766 and 1874, the first two, Sallehuddin and his son, Ibrahim, were Bugis men of action, for whom the state was a territorial base for activities which extended as far afield as Riau at one end of the Straits and Kedah at the other (with Malacca and Penang in between). Although their regime had cultural aspects derived from their Bugis origins in the Celebes, they were traditional Malay rulers, who reigned, at the apex of the political system, but generally shared executive power with kinsmen or ministers or chiefs, according to the circumstances of the time. Chapters 1 and 2 show them in forceful control of the long strip of coastline which was as much of Selangor, in a territorial sense, as they could or needed to occupy. In external relations, which were their main concern, their freedom of action was much constrained by Dutch power, centred on Malacca, and then British influence at Penang, and to a lesser extent Siamese expansion into the Malay Peninsula, and conflict with neighbours, especially Perak.

In these activities they had the assistance, and generally commanded the obedience, of younger brothers, sons and other kinsmen. Unlike its neighbours, Perak and Pahang, Selangor did not have major non-royal families with whom the ruling dynasty shared its power. Such local Malay chiefs as there were probably came from families which had owed a nominal fealty to the Sultans of Johor in the seventeenth century and then submitted, with some reluctance, to the imposition of Bugis control early in the next century. Inland, in the interior of Selangor, there were scattered riverine settlements of Sumatran immigrants, under village headmen.

In the Malay world control of economic resources was always the basis of political power. By the beginning of the nineteenth century the Dutch efforts at mercantile hegemony of the Straits region had been replaced by the free trade regime instituted by Stamford Raffles, when he founded Singapore in 1819, thereby ex-

tending British commercial links with states such as Selangor, which had existed since the foundation of Penang in 1786, and before that. The trade between major entrepot ports and outlying points continued, but it was now centred on the colonial enclaves of the Straits Settlements. As a result Selangor lived, and supported its dynasty, as an exporter of tin and other produce to the Straits Settlements. It was this change in the state economy, more than the personality of Sultan Mohamed (r.1826-1857), which led to disruptive consequences for the government of the state.

The economic base was now dispersed over a number of areas of production, some of them at a distance inland. There was a corresponding decentralisation of political power to local satraps, but -- unlike more traditional Malay states -- these fiefs were held by the more active and successful members of the royal dynasty of Selangor instead of local non-royal lineages. The royal seat was still at Kuala Selangor, where Sultan Mohamed presided over the flourishing padi fields and coconut groves which extended some way up the river. Here, and at the estuaries of other Selangor rivers, tin and other produce from the interior was exported, and paid export duty, conventionally one tenth, to the incumbent Malay (Bugis) authority. North from Kuala Selangor was Bernam, remote and comparatively unimportant now, under Raja Yunus (later succeeded by his son, Raja Hitam). To the south of Kuala Selangor a son of the Sultan, Raja Sulaiman, held Klang until his death, when the Sultan gave charge of this important district to Raja Abdullah of Riau, passing over the claims of Sulaiman's son, Raja Mahdi, with disastrous results (the civil war of 1867-73). Bandar Langat, the port of the Langat estuary, was assigned to the Sultan's younger brother, Raja Abdullah, who was succeeded at his death by his son Raja (later Sultan) Abdul Samad. The most southerly important town on what was then the Selangor coastline was Lukut, under the enterprising and innovative Raja Jumaat of Riau, a son-in-law of Sultan Mohamed. There were a number of minor coastal villages, such as Jeram, Kanchong and Sungai Raya, each assigned to a Raja, but the inherent weakness of the system was that there were insufficient fiefs to provide a livelihood for the rapidly growing ruling class. There were not enough jobs for the boys. *Hinc illae lacrimae* -- it was bound to end in tears.

The prolonged struggle for power, and its spoils, began in the last years of Sultan Mohamed when, having outlived a number of troublesome relatives, the old ruler tried to secure the succession for a son, Raja Mahmud, who was a young boy. The conflict, becoming ever more bitter and destructive, lasted for most of the next two decades (1855-1875). After the death of Sultan Mohamed, in 1857, Raja Jumaat contrived to promote the succession of Raja Abdul Samad to the Sultanate. For greater personal security the new ruler had his capital in his hereditary fief, Kuala Langat, and let the struggle take its course, with the results described in Chapter 4.

A less obvious development of this period was the institutionalisation of the link between the Bugis rulers and the growing number of Sumatran immigrants by the appointment of a 'headman of foreign Malays' (Dato' Dagang) for each of the three main river valleys. In the Sultan's own district Dato' Dagang Abu Said became a crony and business partner of a ruler who was a 'money-loving man'. In the strate-

gically important Klang valley the Dato' Dagang was Haji Tahir, prominent both in the civil war and in the economic boom of the 1880's. In the Selangor valley Nakoda Alang became Dato' Dagang. In the remote inland districts of Ulu Selangor and Ulu Langat, centres of Pahang Malay and Sumatran settlement respectively, prominent figures assumed control and in time were given the title of penghulu.

There was very little central government machinery. In later years Sultan Abdul Samad's staff consisted of a confidential secretary, Inche Behak, who was an influential figure -- Douglas, as Resident, once consulted him before broaching a delicate matter to the Sultan. Behak kept his master's accounts and entered copies of letters and memoranda in a letterbook, composed and wrote in a fair hand the Sultan's letters and, on his instructions, affixed the royal seal, of which he had custody. Tunku Kudin who became 'viceroy' in 1868 had experience, as Raja Muda of Kedah, of more elaborate bureaucracy. At Klang he had a small Malay 'secretariat', of which J.W.W.Birch took a group photograph in 1874. The indispensable Syed Zin had general charge of Kudin's headquarters but, when Kudin's finances reached breaking point towards the end of 1874, he delegated to Lim Teik Hee, a Malacca towkay and one of his major creditors, the task of sorting things out (there were Kedah precedents for this too), but later Swettenham spent a day on Kudin's accounts, and 'drew up rules, in reality a law' (that expenses must always be paid from treasury funds and not out of revenue received in cash but not yet brought to account in the treasury books).

This overhaul of finances came early in Swettenham's Selangor career; he had arrived in August 1874 as Assistant Resident at the royal capital of Bandar Langat. In January 1875 Davidson, who had been advising Kudin informally for some time, became the first Resident under the arrangements agreed between the Sultan and Sir Andrew Clarke in February 1874. This was the beginning of 'the Residential system' which, in time, would grow to resemble the Crown Colony government of the Straits Settlements in its direct rule and elaborate organisation. However in 1875 Selangor lacked both the staff and the money to support such a system, and also -- less obvious -- the requisite knowledge. Davidson and Swettenham went off to deal with disturbances, or rumours of them, as they arose, and they toured the interior of the state, which was *terra incognita* until then. In addition to making contact with Malay notables, they renewed their relationship with Yap Ah Loy, as *de facto* ruler of Kuala Lumpur and its surrounding area. The establishment of a number of police stations, as sources of intelligence as much as means of control, by Syers, the new Superintendent of Police, in the autumn of 1875 marked the beginning of effective control of the state from the administrative capital at Klang.

From 1876 to 1882 the Resident, who moved from Klang to Kuala Lumpur in 1880, was Bloomfield Douglas. There were now 'Collectors' (of revenue) at the three main coastal towns, Klang, Kuala Selangor and Kuala Langat. Import and export duties, still the mainstay of state finances, went into a state treasury (at Klang), and 'political allowances' or 'pensions' were paid to the Sultan and other notables (including Yap Ah Loy and Haji Tahir) in substitution for the taxes which they had levied. Parkinson, in his analysis of the Pangkor Engagement, has commented (p.137)

that article 10, providing for the central collection of revenue under British supervision 'comprises much of the sense' of the ambiguous article 6 on seeking and implementing British advice. It was not a complete innovation, since Raja Jumaat, in the heyday of his power, had proposed a similar reform -- though without success.

The introduction of a legal system, with courts over which the Resident and district administrators presided, was more of a revolution since everyone, Rajas, *rayat*, bondsmen and slaves had -- in theory at least -- the same rights. Yet courts too were not an entire novelty. It was one of the traditional functions of a Malay ruler (which he might delegate) to give audience to those who had matters to bring to his notice, and to make rulings upon them. To the end of his long life, in the 1890's, Sultan Abdul Samad cherished and exercised this prerogative -- it was one of the few public duties which he willingly performed. Devising a system of law to administer presented problems, since the written digests, the *Undang-Undang*, were literary treasures not useable as law. Even Winstedt, who esteemed them as much as anyone, pointed in his memoirs (p.130) to the difficulty of imposing a fine of a white camel 'that does not figure in the Malayan *fauna*' as a punishment for manslaughter. In these early years the courts simply worked out their own plain man's amalgam of Malay custom and (half-remembered) colonial statutes, to make what Isabella Bird, visiting Selangor in 1879, called (Bird p.238) a 'most queerly muddled' code of laws. But, as Emily Innes -- another acerbic critic -- had noted, while listening to her husband trying cases at Kuala Langat in 1876, merely to have an informal hearing ending with a common sense verdict usually gave 'tolerable satisfaction to both sides' (Innes 1/53).

The executive functions of government did not immediately pass completely into expatriate hands. The sons of the Sultan, Raja Muda Musa, Raja Kahar, and his kinsmen, Raja Laut and Raja Hitam, had varying degrees of local influence and the status of 'Malay Magistrate'. Douglas in his diary recounts with glee how he tried a son of the local chief for a minor default, requiring the father, who had put the boy up to what he had done, to sit with him on the bench.

The purpose of the State Council, established in 1877, was to bring some of the more accommodating notables, Malay and Chinese, into formal consultation with the new regime. Douglas was too much of an impatient autocrat to get the successful results which Hugh Low achieved in Perak from the State Council. But he convened meetings of the Council and laid before them a variety of matters, especially those on which he needed influential support, and then reported to the Sultan what the outcome had been. In a celebrate episode (in 1878) Douglas expelled a Malay chief (Tunku Panglima Raja) from membership of the Council, for an alleged attempt at bribery of an official, and was tartly reminded by higher authority that he had exceeded his (nominally) advisory powers and must reinstate the somewhat bewildered Malay councillor.

1882 marked the beginning of the final phase of evolutionary development of the state government. Swettenham (with Rodger as his deputy) replaced Douglas as Resident and took firmer hold of the regime, which by then had much increased resources. The 1880's saw land offices in every district, with officially appointed

penghulus in charge of sub-districts (*mukim*). A professional lawyer became Chief Magistrate -- and William Maxwell, who succeeded Swettenham, found authority for making laws (in State Council) in the Sultan's traditional position as the fount of justice. A doctor and a civil engineer were recruited to develope the appropriate services. At headquarters a State Treasurer administered public finances; annual estimates were approved and the accounts were audited. For Kuala Lumpur, and other lesser towns 'sanitary boards' performed the functions of town councils; an Inspector of Schools oversaw the growing number of schools and a Protector of Chinese tried to enforce a more stringent code of labour laws.

The move of the administrative state capital from Klang to Kuala Lumpur in 1880 was the beginning of an alteration in the balance between coastal and inland regions. The districts (Ulu Selangor and Ulu Langat) to the north and south of the capital ceased to be remote areas accessible by river from the coast and lightly administered through Malay notables. Each became, in the mid 1880's, an administrative unit under a district officer, linked with the head of the Klang valley by road or rail. The Commissioner of Lands combined his supervisory state responsibilities with the direct charge of the Kuala Lumpur district. In the 1890's the Kuala Lumpur district office was also the state registry of titles for landholdings in excess of 100 acres.

Amid this welter of bureaucratic busyness it is easy to overlook the establishment of new institutions to regulate Islamic affairs. Although the colonial regime virtually ignored the prohibition against interfering in 'Malay custom' (an imprecise concept), it found it essential to hold back from intervention in matters of religion (custom and religion were excluded from the scope of British advice by the Pangkor Engagement). Yet the interposition of non-Muslim executives between the ruler, as God's viceregent on earth, and his Muslim Malay subjects created a gap. As described elsewhere (Appendix 3) Islamic education was neatly spliced into the new system of vernacular Malay schools. In the villages a local community of 44 or more males could establish a mosque (or a prayer-house (*surau*) if the numbers were too small for a mosque) and choose its own mosque officials, the *imam* etc, from local *ulama*, especially returned pilgrims (*haji*) to Mecca. A subvention from state funds was obtainable towards the building costs. However there were occasional disputes within the congregation over matters of doctrine or practice. In Perak Sultan Idris once sent an imported expert round the state 'to correct the *kiblat* (the direction faced in prayer)' at each mosque (it should be towards Mecca). There were more mundane matters to be settled when there was a divorce or a division of property after a death. To regulate these and other matters Selangor (like Perak) appointed a state *Kadhi*, and a number of assistants. Higher authorities, with the title of *Mufti* or *Sheikh-ul-Islam*, could be consulted on more difficult issues. The modest cost of this system was borne by state funds but it was answerable to the ruler and not to his alien government. It may be surmised that these developments were not a complete innovation, though it is difficult to trace them in the period before the late nineteenth century. Half a century later new written constitutions would declare the long-established principle that the ruler was the temporal head of the Islamic reli-

gion in his state, and more elaborate Departments of Religious Affairs would act in his name.

Enough has been said in the later chapters of this book of the impact of the federal system on Selangor and other state governments. Although those changes were extensive they adapted governments which had by then taken shape, and which would evolve still further under the constitutional arrangements of 1948 and 1957. After 1895 the government of the state was an administrative agency of a federal organisation, which framed (and from 1909 enacted) the law in force in the state, and determined its policies on fiscal, economic and social questions. The twentieth century Residents of Selangor were (with two late exceptions, Adams and Jones) unremarkable bureaucrats, and the Sultan (Sulaiman) was not a strong personality. Selangor had its representatives in the federal machine, but made little input to it.

Appendix 3

Malay Vernacular and Islamic Education (1890-1914)

Education and religion were obviously enough major elements of Malay culture at all times, and also factors which significantly affected the lifestyle and outlook of the Selangor Malay community. The Selangor experience was not, however, different, except in some details, from that of Perak and Negri Sembilan; Pahang was rather behind the other protected states at this period, owing to its troubles in the 1890's and its economic backwardness. Hence it is difficult to present a distinctive picture, and one drawn within a reasonable compass, of Malay education in Selangor. There is also a comparative lack of information, in government records, concerning Islamic education and organisation.

By 1890 Malay vernacular education, in village schools, was entering a new phase. From 1875 onwards there had been a handful of Malay schools for boys and still fewer for girls. In 1891 there was a total of 12 Malay schools in Selangor with an enrolment of 543 pupils out of a total Malay population of about 27,000; the average attendance was a modest 68%, ie a mere 370 regular schoolgoers. However when attendance was made compulsory the percentage of enrolled pupils who went to school increased to about 80%. The number of schools had more than doubled, to 31, by 1898, and continued to rise, reaching 58 (52 boys' schools and 6 for girls) in 1914.

A number of factors affected the situation. Malay villagers were no longer averse to sending their sons to school, perceiving now that it would give them a better start in life - 'a certain feeling of confidence in education for its own sake' was noted by R.J.Wilkinson, as Federal Inspector of Schools FMS, in his annual report for 1904. It took much longer to induce a similar acceptance that girls should be sent to school, because of fears that, taken away from home, their chastity was at risk (Chapter 9 Note 31).

The colonial regime, although sometimes blinkered by ideas that schooling should aim at no more than making the son of a peasant a better peasant, was convinced that literacy was desirable and would contribute to larger Malay participation in the government service of a Malay state (Chapter 10 Note 69). After tentative experiments in supervision there was, from 1890 onwards, an Inspector of Schools, Selangor, although he (Rev. F. Haines) combined these duties with those of head-

master of the small Raja School in Kuala Lumpur and of Anglican chaplain. Under the FMS there was a Federal Inspector of Schools; from 1904 to 1906 this post was held by R.J.Wilkinson, a celebrated scholar and by disposition a thinker and an innovator. Wilkinson's 'The Education of Asiatics' is regarded as one of the classic statements of official views on Malay education at the time. In a less formal fashion J.H.M.Robson debated with W.W.Skeat, later to be the author of the leading study of Malay culture (*Malay Magic* - it covers much more than that title suggests), whether or not Malay schools should include English in their curriculum. Some of the Selangor Residents - W.E.Maxwell (1889-1892) and W.H.Treacher (1893-95) - were also interested in education.

Two major problems inhibited the satisfactory progress of Malay education in this more favorable environment. Wilkinson was able to achieve a good deal in solving one of them, ie the lack of suitable textbooks and reading material. The other was the shortage of qualified teachers to work in the schools. That difficulty took longer to solve, partly because senior figures, such as Swettenham (Resident-General (1896-1900) and then Governor to 1904) and Governor Mitchell (1893-99) got the question sidetracked into a dispute as to whether a single training college in the Straits Settlements would suffice to turn out teachers for the protected Malay States also. There was such a college at Malacca from 1900, but its utter inadequacy led to the foundation of another at Matang, in Perak, in 1913. A new era of teacher training began with the Sultan Idris Training College (SITC), established in 1922 at Tanjong Malim in Perak (to train teachers for the FMS as a whole), under a talented Principal, O.T.Dussek. In many respects the SITC created a new Malay intelligentsia (Chapter 10 Note 11)

The question of including English as a subject to be taught in Malay schools was prompted, in part, by the educational policy of the Government of India. It would have made it much easier for Malays to enter the government service in Malaya, where a command of spoken and written English was deemed - and made - essential. In the context of the Malay states at the turn of the century, it was hypothetical. There were far too few teachers qualified to teach in the medium of Malay. There were practically none who could teach English as a foreign language. With the expansion of Malay schools in the Straits Settlements, there was no longer even a trickle of English-speaking Malay teachers from the Colony.

The gradual acceptance by the Malay community of lay education owed something to its accommodation with the traditional, cherished practice of instructing adolescents in the basic tenets of Islam. This had been the only formal education before 1874 and it was 'accompanied by much elaborate ceremonial.' The pupil's father held a feast and delivered his son to the teacher 'with a sleeping mat and pillow, a cooking pot and a sack of rice.' The pupil resided with the teacher and attended three lessons of an hour's duration during the day. He learnt by heart various formulae and enough of the Arabic alphabet to enable him to read passages from the Koran, written prayers etc., although his understanding, if any, was likely to be limited. He was expected to make himself useful in the house and fields of the teacher as part payment for his instruction. The teacher might have learnt a good

deal, by committing to memory the lectures of learned men whom he had met during a pilgrimage to Mecca. But both teacher and pupil in Malaya were likely to be illiterate, and so exposition of doctrine etc. was very limited.

The advent of vernacular lay schools in the villages prompted some reformers, already aware of the limited usefulness of the religious instruction described above, to establish religious schools (*madrasah*) on similar lines. Thus the first vernacular school in the Bernam district of Selangor had been opened at Sabak Bernam in 1895, and a *madrasah* was established there ten years later in 1905. However there was a lack of human (qualified teachers) and material resources which inhibited the development of schools of this kind, in western Malaya at least. Moreover from the beginning of lay vernacular education in the 1870's, it had been government policy to include in the curriculum, as an inducement to parents to send their children to these new-fangled institutions, some instruction in reading the Koran. The Malay schoolmaster held these 'Koran classes' in the afternoon. In 1894, however, the Selangor Malay schools introduced a practice which had been pioneered in Perak (this was but one example of the useful cooperation between the Inspectors of Schools of the two states (Collinge and Haines) over common problems of Malay education). The change was a move of the 'Koran classes' into the morning school sessions, with other subjects, though the teaching was now to be given by traditional teachers. By 1896 the Selangor Education Department had 17 part-time Koran teachers in its employ. It was found that this arrangement was a further inducement to higher enrolment and better attendance.

Another helpful factor was the interest shown by members of the Selangor ruling dynasty. Something has been said (Chapter 9) of the active interest in Malay education, both for boys and girls, shown by Raja Muda (from 1898 Sultan) Sulaiman. He was a man of much piety, with an interest in religious questions. When, for example, the Inspector of Schools visited Kuala Langat in 1892 he found that the Raja Muda had compiled a short catechism from the Koran for classroom use. When the State Council discussed and approved the proposal to make attendance at Malay schools compulsory, both Raja Bot and Raja Laut, gave it their influential support. Before Rev.Haines arrived on the education scene in 1890, Raja Bot had for a time acted as honorary Inspector of Schools, making his inspections and writing his reports in a fashion which gave satisfaction to W.E.Maxwell, as Resident (1889-1892) -- a result not easily achieved in any branch of the state service.

The early years of this century saw the publication of Malay newspapers, notably *Al-Imam*, which raised all sorts of questions of religious doctrine and social conduct, and generally advocated a conscious Malay effort (*perjuangan*) at self-improvement, with outspoken criticism of rulers who failed to set an example to their subjects. These papers, published in Singapore, circulated in Selangor and other Malay States. There does not seem to have been any open criticism of Sultan Sulaiman, and no doubt the editors recognised that he deserved praise rather than sharp comment. It may also be that Selangor, with a culturally fragmented Malay population, did not breed reformist criticism of the 'establishment' such as appeared elsewhere.

At a practical level the newspapers with their mild controversy and new perspectives provided reading material for those who had been to school and so could read.

Sources. Basic data from the Selangor annual administration and education reports. See also Bibliography entries for Khoo Kay Kim (1974), Loh Fook Seng (1948), Milner (1994) Mohamed Jani Nain (1980), Roff (1967), Wheeler (1928) and Wilkinson (Archive Material - 1902).

Glossary

adat	custom, tradition
anak	child: *anak raja* person of royal descent
arok	Bugis war dance
astana	see *istana*
atap	palm frond, thatch of woven palm leaves, roof
bahara	measure of weight, approx 400 lbs. (182 kg) see also *pikul* and *kati*
baju	tunic, coat: *baju rantai* coat of chain mail
balai	hall of audience
bangunan	building
becha	rickshaw
belachan	shrimp paste used as a relish
belat	fixed fish-trap: *belat lengkong* a row of fishing stakes across an estuary
benar	true, correct: colloquially 'I agree.'
Bendahara	chief minister in a traditional Malay monarchy; see also *mentri besar*
bongsu	youngest child; also spelt '*busu*'
bunga mas	golden flower, the formal tribute presented to an overlord (typically Siamese)
chukai	tax (esp customs duty); royalty on output paid to a landlord; modern spelling *cukai*
daching	marked rod used as a balance weighing scale
dato	headman: title of respect prefixed to a name; *dato dagang* head man of foreign Malays (*orang dagang*)
daulat	majesty, the supernatural quality which invests a ruler
durian	thorny fruit, succulent but with a pungent smell
dusun	hamlet, orchard of fruit trees
gamelan	set of musical instruments, orchestra
gantang	gallon, measure of volume
gaukang	symbol of unity of a Bugis local community
hadat	Bugis assembly of elders to advise the ruler
hari raya	festival, often the celebration of the end of the Muslim month of fasting or other feast day

haji	title prefixed to the name of a Muslim who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca
hikayat	chronicle, tale, traditional history
imam	leader: the mosque official who leads the prayers, presiding elder
istana	residence of a ruler: also spelt *astana*
isteri	wife: *isteri tua* the senior wife of a ruler
jalan	road, street: often prefixed to the street name, eg *Jalan Ampang* is Ampang street or road
jermal	fixed fishing stakes, in V formation, with a lift at the point of the V
joget	form of dance: dancer - usually a performance by two dancers, of the same or different sexes,keeping in step
kangany	foreman of a gang of South Indian labourers
kanjar	sword used in ceremonial Bugis dance
kapal	decked ship, including European vessels
kati	measure of weight, about 1 1/3 lbs. 100 *kati* make 1 *pikul* and 300 make 1 *bahara*
kebesaran	insignia (with supernatural qualities) of a ruler, regalia
keci	square-rigged sailing vessel
keladi	root crop (*colocasia*)
kerajaan	government of a Malay state, deriving its authority from the ruler (*raja*) as head
kereta	cart, carriage
kiai	prefix to a Javanese name used as a term of respect; cf Malay '*dato*' above
kiblat	direction towards Mecca (marked by a niche on the mosque wall) to which the congregation should face when praying
kinchir	waterwheel, used to lift water or to drive a pump; modern spelling *kincir*
kongsi	partnership or association (Chinese); used loosely by Europeans for secret society or for mineworkers' communal hut
kuala	estuary or junction of a tributary with another larger river: often the first word of a place name
kuku kambing	literally 'goat's foot'; a long-handled, two pronged tool used in planting out *padi* plants
ladang	unfenced jungle clearing made for growing *padi* or other crops; often used in shifting cultivation until the original fertility is exhausted
lampan	tin mining by pulling soil down from the banks into a running stream, which carries away the earth and leaves the heavier ore to be recovered from the bed of the stream
lela	swivel gun
lemah	weak, soft
lombong	pit, cavity: mining by stripping off the soil to expose ore-bearing

	deposits in a shallow pit (usually not exceeding 20' in depth but extending over an ever-widening area); *lombong Siam* is mining by digging a narrow, vertical shaft, and working outwards from the base of the shaft into the ore deposit
mentri	minister: *mentri besar* in a modern Malay state is the executive head of the government, like a prime minister
merantau	to emigrate in search of a living
mimba	lectern, pulpit of a mosque from which the *khatib* (preacher) addresses the congregation
Minangkabau	Sumatran highland community, whose ancient kingdom with its matrilineal social organisation, was an important element in Malay political tradition, especially in Negri Sembilan
mufti	an authority who gives ruling on points of islamic doctrine
mukim	parish: in modern usage an administrative district is subdivided into *mukim* (sub-districts) each under a *penghulu* (q.v.)
negeri	town, city-state: in modern usage a Malay state, eg *Negri Selangor*
nobat	instruments of a royal orchestra, or the players
orang	person: *orang besar* dignitary: *orang dagang* a foreign 'Malay' (not locally born): *orang asing* a non-Malay
padi	rice plant, unhusked rice
palong	trough: the sloping trough raised high on scaffolding to which slurry is pumped from a mine so that, as the mixture flows down the trough, the heavier ore is deposited (and trapped by baffles)
parang	heavy chopper, wider towards the tip (basic agricultural implement)
pawang	magician; in some contexts an expert in some specific field such as prospecting
penggawa	in traditional society an official: in modern usage often an administrator in charge of a district
penghijrahan	flight (eg the Hegira of Muhammad): migration of Indonesians to Malaya
penghulu	headman of a village or local community: in modern usage salaried official in charge of a *mukim* (q.v.)
penjajab	Bugis war vessel, with two masts and sails but with rowers to increase its speed
pengkalan	landing place, wharf: *Pengkalan Batu* a stone jetty (the name given to Klang town)
perahu	undecked vessel, a generic term for many different types: cf. *kapal* (q.v.)
peranakan	Malay by local birth (also '*Jawi peranakan*') commonly used for Malays of mixed Indian Muslim and Malay descent, especially at Penang
perjuangan	struggle, combat, moral self-improvement
pikul	measure of weight, 133 lbs. (100 *katis* q.v.) 3 *pikuls* = 1 *bahara* (q.v.)

raja	ruler, person of royal descent and status: ***raja muda*** a junior or deputy ruler or, sometimes heir apparent: see also Tunku
Rawa	Sumatran tribe: term for Sumatrans other than Minangkabau: includes Mendiling and Batu Bara as sub-groups
rayat	subjects of a ruler, peasantry: also spelt ***raiat*** or ***rakyat***
relau	furnace, smelter (of tin ore)
sabar	patience: a quality which the Bugis were typically supposed to lack
sampan	boat, dinghy
saudagar	merchant: ***saudagar raja*** 'king's merchant' appointed to conduct business for the ***raja***
sawah	swamp or irrigated field for ***padi*** planting
sembah	traditional obeisance, with the hands palms together before the face
sheikh-ul-Islam	head of a state Muslim community
suliwatang	Bugis title corresponding with *Yam Tuan Muda* (q.v.), ie regent
surau	prayerhouse (especially where the lack of a congregation of 40 precludes establishing a mosque): resthouse
tali ayer	irrigation channel
tauchang	queue or 'pigtail' (Chinese)
Temenggong	court official next in status to ***Bendahara*** (q.v.), often army and police chief
tempayan	large jar, for holding water or storing supplies
tob	Siamese vessel of 200 tons burthen
tongkang	barge, lighter, used at sea
Tunku	person of royal descent: title used instead of *Raja* in some Malay states (but not Selangor):more correctly spelt *Tengku*: the *Tengku Ampuan* is the title often given to the consort or principal wife of the ruler
ulama	experts and authorities on islamic law (plural of ***alim***)
undang-undang	laws, traditional written codes of law
wayang	theatre, theatrical performance, actors
Yang di-Pertuan	He who is made lord, the Malay term for the ruler of a state: often abbreviated to *Yam Tuan*: *Raja* denotes a person of royal descent: *Sultan* is an honorific Arabic prefix before the personal name of a Muslim ruler

Sources

Printed Archive Material

(in chronologial order)

Cmd 974 (1847), Commercial Tariffs and Regulations and Trade of the Several States of Europe and America, together with Commercial Treaties between England and Foreign Countries, Part XXII, India, Ceylon and Other Oriental Countries, HC Papers, Vol 61, 1847-48,

IOL BC 2605/163367, pp.45-61, dated 26 September 1854.

Memorandum by T Braddell on Sir Andrew Clarke's visit to Selangor in February 1874, enclosure 3 with SSD 24 February 1874 (*Cmd 1111*), 'Continuation of Report on the Proceedings of Government relating to the Native States in the Malayan Peninsula',

Report of Her Britannic Majesty's Acting Assistant Resident at Salangore', dated 8 April 1875, enclosed with SSD 27 April 1875 (printed in *Cmd 1320* of 1875).

Cmd 1111 (1874). *Correspondence relating to the Affairs of certain Native States in the Malay Peninsula.*

Cmd 1320 (1875). *Further Correspondence relating to the Affairs of certain Native States in the Malay Peninsula,* includes Swettenham's report of 8 April 1875 (v.s) and report dated 22 February 1875 by J.G.Davidson.

Cmd 1505 (1876). *Further Correspondence relating to the Affairs of certain Native States in the Malay Peninsul,* includes report by J.G.Davidson dated 27 October 1875.

Cmd 2410 (1879). *Instructions to the British Resident and Other Papers relating to the Protected Malay States.*

Cmd 3095 (1881). *Papers relating to the Protected Malay States,* includes Swettenham's audit reports on Selangor for 1879 and 1880, and *AR Selangor 1879.*

Cmd 3285 (1882),*Cmd 3428* (1882), and *Cmd 1429* (1882). *Correspondence respecting Slavery in the Protected Malay States. Cmd 3428* also includes *AR Selangor 1881.*

AR Selangor 1882-1920 and annual and monthly reports from districts, all (to 1908) published in *SGG* 1890-1908.

'Report of the Resident-General FMS on the Durbar of 1897', enclosed with SSD 20 August 1897, reprinted as *CO Eastern Pamphlet 24A*.

'Reports Furnished by Order of His Excellency the Governor upon the Best Means of Encouraging the Cultivation of Rice in the Malay Peninsula', *Proceedings of the Straits Settlements Legislative Council*, Paper No 6 of 1893.

Cmd 835 (1902).'The Education of Asiatics', (by R.J.Wilkinson), *Special Reports on Educational Subjects.*

Report on the Durbar of 1903, printed in *SGG* 1903, pp.778f.

Proceedings of the FMS Federal Council 1909-1937.

Manual of Statistics Relating to the Federated Malay States 1920, Government Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1921.

Unpublished Archive Material

CO files at PRO especially the CO 273 and CO 717 series.

Selangor Secretariat files at Arkib Negara ('Sel Sec').

Books and Articles

Ali ibni Ahmad, Raja Haji — *Tuhfat-al-Nafis*, translated and annotated by V. Matheson (Hooker) and B.W.Andaya, (as *The Precious Gift*), Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1982.

Allen, D.F. — *Report on the Major Ports of Malaya,* Kuala Lumpur, Government Press, 1951.

Allen, J.de V. — 'Johore 1901-1914 - the Railway Concession' etc, *JMBRAS* 45(2), 1972.

Allen, J.de V. Stockwell. A.J. and Wright, L.R. (eds.) — *A Collection of Treaties and Other Documents affecting the States of Malaysia 1761-1963*, 2 vols., New York, Oceana Publications, 1981.

Aminudin bin Baki — 'The Institution of Debt Slavery in Perak', *Peninjau Sejarah* 1(1), 1966.

Andaya, B.W. 'The Installation of the First Sultan of Selangor'. *JMBRAS* 47(1), 1974.

'The Indian "Saudagar Raja" in Traditional Malay Courts'. *JMBRAS* 51(1), 1978.

Perak, the Abode of Grace - A Study of an Eighteenth Century Malay State, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1979.

Andaya, B.W. and Matheson (Hooker) V.G. 'Islamic Thought and Malay Tradition: the Writings of Raja Ali Haji of Riau (ca.1809-ca.1870),' A.J.S.Reid. and D.Marr (eds.), *Perceptions of the Past in Southeast Asia*, Singapore, SAA/Heinemann, 1979.

Andaya, L.W. *The Kingdom of Johor 1641-1728*, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1975.

'The Nature of Kingship in Bone', A.J.S.Reid and L.Castles, (eds.), *Pre-Colonial State Systems in Southeast Asia*, MBRAS Monograph No 6, 1979.

'The Bugis-Makassar Diaspora', *JMBRAS* 68(1), 1995.

Anderson,J. *Considerations Relative to the Malayan Peninsula* etc., Penang, Government Press, 1824, reprinted in *JMBRAS* 35(4), 1965, with an Introduction by J.S.Bastin.

Anon. 'H. H. Sultan Abdul Samad K.C.M.G. at Home', *SJ* 1, 1892-1893.

'The Selangor Club', *SJ* 1, 1892.

'The late Towkay Ah Yeok,' *SJ* 1, 1892.

'Fishing in Kuala Selangor,' *SJ* 1, 1893.

'The Public Gardens', *SJ* 2, 1893.

'Coffee Planting' by 'Planter', *SJ* 3, 1894-95.

'The T'ung Shin Institution', *SJ* 4, 1895-1896.

'The Pauper Hospital Kuala Lumpur', *SJ* 4, 1895-1896.

'The Opening of the Water Works,' *SJ* 4, 1896.

'Jugra Revisited'. *Malay Mail* 18 May 1897.

Report of the Proceedings of a Meeting held on 6 January 1924, probably privately printed.

Obituary of Dr E. A. O. Travers, *The Times*, 22 November 1934.

Article on Sultan Sulaiman, *Singapore Sunday Times*, 9 September 1934.

Hikayat Pahang, (c.1932) ed. Kalthum Jeran, Petaling Jaya, Penerbit Fajar Bakti, 1986.

Arasaratnam, S. *Indians in Malaya and Singapore*, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, revised 1979.

Barlow, C. *The Natural Rubber Industry* etc. Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1978.

Barlow, H.S. *Swettenham*, Southdene, Kuala Lumpur, 1995.

Barlow, H.S., Enoch, I. and Russell, R.A. *MacMillan's Tropical Planting and Gardening*, revised 1966, Kuala Lumpur, Malayan Nature Society, 1991.

Bassett, D.K. 'Anglo-Malay Relations 1786-1795', *JMBRAS* 38(2),1965.

Bauer, P.T. *The Rubber Industry: A Study of Competition and Monopoly*, London, Longmans Green, 1948.

Baxendale, C. 'The Plantation Rubber Industry,' *Agricultural Bulletin of the Federated Malay States* 1(5), 1912.

Personalities of Old Malaya, Penang, Pinang Gazette Press, 1930.

Begbie, P.J. *The Malayan Peninsula* etc., Madras, Vepery Mission Press,1834, reprinted Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1967.

Birch, E.W. 'The Vernacular Press in the Straits', *JSBRAS* 4, 1879.

Birch.J.W.W. *The Journals of J.W.W.Birch First British Resident to Perak 1874-1875*, ed. P.L.Burns, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1976.

Bird,I. (Mrs Bishop) *The Golden Chersonese and the Way Thither*, London, Murray, 1883.

Blain, W. *Home is the Sailor - the Sea Life of William Brown*, Master Mariner and Penang Pilot, London, Hurst & Blackett, 1940,

Bot, Raja. 'Rice Cultivation in the States: An Interesting Letter from Raja Bot', *Malay Mail*, 14 November 1902, reprinted in *Peninjau Sejarah*, 1(2), 1966.

Blythe, W. L. *The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies* etc, London, Oxford University Press, 1969.

Brown, Mrs. E. Stratton 'Looking Back at Selangor in the Nineties', *50 Years of Progress' 1904-1954, Malay Mail* Supplement, 1954.

Buckley, C.B. *An Anecdotal History of Old Times in Singapore*, 2 vols. Singapore, Fraser &Neave, 1902, reprinted Kuala Lumpur, University of Malaya Press, 1965, and Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1984.

Bulley, A. — *Free Mariner - John Adolphus Pope in the East Indies 1786-1821*, London, British Association for Cemeteries in South Asia, 1992.

Burkill, I.H. — *A Dictionary of the Economic Products of the Malay Peninsula*, 2 vols., London, Crown Agents (for SS and FMS Govts), 1935, revised edition, Kuala Lumpur, Ministry of Agriculture, 1966.

Burney, H. — *Burney Papers*, reprinted from the originals in the Oriental and India Office Collections, Bangkok, Vagirana National Library, 1910-1914, 5 vols., with an Introduction by D.K.Wyatt, Farnborough, Gregg International Publishers, 1971.

Butcher, J.G. — *The British in Malaya 1880-1941: The Social History of a European Community in Colonial South-East Asia*, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1979.

'Revenue Farming and the Changing State in Southeast Asia' and 'Loke Yew', in J.G.Butcher and H.Dick (eds.) *The Rise and Fall of Revenue Farming: Business Elites and the Emergence of the Modern State in Southeast Asia*, New York, MacMillan, 1993.

Buyong Adil, Haji — *Sejarah Selangor*, Kuala Lumpur, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1971.

Byron, F.E. — 'Beri Beri', *The Institute for Medical Research 1900-1950*, Kuala Lumpur, Government Press, 1951.

Carlyle, E.I. — Entry on Sir William Maxwell, *Dictionary of National Biography*, 1897.

Cavenagh, O. — *Reminiscences of an Indian Official*, London, W. H. Allen & Co, 1884.

Chai Hon-Chan — *The Development of British Malaya 1896-1910*, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1964.

Cheng Siok Hwa, — 'The Rice Industry of Malaya: A Historical Survey', *JMBRAS* 42(2), 1969.

Chin, V. and Hoffmann, C. — *Kuala Lumpur Chinatown I, A Walking Tour*, Kuala Lumpur, 1995.

Clague, P. — *John Russell 1855-1930: A tale of early days in the Malay States*, Kuala Lumpur,T.B.Russell, 1993.

Clifford, H.C. — 'The Experiences of Raja Haji Hamid', *In Court and Kampong* etc, London, Richards, 1897, reprinted 1927 with an 'Autobiographical Preface'.

'A Daughter of the Muhammadans', *In a Corner of Asia*, London, Fisher Unwin, 1899.

'Cholera on a Chinese Junk', *Malayan Monochromes*, London, Murray, 1913.

'The Were Tiger', *The Further Side of Silence*, New York, Doubleday, Page & Co., 1927.

Clodd, H.P. *Malaya's First British Pioneer - The Life of Francis Light*, London, Luzac,1948.

Cobden Ramsay, A.B. 'Indonesians in Malaya', *JMBRAS* 29(1), 1956.

Cowan, C.D. 'Governor Bannerman and the Penang Tin Scheme 1818-1819', *JMBRAS* 23(1), 1950.

'Early Penang and the Rise of Singapore, 1805-32,' *JMBRAS* 23 (2), 1950.

Nineteenth Century Malaya: the Origins of British Political Control, London, Oxford University Press, 1961.

Crawfurd, J. *Journal of an Embassy...to the Courts of Siam and Indo-China*, London, Henry Colburn, 1828, reprinted with an introduction by D.K.Wyatt, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1987.

Daly, D.D. 'Surveys and Explorations in the Native States of the Malayan Peninsula 1875-1882,' *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society*, 1882.

del Tufo, M.V. *Federation of Malaya and Colony of Singapore* M.V. - *A Report on the 1947 Census of Population,* Crown Agents, London, 1949.

Drabble, J.H. *Rubber in Malaya 1876-1922 The Genesis of* J.H. *the Industry*, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1973.

Malayan Rubber - the Inter-War Years, London, MacMillan, 1991.

Elphick, P. *Singapore: The Pregnable City: A Study in Deception, Discord and Desertion*, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1995.

Emerson, R. *Malaysia: A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule,* London, MacMillan, London, 1967.

Fauconnier, H. *The Soul of Malaya*, translated from the French by E. Sutton, Elkin, Mathew and Marrot, London, 1931.

Federated Malay States Railways *Fifty Years of Railways in Malaya 1885-1935,* Kuala Lumpur, Federated Malay States Railways, 1935.

Figgart, D.M. *The Plantation Rubber Industry in the Middle East*, Washington, US Dept of Commerce, 1925.

Gammans, L.D. 'The State of Lukut', *JMBRAS* 2(2), 1924.

Grist, D.H. *An Outline of Malayan Agriculture*, Kuala Lumpur, Dept of Agriculture, 1936.

Gullick, J.M. 'A Careless, Heathen Philosopher?' *JMBRAS* 26(1), 1953, rewritten and published in *Glimpses of Selangor*, MBRAS Monograph No 25, 1993.

'The Entrepreneur in Late 19th Century Malay Peasant Society,' *JMBRAS* 58(1), 1985.

'Kuala Lumpur 1880-1895', *JMBRAS*, 26(4), 1955, reprinted Kuala Lumpur, Heritage of Malaysia Trust, 1988.

Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya, Athlone Press, London, 1958 (revised edition 1988).

'Selangor 1876-1882: The Bloomfield Douglas Diary', *JMBRAS* 48(2), 1975, revised in *Glimpses of Selangor*, MBRAS Monograph No 25, 1993.

'Syers and the Selangor Police 1875-1897, *JMBRAS* 51(2), 1978, revised in *Glimpses of Selangor*, MBRAS Monograph No 25, 1993.

The Story of Kuala Lumpur (1857-1939), Singapore, Eastern Universities Press, 1983.

'Kedah 1821-1855: Years of Exile and Return', *JMBRAS* 56(2). 1983.

'Kedah in the Reign of Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin II 1854-1879', *JMBRAS* 58(2), 1985.

'Tunku Kudin in Selangor 1868-1878'. *JMBRAS* 59(2), 1986, revised in *Glimpses of Selangor*, MBRAS Monograph No 25, 1993.

Malay Society in the late Nineteenth Century-the Beginnings of Change, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1987.

'Tunku Kudin of Kedah', *JMBRAS*, 60(2), 1987.

'W.W.Skeat and Malayan Ethnography - an Appreciation,' *JMBRAS* 61(1), 1988.

'The Growth of Kuala Lumpur and the Malay Community in Selangor before 1880', *JMBRAS* 63(1), 1990.

'William Maxwell and the Study of Malay Society,' *JMBRAS* 64(2), 1991.

Rulers and Residents - Influence and Power Malay States 1870-1920, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1992.

They Came to Malaya - A Travellers' Anthology, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1993.

'The Bangunan Sultan Abdul Samad', *JMBRAS* 65(1), 1992.

Glimpses of Selangor 1866--1898, MBRAS Monograph No 25, 1993.

Old Kuala Lumpur, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1994.

'The Kuala Langat Piracy Trial,' *JMBRAS* 69(2), 1996.

Hall, D.G E. *Henry Burney - A Political Biography*, London, Oxford University Press,1974.

A History of South-East Asia, London, MacMillan, 4th ed. 1981.

Han Suyin. *And the Rain my Drink*, London, Cape, 1956.

Hands, J. 'Malay Agricultural Settlement, Kuala Lumpur', *MHJ* 2(2), 1955.

Harrison, C.C.W.(ed.) *An Illustrated Guide to the Federated Malay States*, London Malay States Development Agency, 1911, 1923 edition reprinted Singapore, Oxford,University Press, 1985.

Hawkins, G. 'The Man who Built Bentong', J.Gullick and G.Hawkins,*Malayan Pioneers*, Singapore, Universities Press, 1958.

Hawkins, G. and Thaddeus, W.S. (eds) *Rotary International Jubilee 1905-1955*, Kuala Lumpur Rotary Club, 1955.

Hill, R.D. *Rice in Malaya: A Study in Historical Geography,* Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1977.

Hornaday, *Two Years in the Jungle: the Experiences of a Hunter and Naturalist in India, Ceylon, the Malay Peninsula and Borneo*, New York, Scribner's Sons, 1885, partially reprinted as *The Experiences of a Hunter and Naturalist in the Malay Peninsula and Borneo*, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1993.

Hume, E.D. *The Globular Jottings of Griselda*, Edinburgh, William Blackwood & Sons, 1907.

Hurgronje. C.S. *Mekka in the Latter part of the 19th Century,* translated by J.H. Monahan, Leiden, Brill, 1931.

Innes, E. *The Chersonese with the Gilding Off*, 2 vols., London, Richard Bentley & Sons, 1885, reprinted Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1 vol, 1974 and 1993.

Innes, J. 'Selangor Past and Present', *SJ* 3, 1894.

Institute of Medical Research — *The Institute of Medical Research 1900-1950,* Kuala Lumpur, Government Press, 1950.

Jackson, J.C. — 'Kuala Lumpur in the 1880: The Contribution of Bloomfield Douglas', *JSEAH* 4(2), 1963.

Planters and Speculators - Chinese and European Agricultural Enterprise in Malaya 1786-1921, Kuala Lumpur, University of Malaya Press, 1968.

Jain, R.K. — *South Indians on the Plantation Frontier in Malaya*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1970.

Kahn, J.S. — 'Patrick Sullivan, Social Relations of Dependence in a Malay State: Nineteenth Century Perak', *Kajian Malaysia*, 2(1), 1984.

Kaur, Amarjit — *Bridge and Barrier, Transport and Communications in Colonial Malaya 1870-1957,* Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1985.

Keyser, A.L. — *People and Places: A Life in Five Continents*, London, Murray, 1922.

Trifles and Travels, London, Murray, 1923.

Khasnor. Johan — *The Emergence of the Modern Malay Administrative Elite*, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1984.

Khazin Mohamed Tamrin — *Orang Jawa di-Selangor - Penghijrahan dan Penempatan 1880-1940,* Kuala Lumpur, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1984,

Khoo Kay Kim. — 'Biographical sketches of certain Straits Chinese involved in the Klang war 1867-1874', *Peninjau Sejarah* 2(2), 1967.

The Western Malay States 1850-1873, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1972.

'Malay Society 1874-1920's', *JSEAS* 5(2), 1974.

'Raja Lumu/Sultan Salehuddin - the Founding of the Selangor Dynasty', *JMBRAS* 58(2), 1985.

Malay Society - Transformation and Democratization - The Demise of the Traditional Entrepot, Petaling Jaya, Pelanduk Publications, 1991.

Kobkua Suwannathat Pian — *Thai-Malay Relations: Traditional Intra--regional Relations from the Seventeenth to the Early Twentieth Centuries*, Singapore, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1988.

'Thrones, Claims, Claimants, Rulers and Rules', *JMBRAS* 66(2), 1993.

Kratoska, P.H. "Ends that we cannot foresee"; Malay Reservations in British Malaya', *JSEAS* 14(1), 1983.

'Patrick Sullivan, Social Relations of Dependence in a Malay State: Nineteenth Century Perak', *Kajian Malaysia* 2(1), 1984.

Kratz, E.U. 'The Light Letters 1786-1794', A.T.Gallop, *The Legacy of the Malay Letter*, London, British Library (for Arkib Negara), 1994.

Kynnersley C.W.S. 'In Memoriam - Sir William Maxwell,' *JSBRAS* 32, 1899.

Kyshe, J.W N. *Cases heard and determined in H M Supreme Court of the Straits Settlements 1808-1884,* 4 vols., 1885.

Lau, A. *The Malayan Union Controversy 1942-1948*, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1991,

Lee Kam Hing *The Sultanate of Aceh: Relations with the British 1760-1820*, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1995.

Lewis, D. 'The Growth of the Country Trade to the Straits of Malacca,' *JMBRAS* 43(2), 1970.

Jan Compagnie in the Straits of Malacca 1641-1795, Athens Ohio, Ohio University Press, 1995.

Lim, J.H.S. 'Shophouse Rafflesia', *JMBRAS* 66(1), 1993.

Lim Teck Ghee *Malay Peasants and Their Agricultural Economy in Colonial Malaya 1874-1941*, Kuala Lumpur,Oxford University Press, 1977.

Linehan, W. 'A History of Pahang', *JMBRAS* 14(2), 1936, reprinted in *A History of Pahang*, MBRAS Reprint, 1973.

Loh Fook Seng, P. 'The British Approach to Slavery in the the Straits Settlements and the Malay States 1819 to 1910', *JHSUM* 3, 1964-65.

The Malay States 1877-1895, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1969.

Seeds of Separatism: Educational Policy in Malaya 1874-1940, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1978.

Loh Kok Wah, F. *Beyond the Tin Mines: Coolies, Squatters and New Villages in the Kinta Valley, Malaysia, 1880-1980*, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1988.

McDougall, H. *Sketches of Our Life at Sarawak*, London, Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1882, reprinted Singapore Oxford University Press, 1992.

McGee, T.G. *The Urbanizarion Process in the Third World: Explorations in Search of a Theory*, London, G.Bell & Sons,1971.

Mcnair, J.F.A. *Perak and the Malays*, London, Tinsley Bros, 1878, reprinted Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1972.

Makepeace, W. Brooke, G.E. Braddell, R. *One Hundred Years of Singapore being Some Account of he Capital of the Straits*Settlements...to the 6th February 1919, 2 vols., and London, Murray, 1921, reprinted Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1991.

Marsden, W. *A Dictionary and Grammar of the Malay Language*, 2 vols., London, Cox and Baylis, 1812, reprinted Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1984.

Marsh, M. *Hard Scrabble: Memoirs of Malaysia 1910-1960*, probably printed for private circulation, 1966.

Maxwell, P.B. *Our Malay Conquests*, London, King, 1878.

Maxwell, W.E. 'The Law Relating to Slavery Among the Malays', *JSBRAS* 22, 1890.

Middlebrook, S.M. 'Yap Ah Loy (1837-1885),' *JMBRAS* 24(2). 1951, MBRAS Reprint No 9.

Mills, L.A. 'British Malaya 1824-1867', *JMBRAS* 3(2), 1925,reprinted with additions by C.M. Turnbull and D.K.Bassett, *JMBRAS* 33(3), 1960.

British Rule in Eastern Asia etc., London, Oxford University Press, 1942.

Milner, A.C. *Kerajaan - Malay Political Culture on the Eve of Colonial Rule*, Tucson, University of Arizona Press, 1982.

'Colonial Records History: British Malaya', *Kajian Malaysia* 4(2), 1986.

The Invention of Politics in Colonial Malaya, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Mohamed Amin Hassan 'Raja Musa ibni Sultan Abdul Samad,' *Peninjau Sejarah* 1(1), 1966.

'Raja Mahdi bin Raja Sulaiman', *Peninjau Sejarah* 1(2), 1966.

'Raja Bot bin Raja Jumaat', *JMBRAS* 40(2), 1967.

Mohamed Amin bin Mohamed Said, Wan *Pesaka Selangor*, ed. Abdul Samad Ahmad, Kuala Lumpur, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Rumi ed. 1966 (Jawi 1937).

Mohamed Ibrahim bin Abdullah, Munshi	*The Voyages of Mohamed Ibrahim Munshi* translated by A.Sweeney and N.Phillips, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1975.
Mohamed Jani Nain	'Sekolah Agama Rakyat di Sabak Bernam', in Khoo Kay Kim and ors (eds.), *Islam di-Malaysia*, Kuala Lumpur, Malay Historical Association, 1980.
Mon bin Jamaluddin	*A History of Port Swettenham*, Singapore, Malaya Publishing House, 1963.
Morrah, P.	'The History of the Malayan Police,' *JMBRAS* 36(2), 1963.
Newbold, T. J.	*Political and Statistical Account of the British Settlements of the Straits of Malacca* etc. 2 vols., London, Murray, 1839, reprinted Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1971.
Onraet, R.	*Singapore: A Police Background,* London, Crisp, 1947.
Parkinson, C.N.	*British Intervention in Malaya 1867-1877*, Singapore, University of Malaya Press, 1960.
Parmer, J.N.	'Chinese Estate Workers' Strikes in Malaya in March 1937', in C.D.Cowan (ed), *The Economic Development of South-East Asia: Studies in Economic History and Political Economy*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1964.
Pasqual, J.C.	'Chinese Tin Mining in Selangor' (a series of articles in *SJ* 4 1895-1896).
	Article on Selangor History, *Singapore Sunday Times* of 14 October 1934.
Paxon, H.C.	'Some Notes on Kuala Lumpur Water Supply', *SJ* 2, 1893.
Pertubuhan Akitek Malaysia	*Guide to Kuala Lumpur Notable Buildings*, Kuala Lumpur, 1974.
Purcell, V.	*The Chinese in Malaya*, London, Oxford University Press, 1948.
	The Chinese in Southeast Asia, London, Oxford University Press, London, 2nd edition, 1965.
Rathborne, A.B.	*Camping and Tramping in Malaya*, London, Swan Sonnenschein, 1898, reprinted Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1984.
Reid, J.A.	'Malaria', *The Institute for Medical Research 1900-1950*, Kuala Lumpur, Government Press, 1951.
Robson, J.H.M.	*People in a Native State*, Singapore, Singapore Free Press, 1894.

Records and Recollections 1889-1934, Kuala Lumpur, Kyle Palmer, 1934.

Roff, W.R. *The Origins of Malay Nationalism*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1967, revised Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1994.

'The Persatuan Melayu Selangor: an Early Malay Political Association'. *JSEAH* 9(1), 1968.

Russell, D.O. 'The Business Romance of J.A.Russell,' *50 Years of Progress 1904-1954. Malay Mail* Supplement, 1954.

Sadka, E. 'The State Councils in Perak and Selangor 1877-1895', K.G. Tregonning (ed.), *Papers on Malayan History*, Singapore, Journal of South East Asian History, 1962.

The Protected Malay States 1874-1895, Kuala Lumpur, University of Malaya Press, 1968.

Sandhu, K.S. 'The Saga of the Malayan Squatter', *JSEAS* 5(1), 1964.

'Chinese Colonization in Melaka', K.S.Sandhu and P.Wheatley, eds., *Melaka - The Transformation of a Malay Capital c.1400-1980*, 2 vols., Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1983.

Selangor Golf Club *Twelve Under Fours - an informal History of the Club*, printed for private circulation, Kuala Lumpur, 1953.

Selangor Planters Association Minutes and Annual Reports, *SJ* 2-5, 1893-1897.

Sharom Ahmat 'American Trade with Singapore 1819-1865', *JMBRAS* 38(2), 1965.

'Joseph B. Balestier: The First American Consul in Singapore 1833-1852', *JMBRAS* 39(2), 1966.

Sheppard, M. *Taman Saujana - Dance, Drama, Music and Magic in Malaya, Long and Not-so-Long Ago,* Petaling Jaya, International Book Service, 1985.

Sidhu, J.S. *Administration in the Federated Malay States 1896-1920*, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1980.

Sidney, R.J.H. *In British Malaya Today*, London, Hutchinson, n.d.

Skeat, W.W. 'Traditions of Ulu Langat', *SJ* 5, 1896-97.

Malay Magic etc. London, MacMillan, 1900, reprinted Singapore Oxford University Press, 1984.

Skeat, W.W. and Blagden, C.O. — *Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula*, 2 vols., London, MacMillan, 1906, reprinted Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press. 1995.

Smith, S.C. — *British Relations with the Malay Rulers from Decentralization to Malayan Independence 1930-1957*, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1995.

Stenson, M.R. — *Industrial Conflict in Malaya: Prelude to the Communist Revolt of 1948*, London, Oxford University Press 1970.

Stevenson, R. — 'Cinema and Censorship in Colonial Malaya', *JSEAS* 5(2), 1974.

Cultivators and Administrators - British Educational Policy towards the Malays 1875-1906, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1975.

Sulaiman, H.H.Sultan — 'Royal Recollections - an Extract from a Talk given by H.R.H.Sultan Sulaiman of Selangor to the Rotary Club of Kuala Lumpur in 1936,' *MIH* 12(2), 1969.

Sullivan, P. — *Social Relations of Dependence in a Malay State: Nineteenth Century Perak*, MBRAS Monograph No 10, 1982.

'Social Relations of Dependence -- A Reply to Kratoska and Kahn', *Kajian Malaysia*, 2(1), 1984.

Swettenham, F.A. — 'Some Account of the Independent Native States,' *JSBRAS* 6, 1880.

About Perak, Singapore Straits Times, 1890.

The Real Malay - Pen Pictures, London, John Lane Bodley Head, 1900.

British Malaya, etc., London, John Lane Bodley Head, 1906, revised London, George Allen & Unwin, 1948.

Footprints in Malaya, London, Hutchinson, 1942.

Sir Frank Swettenham's Malayan Journals 1874-1876, edited by P.L.Burns and C.D.Cowan, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1975.

Tarling, N. — *Piracy and Politics in the Malay World* etc., Kraus Reprint, Liechtenstein, 1978.

Tate, D.J.M. — *The Lake Club 1890-1990*, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1990.

The RGA History of the Plantation Industry in the Malay Peninsula, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1996.

Teeuw A.and Wyatt, D.K. — *Hikayat Patani - the Story of Patani*, The Hague, M.Nijhoff, 1970.

Thio, E. — *British Policy in the Malay Peninsula 1880-1910*, vol.1, Singapore, University of Malaya Press, 1969.

Tickell, G.T. — 'Early Days at Kuala Kangsar, 'Early Days in Selangor', 'Early Perak Days,' *British Malaya*, 1927-1928.

Toynbee, EA. — 'Coffee', *SJ* 2, 1893.

Treacher, W.H. — 'Notes of the Resident's Visits to Districts in 1894', *SJ* 2, 1893-1894, reprinted from *SGG* 1894.

Tregonning, K.G. — *The British in Malaya*, Tucson, University of Arizona Press, 1965.

Home Port Singapore: A History of the Straits Steamship Company 1890-1965 Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1967.

Tsou, Pao-Chun — *Urban Landscape of Kuala Lumpur: A Geographical Survey*, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asia, Nanyang University, 1967.

Turnbull, C.M. — *The Straits Settlements 1826-1867 - Indian Presidency to Crown Colony*, Athlone Press, London, 1972.

'Melaka under British Colonial Rule', K.S. Sandhu and P. Wheatley (eds.), *Melaka - the Transformation of a Malay Capital c.1400-1980*, 2 vols., Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1983.

Turney C.H.A. — 'From Kuala to Ulu Selangor in 1882', *SJ* 3, 1894.

Vaughan, J.D. — *The Manners and Customs of the Chinese of the Straits Settlements*, Singapore, Mission Press, 1879, reprinted Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1971.

Vetch, R.H. — *Life of Lieutenant-General Sir Andrew Clarke*, London, Murray, 1905.

Vlieland, C.A. — *British Malaya - A Report on the 1931 Census* etc., London, Crown Agents, 1932.

Vredenbregt J.J. — 'The Haddj: Some of its Features and Functions in Indonesia', *BKI* 118, 1962.

Warren, J.F. — *Rickshaw Coolie: A People's History of Singapore (1880-1940)*, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1986.

Ah Ku and Karayuki-San -- Prostitution in Singapore 1870--1940, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1993.

Watson, M. — *The Prevention of Malaria in the Federated Malay States*, London, Murray, 2nd ed, 1921.

Wheeler, L.R. *The Modern Malay*, London, Allen & Unwin,1928.

Wilkinson, R.J. 'A History of the Peninsular Malays' etc., *Papers on Malay Subjects,* History Part 1, Kuala Lumpur, Government Press, 1908, reprinted in R.J.Wilkinson, *Papers on Malay Subjects*, edited by P.L.Burns, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1971.

Malay-English Dictionary - Romanised, 2 parts, Mytilene Salavopoulos and Kinderlis, 1932.

Wilson, P.J. *A Malay Village and Malaysia*, New Haven, HRAF Press, 1967.

Winstedt. R. O. 'A History of Selangor', *JMBRAS* 12(3), 1934.

'Negri Sembilan: The History, Polity and Beliefs of Nine States', *JMBRAS* 12(3), 1934.

The Malays: A Cultural History, Singapore, Kelly & Walsh, 1947.

Entry on Sir Frank Swettenham in *Dictionary of National Biography*, 1947.

Start from Alif, Count from One - An Autobiographical Memoire, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1969.

Winstedt, R.O. and Wilkinson. R.J. 'A History of Perak', *JMBRAS* 12(1), 1934, reprinted in *A History of Perak*, MBRAS Reprint No 3, 1974.

Wong, D.S.Y. *Tenure and Land Dealings in the Malay States*, Singapore, Singapore University Press, 1975.

Wong Lin Ken, *The Malayan Tin Industry to 1914*, Tucson, University of Arizona Press, 1965.

Wright A., and Cartwright. H.A.. *Twentieth Century Impressions of British Malaya*, London, Lloyds Publishing, 1908.

Yegar, M. 'The Abolition of Servitude in British Malaya', *Israeli Yearbook on Human Rights,* 1975.

Yen Ching-hwang *A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya 1800-1911*, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1986.

Yeo Kim Wah, 'The Selangor Succession Dispute', *JSEAS* 2(2), 1971.

The Politics of Decentralization: Colonial Controversy in Malaya 1920-1929, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1982.

Yip Yat Yoong *The Development of the Tin Mining Industry of Malaya*, Singapore, University of Malaya Press, 1969.

Yong, C.F and Mckenna, C.B. — *The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya 1912-1949*, Singapore, Singapore University Press, 1990.

Zainal Abidin bin Ahmad ('Zaba') — 'Recent Malay Literature', *JMBRAS* 19(1),1941.

Unpublished Private Papers

Birch, E.W. — 'Journal of a Voyage to the Malay Peninsula 1920-21', unpublished autobiography written while returning by sea from a business trip to Malaya. Rhodes House Library MSS Ind Ocn s 242/3.

Douglas, W. Bloomfield — Journal 1876-1882 of his work as Resident of Selangor in those years (copy in Rhodes House Library, Oxford).

Turney, C.H.A. and others — Journal of the Collector Kuala Langat, 1882-1885 (copy as above).

Choo Kia Peng. — 'My Life's Journey', unpublished autobiography c.1953 (copy in Library of the University of Malaya).

Maxim, S. — 'The Resemblance in External Appearance: the Colonial Project in Kuala Lumpur and Rangoon,' Cornell PhD Thesis, 1992 (copy in Library of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London).

Index

Abdullah, Raja, of Langat 37, 187
Abdullah, Raja, of Klang 37, 39, 41, 46n, 49f, 59, 142n, 187
Abdul Samad, Sultan:-
before 1857 21, 37, 41f, 47n, 187
as ruler 4, 49f, 52, 57f, 59f, 67, 76, 92, 102, 107, 115, 130f, 179, 185, 188
personal and economic 37, 40, 45n, 57, 63n, 65n, 83, 92, 102f, 141n, 142n
relations with Raja Sulaiman 133-138
Aceh, 17
Agricultural development, 40, Chapter 7
American miners, 39, 45n
Ampang, 39, 70, 88f
Anderson, John, of Penang, 22, 26, 35
Anson, A E W, 55f
Arfah, Raja, 51, 59, 63n, 134f, 144n. See Kudin, Mahrum
Atap, 104,108,117

Bandar Langat, 38, 42, 70, 133f, 187. See Kuala Langat.
Banking, and credit, 89
Beri-beri, 90, 155, 167n
Berkat, Raja, Tunku Panglima Raja, 77, 92, 97n, 131, 136, 141n, 189
Bernam, 8, 22, 28, 42, 54, 59, 72f, 83n, 92, 187, 189, 194
Birch, J W W, 67
Bot, Raja, 40, 54, 59, 72, 93, 132, 135-139, 177, 194
Boundaries (state), 28, 32n, 81n, 92f, 179
Braddell, T, 56,61n
Britain and SS, relations with, 16f, 19, 27, 33, 41, 67. See Residential system
Brothels, 120
Buffaloes, 108, 113n, 122
Bugis, Chapter 1, 41, 99, 104, 136, 186
Building materials, 70, 117, 121f
Bullock carts, 70, 73, 84f, 102, 116, 133, 157
Busu, Tunku, 35, 44n

Cannon, 17, 70
Carriages, 86, 118, 122, 138
Cheras, 74f
Chiefs, 24, 30n, 77, 111n, 134, 177, 186f
Chinese, 34, 39f, 51, 62n, 132, 150. See Labour, Mining, Secret Societies, Squatters
Choo Kia Peng, 158, 166n, 170n
Chow Ah Yeok, 118, 120, 132
Civil War, 49-56, 67, 70, 130, 179, 187
Clarke, Sir A, 56-58, 67
Clifford, Sir H, 131, 142n, 178
Clubs, 123, 128n, 158
Coconuts, 40, 71, 102-108
Coffee, 102-110, 114n, 148f, 156, 164n
Cooperative Societies, 175
Country traders (English), 12, 16
Crime See Law and Order, Police

Dagang, Dato', 70, 72, 80n, 108, 187
Davidson, J G, 57f, 65n, 67, 71, 79n, 185, 188
Debt-bondage, 30n, 76f, 82n
de Fontaine, 54
Dhiauddin, Tunku. See Kudin
Douglas, B, 73f, 80n, 92, 97n, 130, 134, 185, 188f

Drainage. See Irrigation
Dutch, relations with, 4f, 9f, 16, 18, 26, 186
Education. See Schools
European community. See Race relations
Federated Malay States, 147, 174, 180, 184, 191
Festivals and religion, 122f
Fires, 116f, 122, 162
Fishing, 40, 108f
Floods, 116f
Foodstuffs 100, 104, 120. See Produce, Rice

Haji, Raja, Yam Tuan Muda, 6-10, 14n, 16, 18, 43n
Hill, T H, 89, 109
Hitam, Raja. See Bernam
Hospitals and health, 90f, 96n, 97n, 116f, 161
Hussain, Syed, 18

Ibrahim, Sultan, 6, 8, 13,Chapter 2, 33, 40, 131, 185f
Ijok Cooperative Society, 175
Indians. See Labour, Rubber, Thambusamy Pillai, Tin
Irrigation, and Drainage, 103-108, 113n, 156, 176, 182n
Irving, C J, 55f
Islam, and Mosques, 25f, 101, 130-139, 146n, 190, Appendix 3

Ismail, Raja, 51f, 59

Jafar, Raja, Yam Tuan Muda, 6, 18f
Javanese, 99, 102-106, 167n, 175
Johor Sultanate, 5f, 9
Jugra, inlet, hill and river, 39, 46n, 67
Jumaat, Raja, 35f, 39-43, 49, 51, 72, 187

Kajang, 74f, 82n, 101
Kampong Bahru settlement (Kuala Lumpur), 157
Kanching, 40, 51, 74, 107
Kemboja, Daeng, Yam Tuan Muda, 6-10
Kindersley brothers, 102, 111n, 149
Klang, town and district, 18, 22, 37f, 41f, 51f, 55, 63n, 67, 70f, 84, 115, 134f, 154f, 188
Klang, To Engku, 22, 71, 81n, 104, 134, 137
Kuala Kubu, 74. See Ulu Selangor, Kanching
Kuala Langat, district, 24, 67, 71, 76, 102f, 108, 188. See Bandar Langat
Kuala Lumpur, 39, 46n, 56, 60, 69f, 84, 92, 102, 104, Chapter 8, 132, 148
Kuala Selangor, 1, 22, 37, 42, 46n, 48n, 55f, 60, 67, 72, 74, 76, 107, 115, 130f
Kudin, Tunku (Dhiauddin):-
Personal, 52, 63n, 134-137
Political, 52-60, 63n, 67, 72, 74, 76, 78, 92, 115, 188 See also Arfah and Mahrum

Labour, immigrant, 150, 153, 155, 162, 174. See Chinese
Ladang See Land, Rice
Lake Gardens, 118, 120, 127n, 148
Land system, 86f, 94n, 95n, 100, 102, 111n, 155f, 164n, 168n, 189f
Laut, Raja, 42, 78, 136f, 175, 189, 194
Law and Order, 68-71, 116, 126n, 157f, 175, 188
Lawyers, and legal system, 161, 171n, 189
Light, F, 13, 16
Linggi, river and estuary, 7, 15n, 24, 36, 40, 73, 92
Loke Yew, 150f, 158f
Lombong Siam, 34, 88, 151. See Mining
Lukut, 22, 24, 35f, 41f, 54, 72, 77, 93, 136
Lumu, Raja See Salehuddin, Sultan

Macpherson, R, 36, 43, 45n
McNair, J F A, 56
Mahdi, Raja, 41, 49-56, 59, 67, 91, 130, 179, 187
Mahmud, Raja, ibni Sultan Mohamed, 41f, 141n, 187
Mahmud, Raja, bin Tunku Panglima Raja, 54, 64n, 67, 77, 79n, 107, 130, 139, 142n, 175

Mahrum, Tunku Ampuan, 134-137, 144n, 177
Malacca merchants, 35f, 39f, 43, 49, 51, 54f
Malaria, 39, 90, 155, 167n
Malay Reservations, 133, 156, 168n, 175, 181n
Malays. See Agricultural Development, Bugis, Chiefs, Debt-bondage, Islam, Javanese, Kampong Bahru Settlement, Land System, Penghulus, Rice, Selangor Malay Association, Sumatran immigrants
Mandiling. See Sumatran immigrants
Markets See Produce
Mashhor, Syed, 54, 56, 60, 64n, 107, 139, 168n
Mat, Che, of Kelantan, 108
Maxwell, W E, 87, 95n, 132, 180, 184n, 185, 190, 193
Minangkabau See Sumatran immigrants
Mining, 34f, 37, 42, 71, 74, 87f, 89f, 95n, 96n, 106, 150-153. See Tin exports, Trade
Mohamed, Sultan, 33f, 40, 102, 107, 136, 185
Mohamed Ali, Sheikh, 74, 80n, 83n
Mohamed Amin, Wan, 61, 138
Mosques. See Islam
Musa, Raja Muda, 42, 55, 59, 72, 76f, 92, 102f, 107, 131f, 136, 143n, 189
Musa'eddin, Tunku, 135, 140, 177, 179, 182n, 183n
Muskam, Dato', 176

Negri Sembilan, 5, 21f, 24 See Boundaries, Sumatran immigrants, Sungei Ujong
Newspapers, 148, 161, 163n, 194f

Padang (Merdeka Square), 120
Padi. See Rice
Pahang, relations with, 56, 60, 72, 74, 76, 106, 131. See Ulu Selangor
Penang, 9, 16, 18, 26, 51, 89, 103, 137f, 186f
Penghulus, 77f, 92, 101, 103f, 107f, 131, 137, 139, 155, 168, 189 See Chiefs
Perak, relations with, 4, 8, 12, 18, 28, 31n, 138, 174. See Tin exports
Pilgrimage to Mecca, 25, 30n, 139, 148, 194
Piracy, 28, 34, 40f, 55, 57, 65n, 67, 71, 81n, 130
Police, 68, 116, 155, 158, 168n, 170n, 175, 188. See Law and Order

Political activity (1930's) 178f, 183n
Political allowances, 77, 188
Population, 77f, 92, 101, 103f, 107f, 131, 137, 139, 155, 168n, 189
Port Swettenham, 152, 154f, 166n, 167n
Posts and telegraphs, 91
Produce, 13, 73f, 109 See Agricultural development, Rice
Proudlock case, 159-161, 171n

Race relations, 158f,161
Railways, 84, 94n, 104, 106f, 109, 117, 122, 139, 153, 190
Raja Muda, 17, 33, 41f, 52, 130, 136, 140, 141n, 177
Rathborne, A. See Hill, T H
Regalia (kebesaran) 4, 135f, 145n
Rekoh, 39, 74f, 101
Residential system, 67, 71, 76f, 97n, 147, 174, 177, 180, 184n, 188
Riau, 18f, 136. See Bugis
Rice, and padi, 13, 36, 40, 46n, Chapter 7, 133, 156, 169n, 176
Rinaldo, H M S, 55, 60, 72
Roads, 70, 73, 81n, 84, 94n, 102, 106, 118, 122, 190
Robson, J H M, 161, 172n, 193
Rubber, 110, 149f, 153, 156, 162, 169n, 175
Russell, J, 161

Salehuddin, Sultan (Raja Lumu), 7-9, 179, 185f
Sanitary Board (Kuala Lumpur), 118, 127n, 139
Saudagar Raja, 13,15n
Schools, 124, 129n, 132-136, 142n, 148, 190, Appendix 3

Secret societies, 51f, 59f, 158
Selangor Malay Association, 178
Shophouses, 118, 120
Siam, relations with, 27f, 186
Smallholdings, 87, 94n, Chapter 7, 156, 164n, 169n, 175, 181n, See Land system, Malay Reservations, Rice, Rubber
Sootan Puasa, 76, 79n
Sports, 123, 158
Squatters, 175, 181n
State Council, 9, 97n, 131, 139f, 147, 174, 189
Sugar, 102f, 111n
Sulaiman, Sultan, 102f, 113n, 115, 118, Chapter 9, 174, 177, 185, 191, 194
Sumatran immigrants, 21f, 30n, 50, 71, 74, 76, 86, 92, 99, 101, 106, 156, 178f, 187
Sungei Ujong, 35, 67, 73f, 92
Swettenham, F A, 19f, 58, 67, 78n, 92, 97n, 131f, 136, 142n, 180, 184n, 185, 188-190, 193
Syers, H C, 68

Tahir, Haji (Nonggek), 70, 80n, 87, 188
Tanjong Karang, See Irrigation
Taxes, and state revenues, 43, 49, 58, 68, 70, 76, 82n, 89, 151, 153, 158, 188, 190
Thambusamy Pillai, 158f
Tin exports, 8f, 12f, 16, 18f, 21f, 26f, 44n, 62n, 65n, 70, 73, 162. See Mining
Trade, 4, 11f, 16f, 22, 26f, 40, 42, 49, 72, 107, 109, 118, 161f, 186-188
Travers, E A O, 91, 161, 172n

Uda, Raha, 178f, 183n
Ulu Klang, 70, 74, 78
Ulu Langat, 39, 67, 70, 74-76, 101f, 149
Ulu Selangor, 19-21, 29n, 37, 56, 59f, 73-76, 84, 106

Wage labour (Malay), 100-103, 156
Warfare, 10f, 49, 54, 59f, 70, See Civil war
War (1914-1918), 162f, 173n
Water supply, 121

Yahya, Syed, 101
Yakub, Raja, 57, 65n, 72, 81n, 141n
Yam Tuan Muda (Johor), Chapter 1, 18f
Yap Ah Loy, 51f, 55, 59, 68, 70-78, 87f, 117f, 120f, 148, 150, 188
Yap Ah Shak, 78, 83n, 132

Yap Hon Chin, 132
Yap Kwan Seng, 132, 159

Zin, Syed, 71,188